Matt Slick Live: January 23, 2025

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Show Introduction and the Planned Conversation with Dr. Stan Wallace

It's Matt Slick Live! Matt is the founder and president of the Christian Apologetics Research Ministry, found online at calm .org. When you have questions about Bible doctrines, turn to Matt Slick Live for answers.

Taking your calls and responding to your questions at 877 -207 -2276. Here's Matt Slick.

Alright, welcome to the show. Today's date is January 23rd, 2025. And I hope you're going to have a good time listening. The plan, I forgot to mention it, but the plan is to have on a guy we had on before talking about neuroscience, theological neuroscience stuff, which is really an interesting conversation.

He's having a little trouble getting in on the phone to the station, so I don't know what's going on, but he should be able to do that. And we'll just give that a go. It's Dr. Stan Wallace on neurotheology.

We did that, I don't know, about three or four weeks ago, I think it was. It was really interesting. And it was one of those kind of conversations where, are you kidding me? That can't be true, you know.

And for me, it was stuff like that. And so I was working on it, trying to, well, there's a lot of things. As you know, I burn the candle at both ends a lot of times. Trying to figure out what things to do and stuff like that.

So anyway, hey, look, if you want to give me a call, the number is 877 -207 -2276. Hopefully he can get in. So, okay. I don't know if they're having phone issues right now. I'm going to ask. I'm going to type it into the thing here.

You can call him. Oh, okay. Let's see. Let me get, yeah, I can get the number. Here we go. We can call him and try it that way. Yeah, you know, we're just working this. It was a good interview. It was really good before.

And so it should be good again. And I just put the number into the, the producer is going to give him a call. We'll see if we can get all that going.

All right.

Now, we tried to get, I tried to get Clubhouse working. I couldn't get it to work right. I'm probably, probably going to rebuild my computer this weekend. I do it about once a year. It's not hard to do if you know a few tricks.

And I used to be a computer tech. So, you know, you just download a file. You do this. You do that. You restart. You blah, blah, blah. And it reloads the system. And then you just update. So it sounds easy when I say it.

But at any rate, so I'll probably end up doing that this weekend. Because, you know, the system, your computer will just get a little buggy after a while. And for those of you who have a system that's, yeah, just a little buggy, you know, it works.

But just you notice a few things. Then you can do what's called a restoration on your computer too. You can talk to your local tech guy about that and see. So, hey, he's on. He's on. Let's get on with it right now.

And let's get on with Stan. Dr. Stan Wallace, are you there?

I am. Can you hear me?

Yes, I can. Sorry about the mix up there. But, hey, you know, it happens.

No problem. Am I coming through loud and clear?

Yes, you are. You sound good.

Okay, perfect.

Perfect.

So, we had a really good conversation the last time. I really enjoyed it.

We sure did.

What Neurotheology Claims About the Brain, Soul, and Human Identity

Neurotheology. And, you know, I could talk about it because I learned it from you. But, hey, you're the man. So why don't you tell us what it is. We'll get into more of the conversation and we'll just get going again, you know.

Well, sure, sure. So, yeah, just to summarize what we talked about, there's a growing group of Christians who are advancing this idea of neurotheology. They call it the science of spiritual maturity. And it really just assumes our brain and not our soul is where our beliefs are and our choices, our character, and even our very selves.

And I critique in my book two very popular proponents, Jim Wilder and Kirk Thompson. You know, they're men who I don't have, I think, have any impure motives. They want to serve the kingdom. They give very good pastoral advice in their books.

But just a horrible theology of what we are. They're essentially Christian physicalists saying things like, for instance, Wilder says it's brain functions that determine our character and even our human identity.

And Thompson himself says the left hemisphere of the brain sets me apart as me. So those are things that historically in biblical understandings of who we are, what we are, have been functions of the soul.

So I think it's a really, really damaging theology and has wide-ranging implications. And so though I appreciate their pastoral intent and some of the good practical advice they have, ultimately soul care, when they turn around and ground it in the brain, it leads to all that I'm trying to point out.

I'm going to have to write an article on it and I'll do some research, some more, and get your books and stuff like that and go through it. But it seems to me, for my simplistic autistic mind, for me it just breaks down pretty simply that it's, you know, you already said physicalism, which is property dualism, and this hesitates.

