Molinism Discussion and Q&A Eli Ayala

Well guys, welcome to another edition of the Reform Rookie podcast and video podcast. We have a returning guest on our show today,

Eli Ayala of Revealed Apologetics Ministries. Welcome back

Eli, how are you? I'm doing great, thanks for having me on. Thanks for coming on, we appreciate it.

So as you know, we had set this up in advance, we, as part of our mentoring group, we watched

William Lane Craig and Dr. White's discussion on Molinism. So now, in watching it, we came up with a bunch of questions and we know that you interviewed

Dr. White, you interviewed Guillaume, so this is kind of like right in your wheelhouse.

So, let me ask you, what do you think was Dr. White's strongest argument against Molinism?

Well first, before we get into that, I just want to make a qualification, I am not an expert in this area.

I used to be a Molinist, and so I know the physician, but I do not consider myself an expert, but I will try my best to give you my honest answers and views as to how

I understand the issue. So I just wanted to make that qualification. Sure. So what was your first question again?

My first question was, what do you think Dr. White's strongest argument against Molinism was?

Okay, so there are a couple of things. Number one, I think his appeal to Scripture was really good, although there was the response by Dr.

Craig that we all appeal to Scripture, and then we have our philosophical systems that try to explain things that maybe the

Scriptures don't explicitly teach. So I think that's a strength of his, but at the same time there are responses, so we do need to go a little bit deeper than simply quoting

Scripture. It kind of reminds me of the debates over sovereignty. So an Arminian would say,

I believe that God is sovereign. A Calvinist would say, I believe that God is sovereign. A Molinist will say,

I believe that God is sovereign. And you won't get anywhere unless you define and give content to the word sovereignty.

So it's not enough to quote Scripture. We have to go and actually demonstrate that the

Scripture is teaching what we claim it's teaching. And so I think Dr.

White, as best as he could, given the limited time, I think he was able to put forth some

Scriptures and try to focus the conversation on deriving our position from the biblical text.

It just seemed to me that Dr. Craig didn't really think that this is an issue that is necessarily derived from the text.

Rather, it's a position that is consistent with the text. And so I thought that was a strong emphasis on his part because it gives the impression, as it should, that we should be starting with Scripture.

But at the same time, I do think that there is an interesting discussion and debate to be had as to how to understand those relevant biblical passages.

So that's just one point. Now, the second point is he brings the philosophical objection known as the grounding objection.

And for those who don't know what the grounding objection is, it basically is asking the question of what grounds these counterfactuals of creaturely freedom.

So if they're not grounded in man and they're not grounded in God, where do they come from?

And so you have this issue of the problem, as is seen by some, that Molinists are unable to ground these truths, and hence there seems to be a weird dualism at work in which you have

God as ultimate. And you also have this other thing, this subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom that are true independent of God's will.

And so that has some strength. It is something that has been brought out in the literature.

However, I do think that Dr. Craig did make the point, I think correctly so, and I think

Calvinists who bring up this objection, not just Calvinists, other people bring up the grounding objection. We do have to address this issue of truth -maker theory because in reality, when we're talking about topics like this, we can't claim, well, we just need to stick with the

Bible as though we come to the Bible without presupposition. And so for example, truth -making theory is in fact a valid and legitimate philosophical topic.

And so if we are presupposing certain versions of truth -making truth, when the opponent challenges those presuppositions, we do need to be equipped to kind of respond to that.

So I think his strongest argument were both the points that he made, the biblical aspects and the grounding objection, but I think the

Molinists does have responses to that. I think we need to push a little deeper on those same points or kind of bring into the conversation some more options in terms of critiquing

Molinism. Because I do think that Molinism has a subtlety to it that allows the Molinists some resources in responding to some of the common objections.

Especially when your whole system is based on these creaturely counterfactuals, which according to Dr.

White, these are facts independent of His will and outside of God's control. So these are things that delimit or put handcuffs on God.

So when I hear something like that, I go back to the Scriptures and I say, you know, Psalm 115,

Psalm 135, what can God do? God can do whatever He pleases in the heavens and the earth and beneath the earth.

Would that not contradict that Scripture? Or, you know, are they going to couch it and say, well,

He's doing what He wants within the world that He's actuated? Right. I would say that the

Molinists would say that God does do what He does what He pleases, and what He pleases is to operate under those conditions.

So that if God wants to create creatures with libertarian freedom, and He wants to create based upon His middle knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom,

He is sovereignly choosing to do that. A Molinist could readily admit that maybe

Calvinistic determinism in a sense is true. Some would argue that God could have middle knowledge, but technically not use

His middle knowledge to work out the things that He does. If He chooses to do that, that's based upon His own sovereign choice.

I think a Molinist would probably answer along those lines. At least in my interaction with Molinists, they tended to go that route.

Okay. So when God moves the Assyrians against the

Israelites, and we go to Proverbs and it says the king's heart is in the Lord's hand, He turns it like a watercourse wherever He pleases.

The Molinists would say, well, yeah, that's because that's what man wanted to do.

But if that's the case, why would God have to turn His heart like a watercourse? Why does God have to restrain evil?

I heard Dr. White and Sorum on the video say several times God is actively restraining evil.

If Molinism is based on an actuated world and it's all libertarian free will, why does

God have to interact and restrain the evil of mankind? Wouldn't that be against His free will, so to speak?

Well, I think a Molinist would—when God decrees a world based on His middle knowledge, that would also include

His knowledge of what that free creature would do in response to His interactions. So it's not like a complete hands -off that God's not involved at all.

They would say that God could actualize a world, and that includes His knowledge of what they would do when

He makes certain advances towards a person to bring them to the gospel. Or if He wants an action to occur,

God can providentially be involved such that He knows precisely how that person would respond in those circumstances so as to bring upon His desired result.

