Eli Ayala vs R.C. Sproul's Criticisms of Presup

All right, welcome back to another episode of Revealed Apologetics. I'm your host, Eli Ayala, and today we are going to be interacting with the late, great Dr. R .C.

Sproul.

I am venturing to go into the realm in which angels fear to tread, okay? I don't do this lightly as I greatly respect Dr. Sproul. I consider myself, well, I consider him a mentor. I've learned so much from Dr. Sproul and his work, and I think he was a theologian par excellence, and so obviously I'm not going to be coming at this in any cavalier sense.

For those who have no idea who R .C. Sproul is, we can welcome you out from under the rock that you've been living under, okay? Just a little bit about R .C.

Sproul. R .C.

Sproul was a very prominent theologian, a pastor, an author within the Reformed tradition. He played, I think, he played a really significant role in popularizing Reformed theology in a lot of ways, through his writings, his teaching ministry, and the founding of Ligonier Ministries, which I highly recommend.

Obviously, I'm going to be critical of the apologetic and the critiques that Dr. Sproul had of presuppositional apologetics, but that's not to say that his ministry is not useful. I listen to the Ligonier app all the time.

My wife listens to the Ligonier app. There are awesome lectures and classes that cover various topics from church history to systematic theology. I highly, highly recommend the Ligonier app. Again, it's one of the ways through Ligonier and through his teaching that Dr. Sproul has greatly contributed to the spread of Reformed theology, especially to kind of the lay level,.

Okay?

Sproul's emphasis in his teaching has been on a wide range of topics from the holiness of God, the sovereignty of God, the authority of scripture, and I think these teachings that he chose to focus on very much resonated with Christians who really are looking for a deeper understanding of their faith.

I think he was able to bring these important theological concepts, systematic theology, church history, Reformed theology, in his mastery of communication. I think Dr. Sproul was able to kind of take complex issues and give it to the masses,.

Okay?

He was able to teach in such a way that he literally painted a picture in your mind, so you kind of got the point of what he was saying. And so to that end, I think Dr. Sproul is someone that is to be greatly respected, even for folks who don't agree with Reformed theology.

I mean, let's just be honest. As a teacher, he was an excellent communicator. Now, I want to say this too, okay? I've listened to hours and hours and hours and hours and hours and hours and hours and hours and hours worth of R .C. Sproul lectures, and I've listened to hours and hours and hours and hours and hours and hours of Dr. Bonson's lectures.

And I think both of them are excellent, excellent, excellent teachers. But in my opinion, okay, this might be blasphemous to those who are presuppositionalists, but in terms of being a teacher, I think R .C. Sproul was the better teacher, the better communicator than Dr. Bonson, although I absolutely love Dr. Bonson, and I think he was an excellent teacher as well.

There's something about R .C., the way that he communicated. He kind of conveyed the energy and excitement that he had for theology and theological truth that kind of very much was communicated to those who would listen.

And I think he did that in a way that perhaps Dr. Bonson didn't. They're very different teaching styles. Now, all of that said, okay, in my view, okay, despite R .C.'s numerous positive contributions, I find his specific critiques of the presuppositional approach, and I say this respectfully, lacking in accuracy, and I won't say it's lacking depth.

I think he does try to grapple with some key issues that I think are relevant in the apologetic methodology debate, but I don't think he gets it quite right. Even in the book he co-authored with John Gerstner and Arthur Lindsley, the criticisms that are launched in that book I think seem very misguided, and they address a lot of issues that Dr. Van Til addressed specifically in his writing.

So I think there is a weakness there. With respect to the book that he co-authored, if folks are interested, it's called Classical Apologetics, and then I think the subtitle there in the title was A Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics or something like that.

With respect to the quality of the criticisms offered in that book, I'm going to echo Dr. Bonson's sentiments with respect to that book, that if there is an adequate critique of the presuppositional approach, it's not found in Sproul's book and Gerstner's book and Lindsley's book, Classical Apologetics.

This is just honest. If there is an adequate critique, I don't think it's captured well in that book in my estimation. Now, let's examine some of Dr. Sproul's specific criticisms of presuppositional apologetics and attempt to kind of provide some context and maybe some commentary.

And again, I do this respectfully. I'm going to be playing some video here. There's actually two videos I want to play that kind of R .C. is expressing. One is in response to a question or a series of questions, and then another one's kind of within the context of teaching in a classroom.

He offers kind of his criticisms there, and then I want to interact with that. But before we do that, I want to welcome everyone. Thank you so much for coming in. And let's take a look at the comments here.