Well, it might be. There's two forms. Just to break in, they might be pure physicalists where there are no other properties but physical properties because they're reductive or physicalists per se. They might be property dualists where ultimately the physical thing, the brain, is the source of everything, but it does have these immaterial properties that emote from it such as thoughts or beliefs in the same way that smoke is produced by fire, but it's ultimately dependent on fire for its existence.

So they may be property dualists, kind of smoke-fire idea, but a lot of what they write is a pretty full-blown pure or simple physicalist reductive idea of all you are is your brain.

Okay. I just got to say it. That's harassing. It's really seriously bad, theologically speaking. Let me get to that a little bit. Well, now I'm curious. I'm taking notes. I'm going to take notes from you because I'm going to learn as we're talking.

You're the expert. Maybe I'll even call you when we have time privately. I can just ask you a lot of questions and stuff, but maybe not. Who knows?

Can I say just for the record, I'm a translator, not the expert. There are Christian scholars that have been called to study this issue at a very high academic level, including my mentor J .P. Moreland, and they're the experts, but I'm trying to take what they've written and translate it for the broader thoughtful Christian community, whether it's pastors or Christian counselors or just laypersons who want to understand better what we are and how we flourish.

So I see myself much more as a translator than an expert in this, but I try to do my homework to get right what these folks are saying.

All right.

Okay.

So now I'm just going to ask a question. I'm going to ask you stuff, okay? You can teach me here because I want to make sure I'm understanding it properly. So we have two major ideas working that the soul mind, soul slash mind, is a different substance than the physical or it's the same substance.

And that's the same as property dualism, what I understand it to be, that the physical brain produces the mind slash soul, and so that when the physical brain ceases, it ceases. Is that largely what they're saying?

Absolutely. In fact, Thompson himself says in his book, The Anatomy of the Soul, the mind is housed in your physical self and it depends on your body to function. And so, quote, no body, no mind.

Yeah, that is heretical. I'm sorry, but it is. I have to say it. Yeah, that's bad.

And it leads to a lot of other heretical views in terms of the person and work of Christ and so on and so forth, which we can also talk about.

Right, yeah. And also, there's a problem with property dualism in that it's self-refuting because if the physical brain produces the mind, then the mind is nothing more than chemical reactions, neurochemical reactions.

And if that's the case, then the physical brain is restricted by the laws of chemistry, neurochemistry, and so it can only operate within a parameter, which means gigo, garbage in, garbage out, that whatever you say, your senses cause certain reactions in the brain.

It's just necessary reactions, not truth values. That's one of the problems.

You're determined to think what you think. Yeah, it's purely deterministic.

Right. And so it's self-refuting because then you can't know if your view on property dualism is true because it's just chemical reactions making you say it.

Exactly.

And you can't argue others should adopt your view because they can see the truth of the position and therefore believe it to be true as well. All that goes out if it's all determined.

Now, of course, for the listeners, why this is so heretical, and it's seriously bad, is because it would then mean that Jesus, who has two distinct natures. I know you know this, but this is for listeners.

Jesus has two natures, a divine nature and a human nature. And so Jesus came into existence 2 ,000 years ago. What we mean by that is that the union of the divine and the human nature occurred 2 ,000 years ago.

And the properties of both of those natures are what make up the person of Jesus. And we call that the communication of the properties. And so these are critical doctrines that are really important in Christianity, the hypostatic union and what's called the communicatio ideomatum.

So Jesus, by definition, he still has that state of the union of the divine and the human nature. And that's a necessary doctrine. Anybody who denies that, well, we'll talk politely about that. So the property dualism position would then say, this is what's radical, folks, would then say that when Jesus died, the physical brain ceased to function, and therefore that soul mind of the human nature ceased.

And that would break who Jesus was. He would no longer be the person of Christ. And that invalidates the atoning sacrifice and the resurrection, as well as the issue of continuity. So that's from them.

Do you have any comments you want to add about that?

No, that's exactly right. You have really unpacked it well in terms of the doctrine of the person of Christ, but the doctrine of the worker Christ, as you touched on, is also in play there, because if he did not actually share a human nature just like us, he couldn't be an equal substitute for us.

And if you hold either a pure physicalist or a property dualist, also known as non-reductive physicalist view, you don't have natures. You don't have essences that make you what you are. You have a material substance, namely matter in motion that has certain relations, and that's what you are.