I think they would answer something along those lines. It's not just setting up the world, and then

He knows what you're going to do in a circumstance. Some of those circumstances involve God Himself intervening, but intervening in such a way that does not violate the creature's libertarian freedom.

But if He's restraining the evil in the person's heart, isn't that a restraint of their freedom to do otherwise?

Well, it would depend what you mean by restraining. See, this is where you get into some of the technical issues.

So for example, when we say as Calvinists that God determines everything, what do we mean by determining?

You see what I'm saying? We need to understand kind of the metaphysics behind the idea of determination.

Is God determining things by forcing? Is God determining things by actively putting forth power to bring about a result?

Or is God determining something passively in the sense that He's permitting? So it really depends what we mean by God restraining.

Well, what does that mean metaphysically? And I think people have different views on that, and Calvinists have different views on that as well as to what that looks like.

And even Tim Stratton, who's a Molinist, he said that if he was a

Calvinist, he would be a Mysterian Calvinist… … namely that determinism is true, but it's a mystery as to the mechanisms by which he uses it.

And so I don't think that Calvinism commits someone to a specific metaphysical explanation as to how

God does in fact determine certain things that happen. And I think that's true.

If you look at the Reformed confessions, what is affirmed is that God is meticulously sovereign.

He decrees everything that comes to pass, and that man is sufficiently free and morally responsible for his actions.

But not to my knowledge do any of the confessions actually explain dogmatically how

He accomplishes that. That's why you have the confessions that want to affirm what is stated biblically.

And then you have kind of philosophical speculation as to how that might work out.

So you might take a more Jonathan Edwards approach or some other type of approach as to how to explain the metaphysical working out of how

God brings those things about. And I think that's where some of the philosophy comes from. And I think

I would obviously agree with Dr. White at this point that while it's true that we can philosophically reflect on these biblical ideas… … that our philosophical reflections must be guarded, and there must be barriers that are set, parameters that are set by the

Scriptures themselves. And so that's where you'll get into the criticism that if there are certain truths whose values are not determined by God, where in Scripture… … or is there, based upon the very idea of who

God is and how God is described in the Bible, is there anything in the Bible that would support that notion, that idea that there are these truths independent of God?

And if I could add this, because I do think that Molinus brings up a good point, but he doesn't –

I don't think it does what he wants it to do. So for example, in the discussion, Dr.

White was saying, what grounds these truths of these subjunctive conditionals? And Dr.

Craig pointed out, well, you're presupposing truth -maker theory. And not only truth -maker theory, but you're presupposing a certain flavor of truth -making theory, namely truth -maker maximalism.

And so it's this idea that truth must have a truth -maker. There needs to be something that makes that truth true.

And so then he brought a counterexample as to an example that something's true but doesn't have a truth -maker.

And so he gives an example that fail does not exist. And he says there's nothing that makes that statement true.

Or I'll even give you a better one. God exists. What is the truth -maker of God's existence?

Is there anything that makes that proposition true? Well, I mean God exists.

I mean there's no truth outside of that that makes that true or what makes God triune.

Now, suppose that's a valid response by the Moanists, and he's given us an example of truths that don't require truth -makers.

Even if we grant that, it doesn't prove that the truth values of subjunctive conditionals of creaturely freedom are the sorts of things that don't need truth -makers.

You see how that works? So if it's true that not all truths require truth -makers, it doesn't necessitate, therefore, that the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are the things that don't require truth -makers.

Dr. Craig said in the discussion that these counterfactual truths are good candidates for things that don't require truth -makers.

And then I asked myself when I was listening, why? What makes them good candidates? And maybe he has an answer.

I did not hear an answer as to how he explained that just to say that, well, these are good candidates that fit that category that don't require truth -makers.

I didn't hear an argument for that. Maybe there are people who have arguments for that, but I didn't see it. So even if we were to grant this point that not all truths require truth -makers, that doesn't logically necessitate that, therefore, these counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are the things that don't require truth -makers.

So how would a Calvinist go about grounding the free acts of creatures?

Well, we ground everything in God's decretive will, right? Everything – the things have their truths because God has decreed them to be the way that they are, right?

So if God decrees everything that comes to pass, things are true because God defines what those things are by His creative decree, and He creates those things.

He decrees everything based upon His own good pleasure and His purposes, and that's why, as Dr.

White would point out, this is the reason why everything in space and time has meaning.

On Calvinism, there is no such thing as gratuitous evil, for example, evil that just happens for which there is no reason for why it happened.

On Calvinism, everything has a purpose, not only good things but evil things.

The raping of a child, the murder of a person, those are genuinely evil things, but there is an ultimate purpose as to why

God has decreed a world in which that happens, right? Now, does it necessitate that that makes

God evil? Now, that was another presupposition that I thought was kind of an assumption that was kind of –

I wouldn't say – I want to use a pejorative term. It wasn't snuck in there, but to say that God decrees evil from a

Calvinist position is not to equate God with being evil. For there is no law that God violates that says thou shalt not decree evil for your greater purposes, right?

God can decree evil in such a way that alleviates Himself from being responsible for evil because, as many have pointed out,

God is ex -lex. He's not under a law that's higher than Himself that He has to follow.

God has ultimately good purposes that flow out of His perfectly good character, and even the evil that He allows,

He has morally sufficient reasons to permit that. The Molinist uses that as an argument for why

God creates evil – why God permits evil, sorry – and the Calvinist. That option is open to the Calvinist.

As a Calvinist, I say God has morally sufficient reasons for the evil that He allows, and I don't even need to know what those morally sufficient reasons are because that response is typically brought up in the response to the objection that it is a logically incoherent concept for there to be an all -good, all -powerful

God, yet there be evil in the world. So it's an attempt to kind of show an incoherency between an all -powerful and omnibenevolent

God and the existence of evil. And all I need to do to split that kind of dilemma is to suggest that God could have morally sufficient reasons for the evil that He allows.