We have rogue Calvinist. We have Cedric and Myron, Jess, Marie Sedgwick. Welcome. And and Martin Luther, Martin Luther.

Let's see here.

Let's see what he has here. We'll address here. OK, so Martin says, hey, how should we as believers who are presuppositional read and understand Dr. Bonson in light of the lawsuit occurring right now?

This is a genuine question.

Yeah.

Thank you so much for that question. I can't get into the details of the lawsuit and the details of what all of that entails, because that's going to divert from the entire topic of what I'm addressing.

Here's the thing. I very much think that we should wait to see all the details come out before drawing any conclusions. OK, obviously, we don't want to. We if there's a lawsuit, we must be evidentialist.

If there is a lawsuit or accusations made by Dr. Bonson or anyone in the Bonson family, I think we need to be patient and wait for all of the data to come out instead of drawing hasty conclusions. But be that as it may, suppose the accusations, which we're not going to get into here, suppose they're all accurate.

The truth that is taught in Bonson's lectures and his books and things like that don't change because of other issues. Now, obviously, that's going to cause us to see Dr. Bonson in a different light if the accusations are correct and the details of all these things.

Come out.

But I think that we should we should wait patiently until all the details come out and then begin to try to see the situation through a biblical lens. And so I think that's that that's how I could respond to it without getting too much into detail there.

So I hope that I hope that's sufficient. And I'm sorry if folks are listening like, what is he talking about? So so there you go.

All right.

And you're welcome. It was my pleasure. I know that's a tough it is a tough question, but there you go.

All right.

Well, without further ado, I want to start playing Dr. Sproul. And again, I'm going to say this real quick. I am going to look into the camera right now as a hardcore, sold out presuppositionalist. I am I am.

A huge R .C. Sproul fan. OK, so let me see.

Is this about, you know, I'm hooked and really enjoy it.

Oh, thank you.

Let's see.

Hariborn Music says, hey, Eli, your academy lessons on Apologia. I took your academy academy lessons on Apologia. Now I'm hooked, man. Really enjoy your content and expression. Thank you so much. First time here for live.

Don't know R .C. Sproul at all, which is a shame. That is a shame. OK, that is a shame. I would not point you to R .C. for accurate critiques of presuppositionalism, but I would highly recommend you check out his stuff, download the Ligonier app right now.

And if you have your phone with you and there is some priceless theological teaching there, so I highly recommend him in that regard. But thank you so much for those kind words. Just as a just as kind of a an extra point here, I did record lectures at Apologia Church, five part lecture series on practical precept.

But I'm also recording my version of that course that is actually includes my PowerPoint presentation and much longer presentation. So if folks chucked out the stuff on Apologia, but you're wanting to go a little deeper and have visual kind of aids as I work through the material, that's going to be recorded soon and will be available on the website and excellent way to support what I'm doing.

As well.

Helps me pay the bill. So that's definitely useful when folks sign up for that. So I appreciate it. If you're interested in that, you can check out the Revealed Apologetics website and I'll let folks know when those videos are up.

All right.

So without further ado, let's jump right in. OK, and boom, we're going to start and then I'm going to stop and give commentary. And of course, this is all this is all in goodwill, as I'm going to keep saying it.

I absolutely love I absolutely love R .C.

Sproul.

But let's check out his criticisms of presuppositional apologetics and make sure I have the right video here.

Boom.

OK, do do.

All right, let's go.

Nope, we're going to we're going to fast forward that until we get to the Dr. Sproul.

Part.

There we go.

It's a little commentary there by the person who created this specific video.

There we go.

Let's say it's going to start here. Wait, so you can't hear it. That's helpful. Thank you. OK, if you can't hear the video, the audio is playing on your headphones, I think. Oh, no, it's not. Let me see here.

I I think.

OK, so let me try something. I'm sorry. This is what happens when we go live. I'm going to remove this. I'm going to remove this. OK, and I'm going to stop the screen and I'm going to present. I could read lips.

We're not going to make you read lips. That would be terrible. So we're going to share the screen here. And I think there is a also share the audio. OK, so I think I have to turn that on. So window boom.

And if you guys can give me a thumbs up or an acknowledgement that you can hear it once I start playing it.

OK.

All right.

So we're going to start again.

Ready?

I'm going to come back over here. And if someone could let me know as soon as they could hear it.

Ready?

Someone indicate in the comments if you can hear that.

It's still me.