And so you don't have continuity through time, because that's always changing. You don't have anything that is like other people, because there truly is nothing shared among persons. So you lose all of those underlying necessary commitments that are deeply biblical that undergird the doctrine of the atonement.

Very good. Yeah, I'm liking you more and more. You're good. Well, it's true. So there's a doctrine. I'm trying to remember what it is. There's a heresy, a Polynarianism, maybe it's what it is, where the divine nature overshadows the human nature to such an extent that the human nature has functionally nothing really going on.

And this would be related to that.

Yeah. Exactly.

Yeah, this is really bad. And let me ask you, would you would you qualify this? I'm going to ask you two questions. We got a break here in about a minute or less. Would you say it's heresy to say this?

Oh, there's the music.

OK, hold on.

We'll get back after the break and then we'll get to it. I'm going to ask, is it heresy? And then is it damnable heresy? OK, those are the two questions I want to ask you afterwards.

What do you think?

Hey, folks, we'll be right back after these messages. I want you to, if you would, please stay tuned. This is a really good conversation. I love having conversations with guys like this who are smart, educated and can articulate it.

We'll be right back.

It's Matt Slick live. Taking your calls at 877 -207 -2276. Here's Matt Slick.

All right.

Welcome back to the show. We're on the air with Stan Wallace. I'm having a great time. Really, I loved it. Love talking about stuff like this. It shows my geekness coming out, but I really enjoy it. Stan, are you still there?

I'm here.

All right.

So I've got the book open, Physics of God, on Kindle, your book. And I'm going to be going through them. I'm going to write an article on this. Maybe I'll run it by you. You can give it the imprimatur and then you'll love stats, you know, if you say it's good.

But OK, so I asked two questions. We both have agreed it's heretical.

Well, you'd ask me if it was heretical. You'd ask me. I hadn't answered.

Oh, OK. Go ahead.

Yeah, let me offer maybe a little bit of a nuanced answer. So first of all, heresy is a really, really important word and carries a lot of freight. So it really needs to be used in very rare situations.

I think a lot of conversations have been shut down by people invoking heresy, and then there's no more engagement on the issue. And so, you know, first it's important to get clear on what a heresy is.

So a heresy is a view that clearly denies or contradicts a core biblical doctrine that has to do with the key themes of Scripture. The nature of God, his triune nature, and the incarnation, the second person, the Trinity, the nature of salvation, so on and so forth.

So that's what it is, and those core doctrines are encapsulated in the historic creeds of the Church. So it's easy to see what it is that historically has been seen as core, and therefore what would be heretical to deny those things.

So I would say with that definition, and wanting to be careful, that certainly a number of implications of Christian physicalism, which is what we're talking about here, a number of implications are heretical.

You mentioned one in terms of implications in relationship to Christology, to the person of Christ as the second person of the Trinity incarnate. It has implications that deny, again, his human nature, and therefore the work he did on the cross.

It has implications for the nature of the Gospel and human salvation, so a number of implications in soteriology that are heretical. It has implications in eschatology that I believe are heretical, namely our ability to continue after our death as the same person into the final resurrection and forevermore.

So there are clearly implications that are heretical. Now the question is, does physicalism itself, even though it entails those things, does it also count as heretical? I stop short of that, because I think there are a lot of physicalists, and I think the two gentlemen I critique are examples, who, even though they're Christian physicalists, they are not consistent, and therefore they don't take that step of drawing out to its logical conclusions like we're doing here the implications in these other doctrines.

So I think it's extremely heterodox. It may be heretical, but I want to be careful with that, so I just want to at least say it's way, way on the far end of orthodoxy. It may be heretical, but at least what it entails or implies is clearly heretical.

Yeah, I would take one step further. If, put it this way, a strict view of property dualism defined as the mind is dependent upon the physical brain for its actuality, that when the physical brain ceases, the mind ceases.

That would be, when applied to Christ, that would necessarily destroy the hypostatic union, and that would qualify as damnable heresy.

Absolutely. Again, implications in Christology like that are clearly heretical, but follow from a physicalist view of the person.

All right, so that's property dualism. Again, I'm reminding people that it means that the physical brain produces the mind-slash-soul, so that when the physical brain ceases, the mind-slash-soul, and it starts saying mind from now on, ceases to function, ceases to exist.