That shows that there's no contradiction since the contradiction says that a statement cannot be both true and false at the same time in the same way.

There is a sense in which God permits evil, right? He permits evil. He can get rid of it, but He chooses not to.

Why? Well, according to Scripture, He has morally sufficient reasons for the evil that He allows. And while we can't know every single reason for every single evil,

He has given us examples in Scripture in which He shows us that certain evils occur and He has morally sufficient reasons to permit them.

A perfect example is the predestining—the Bible uses the word predestined—the crucifixion of Christ, which is the greatest evil that has ever been committed in the history of mankind.

Many people don't really think of it that way, but it is. Jesus Christ is the only truly sinless and innocent person ever to be put to death, and so that was more evil than the murder of anyone.

And that was the reason why I asked that, where would they be grounded on Calvinism? Because Dr. Craig at least six times said, you know, this makes

God the author of evil. So I'm going to ask one more question, and then I'm going to let the guys—

Well, I just want to address that point because a lot of people bring this up, you know, Calvinism makes

God the author of evil. And then, of course, the Calvinist scurries and tries to explain, well, no it doesn't. I think we need to stop and actually ask what they mean by that phrase.

Jonathan Edwards spoke about this, and he said that, well, the author of evil means that we think that God does something such that he himself is evil, or, you know, something along those lines.

Then no, we don't affirm that God is the author of evil in that sense. When we say that God is the author of evil, you need to be careful to understand in what sense is the

Calvinist saying God is the author of evil? Because in a sense, I would say as a Calvinist, God is not the author of evil.

But in another sense, I would say God is the author of evil, in a particular sense.

But the particular sense in which the Calvinist understands it is not in any interesting sense in which, well,

God is evil. I don't believe God is evil. God is the author of evil in the sense that if it hadn't been for God, no evil would exist because God creates a world in which evil is there.

So in a sense, he's the author. But then again, ironically, on the Molinist position, God is the author of evil in that sense.

And then the Molinist is going to say, no, no, no, no. He's not the author of evil in this detrimental sense because—and then they'll give their

Molinistic explanation. So he's the author of evil in some sense, just not in the kind of sense that would make

God guilty. That's what the Molinist says, and we say the same thing, and the Molinist disagrees because they believe incompatibilism.

They believe that determinism and moral freedom and responsibility are incompatible with each other.

So that God can't determine and man can't be free, sufficiently free and morally responsible at the same time.

And so if God is causing everything, then it falls back on God. But you can't just assume that.

This is the whole debate between incompatibilism versus compatibilism, libertarian freedom versus a compatibilistic sort of freedom.

So this conversation gets really deep in the philosophical weeds, but those sorts of conversations need to be had, and we need to move away from simply just saying

Calvinism makes God the author of evil, case closed. Oh, if Calvinism is true, then we're just puppets and robots.

Well, we need to have a deeper and more in -depth conversation to kind of iron those points out. Because he did say on Calvinism God moves the heart of man to do evil, and I was surprised that he said that so often because Calvinists vehemently deny that.

If anything, like Dr. White said, God is restraining the evil in man's hearts.

But for God's restraint, people would be doing much worse things than what they actually are.

I really think this comes down to your anthropology, what you believe about man.

Because if you believe that man can do good and is free autonomously, well then yeah, then

God can't control him. But when you understand from a Calvinist perspective that man is depraved at the core in his heart, and his intent is to do evil only,

God actively restraining that with his common grace, and metaphysically I can't tell you how he restrains that evil.

But that's going to be a big factor in you understanding how things come to play.

With that, I have my fellow elder here. He has a few questions. You don't have a question? No, it was just a couple questions,

I guess. But I don't know if you'd like to answer them. It looked like it was thinking about how

Dr. Craig handled some of those things, or how he would handle something like Romans 9.

It just seemed interesting to me. He took a lot of Scripture and said, oh yes, well the Molinists would affirm that. We're both appealing to Scripture, but he seems to have a certain tint to it that I felt.

You're saying, well there's these philosophical constructs that we're applying to it.

And yet I think the argument could be made that in Reformed theology, you don't have a specific chapter and verse, but you can find those arguments that are based in Scripture, where it seems like the

Molinistic philosophy is entirely constructed in someone's mind, and then just put over Scripture to see it, and not derive from Scripture itself.

So I'm just wondering, with something like Anthony already mentioned about he does whatever he pleases, but like Romans 9, where Paul is dealing with the objection, why does he still find fault?

There's a certain understanding about what's going on there that presupposes the doctrines of grace, the sovereignty of God, and that's what the

Arminian would object to, and what the Molinists would have to object to. How does a

Molinist interact with something like Romans 9? Well, they would affirm

Romans 9 if you take a look at Dr. Kirk MacGregor's book.

Kirk MacGregor is a prominent Molinist, and I would actually argue one of the best

Molinists that I know. As much as I respect Dr.

Craig and his ability to kind of explain those things, I actually think Dr. MacGregor is more proficient.

Now, Dr. MacGregor would probably deny this, but I think so, based upon my interaction with him. And in his book, in his biography on Molina, there's an entire section as to how

Molina would understand Romans chapter 9, and it sounds very Reformed -ish. He would believe in an individual predestination in election.

So he would take Romans 9 and say that's not referring to corporate election, it's referring to individual election.

And it just happens to be based upon God's middle knowledge. So you have to remember that on Molinism, God does have a decree, and what he decrees does come to pass in every detail.

It just so happens that that decree is based upon this issue that we're debating as to whether it's grounded in anything, and whether libertarian free will is a necessary part of that.