OK, let's see here. We're going to remove it again. So sorry. Let's see if we can fix this quickly. Stop screen. Going to present share screen. Share screen. Also share tab.

OK, I have that on there.

Select the tab.

Boom.

Share audio.

Huh?

Let's see here.

To share audio, share a tab instead. OK, so maybe I'm doing it wrong.

Let's see here.

All right.

How about now?

Ready?

This is this is it. This is the luck. This is the lucky one. OK, let me be careful. I'm a Calvinist. I can't say lucky. Otherwise, someone will make a long video in response.

Let me see here.

Dr. Sproul, after Dr. Myers talk back here in the room, you mentioned, boy, that's that's great apologetics. And there's a question here asking an apologetical method question. Can you explain the difference between presuppositional and classical apologetics?

And maybe elaborate on what you meant by even Dr. Myers talk and how you thought that that was was well presented, apologetical argument within a framework of the different schools of thought of approaching apologetics.

There are different schools of thought with respect to apologetics. I can think of at least three right off the bat. There's presuppositionalism in the different schools of that. There's axiomatic presuppositionalism that follows Gordon Clark.

And then there's the other presuppositional school called follows Cornelius Van Til. And then there's a second approach to apologetics, which is called evidential.

All right.

Now, before he goes into the other methodologies, I think this is key. And I think this is very important. And I appreciate that Dr. Sproul mentioned the distinction between various schools of presuppositional thought so that this is very true.

So when we talk about presuppositional methodology, you do have different streams. And this is very important, especially if you're trying to offer critiques of presuppositionalism. You're going to have to be specific.

Are you critiquing the Vantillian stream? Are you critiquing the the Clarkian stream? For example, even Francis Schaeffer is often placed within the context of, quote, unquote, a presuppositional approach.

And so we're going to have to define our terms. This is important because there are those who will critique Van Til. They think people think they're critiquing Van Til when in actuality, they're critiquing Gordon Clark.

This happened to me when I was debating negation of P, a debate that I did some years ago on my YouTube channel, a gentleman by the name of negation of P, very good debate discussion. We had a very respectful interaction.

But a lot of his criticisms against what he perceived to be presupp was criticisms against a Clarkian form of presuppositionalism, which places a great emphasis on unprovable axioms as one starting point of which we then logically deduce the rest of our worldview from those unprovable axioms.

So that's not quite what Van Til argued for. And it's and it's makes the world of a difference. For on the one hand, Gordon Clark believed you couldn't prove your axiom, whereas Van Til, starting with kind of an ultimate presuppositional starting point, he believed you could objectively prove the truth of your starting point.

So on the one hand, one is more fideistic. You start with a starting point. It can't be proven, but then you build a system out of that. It answers the hard philosophical questions and it's consistent.

And so you're saying this is the best worldview, whereas Van Til says, no, our starting point is actually objectively provable via a transcendental argument. So that's that's a key difference there. So I very much appreciate his acknowledgement of the differentiation between different presuppositional schools.

Now, this can get confusing. And I think this is one of the reasons why Dr. Scott Oliphant from Westminster Theological Seminary is not is not a big fan of the terminology of presuppositional apologetics.

I agree with him. The term presuppositional is too ambiguous. Now, I'm not sure his substitute title for the methodology is going to stick. He calls it covenantal apologetics. I think that's a little better, but I don't know if it's going to jive with people.

Presupp is kind of just in the the the language associated with the method. So I think it's going to stay that way. But I understand the frustration. OK, let's continue here.

And and then the third view that I espouse, which is called classical view of apologetics. There are lots of differences, Chris, and it would be unfair to try to define them absolutely in the short term.

But the fundamental differences in presuppositional apologetics argues this way, that the only way you can come to a sound conclusion of the existence of God is that you must begin with the assertion of God's existence.

You must presuppose the existence of God in order to have a sound argument for the existence of God. Evidentialism sees that.

OK, so here is a couple of things here. So R .C. summarizes the presupp approach as he says, the only way this is presuppositionalism to him, this is what he thinks we're saying. The only way you can come to a sound conclusion.

OK, for the existence of God is that you must begin with the assertion of God's existence. You must presuppose the existence of God in order to have a sound argument for the existence of God. And I think describing presuppositionalist arguments in this way, I think is is lacking in precision and clarity.

I think, OK, it doesn't actually actually capture the essence of what presuppositionalists are saying. It's it's not it's not accurate. OK, now when we dive deeper into the discussion, it's going to become very evident that the terminology that Dr. Sproul uses is going to be based upon his misunderstanding of of what presuppositionalism is all about.