Then there's the logical issue of continuity, which I know you know this. I don't know if my listeners know this, what continuity is. The illustration I give is we have a chair that I built in a garage, and I had somebody help me build this chair.

I have exact plans, exact wood, exact nails, exact screws, exact everything. Then I take that exact chair, and I go out, and I destroy it, put it in the fire in the backyard. Then I go back into the garage, and I build an exact duplicate of that chair.

You couldn't tell the difference between them. The question is, is the second chair the first chair? Not the same as, because it looks the same in all aspects, but is it the first chair? The answer is no, because the first chair ceased to exist.

Therefore, it's not the second chair, but the second chair is a duplicate. We have the loss of continuity of existence, and that's the issue here. If the human soul ceases to exist, then this next soul that exists, which is the exact duplicate, has a logical continuity issue.

This is also a very serious problem. Okay.

To anything we talk about here, there are going to be Christian scholars who are physicalists, of which there are many, by the way, who would have counterarguments. If you'd like, I could give the counterargument to that and respond to that.

Sure. I would love that.

All right.

So the counterargument is—well, there are two I'll mention, though they're related. But one is, no, we don't cease to exist, even though our soul ceases to exist, but God remembers us, and then he recreates us in the final resurrection.

So there is no intermediate state. I think there's problems exegetically with that, because Scripture is clear there is. Jesus says to the thief on the cross, today you will be with me in paradise, even though your body won't.

But the argument is, no, you do cease to be, but God remembers you, so he can create you, and you come to be again. It's what folks like Trenton Merricks call gappy existence. So your existence has gaps where you cease to be and come to be again, but it's still you, because God makes it you.

And my argument and the argument that many would give is, well, that's not part of the nature of existence. Something that can't exist, not exist, and come back to be. In other words, there is no gappiness.

You exist, and you cease to exist. And whatever comes to be later may be a really good copy, but it's not you. And as William Hasker says, when I die, I don't want to see really good copies of my loved ones.

I want to see them. I want to be with my dad, not just a really good copy of him. And I think that's what Scripture talks about. It's you that continues through the death of your body and the reembodiment in the final resurrection.

You're there all the way through the process. So you're what's called a substantial soul, which is the opposite of this property dualism or even reductive physicalism that's being advanced.

Yeah, I've thought about that. When I've dealt with annihilationists, they hold varying views, and I've had to go through a lot of considerations and thought. And I didn't use the term. I like the term, though, a gap idea.

And we've got another break coming up. I want to follow up on this after the break. But this is really interesting. It's really important stuff.

So hold on. Okay. Hey, folks.

Once again, be right back after these messages with Dr. Stan Wallace. Really enjoying the talk. Please stay tuned.

Be right back.

It's Matt Slick live. Taking your calls at 877 -207 -2276. Here's Matt Slick.

There you are, everybody. Welcome back to the show. Bottom of the hour. We're talking with Dr. Stan Wallace. I'm really enjoying the conversation. Stan, are you still there?

I'm here.

All right. So we're talking about continuity issues. And I forgot where we were, actually. I was writing my notes. Yeah, there's so many problems, I mean, with this.

Oh, man.

Anyway, we'll get into some of this stuff. So it's definitely heretical, and it's problematic. Now, there are solutions. One of them is the gap existence issue. What's another one that they have, if you remember?

Well, I mean, the term of ontology, which is what I'm working on, you know, what is essentially to be human, that's really the key is that we cease to be and can be brought back to existence. There are then exegetical arguments that, for instance, a number of scholars will say that the scriptures speak of the person as a unity of soul and body, fundamentally or essentially, in their nature or their being.

Again, the word ontos is where we get the word being. It's on ontological issues of what are we essentially. And so the argument is, well, if we are essentially a unity or a composite of soul and body or these material and immaterial dimensions, when one ceases to be, the composite ceases to be, and therefore they would argue exegetically we can't exist after the death of our body because we are no longer that composite that makes us what we are.

Now, the response is, and even folks like N .T. Wright would argue that we're fundamentally a composite. And the problem is that while the Old Testament especially does speak of us as a deep, deep unity, it could be interpreted to be an ontological unity, granted, or it could be a functional unity.

In other words, we function as one. Our soul and body is so deeply united and causally connected that we function as one unified being, although there are two distinct realities, again, soul and body, and the soul can live beyond the body.