So there's an entire section there in which he treats Romans 9 and really interprets it very closely to how a

Reformed person would, but of course we would take issue with kind of the presuppositions there and kind of the broader implications of the

Molinist paradigm. I think that, for example, in speaking with Guillaume Benyam, who

I had on my show recently, and I highly recommend you guys watch that video.

The entire video is based upon the question, is God the author of sin? And he goes two whole hours in laying out the entire case.

It is a very, very good discussion. And where was

I going with that? I had a brain fart just for a moment here. Oh, and what was

I saying? Can you help me out? Romans 9. They have a Reformed sort of answer. It's just a presupposition.

Oh, yeah, yeah. So when I was talking to Guillaume, he acknowledged the fact that one of the big objections to Molinism is the grounding objection, but it's probably not the route he would take if he were to criticize

Molinism, right? He actually would think that the better route to attack

Molinism is to attack one of its foundational pillars, which is actually libertarian free will.

So suppose you broke the grounding objection. Maybe it's a good objection. I still think there's some merit to it.

I would like to see someone kind of explain how the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom is in fact a good candidate for one of the things that don't require a truthmaker.

I would like to see that ironed out. But suppose we didn't want to use the grounding objection. I think Guillaume is on the right track when he says we really need to focus our guns on libertarian freedom because one of the twin pillars of Molinism is libertarian freedom.

So you have two main key components to Molinism. A, God has middle knowledge. He has this knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom that are located logically prior to God's divine decree.

And then you have this position of libertarian free will.

And so Guillaume goes the route of criticizing that. Now, there are a number of ways you can criticize Molinism. Number one, you can criticize it biblically if you want to go that route and you think that there's a strong biblical case against some of the tenets.

Again, that I think is a plausible route, and it's a good route we should go. However, you do get into the issue of whose interpretation is correct, and so you're going to really have to wrestle and grapple with the text, and I think that's a valid way of going.

You could bring about the grounding objection, of course, which we just mentioned, or you could attack libertarian free will.

And one of the ways you could attack libertarian free will is by giving an argument for the truth of compatibilism since compatibilism, if it's true, libertarian free will is false.

Since libertarianism by definition is the thesis of incompatibilism, namely that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible.

So Molinism, for example, is the conjunction of libertarianism and middle knowledge.

Those are those twin pillars. Libertarianism is the conjunction of incompatibilism, that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible, and the thesis that at least some of our actions are free and therefore indeterminism would be true.

So given these points, any argument for the compatibilist view would refute libertarian free will, and hence by extension would refute

Molinism since Molinism presupposes libertarian freedom. And there are multiple examples of this in the writings of Luther, in the writings of Jonathan Edwards.

For example, Jonathan Edwards tries to refute what some philosophers have called the

PAP, the principle of alternate possibilities, so that in order to have genuine free will, libertarian free will, there needs to be the possibility that you have alternate options.

So you're presented with a choice, and there are multiple options I can choose. I don't have to choose one. And Edwards tried to refute that idea.

So for example, Jonathan Edwards argued along the lines that God, for example, is praiseworthy for acting righteously, even though God is unable to do other than act righteously.

So someone says in order to be praiseworthy or blameworthy, you need to have the ability to do other than what you in fact do.

Well, that's demonstrably false given the fact that God can only do righteous things. He's unable to do other than that which is righteous.

And yet God is praiseworthy. You see, so that demonstrates that the principle of alternative possibility, which seems to be a necessary presupposition of libertarian freedom, is false.

Martin Luther argues along the lines that fallen sinners are blameworthy for failing to live a sinless life even though original sin makes them unable to live a sinless life.

So you argue along these lines that those arguments are true. They go through. Then you go something like this.

Incompatibilism, which libertarianism assumes, incompatibilism, determinism, and moral responsibility are incompatible, entails the principle of alternate possibilities.

But the principle of alternate possibilities is false. Luther and Edwards, I think, demonstrate that.

So incompatibilism is false, which is to say that compatibilism is true, and therefore Molinism is false because Molinism presupposes libertarian freedom and incompatibilism.

So there are a couple of routes that you can go other than just bringing the grounding objection.

Because if you get into this whole truthmaker theory, there may be some responses to it. And as I said,

I'd like to see that hashed out in terms of showing that the subjunctives of creaturely – the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are good candidates for being things that don't require truthmakers.

So I'd like to see that hashed out. But even if that point stands, I think the criticism of libertarian freedom, if it goes through,

I think is a sufficient form of argumentation that would discredit libertarianism and, by extension,

Molinism. That's a really good point. I'm looking forward to listening to your talk with Guillaume.

Now, with regards to Molinism and the decree, once God decrees or actuates a specific world, wouldn't that be determinism also in the sense that put in situation

A, Anthony can make a right -hand turn or a left -hand turn? In world 1,

Anthony makes a right -hand turn. In world 2, Anthony makes a left -hand turn. As soon as God hits the button and actuates world 1 where I make a right -hand turn, although I do have the choice,

I'm determined by my own will to make the right -hand turn. Wouldn't that be determinism also?

Well, I wouldn't say determinism in the form of determined like we understand it.

God can determine the – how can I word this? He can determine the certainty of a particular action, but that's not the same thing as that action being necessary, if that makes sense.

So within libertarian free will, there is this important distinction between different forms of ability.

So, for example, you have in the philosophical literature the difference between the categorical ability to do otherwise versus the conditional ability to do otherwise.

And libertarian free will seems to me to presuppose the categorical ability to do otherwise, so that even though God actualizes a particular world in which it's certain that you will do that which

God decrees, in principle, you do have the categorical ability to do other than what you in fact do.

It's just that you don't do that, and God knows you won't do it, but the ability is still there. Just as my friend

Eric Hernandez used the example of an acorn, he says an acorn has the potential – it's an inside joke for some people.