I'm not going to say that he purposefully uses certain terms so as to set up a straw.

Man.

I don't think he's doing that on purpose. I think it's the language he uses. And I'll point this out later in the second video, because he kind of uses more precise language with respect to what he thinks we're saying.

I think it's very much based on his misunderstanding of presuppositionalism. Now, essentially, our stance is that the triune God and his revelation established the necessary framework for argumentation itself.

OK, we believe that the Christian God and his revelation provides what we call the necessary precondition. What must be the case first in order for something like argument to make sense? OK, now, with respect to the structure of the transcendental argument generally follows the pattern something along the lines of X is the necessary condition for Y, Y, therefore X.

OK, and so we're basically saying, you know, something is the precondition for this other fact. OK, and we're arguing that the Christian worldview is the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of whatever fact you want to put in its place.

So we're not simply asserting, as you as you'll see, he thinks we're asserting. We're not simply asserting in terms of argument structure. OK, God exists. Therefore, God exists or anything along those lines.

That's not what we're saying. Now, we also made reference. He said that the only way you can come to a sound conclusion of the existence of God is that you must begin with the assertion of God's existence.

You must presuppose the existence of God in order to have a sound argument for the existence.

Of God.

So I think the concept here of sound argument, when he uses that language, I think things get a little muddled. Now, a sound argument relies on true premises. And so this is the distinction between what we talk about in logic, the difference between validity and soundness.

OK, so soundness of an argument deals with whether the premises are true. Now, we acknowledge as presuppositionalists that unbelievers or non-presuppositional apologists, for that matter, can construct arguments with true premises and have arguments that have valid structure.

The conclusions follow from the premises. However, our question as presuppositionalists, it really goes beyond a surface level issues. We're actually talking about things at the paradigmatic level. So what foundational truths about reality must be the case in order to justify the very fact of argumentation itself?

What is the precondition for argument itself? Now, furthermore, I think this is important. It's not our position that men come to a conclusion of God's existence. Notice what he says here. He says the only way you can come to a sound conclusion of the existence of God is that you must begin with the existence of God.

OK, it's not our position that men come to a conclusion of God's existence in like some chronological method of reasoning.

Right.

No one is arguing that in order to come to the conclusion of God, you have to start with.

God.

Rather, the presuppositionalist is going to say, and I think in agreement with Scripture, that all men already know God. This is what the Bible teaches. OK, and this knowledge of God, we're arguing, is innate.

OK, it's not merely mediated to man the moment he begins to look at his created surroundings. OK, all men know God either within the context of covenant keeping or covenant breaking. OK, now, with respect to the specific argument that we're making, the transcendental argument, and I mean this kind of in the logical sense, Vantill, Dr. Bonson or any other presuppositionalist worth their salt, but they're not presenting anything of the sort of which the conclusion of the argument is also stated in one of the premises.

OK, we're going to have to make the important distinction. We'll talk about this a little bit later. We're going to have to make the distinction between the presupposition of an argument, what we presuppose when we argue, and the premise that is stated in the argument.

OK, that's going to become important later on. OK, so I hope that makes a little sense. All right, let's see here. Let's continue on. Let's let him finish here.

Let's actually back up so we can settle down.

And which, of course, they don't have that critique of presuppositions being circular in its reasoning process is not something that one must prove or display because, for example, in Vantill's defense of presuppositional apologetics, he not only admits, in fact, he wouldn't like the word admit, but he agrees that it is circular.

But he says in defense of that, that the nature of all our argument is circular. That the starting points and the conclusions are all bound up one with another. And what he means by that, I see two problems with that.

One is if you admit that your method of proving the existence of God is circular and commits the Petit Principia fallacy in logic, that you've already surrendered the rationality of your position.

OK, so did you hear what he said there? He said Vantill admits that the presuppositional form of argumentation, which, again, is the transcendental argument. He admits circularity. And commits or this is what he says, let me let me phrase it the way that Dr. Sproul said, he says, if you admit this is the two problems he has.

Well, one of the first of the two problems he has with with presuppositionalism, he says that if you admit that your method of proving the existence of God is circular and commits the Petitio Principia fallacy, this is begging the question right in logic, then you've already surrendered the rationality of your position and you've given the unbeliever an excuse.

OK, now I want you to pay attention to this. OK, I agree with Dr. Sproul when he says if you admit that your method of proving the existence of God is circular and commits the Petitio Principia fallacy, this idea of begging the question, engaging in kind of some form of fallacious circular reasoning or fallacious circular argumentation, then, yes, you have surrendered rationality.