That's a possibility, and the way you interpret which view would be best when you come to scriptures that could go either way is by other scripture. Scripture interprets scripture, and especially given progressive revelation that God reveals more truth as the scriptures unfold, we need to look throughout the Old Testament and into the New Testament to get clears of should we take this biblical data that seems to talk about us as one thing to just mean one ontological reality, one thing essentially, or just a functional unity.

And as you go through the Old Testament, it becomes clearer and clearer as more revelation is given by God that no, we are a duality. We are two things, and then you get into the New Testament, it becomes even more clear.

You know, Paul says, I'd rather be absent from the body and present with the Lord. That's all through the scriptures, especially as you get more and more into the New Testament and full revelation, that the exegetical argument just doesn't hold up.

And I will refer, and all of the things that I'm saying, again, are things that are just paraphrasing very, very detailed work that Christian scholars have done. And as far as the biblical data and the exegesis, the book that is by far the best treatment of this is John Cooper's book, Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting, where he does a deep dive on all the texts, Old and New Testament, that deal with anthropology, what we are.

And comes out with the view that I advance also in my book. He calls it, and I take the title he uses, which is holistic dualism. We are a duality, soul and body, but there's a wholism, there's a deep unity, though it's a functional unity because we can live apart from our body.

So it's not an ontological unity.

All right, Body, Soul, Everlasting, John C. Cooper. There it is, and I just bought it.

So, all right.

Now I've got a question.

While we're at it, I'm going to make a little plug for a few other books. Because I don't want to forget this, because your listeners, I can tell by the questions you're asking, if listeners are still with us, they're very thoughtful, and they're willing to think about these important issues, and might want to read other things.

So there are three books that deal with the philosophical side of this, and that's what I'm doing, because I think philosophy can help us understand our anthropology and nuance the biblical anthropology that Cooper helps us to see, okay?

And I'll go from the easiest, most accessible up. The most accessible is a book called, and there's a lot of books, I'm just pulling a few here, but Philosophy Made Slightly Less Difficult by Two Christian Philosophers, J .P. Moreland and Gary DeWeese.

And it's a nice little chapter, actually a part of a chapter, maybe 15 pages on this issue, that's really solid. So that could be a nice little next step, and also give you, your listeners, a book on their shelf that would have so many other things they would benefit from reading.

Now the next level up is a book that J .P. Moreland also co-authored with William Lane Craig called Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview. And that will have a whole chapter on this, 30, 40 pages, and a deeper dive, more technical, but written for the non-specialists and important, I think, for Christians to have on their shelf and pull off.

There'll be a lot of other issues that you could dive into there. Lastly, and again, I say it under J .P. Moreland, I think he's doing the best work as a Christian philosopher thinking about these things, so I'm going to recommend a book.

He just came out with Brandon Rickenbaugh called The Substance of Consciousness. And it is a very rigorous, very detailed treatment of this in defense of this holistic dualism that I'm advancing. It is written at an academic level, so I'm just giving listeners a heads up that this, if you want to drill down to the deepest level, well, not the deepest level, but the deepest level that's probably accessible to somebody without a PhD, this is the book that would really help you ground these things at a very sophisticated level.

And that's by Rickenbaugh, okay.

Moreland and Rickenbaugh.

Okay.

All right. I was thinking through this during the break.

All right.

So the property dualists, they do affirm a physical resurrection, right?

Yeah, they do, because you can't get away from that credo.

Now, if the fallen brain, which has problems with entropy, misfirings, so to speak, all the problems that would be natural to the fallen physical brain, that would not be the case in a glorified resurrected body.

So if the resurrected body brain is different than the original non-resurrected body brain, then doesn't that produce a potential problem? That continuity issue, of course, is broken, and you wouldn't be the same person because you're the product of the physical realm.

In a resurrected body, you'd be a new person. Make sense?

It absolutely does, yeah. And it does create a very severe problem. Actually, the problem is much, much worse than that. Let me unpack it this way. So first of all, what does it mean for two things to be identical?

Because the physicalists would say this physical body brain before death is identical to or the same as, same person as, this resurrected body. So it's a claim of identity. Well, like in most things, to understand whether a claim is true or accurate, you have to understand what the term means.

So what does identity mean? Here's the illustration I use in my book. It's a very simple concept. We use it all the time. Let's say I have a daughter, and for her birthday I get her a goldfish, and she names him Gil.