It has the potential to grow into an oak tree, and suppose you don't put the acorn in the ground.

Well, the fact that the acorn is not in the ground doesn't mean it loses its potentiality. It just means that that which it potentially can grow into is not in fact actualized.

In life fashion, just because God, through middle knowledge, decrees a world, suppose you don't use your libertarian freedom to do option

B. You do option A because God has actualized a world in which option A will happen with certainty.

That doesn't mean you lack the capacity or the potentiality to libertarianly freely choose option

B. You see what I'm saying? So they would probably argue along those lines.

If you have the categorical ability to do otherwise, then that's sufficient for moral freedom and responsibility, and they think that that's necessary.

Whereas the Calvinist would say that we don't think that the categorical ability to do otherwise is sufficient.

In fact, we think that it's false because if it presupposes the principle of alternative possibilities, we think that there's good reason to think that that's false.

So the Calvinist would argue more along the lines of the conditional ability to do otherwise, namely that if conditions were different, then we would have in fact chosen differently than what we in fact chose.

So if the conditions were different, then we would choose differently. On the libertarian view, on the categorical ability, they would say that even if all the conditions were the same up until my point of decision,

I could choose differently than what I did in fact choose. Even if all things were equal,

I can choose one way or the other, and we would say that that's not sufficient, and it's probably false.

Wouldn't that make their choice arbitrary? Some have argued that. Just got to be careful how you phrase that.

I know that Leighton Flowers, for example, when someone asked Leighton, but why does this person choose that and another person chooses another thing?

He says, well, to ask that question is to presuppose a deterministic answer. You're asking why as though there needs to be this other thing outside of the fact that the person simply desired to do it.

So, yeah, it does seem arbitrary, and I think there's a conversation to be had there, but you need to be able to anticipate some of the possible objections and push back at that point.

Jake, do you have a question? Honestly, a lot of this is going right over my head.

So, you had talked about, one of the things I wanted to ask was, when

James White says the sovereignty of God, and Bill Craig says the sovereignty of God, they don't mean the same thing.

What does Bill Craig mean by the sovereignty of God when he says that?

I would say that when Bill Craig uses the word sovereignty, as a Molinist, he does believe that God is meticulously in control, but he thinks that that is not inconsistent with creatures having libertarian freedom.

Now, we as the Calvinists would think that libertarian freedom gives the creature a little bit too much freedom that seems to give the impression that there are just things that God can't do because he's limited by those things.

So we think that challenges what we think the Bible teaches with respect to the nature of God's sovereignty.

Does that make sense? So Dr. Craig would say God is sovereign to give libertarian free will.

He's able to do that if he wants. But the nature of that will seems to limit God so strongly in many regards that the

Calvinists would say, when I read the scriptures, I don't see God limited in the way that the assumption of libertarian free will seems to present

God. Does that make sense? In the Bible, it seems that God, when he wants something, he gets what he wants.

And when it looks like he doesn't get what he wants, we do make those distinctions between his prescriptive will and his decretive will, and we have our explanations for that.

I don't see this picture in the Bible where, gee, God just can't do something about that, or it's in the creature's hand.

Things like that, I think, make Calvinists break out in hives. And I think for good reason.

I mean, I'm a Calvinist, right? One of the things that challenged me when I was a

Molinist is that when I stopped reading Molinist books and I just read the scripture, and I know this is not a great argument, this is kind of just appealing to my existential experience, but when

I conceive of God through the lens of Molinism when I'm studying, and then I read the scriptures, they don't look like the same

God to me. Now, I'm not saying Molinists are worshiping a false God. I believe they're Christians, right, whatever. You heard it here first on the

Reform Rookie. Eli said... Yeah, no, I'm not saying that at all. What I meant by that is that when

I read God as presented in scripture, I just don't see God as presented in Molinism.

It almost makes me feel uncomfortable when I come to the scripture through the paradigm of Molinism, and then

I read of a God who is so kingly and in control.

It just rubs me the wrong way, and I do see a difference there.

Now, granted, you're going to see people who say, well, when I assume the Calvinist God, and I read the scriptures,

I don't see that. Well, yeah, that's why I'm not making an argument. I'm just saying, for me, I always thought that was an interesting feature.

It seemed like – how can I say this? I don't want to commit a genetic fallacy or something like that, but I get suspicious of the fact that Calvinism, whether true or false, seems to be derived from a desire to exegete the text, right?

And Molinism seems to be an attempt to answer a theological and philosophical question.

And that rubs me the wrong way. It doesn't mean it's false. You have to have those arguments. But it seems to me that I want to go with the method that says, what does the text actually say?

Let's look at it in context. And I know there's disagreement and debate there. As opposed to taking the method of, hmm,

I have this really puzzling philosophical question that I want to try and solve. And so we create this system that maybe might not be completely unbiblical, but I create this system, and it seems to be consistent with the

Bible, and it seems to be really fruitful in answering the question. So I'm going to adopt this view that actually affects my entire way that I interpret scripture.

I think that's something that, at least for me, and I say this respectfully because I know that there are a lot of godly

Molinists out there, and I don't want to offend anyone. But for me, my antennas really go up when

I have to adopt that sort of method. That's true for me. No questions?

Yeah. I just wanted to... So at the end of the conversation that came to play,

Bill Craig had talked about how, you know, we talked about God's omnipresences, omnipotence, and all these different attributes of God.

He said, if I remember this correctly, he said that he doesn't see them necessarily in scripture.

Now, as a Christian, as I've been growing in my faith, and as I've been reading scriptures, I've wanted to bring up a couple of different portions of scripture.

And maybe you could respond with, how would a Molinist understand these scriptures?

And how would they interpret them according to their perspective?

I'll try. And you have to understand, too, you have to understand Molinism is not monolithic.

