Bahnsen vs. Sproul Pt. 2 | Presuppositional vs. Classical Apologetics | with @RevealedApologetics

You saw part one, and we delved into the discussion between Greg Bonson and R .C. Sproul. You think you have a grasp on who has the upper hand in this discussion? But wait, there's more. In this video, my friend Eli Ayala and I go even deeper as we get into the kind of knowledge the Bible says unbelievers have.

We talk about whether or not evidentialist arguments are even out of bounds for a presuppositionalist. Do I become a presuppositionalist by the end of this discussion? Find out in part two happening right now.

The Knowledge Unbelievers Have and the Meaning of Natural Theology

Let's let's get a little bit deeper into this discussion. Sproul is answering a question here.

What I meant by that is apologetics in the classical sense of an ad hominem response to where the world is coming from, where we come off the reservation, we gruel with them in their own backyard. I think what I meant by that, Josiah, I don't want to put words in Greg's mouth, but I would assume that that is not a point of controversy between us.

I hope not. I hope we're just looking for more agreement to disagree. I hope we're not going to uncover more disagreement. What I mean by that, you see, the concern at this point is to show we both agree that the whole life and worldview of the pagans is built on a lie.

God reveals himself clearly to all men. Men have that knowledge. They exchange the truth of the lie. Therefore, their thoughts become futile. We see brilliant men in the world. We see sarts, the sarts and the humes of this world that are formidable minds, intellect.

And they construct fantastically complex and intricate philosophical systems that are very intimidating sometimes to us.

Very, very clever.

But we know that in the final analysis, their whole systems are so much exercises in futility. And wouldn't that be the case if their starting point is a rejection of God's revelation? If they refuse to acknowledge what they know to be true at the beginning of their thinking, you know, Greg and I both agree that there's an objective general revelation.

We both agree that there is an objective natural theology.

So, um, sounds like Bonson, you know?

Well, if you listen on, Bonson's going to be like, well, everything I just heard the last five minutes sounds like pure presuppositionalism and the audience will laugh because he's saying things. I mean, this, this is, this is his Calvinism coming through.

This is the point where Bonson and Sproul agree. The disagreement is, well, what flows from that? Which apologetic method flows more consistently from those assumptions about man, the effects of sin, you know, the revelation of God, whether it gets through these sorts of things, right?

The question is, though, this issue of natural theology, what do we mean by natural theology? Bonson says later in the discussion, this is a quote here, he says, he says, that's the problem I have with natural theology because it says on autonomous grounds with no prior commitment, we can take some facts about the universe and from that reason to there being a God.

It's, it's, it's the idea of neutrality and autonomy that is being snuck in and not on purpose. I mean, Sproul's not going to say we have to be autonomous or that we have to be neutral, but as Van, if you read Van Till, Van Till will say, listen, a skunk has snuck into your house.

It's not as though the reform, the reform theologians want to be neutral and autonomous, but this neutrality and autonomy, like a skunk has snuck into your house and it's stinking up everything else that you're doing so well.

And so it's really a pointing out an inconsistency. Yes, yes.

Right.

So, um, yeah, those are right.

Well, and even when I, you know, Sproul talking here, I hear a little bit of, um, Warfield, uh, you know, there's some Gerstner in there. It's coming, it's just coming out in his comments. I think the issue that Bonson has, and I, and I think you would agree with this is when Sproul says God reveals himself clearly to all men.

I think the question is, I think Bonson would ask, maybe he will, is what does that mean? Like, how exactly does God do that? Cause I think that's where they would probably answer this question a bit differently.

What do you think?

Uh, I, I don't, I'm not sure exactly how I'd interact with that, but there, there is a difference. They are, they are talking past each other because some of the things that they say are, that are very similar.

They don't mean the same thing.

Right, right.

Depending, you know, Sproul would say all men know God, uh, but do they know him immediately or do they know him immediately?