She's very creative with his naming conventions, right? So she loves Gil, and they spend hours together. She knows everything about Gil, how he moves, his gold scales, everything, right? Well, she goes to school one day, and you're walking past her room, and you notice Gil's floating on the surface of the water.

And he's gone. So you promptly give him a burial, and you go to the pet store, and you get Gil, too. You find one that's just like Gil. And you get it home just in time for her to arrive home after school.

She, like every day, runs up to her room to say hi to Gil, and within 10 seconds, she's sobbing. Now, why is that? It's because she recognizes this is not identical to the Gil I left in the morning. There's something just even very slightly different.

Maybe it's a little different hue of gold. Maybe this Gil II swims in a little different manner. Who knows what? But the point is that it's not identical because it doesn't share all the properties in common with Gil I.

And that's what identity is. If two things are identical, they are going to share all their properties in common, their color, their movement, everything. And so you can see if two things are not identical just by saying, well, there's one property true of this thing that wasn't true of the other thing.

And that's what she's recognizing. So the question is, can we be the same if we're just...

Sorry about that. We've got a break, so we'll get back to Gil.

Okay.

All right.

All right.

Sorry about that. The last break. Hey, folks, we'll be right back after these messages. Please stay tuned. We're talking to Dr. Stan Wallace, having a great conversation, really enjoying it. We'll be right back after these messages.

Please stay tuned.

Continuity, Identity, and the Resurrection Body

Matt Slick. Live! Taking your calls at 877 -207 -2276. Here's Matt Slick.

All right. Everybody, welcome back to the last segment of the show. Stan, are you still there?

I'm here.

All right.

Okay. So we're talking about something.

Yeah, let me pick that up. You were making the point that if one ceases to be and the brain is recreated in the resurrected state, it wouldn't be the same brain. And I said, that's right. Huge continuity issue there.

It can't be identical, because to be identical is to share all properties in common. And all of the properties of an earlier brain would be different than a latter brain, unless God somehow got every single molecule from your earlier brain and stuck it in there.

But some of those molecules were part of yours at one time, and then they're part of another person's brain, and so on and so forth. So you get kind of the problems there. But it's much worse, because the fact of the matter is, every seven years in this life, all of the atoms in our body turn over.

So we are literally not if we're just physical, we are literally not the same person. Given the law of identity, I just unpacked sharing all your properties in common. We aren't the same person seven years from one season to another.

And what's worse wait, wait, wait, that's not all. In fact, every moment, we are changing our physical constitution, losing cells, gaining cells, atoms changing in the cells. So the problem was called unity through time for the physicalist.

How do you explain that I am the person who is in those baby pictures, and I'm the person who will enjoy my retirement? When if I'm just physical, I wasn't there, and I won't be there, because this matter wasn't there and won't be there.

You've got to have something that stands under the changes of the body, a substantial soul. It's a substrate, if you will, a substance that endures throughout the life of the person and into the afterlife, that isn't identical to or constituted by the physical constituents.

Oh yeah, to me it does, absolutely. So I do outlines on different topics, and I do it on science. I have Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Christian theology, Mormonism, blah, blah, blah. I have one on philosophy, and it's 104 pages long.

And I opened it up during the break and went to the issue of identity. And in my notes, it's several pages long just on identity, for those who realize this is a huge topic. Identity is not something you just solve it in five minutes.

You have a discussion, let's move on to the next thing. There's all kinds of issues related to identity, relative identity, personal identity, transitive identity, indiscernibility of identicals, is of identity, is of predication, all these things.

I've had to discuss all of these with atheists who want to discuss the issue, the nature of the person, the trinity, the ontological, is identity, is of predication, and we've gone into all this stuff.

And these things are just not easily, they're just not easily solvable. There's always questions and counter-arguments and stuff to this, is of, well, what it means to be a person. Philosophers have been working on this for a long time.

I think the solutions found in substance dualism, as God created us, that we don't have any problem with that. But that's another topic to get into, maybe.

Well, that's what I'm arguing, a form of substance dualism called a holistic dualism.

Right.

And I would also say that identity, okay, first of all, any view, not only in philosophy, in science and other fields, any view has its detractors. So the fact that there's not 100 agreement doesn't get something thrown away.

It just says, okay, we need to look at the arguments against, see if they're strong enough to overcome the arguments for. And in the case of what identity is, I think that it's a very strong case.