There are different interpretations. So for example, I'm not sure if you know this, but one of the attractive things about Molinism, and this is one of the things that attracted me to Molinism, is that it's actually pretty flexible.

You could have Molinists who lean more towards kind of an Arminian sort of flavor. And then you have

Molinists who lean very closely to like a Calvinistic view. So it really depends where you lie on that spectrum.

It might affect how you understand certain passages, and how God, in fact, uses his middle knowledge to accomplish the things that he accomplishes.

But go ahead, I'll give it a try. I hope I can. I'll just tell you if I can't, if I don't know how they would respond,

I'll just tell you. Okay. Do you want to do one at a time, or do you want me to just give you all three? Yeah, just let's try one at a time.

Okay. So the immediate one that I thought of was in Job chapter 12.

And I'll read the verses that I'm specifically thinking of. In verse 16 it says,

So wait, I apologize. Job 12 what? Verse 16. Okay.

It says, And he goes on, and I wanted to just skip to verse 23.

He says, So now, when

I read that text, I'm getting a big picture of who

God is, what he is able to do, how he deals with nations, how he deals with men.

Specifically where it says the deceived and the deceiver are his. It shows me that God is in control of both the one who is deceiving and the deceived.

Now when I think of that, I'm trying to understand how a Molinist would take that text into consideration.

So maybe you can help me with that. Yeah, so you said that you think that that sounds like God is, he's really in control.

And the Molinist would not disagree with that. The Molinist is not going to sit here and say God's not in control.

The difference is going to be, how does God use his control? Right? The answer of the

Calvinist is going to be different than the answer of the Molinist. So for example, You move down to, what was that last verse?

Well, when God makes a nation great and then destroys them, the

Molinist is going to say, well, when he destroys those nations, he doesn't do it arbitrarily. Usually the destruction of those nations are due to judgment.

And so on Molinism, they'll just say, you know, God actualized a world in which they freely disobeyed.

And God knew that in their free disobedience, he would also bring about the judgment that he does in fact bring.

And so they would see it as compatible with their model. Right? So God is in control.

He raises people up and brings them down. But that's not arbitrary. He brings them down as a result for the judgment of their libertarily free, morally responsible choices.

And God acts, you know, justly in response to those. But those are their libertarily free choices.

That's what makes their choices morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. Because of that particular version of free will.

So again, and I think correctly, the Molinist will point out that you need to interpret Scripture in light of Scripture.

So taking this idea that God raises and brings down, they would argue, well, according to Scripture, when

God raises and brings down, it's usually as a result of his judgment. And Molinists have no problem believing that God brings judgment because he judges those who use their genuine freedom to do that which they shouldn't have done.

And so as a result, God brings about their judgment. But he does so through decreeing a world based on those counterfactuals and all of the different details that are involved in that.

Now the question is, now on a surface level, that makes sense from a Molinist perspective. But if libertarian free will is false, then everything

I just said was meaningless. So again, so there's a debate to be had.

That's why I appreciated the approach that Dr. White took in using the grounding objection.

I think there's something to that. That's a conversation to be had because I too am not satisfied with the

Molinist answer. But at the same time, there are other routes to engage

Molinism. And someone like Yong Bin Yong sees that attacking libertarian freedom is probably a better way to go.

But again, it depends. It really depends who you're talking with and whether you think each of those points have the merit that we think they have.

And so that's going to really depend on, that's really going to affect how you engage the topic.

When, in Isaiah chapter 46, verse 10.

Let me just get there real quick. Isaiah 46? Yep. Isaiah 46, chapter 10, verse 10, sorry?

Yep, 46, verse 10. Okay. It says, declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying my counsel shall stand and I will accomplish all my purpose.

Now, when it says declaring the end from the beginning, we believe that it's saying that God knows the end.

He knows the beginning. Things that are going to happen in the future, things that have happened beforehand, and he declares it.

And he says my counsel shall stand and I will accomplish all my purpose. Now, when

Will Craig says that, you know, we, as Calvinists, we believe that God is timeless, you know, faceless.

Like, he says, well, you can't prove that scripturally. But, I would,

I mean, correct me if I'm wrong, but what I understand, this is showing the eternality of God, who

God is. That he is transcendent, that he is outside of space and time, that he knows what is to come, what has come already, you know?

So, how would, how would we, you know, is this, could this be an argument towards the

Moanist position at all? Well, you do want to make the distinction between the eternality of God and the timelessness of God.

They're not the same thing, and I think a lot of people equate that. So, for example, a Moanist could say that God is timeless, but the timelessness of God is an accidental attribute.

And so, that is only in light of the fact that God exists before he created the universe.

So, in that sense, he existed timelessly, but at the moment of creation, he relates in some way to time.

So, that prior to creation, if we can use the language prior to, I mean, that's not really a coherent way of addressing it, but if we could use that language, there is a state of affairs in which

God exists timelessly. And then upon creating, then there's a state of affairs in which God relates in some way to time.

So, you want to make a distinction between eternality, this forever enduring, right, that God never began and will never go out of existence, and this idea of whether he exists without past, present, and future.

You see what I'm saying? So, we want to make those distinctions. So, I think from this perspective,

I am God, there is none like me. Which verse did you...? Oh, yeah. "...declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times, things not yet done."

The Moanist would affirm that. God, there is none like God, especially because he has little knowledge.

Who else has little knowledge? Come on, man. There is none like God, declaring the end from the beginning.

Remember, on Moanism, God has a decree. On Moanism, it's God who chooses which world he wants to actualize.

God could actualize a world in which everyone is saved if he wanted to. God could actualize a world in which libertarian free will was not a thing.

Moanists would affirm that God could have decreed a world in which Calvinism, you know, determinism is true.

God could have little knowledge, but not necessarily use that little knowledge to do the decreeing, right? They could affirm those sorts of things.