That, that's it, right? Is it through direct awareness? Um, or is it through something else?

Or, or, or it's both. I would say that knowledge of God mediated through nature and creation, and we are part of the creation. So the very, the very, the very intellectual process where we're thinking and reasoning is itself evidence of our maker.

That's why we exist as human beings within the very context of revelation.

So that's interesting. You said it's both. So it's both immediate and immediate.

I would say that we have a knowledge of God in light of the fact that we are made in his image. That's, that's the innate. And that knowledge of God is further made manifest when we look around us.

But without the immediate, there would be no immediate.

Uh, exactly.

Because it's the, it's the immediate. It's through the immediate knowledge through those eyes that we look at and give meaning to everything we see around us.

Right.

That's right.

Okay.

I've got my eyes. I'm still without excuse, but it's not reliant simply on what I'm seeing. I am revelation itself to properly understand myself. I need to have a knowledge of God. Now the difficulty here is, well, wait a minute, Eli, uh, or Bonson or whoever, well, what does the unbeliever know innately?

Give me some tangible. What is the specific? And that I think is a very difficult question to answer. The Bible gives us a little bit of that, um, bits and pieces. But what I like to say, because I don't really know how to answer that question.

What I can answer is that the Bible does give us sufficient information that in some way, in some profound way, the unbeliever has a knowledge of his maker that leaves him without excuse. What is the specificity of that?

I don't know. I mean, suppose people can debate over the details of that, but regardless of what the details are. He does have a knowledge that leaves him without excuse.

So again, trying to get back into, uh, Sproul's head, um, by the way, stop talking about poking your eyes out. That's disgusting. Um, uh, he, he would say that, um, there could, there could be more work done through the immediate, uh, style of knowledge.

You could, uh, do a bit more work. And, and, and I mean, through apologetics, uh, through the immediate with the, you know, sort of classical arguments then Bonson would allow for, is that, is that right?

That's correct. But we'd have to make a distinction between Bonson's issues with the traditional arguments and where those traditional arguments stand within the broader spectrum of presuppositional, uh, ism.

So for example, Bonson rejected the, um, rejected the cosmological argument. But Bonson's rejection of the cosmological argument, at least as how it's been traditionally formulated is not an essential feature of presuppositional ism.

It was just as Bonson, as a philosopher, he didn't think the arguments were good. Some of them were good. So I, there are presuppositionalists who say, well, wait a minute, that is a good argument. And I think we should expand on that, uh, doing it within the realm of a consistently presuppositional framework.

And so, um, so yeah, I, I think, I think, uh, Christians would do well, presuppositionalists would do well getting some of the details and some of those evidences and some of those arguments and fleshing them out more.

I think the problem that I see with presuppositionalists, and I'm gonna make a distinction between presuppositionalists and presuppositionalism is that presuppositionalists tend to be very, very good on the big picture worldview.

You need the worldview, right? You, you need the interpretive grid. And then when you're called on the carpet to explain the specifics, there's like, wow, I mean, Christianity is needed to make sense of it, but we can't even go into the details because we're so big picture that we don't actually look at the details, like the scientific evidence and the design and on all these sorts of things.

You know, if I were to say what one area that I'm weak in is, is, um, is history. I know history, I've taught history, but, um, if so, if I were to say the Christian worldview is necessary to make sense out of history.

Um, I know what I mean by that, but that's an area that I haven't paid too much attention to. So that I have to, I'd have to work to flesh that out since it's like, what do you mean by history makes sense?

Like, what are you talking about? So there are areas that I can, I can work and focus on and not just always talk big picture. How can we seek to be consistent with our worldview? How can we fine tune, so to speak, the details of the sorts of things we can talk about?

You know, I, I go to a museum with a friend and my atheist friend says, Hey man, that painting is beautiful. Well, let's talk about beauty. Well, I can't talk about beauty because it's about worldview, bro.