But notice what he says here. He says, if you admit that your method of proving the existence of God is circular and commits the Petitio Principia fallacy, is that what Vantill admitted? Did Vantill ever admit that he's committing the Petitio Principia fallacy?

Absolutely not. OK, to quote, I think it's Dr. Oliphant, he quotes here, and this is found in his notes in the commentary he provides in Dr. Vantill's Defense of the Faith. He says Vantill's affirmation of circular reasoning should be seen in the context of the point he makes in various places about indirect arguments.

Notice that Vantill's presuppositional argumentation is a form of indirect argumentation. Any Petitio Principia, this kind of begging the question, OK, any Petitio or circular argument, any Petitio Principia fallacy is by definition a direct argument containing premises and a conclusion.

OK, Vantill's indirect method moves out of the context of a strict proof or direct argument and into the context of the rationale for any fact or law assumed to be or to be true. And thus circularity is inextricably linked to the transcendental approach and is not meant to be in reference, strictly speaking, to direct argumentation.

So in order for Vantill's argument to be to commit the fallacy of a Petitio Principia, it has to be a direct argument. But as you know, if you're familiar with presuppositionalism and you're familiar with Dr. Vantill is that he did not use the transcendental argument in a direct way.

Now, you can formulate, for example, and you guys have seen me doing on this channel, you can formulate a transcendental argument utilizing premises, premise one, premise two, conclusion. OK, and then, of course, you're going to defend one of the premises transcendentally.

But the Petitio Principia by definition is engaged in direct argumentation. And when we give direct argumentation premise, premise conclusion, if we were to put Vantill's argument in that form, you will see very clearly that it is never formulated by any presuppositionalist worth its salt in such a way where the conclusion is actually in the premise, that you just won't find that.

And this is where I was talking about that we need to make the distinction between the presupposition of an argument and the premise of an argument. Now, if I give a direct argument and my conclusion is also in one of the premises, then, yes, I'm engaging in circular argument.

But you need to make the distinction also between circular argument and circular reasoning. Circular reasoning is not always fallacious. And I think Vantill is correct. When you're dealing with ultimate paradigmatic matters, OK, things that are, quote, unquote, in someone's paradigm, self-evident or within the Christian paradigm, you know, God being self, his authority being self-attesting, you're going to have an element of circularity.

But that circularity is not the sort of circularity in which the conclusion of an argument is stated in the premise of the argument. That's just never presented in presuppositional argumentation. And even the argument structure of a transcendental argument doesn't commit that.

So I think he is on the way he's explaining or expressing his problem with presuppositionalism is already predicated upon a misunderstanding of what Vantill is arguing. And if someone was using a more direct argument, it just doesn't fit that category.

There is no argument constructed in which the conclusion is in one of the premises. So I think he's wrongheaded here. Let's continue.

You've given the unbeliever an excuse to reject your position because you have made a logical violation in the process. Well, Vantill acknowledges circular reasoning, but he defends it by saying, as I mentioned, that it's a particular type of circular reasoning.

And in this case, he commits a second informal fallacy, the one of equivocation, because the meaning of the term circular changes in the argument. He could have just as easily—.

No, it does not.

Okay.

The meaning of circularity changes within the argument. You mean the argument that you accused of being a Petitio Principi? You mean an argument with premise, premise, conclusion? What presuppositional argument that's given in a direct fashion uses the word circular and then changes the meaning of the word circular?

This just doesn't happen.

Okay.

He doesn't equivocate. I think Vantill, although he can be difficult to understand, does explain what he means by circularity, and it is explained by Vantill and his students what he doesn't mean. And what he doesn't mean is circularity in any fallacious sense that has been suggested here.

And so I think that's important to keep in mind.

He said that all arguments are by nature linear, that if I start with a rational starting point and come to a rational conclusion, that's not circularity. That's linearity. It's the same thing if I begin with an empirical premise and come to an empirical conclusion.

I've just remained consistent in my methodology, and there's no sin in that. The problem against that, evidentialism says that we present concrete empirical evidence for the existence of God, arguing from nature and so on, and also from history and the like, and that that will give you a probability quotient of conclusion that would satisfy even somebody like David Hume in terms of the astronomical probability quotient that you achieve, but that even those arguments based on empirical investigation and so on and inferences drawn from them will not get you to formal certainty, that that can only be arrived at through a logical proof that is irrefutable.