So, they would say that, yeah, he declares the end from the beginning because he's the one who chooses the world he wants, and then decrees it.

And then when he decrees it, it falls under the category of his free knowledge, and that which he decrees will most certainly come to pass.

But they think that that's consistent with libertarian freedom. So, I think a Moanist would affirm this verse and say, yeah,

Moanism gives a more robust understanding of that passage, as they see it, of course.

Okay. You had said that God relates to us in time.

Did you say that? Is that correct? Well, some people hold to the idea that—I don't have to use the philosophical one— ontologically—I won't use that because I don't want to make people's ears bleed.

There was a state of affairs that only

God existed, and he existed timelessly. But, upon creating,

God then, in some sense, relates to us in time. So that timelessness is an accidental feature of God.

It is not a necessary attribute. Eternality is, but timelessness isn't, for some people.

And I do believe that, if I'm—I mean, I would be willing to be corrected on this. I think that's Dr. Craig's position, that Psalm's creation, right?

Before creation, without creation, God was timeless. But then, he relates to time upon creation, and as he's relating to, you know, his creation.

Now, how that works out, I'm not sure how that works, but that's going to be related to a bunch of other theological assumptions,

God's simplicity and things like that, which will go way beyond, you know. I don't know why

God's simplicity is so not simple. It's a very difficult concept. If there ever was anything not simple, it's getting into divine simplicity.

But I think there's an important distinction between God's timelessness and God's eternality.

Now, Reformed folk typically believe that God is timeless, and that's actually an essential attribute of God, that God is still timeless, even as we speak.

And then you have people who believe that timelessness is really an accidental feature of God, and that there was a point in time in which he was timeless, and, you know— well, a point in time, but that doesn't really make sense.

But there was a state of affairs in which he was timeless, and then, upon creating, there's kind of an interaction there. So he's no longer timeless, but he is always eternal.

So you just want to keep that distinction in place, because you do have people who have different perspectives on that. Thank you.

One last thing, brother. I know Dr. Whitehead brought up this objection when he was on your show, talking about God as Creator, and he asked the question, did

God have middle knowledge of Jesus' actions before creation?

And you had said, hmm, that's really interesting. Well, the reason why

I thought that was interesting— a lot of people making comments are like, what the heck is he talking about?

It's like he's not even saying anything remotely related. But actually, when I was a

Mullen, and I was actually trying to call a couple of people, I haven't really—at least today, I wasn't able to get in touch with any of my

Mullenist friends. I have a very small window of time when I'm able to make a phone call, and it's usually on my 50 -minute drive home from work.

So sometimes, you know, someone will pick up and have a conversation. But when I was a Mullenist, I could have sworn that I was told that on Mullenism, God cannot have middle knowledge of His own actions.

That He has middle knowledge of creaturely freedom. That He doesn't have—you know, there's no middle knowledge of what

God would do. And if that's true, then that's interesting, what

Dr. White brought up, because in the Incarnation, you have the God -Man. I mean, Jesus Christ is

God in human flesh. And so, is there this sort of knowledge when you're talking about the

God -Man? I wonder. That was a question I wanted to ask a few people, and I think that'd be an interesting question to pursue. I'd be interested in the answer.

I'm definitely interested in that answer, because that made me start thinking, okay, can Jesus do different things?

Would Jesus do different things in different worlds under different conditions? You know, it just doesn't seem to fit

Colossians 1 -15, that Jesus is preeminent before all things, and in Him all things hold together.

Like, Jesus is the starting point. Well, it's going to be—this is another interesting point, that if God doesn't have middle knowledge of His own actions,

His own choices, and Jesus is the God -Man, how you answer that question is going to relate very much to what you think the nature of Christ is.

And so, Dr. White was making an interesting connection with Dr. Craig's neo -Apollinarianism, his view of Christology, and was wondering whether his view with respect to the nature of Christ was related to whether counterfactual knowledge of what

Jesus would do. He was making that connection, saying, I wonder if there's a connection there. Again, that's another interesting—maybe there isn't.

But I, thinking about these things, I'm like, wow, that's actually a very fascinating point. I'd like to pursue that a little more.

Sure, yeah, when you get that, let us know. We'll be tuning in to that particular podcast or video vlog.

So, well, brother, we really appreciate it. We're coming up close to an hour now. I very much appreciate you giving us—

That was fast. It felt so quick. Yeah, no, no, no. It was quick. I've been immersing myself in this stuff for the past week since Dr.

White did this, just trying to get my own understanding down.

I don't like the fact that—I like the grounding objection, the fact that creaturely counterfactuals cannot be grounded in the mind of God.

Where do those true values happen? So many other things on Molinism. If person

A—if God actuates world A, person A might get saved.

But if He actuates world B, that same person may not get saved, which really, to me, again, limits

God. He can't save whoever He wants. Well, we want to be careful, though, because what you're appealing to there is issues of salvation, which are not necessary components of Molinism.

So this is really important to understand that Molinism is a view of God's omniscience.

It's not necessarily a soteriological position. People can apply

Molinism to soteriology, but there's not a necessary connection. So we need to be careful because when we critique a particular

Molinistic application to soteriology, that's different than actually critiquing

Molinism in its bare form, like what Molinism is. So again, there's

Molinism, and then there are different applications of Molinism. Criticism of the application is not necessarily a legitimate criticism on the view itself, if that makes sense.

Yeah, no, no, that does. I guess the question, because I hear Dr. Craig saying he wanted to create a world in which the maximum number of people would be saved.

If that's an entailment of Molinism, well, then they're going to – no?

Well, I would say that's an entailment of a particular application of Molinism to salvation.

Got it. So that would be a critique against that application, not necessarily a critique of God in fact having middle knowledge.