No, I need to learn to interact with that idea and show how the Christian worldview makes that shine all the more and give it meaning. And I need to navigate the big picture along with that small data point that, um, depending on who you're talking to, you might be required to go into great depth.

Right.

That's good. That's good. Let's get back into it.

Objective general revelation, but natural theology is taking knowledge about nature, which does not itself have anything to do with the presuppositions of God and all the rest and moving from them independently and autonomously to another conclusion, namely that there is a God.

Oh, we're talking about an objective argument for God's existence, but I don't have to think it is natural theology. I think it's a transcendental argument.

What I mean about natural theology is, what I mean by theology is the knowledge of God. What I mean by a natural theology is a knowledge of God that comes through nature. You know, buy that.

Oh, I'm willing to buy it. But there's a distinction within what you're calling the knowledge of God, whether it's immediate or immediate. And there's also a distinction between types of arguments.

Okay. So, I mean, we forget that. I just thought that we had a point of agreement there, which obviously we don't.

So, I mean, again, right, highfalutin terms, bad audio, immediate, immediate knowledge, immediate knowledge is knowledge by direct awareness, right? There is no need for an argument for knowledge by direct awareness.

It's the kind of knowledge that we know through direct—like the fact that my thoughts are my own thoughts and not your thoughts. The fact that, you know, that I exist, right? But immediate knowledge then is—so help me here, Eli—it's propositional knowledge that's more inferential?

Is that the distinction?

Yeah, yeah.

Now, I'm not an analytic philosopher where they would be more precise with the terminology and the issues involved. But yeah, immediate knowledge, you know, if I were to give a scripture that kind of equates to that sort of knowledge that we get immediately, the heavens declare the glory of God.

I mean, you know, you want to know if God exists, look out your window, right? There is a knowledge of God that we can get by looking out the window. I think that's a perfectly valid thing to say to someone.

But that's how I would understand immediate. Immediate is kind of a look-and-see sort of deal, and immediate's kind of like, you know it.

Right.

All right, let's get back into it.

No, I'm rejecting the nature of argument that the old Princeton school used to substantiate that knowledge of God.

Okay, but we're not into that right now at this point, right? We're talking just simply about whether or not we agreed that there was a natural knowledge of God that all men have.

Yeah, and I would say that is immediate.

Okay, and I would say immediate.

No, I'd also say that the apologist can give an immediate, transcendental, and objectively valid proof for God's existence. Okay, but that's not what Aquinas was going for.

All right, Aquinas was going for immediate. Immediate, not immediate. He wanted to prove immediate. That's what I'm trying to do. That's what Calvin believed in. I got those quotes here if you want me to document that.

I'm not just saying that. Calvin uses those very terms. Immediate. When he speaks of Romans 121, check it. Look it up.

But yeah.

So I don't know about this, Eli. So Calvin said that knowledge of God in Romans 118 -20 is immediate knowledge?

I don't know.

I haven't read Calvin on that. But as a presuppositionalist, it would be irrelevant to me. I think innate knowledge of God can be inferred by the fact that we are image bearers. So I would take people to Genesis 126 and talk about what it means to be an image bearer of God, to be a creation of God, what it means to have a knowledge of God, those sorts of things.

But Romans 1 is useful, but I don't think it's the only place that we can go necessarily. I'm not sure what Calvin said there.

Yeah.

All right, let's keep going here.

Romans 1, General Revelation, and the Limits of Classical Apologetics

Another point I want to get across here is that what we're both trying to do is show that those pagan systems which proceed from a rejection of general revelation, be it immediate or immediate, skip that for a minute, they still know there's God.

And they refuse to acknowledge God as God. Grant that, okay? They all know that there's a God. Sartre knows very well that there's a God. Hume knew that there was a God. Now, their starting point then for the construction of their philosophy is based upon a refusal to acknowledge what they know to be true.

