Open Theism Debate

Is it your position, then, that, for example, in Genesis chapter 50, verse 20, when the scriptures record for us

Joseph's words, you meant this for evil but God meant it for good, how do you understand that?

Yeah. Well, here you're going to stretch my memory and try to remember what I did write about it. Let me get out the scripture index and find out if...

Here, I'm, oh, I don't have time to look it up. It's page 55. What I suggested was that, you know, here, if I remember correctly at all, that there are certain indicators or clues in the

Genesis text as to what is going on. And so I don't see

Joseph as issuing a deterministic kind of statement there. Okay. Do you mind if I quote you?

Go ahead. Okay. Since I had the freedom to look it up. It is the glory of God to be able to bring good out of evil human actions, but nothing in the text demands the interpretation that God actually desired the sinful acts.

The text does not say that God caused or necessitated the events. But isn't it the case that Joseph specifically says that God intended this for good to save many people alive today?

Okay. What did God intend? And here, let me just first of all admit that this passage is one of the premier, you know, texts that are used for the meticulous providence view.

It doesn't happen to be a favorite text of the general sovereignty view. Well, that's just the way it is.

And so, you know, the explanation that I give to that in my book is likely going to sound to you very stretched, and I would understand that.

Well, I guess really the fundamental question that I'm getting to is, you know, you've raised a number of philosophical issues.

You were talking about, you know, things a timeless being cannot do, so on and so forth. But in my opening statement,

I made the assertion that we have to go to the text of Scripture as our primary focus. And my concern is that Genesis 5020 says, as for you, you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good in order to bring about this present result to preserve many people alive.

I would assume that an exegesis of Genesis 5020 could be offered that is compatible with a libertarian perspective, if a person who is a libertarian claims their position is biblical.

Are you claiming that yours is biblical, or at least that it can be made to fit biblical data, but it doesn't actually derive from biblical data?

No, I think it does derive from biblical data, but it's going to come out of other kinds of passages that Arminians—I mean, this is nothing new—that

Arminians traditionally appeal to. You know, whosoever will, the invitations, that kind of stuff, are read in a certain way.

And Calvinists read them a very different way. You want to, in my opinion, what you're suggesting is,

I'm not accepting the authority of Scripture, that somehow I don't take the

Bible seriously. And on so many different theological issues throughout the history of the church, where there are various positions, one may say, well, the clear teaching of Scripture is this.

I wouldn't even say that my own position, that I can prove it beyond a shadow of a doubt from Scripture.

But I don't believe yours can be proved beyond a shadow of a doubt from Scripture, either. I guess

I'm advocating a degree of epistemic humility in terms of what I claim to know.

Do I believe my position's right, and I believe it's biblical? Yes. Would you claim this epistemic humility for the assertion that Jesus Christ is very

God of very God? Very God of very man. Very God of very God, the deity of Jesus Christ, a biblical teaching.

Is it epistemically humble to say, maybe, maybe not? I mean, there's

Arius, and there's, you know, the modalists, and Sabellianism.

There's all sorts of different takes on that. If we take that perspective, how far do we take this epistemic humility?

Well, if we go back to, I believe, the Reformers' doctrine of the perspicuity of Scripture, it is not that every passage or every doctrine of Scripture is clear, but rather the main teachings of Scripture are clear.

And those, I would say, are that God is the creator, humans are sinners,

God has come to redeem us specifically in Jesus Christ, Jesus is the second, you know, the

Son of God incarnate. I think those teachings are clear. Okay. Could I ask how you understand, then, one of the chief passages that I presented in my opening statement?

That is specifically Isaiah chapter 41. You indicated that I had dissed your explanation of Isaiah 46.

Actually, I didn't. I just cited it as an indication of something else. But I didn't see any discussion in, at least,

The God Who Risks of Isaiah chapter 41, especially verses 22 and 23, which specifically say, let them bring forth and declare to us what is going to take place, as for the former events, what they were, that we may consider them and know their outcome, or announce to us what is coming, declare the things that are going to come afterwards, that we may know that you are gods.

What do you feel is wrong about the assertion that I and many others make that this ability to declare what is going to take place is one of the key indications of deity itself?

Yeah. Well, I believe that, again, the issue in these chapters of Isaiah is one of, can you do it?

Can you pull it off? Can your gods say something is going to happen and bring it about, and the answer is no.

So again, I think that the issue is really one of divine power, not one of God simply knowing, oh, that's going to happen, so let me tell you it's going to happen, and that will prove

I'm God. Okay. But, so it is your understanding then when it says, declare to us what is going to take place, and is it your perspective that God can declare to us what is going to take place if that includes the activities of libertarian free will?

Okay, if it involves libertarian freedom, and God does not remove the libertarian freedom, because I believe

God can do that and has done that, but if it involves God leaving the human with libertarian freedom, then

God, in my opinion, would not make such a prediction unconditionally, even though it might be stated unconditionally, there would still be a conditional element there.

However, God can remove human freedom, or if God wants to bring it about unilaterally, think I can declare it, and then the issue is, you know, okay, if I want to make it back to Tampa tonight safe,

I can wish that, but, you know, assume I could crash into the car and I could be killed.

But if God wants to make it to Tampa tonight, there's nobody to prevent God from doing that.

Okay, in regards to, for example, Cyrus, how do you understand that in light of what you just said?

That isn't the naming of a child a part of that libertarian free will, or did God, and if God removed the libertarian free will, then are you saying you disagree with Pinnock and Boyd and others, that that then dehumanizes us, makes us less than persons?

Okay, a couple of things. One, open theists don't necessarily agree on how to interpret every passage, just like all

Calvinists don't agree on how to interpret every passage. So, with Cyrus, Boyd, for instance, tends to say that God removed the free will.