But classical apology—.

Right, and that's what we're asserting. The transcendental argument does, in fact,.

Do.

We're arguing that the existence of God, we can be epistemically certain of the existence of God, and the way we can demonstrate the epistemic certainty of God, or the way we can demonstrate the existence of God is through a transcendental argument, which, if successful, demonstrates the existence of God by the impossibility of the contrary, okay?

And so that kind of argumentation is going to be different than arguments that are trying to—that give us the probability of God's existence. So it definitely—the transcendental argument is definitely making a more robust and—I'm going to say robust—it's making a more—not dramatic assertion—it's making a stronger claim, okay?

Not—it's not arguing for the probability of God's existence, it's arguing for the fact that God exists by the impossibility of the contrary.

Apologetics say that the case for the existence of God can be proven demonstrably, rationally, and formally, and compellingly. So it's a little stronger than evidentialists, who are more empirically oriented.

But what I said afterwards was that that's the way apologetics ought to be done. You don't just say to the scientific community, well, you're working on the wrong presuppositions, or you have the wrong worldview.

That's true. All right.

I want you to listen to this part. This is important, okay? I'm going to play it again.

—essentialists, who are more empirically oriented. But what I said afterwards was that that's the way apologetics ought to be done. You don't just say—.

Okay, you don't—this is how apologetics ought to be done, as—in contrast to the presuppositionalists. Ready?

To the scientific community, well, you're working on the wrong presuppositions, or you have the wrong worldview. That's true.

So we don't just go to the scientific community and say you're working on the—working off the wrong presuppositions. And then he says in passing, that's true, but then look what he goes on to say.

But you have to begin to show them that they're—that the conclusions that they've drawn from their own evidence are formally invalid, which is what I heard this morning, and I thought it was magnificent.

Okay, so that's interesting here. So more, again, on the distinction here between validity and soundness with respect to argumentation. Validity deals with structure. Soundness deals with the truth of the premises.

Now, is it the case, as what he just suggested, that all we need to be doing is showing that the unbeliever's conclusions simply don't follow from the premises of their arguments? Are we simply trying to demonstrate that the counterarguments are invalid?

Are we not also trying to show that the key premises in the unbeliever's arguments are unsound as well? They're not true. And that one of the primary reasons they're not true is because they're interpreting the very evidence they utilize from within a very—from within a faulty worldview framework.

Is it not the case that the competing worldviews between believer and unbeliever is the very reason we're disagreeing when we debate with the—we debate over fundamental issues? Isn't that—isn't that the reason why we disagree?

So he says, you don't go to the secular scientists and say, oh, you're working off false presuppositions, right? What we're trying to show is that their conclusions are unsound, okay—I mean, are.

Invalid.

They're—the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises, okay? But we're also trying to show that the premises, in many cases, are false. And the reason why it's false is because they're not interpreting the data correctly,.

Okay?

So on the one hand, he's saying, we shouldn't be doing this. It's true that they disagree because of the different worldviews. If that's true, then, of course, then the presuppositionalist is right on in emphasizing the fact that the key reason why there's disagreement is because of differing presuppositions, and hence the reality that—the fact that no one is neutral needs to be stated there.

And so the impossibility of neutrality, I think, lends to a more presuppositional and transcendental thrust to our apologetic, right? We're not going to grant neutral area to the unbeliever. And so, again, I think that's very interesting statements there at the tail end of his response.

But let's continue here.

SPROUL JR.: One follow-up question is, how do we explain why classical apologetics is not equated with rationalism? SPROUL JR.: That's to me again? How do I answer the charge that it's—well, you know, if I espouse to be human, that doesn't mean I've embraced humanism.

If I argue that I exist, that doesn't mean that I am an advocate of existentialism. And just because a woman is feminine does not make her a feminist. All right? We want to be rational. To be rational is to think in a sound way.

And to be rational does not mean you embrace rationalism. And at the same time, you have to understand that historically, in the field of philosophical inquiry, there have been three distinct types of rationalism.

By the way, he is 100 percent correct, and I think that's a very important distinction to be made, right? Utilizing reason or having a desire to be rational does not necessarily commit someone to rationalism.

Okay?

That's super, super important. These terms need to be defined as well, right? When we say we are relying on reason, well, what do we mean by that?

Okay?

You want to define your terms. You know, reason and evidence, reason and evidence. We hear this a lot in apologetics. Well, what kind of reason? Are we reasoning along Cartesian lines after Rene Descartes?