Paul called that foolishness. And if you're careful exegetes, you realize that the word fool in the New Testament is not merely a judgment of one's intellectual capacity, it's a moral judgment. Foolishness is a sin from a New Testament perspective.

So we have a moral problem of man now in this repression or suppression, stifling, holding down, whatever you want to call it, of this general revelation. So one of the tasks of the apologist is to expose the lie and the bankruptcy of this system that is built upon an initial refusal to acknowledge what a man believes to be true.

Its starting point is a lie. And on the basis of that lie, he can build very sophisticated, clever worldviews.

Okay, so Sproul is heavily relying on what I'm hearing him say is Romans 1 to flesh out his view of mankind's epistemology and how it works, because if it works the way that Sproul says, then classical apologetics is totally appropriate.

There's nothing wrong with appealing to general revelation and arguing for God's existence along those lines. But he's not, what is he missing?

Well, I mean, the interesting point is that he's acknowledging with Bonson that all men have a knowledge of God. He said that.

Yeah.

And that the starting point of the unbeliever is a rejection of the knowledge of God that they have. He said that.

Yeah.

And so how do we demonstrate that they have a knowledge of God that they are denying through probabilistic arguments? That's how we show it. To show that they have a knowledge of God that they are suppressing, we demonstrate that through probabilistic argumentation.

I mean, this was the quote that I read where it says that, and that clear revelation in conjunction with the testimony of the Holy Spirit gives us an infallible assurance of our faith. But I do not believe, Bonson says, that the Holy Spirit takes probable evidence, that's the natural theological evidence, or uncertain evidence and turns it into certain evidence or certainty.

I think he takes certain evidence and with his infallible moral persuasion, turns it into infallible faith in our hearts. So that if all men have a knowledge of God, like Sproul says, and it's undeniable, how do we demonstrate that?

How do we engage in apologetics by giving them probabilistic arguments? How does that work? You most likely have a knowledge of it. You most likely are suppressing the truth because of this probabilistic argument I'm giving you over here.

Bonson's saying, no, there's an argument that gives us more certainty and does not leave the unbeliever with any excuse whatsoever.

But Bonson would not be opposed. Would he be opposed completely to utilizing, say, an argument for the existence of God the way that Sproul would?

Not necessarily. We'd have to give a specific example because, as I said before, Bonson rejected certain arguments, but his rejection of those arguments is not essential to presuppositionalism. But I could, as a presuppositionalist, I can give, to illustrate a point, I can give a probabilistic argument.

In other words, an argument will be evidence for my broader position. But as Jason Lyle says in his book, The Ultimate Proof for Creation, he makes a distinction between evidence for your position and an ultimate proof for your position.

I can show through scientific fact and elements of design, they are evidence for my broader commitment to the ultimacy of God, but they're not ultimate in and of themselves. That's where the transcendental argument kind of does a little more than simply stating some of the evidences that I could illustrate to show my point.

Well, so then are we really so I'm trying to find where the clash is. Are we really just then arguing over order? Our conversation should begin with some kind of chronology. Because if we can use what an evidentialist would use in terms of argumentation, maybe not all of it, but some of it, then at least let's not lead off with that.

Let's begin with maybe tag or something else and then we can use?

Not necessarily. Okay, so there's a show that Bruce Lee did. It's called Longstreet and he was training this guy how to fight. He was being bullied and he gets the guy in a headlock and he's like, what are you going to do, right?

And he's like, I don't know.

I can't move.

I can't do anything. And then Bruce Lee tells him, he goes, bite me. He's like, what? Bite me because by biting me, I'm going to let go. He says, you can bite, but don't make it a plan to bite. That is a good way to lose your teeth.

Okay, so we're using tools, but we don't have it all figured out. When I'm in a fight, I have to do it this way. As a presuppositionalist, I wouldn't say you have to start with tag. Scott Oliphant, I had Dr. Scott Oliphant on my show and he even spoke about this, that you don't have to start every interaction with a transcendental argument.