Okay. On Molinism – I lost count how many times Molinists – when

I was starting off, Molinists were saying, Molinism is not a soteriological framework, you know?

So I want to make sure I remember that because I do know that they're not the same. There are different ways that Molinism can be applied, and we want to be careful to keep those distinct

Molinism and the applications of Molinism. So would you say on Molinism man is preeminent in that God does not want to violate their free will?

So basically man's will is first and foremost?

I wouldn't say first and foremost because on Molinism God doesn't have to create creatures with libertarian freedom if he doesn't want to.

The Molinist could just say that God wants to because that's maybe – someone might say that's a necessary prerequisite for meaningful love relationships, right?

So that if it's true love, then libertarian freedom needs to be the case because otherwise you're being forced, and how can forced love be true love?

Something like that. You have people who make those sorts of arguments. See, it seems like no matter what I ask, the

Molinism can just pop something out and say, well, God may want this, God may want that.

Well, I want to be careful here because Calvinists have their rescuing devices as well.

We call them rescuing devices. Dr. Lyle. Yeah, well, I mean it's a good point.

When we are put in a corner as Calvinists, I mean someone says, well, Calvinism makes God the author of sin.

Well, what do you mean by that? Oh, come on. You know what I mean by that. Well, we have our rescuing devices.

They have their rescuing devices, but here's the point. Whose rescuing devices are best being derived from principles in Scripture?

Not even just bare text, but principles laid out in the text. Who is using their rescuing devices in a legitimate way?

As opposed to – you see what I'm saying? Our philosophical speculation needs to be guarded by scriptural parameters, but so does our rescuing devices.

I would argue that the rescuing device of the Molinists is not the same as the rescuing device of the

Calvinists. I think the Calvinists is on better grounds, but of course I would say that because I'm a Calvinist. Right. I think when we're talking about God's sovereignty, the

Calvinists, like you or myself, are going to point to a Scripture and say, okay, this is why

I think this. Now, we may be wrong in our understanding of what that Scripture actually means, but at least we're pointing to a

Scripture. Whereas I think with Molinists, the ones I've interacted with anyway, they're not giving you a

Scripture for what their answer is at times and just say, well,

God may want the most people saved, or God may want this, or God may want that.

Well, he could decide to do this, or he could decide to do that, and they don't give a scriptural answer to why they're saying that.

Because I think it's just more of a philosophical type thing.

Well, I still want to be careful because I could say that about God as a

Calvinist. Well, God could have morally sufficient reasons for doing it this way. You see, so it's not as simple.

I agree that there is a philosophy being overlaid in Scripture, but I want to be very careful that that's not always the case.

Sometimes the Molinist is drawing from principles that are in Scripture, and they're trying to make application.

I just disagree with the kind of application they're drawing out of biblical principles. So for example, this idea of the ability to do otherwise, that's kind of a philosophical construct, but they believe it's grounded in principles laid out in Scripture.

The problem is we disagree with them. So when you show, for example, that Scripture gives examples of counterfactuals, some people say, yeah, their middle knowledge is in the

Bible. Some people don't. Dr. Craig doesn't say it like that, but I've heard some people say, Molinism is in the

Bible. Look, there's this counterfactual knowledge, and they'll give you a Scripture. So they're using a scriptural principle and trying to draw some application there, and we would point out that, well, wait a minute.

Calvinists affirm the reality of counterfactuals. The issue that Molinism is trying to demonstrate is where does that counterfactual knowledge of God exist?

Does it exist logically prior to his divine decree or posterior to his divine decree?

And how you answer that is not something you're going to get from the text because the text is not really addressing that.

We're trying to take principles and extract from those principles other things that we think can be drawn from that foundation.

And so I think both of us, Molinists and Calvinists, are trying to do that. We just think that the Molinist is not doing it in a legitimate way with respect to some points they're trying to make.

Yeah, I agree. Once again, brother, you are extremely fair and give us great insight into these things.

So we very much appreciate you, and we appreciate your channel and your podcast. Tell everybody again who listens to our show where they can find you.

Well, they can find my show obviously on Revealed Apologetics on YouTube, and you can look up Revealed Apologetics on iTunes.

So I take the audio for my interviews on YouTube, and I put them as podcasts on iTunes. And they can check out my website, revealedapologetics .com.

And if folks don't know why Revealed Apologetics is called Revealed Apologetics, my primary focus is not so much on Calvinism and Molinism, although it's a very interesting topic.

I like the topic. The primary focus is in promoting apologetics in general, and presuppositional apologetics in particular, because I believe the way we should defend the faith is actually revealed in Scripture, and so hence the name

Revealed Apologetics. So you can find me on iTunes, YouTube, and the website revealedapologetics .com.

Would you happen to have a place where I could take a class on presuppositionalism? Well, yes,

Anthony. Thank you for asking. I do have recorded lectures along with PowerPoints and outlines that folks can sign up to take my course where I teach presuppositional apologetics.

I sometimes offer what's called the premium package in which I meet with students who are taking this five -week course once a week to kind of go a little deeper.

But when I'm not doing that, the course is available anytime all throughout the year if you want to just go at your own pace, get the lectures, get the notes, the

PowerPoints, and work through the content, and people can sign up for that on revealedapologetics .com,

and you pick the option Presupp U, presuppositional apologetics, Presupp University, and it'll give you the information there to enroll in the class.

Where are you at with your systematic theological class? Oh, yeah.

Again, we're in a transition of moving, so I have my office set up, but there's still a lot to be done, so a lot of those things have kind of slowed down right now.

I haven't been able to write anything, but once we settle after the new year comes, I think I'll be in a better position to really have my blocks of time to be able to give attention to some of those things, but that's definitely something

I want to do soon. Terrific, brother. Thanks so much for everything you're doing. It was another enjoyable talk. I look forward to talking to you more in the future, brother.