We can start anywhere. I can talk about facts. I can give an argument. It's just that while you're doing that, you have playing in the background of your mind, the music of the Christian worldview and your commitments, and you're not going into neutral and autonomous categories.

Sometimes I won't ever have to use a transcendental argument. If someone says, is the Bible historically reliable? That's my struggle, and I give them evidence for the historical reliability of the Bible.

The person says, wow, I never thought about that. I think I'm going to consider this Christianity thing. Let's meet again. I'm not going to be like, wait, no. You didn't hear the transcendental argument.

That's not required of a presuppositionalist. Presuppositionalist is not required to lead with a transcendental argument all the time. It's just that when we lead with facts and evidence, we try to do it as Christians, not assuming that there is something that lords over God's facts.

Right.

I mean, I get the disagreement when it comes to, boy, who would be a better example? It's just that we're not talking about Bonson versus somebody else. We're talking about Bonson versus Sproul, and so I guess that's where I'm trying to needle in on where this clash really lies.

It's not Bonson versus Geisler or Craig.

It's Calvinist versus Calvinist. Take a look for natural theology. Let's make a distinction real quick between natural theology, which is what R .C. is talking about, and natural revelation. For your audience, very easy.

Natural revelation is top-down. God reveals himself. He shows himself through creation.

Through creation.

That's right.

That's top-down. Natural revelation is top-down. Natural theology is bottom-up. We are taking the data of creation and working our way up to there is a God. You follow that so far?

Yeah.

Okay.

Now as a Calvinist, if you believe in total depravity and the noetic effects of sin upon the mind of the man, what will the natural man do with natural theology? Bonson says in a different context, if anything, we should be talking about natural atheology because what he's going to do is he's going to interpret the data of creation in a twisted and distorted way.

So we can't speak of natural theology as though the man tainted with total depravity and the noetic effects of sin upon his mind as though he can deal in a fair way with the facts that God has given him.

And so that's where you get to the question of is R .C. being a consistent Calvinist at this point when he suggests natural theology is the way to go?

So I don't know if, I don't know because I haven't heard it yet, but I don't know what Sproul would say. But Warfield would say that, yes, I am being a consistent Calvinist because what I'm relying on is the work of the Spirit.

And this gets back to, I think, something we talked about four hours ago because this video started four hours ago. But like we were talking about Romans

I'm having fun, by the way.

Oh, this is great, man. I love this. I'm really enjoying this conversation. But Romans 1, right, and we sort of read that super quick. But the active agent who is revealing there is not the one, is not the human who looks at creation and works his way up inferentially to God.

It's God who reveals himself from top down. And so Sproul would say that natural theology is the result of natural revelation. But it's only the result of that because of the active work of God doing it.

And so both, I think Sproul, although I haven't heard this, so you can correct me, but Warfield would say that really what we're doing is we're speaking to the natural man and we're trusting that the Holy Spirit is working on the natural man because the Holy Spirit is the one who does the lion's share of the work anyway in regeneration.

And the Holy Spirit is using means, including apologetics conversations, in order to do that work. Not that he needs it, but that's what he does.

Yeah, yes.

So but doesn't that make them both a consistent Calvinist?

Not necessarily. I mean, the reality is that when we give arguments that open up categories of neutrality and autonomy, okay, that's going to be against scriptural principles from a Calvinistic.

Perspective.

I mean, Calvin would not assert autonomy or neutrality with respect to facts and things like that. So if you're going to assume those categories, there's going to be an inconsistency there. Of course, when we appeal to, this is the reason why Bonson, let me get the quote here, where he talked about the problem with natural theology is that it assumes that we can say on autonomous grounds that we can take some facts about the universe and from that reason to there being a God.

I mean, is that what Sproul is saying? If Sproul is not saying that and he's saying, no, it's not on autonomous grounds upon which he bases a natural theology, then at that point, he's being a presuppositionalist while using evidences, which is exactly what a presuppositionalist would want you to do,.

Which is fine.

That's okay.

You can use arguments as long as you're not neutral and autonomous in doing it, because as Christians, we shouldn't do that. And philosophically, it's impossible to do it consistently.

Fascinating discussion, man. Let's keep going as far as we can go here.

Presuppositionalism, Evidences, and the Positive Case for Christianity

Both of us are trying to show the foolishness of it and expose the foolishness of it. Let me say this about the presuppositionalist school and particularly Westminster Seminary. I don't think there's been any school in the history of the Christian church that has produced a more devastating, scintillating, and effective critique of alternate world views to Christianity than the advocates of the presuppositionalist school in general and Westminster Seminary in particular.

Let me say it again. I don't think there ever has been in the history of the church, a single school or, I mean, an institution or a school of thought, the disciples of Dr. Van Til and company of the presuppositionalist school have been more effective in exposing the weaknesses and the fallacies in terms of comprehensive critique of all alternate systems.

I just wanted you to stop it in a place where he was complimenting presuppositionalist. No, I'm just kidding. Now, I very much appreciate that. But now here's where he's going to get into, and I've listened to this thing so many times.

I've only listened to it once before coming here, but I've listened to it over the years so many times, I already know where he's going, is that he's now giving a compliment to the presuppositionalist, right?

In terms of critiquing, a negative critique, the presuppositional school of thought and the students of Cornelius Van Til have no equal in the history of the church. They've just done an excellent job critiquing the non-Christian worldview.

And what Sproul is now going to do is he's going, and I'm going to be prophetic here. I haven't listened to it in a while, but he's probably going to go here. What he's now going to do is, what do we do to replace the destruction of the unbelieving.

Worldview?

And he can say, this is where you need the positive arguments. And then he's going to place emphasis on the natural theological arguments that are to be used to replace the destruction of the unbelieving perspective.

So what he gives with one hand, you guys have been doing great. The problem is you're focusing on the negative aspect, destruction of worldviews, but you're not giving anything and replacing it to show that the Christian worldview is in fact true because he would be correct if he were to make this assertion.

Disproving, I'm going to say this, if other people who criticize presuppositional apologetics, they often think this, and I've heard it a lot and I agree. Refuting an unbeliever's worldview does not prove the truth of the Christian worldview.

A lot of people think presuppositionalists, well, you think you've refuted the atheist, but that doesn't mean your position is correct. What's your argument? And I think that's correct. But where Bonson's going to disagree is like, yeah, there is something that we're going to replace that destruction with.

But the thing that we're going to replace that destruction of the unbelieving worldview with is not natural theological arguments. It's a transcendental argument that leaves the unbeliever without excuse.

I think that's where it's going to go, if I remember correctly.

But go ahead.

But well, let's see what happens.

It comes to Christianity. I have no dispute there. One talks about challenging the grounds upon which these other life and worldviews are established. There we're very, very close, I think. Our disagreement is on how we then replace what we've demolished with a positive presentation of the truthfulness of the Christian faith.

Now, getting back to the question about what I—.

Yeah, so you precept guys are not interested in building up a person's knowledge of the Christian faith with a strong offensive-style apologetic. It just comes back to, you know, presupposing God. You know, it's interesting.

I was talking to William Lane Craig years ago, and we were just talking about the 60s and how he was coming up and stuff, and then I talked about Francis Schaeffer, and he said that was kind of his critique of Schaeffer.

He said, well, Schaeffer was really great in what he called negative apologetics, but even back then, there was no offensive apologetics or positive argumentation. And so, same critique.

Yes.

But Schaeffer's a little different than Van Til in some key points, but that's another. If you're interested in what Bonson thought about Schaeffer, in the back of his book, it's one of the appendices in Presuppositional Apologetics Stated and Defended, he actually critiques versions of presuppositionalism that allow or allow elements of autonomy and neutrality to sneak in, and Schaeffer is there, and he critiques him very in detail.

He critiques Schaeffer. He critiques Clark, Carnell, and some other Reform thinkers, but that's another interesting topic in and of itself. But let me read something to you, because I have a transcript of this debate in this book, The Poor Country of Presuppositionalism.

This is this issue. What do we replace? What do we replace the destruction of the unbeliever's worldview with? So Bonson says, can I show you my version of that? I mean, we're getting somewhere. Boy, and Bonson says, boy, the last few minutes of what R .C. has been saying sounds like presuppositionalism, and it's been grand.

And that's right.

Nothing that we just heard R .C. say, Bonson would disagree with. The question is, after you've done the internal critique, how do you then go about showing that it's not a shot in the dark? What is the nature of a positive argument for Christianity?

What is the type of argument that is morally required, right? No neutrality. The Christian shouldn't engage in neutrality, shouldn't engage in autonomous reasoning. What's morally required, that's what the Christian should be avoiding, and epistemologically sound in dealing with a positive presentation of the gospel.

So he's saying, what must the Christian, how must a Christian argue if he's going to give this positive case? He has a moral obligation to not engage in elements of neutrality and autonomy. But then epistemologically and philosophically, he needs to avoid those things because they're problematic also, right?

So what is the nature of that positive case? He says, that's a problem I have with natural theology, because it says on autonomous grounds, we can take some fact about the universe and from that reason to there being a God.

And then he goes on to talk about the nature of how we build up what we've destroyed is through a transcendental argument, not a natural theological argument that assumes those neutral and autonomous categories.

What would be the harm in—so let's say the atheist's worldview is demolished, or whatever the word was that Sproul said. Now there's rubble. There's nothing there, which I take it is in commensurate with 2 Corinthians 10 .5, right?

So we're striking down arguments and every lofty thing raised up against the knowledge of God, and then we're taking captives for Christ, right? So what is the problem then if there is rubble to provide some of the evidentialist arguments?

Well, again, we've got to be careful. There's a difference between evidentialism and evidences. Evidentialism as a methodology, which can presuppose categories of autonomy and neutrality, would be inappropriate for the Christian if he's to remain faithful to his ultimate authority, and it'd be philosophically vacuous because philosophically, he can't be neutral.

He can't be autonomous. Those are inappropriate for the Christian to engage in, and rationally, they're incoherent. I mean, a good philosopher can critique those sorts of things. I mean, I had a debate with an atheist, Tom Jump, who basically is an atheist presuppositionalist, and he questions everything.

Everything that you think, oh, you know, look at the evidence for the resurrection. Bonson brings out that if you were to give an argument for the resurrection of Jesus, that as a historical event, a man rose from the dead, contrary to Frank Turek, contrary to many of the classicalist and evidentialist, that wouldn't prove Christianity.

If anything, proving that a man was raised from the dead proves just that, that a man was raised from the dead. That doesn't tell us anything about what that means, why it's important, right? You need to bring revelation into that for the interpretation of that.

So that's a critique that Bonson gives with defending Christianity in a piecemeal fashion. We should argue for the resurrection, but it's in a context of a broader worldview that's grounded in revelation and non-neutrality with respect to how we investigate history and all those sorts of things.

But what's the problem if we were to give some of those evidential arguments? There is no problem as long as you avoid those pitfalls of neutrality and autonomy. I would use those arguments. Van Til even said that in some contexts, he finds historical apologetics necessary.

He says it's necessary. He's like, at that point, historical apologetics becomes absolutely necessary. And his critics would say, then why don't you use those arguments? And he says, well, that's the area of the history department of the seminary.

That's never been my strong point. But he's not against it. And so, yeah, if I throw down your rubble and someone's like, well, how do I make sense of everything? Now you've destroyed my worldview. I can give specific evidences, but evidences is different than evidentialism as a methodology.