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This video explores the question of whether or not the Calvinist determinist lacks a justification for their beliefs. The presentation also explores whether the Calvinist determinist is warranted in trusting his cognitive faculties. For a longer exploration of these topics, click the links to the following discussions: https://www.youtube.com/live/rP2BWwC9M3s?feature=share https://www.youtube.com/live/mX6IvrmFUos?feature=share
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Do Calvinists lack a justification for their beliefs on determinism? Let's summarize the objection.
The Calvinist determinist lacks a justification for their beliefs because they are determined by God. God determines the person also to hold to false beliefs.
How would the determinist know the difference between his true beliefs and false beliefs under determinism?
How can the Calvinist who is a determinist and holds to compatibilism answer this question?
Well, he could say no. To say we are determined to believe falsehoods or truths is simply to affirm what the determinist already believes.
What is snuck into this line of reasoning is the assumption that our being determined is somehow inconsistent with having a justification for what we believe.
So if determinism is true, it is not helpful nor is it interesting to assert, well,
I guess you were determined to say this or that. Of course, if determinism is true, then yes,
I was determined to say this or that. Also, when we speak of determinism, we must differentiate between different flavors of determinism.
For I assert that there are flavors of determinism in which, if true, would in fact undercut our justification for our beliefs and knowledge claims.
For example, naturalistic determinism. On naturalism, the reason why cognitive faculties cannot be trusted on naturalism is because there's no one or nothing intentionally designing them so that they deliver a preponderance of true beliefs.
On Calvinism, though, that's false. On the contrary, our cognitive faculties are designed by God to deliver a preponderance of true beliefs, hence, they are reliable.
So the objection is a non sequitur. The fact that some people hold false beliefs does not logically entail that therefore they lack cognitive faculties aimed at truth, generally speaking.
But how would someone know if they were mistaken about a belief on determinism?
How would they know if God has determined someone to be mistaken? The answer is they wouldn't know.
But of course, that doesn't do anything to undermine the general reliability of our cognitive faculties.
Just because these cognitive faculties can malfunction doesn't mean they're not generally reliable and that we shouldn't trust them.
The objector is probably making claims that refute his own view. Forget determinism.
Even on his view, we can be mistaken. And if someone is mistaken, how does one know if their beliefs are true?
Well, they don't and not much of interest follows. So in essence, we can be mistaken about beliefs given determinism and he could be mistaken about beliefs given libertarian free will.
Big deal. If he was mistaken, he wouldn't know. Yet, he could weigh the evidence and correct his false beliefs.
On the other hand, if we, the determinist, is mistaken, we wouldn't necessarily know.
But then again, we too can weigh the evidence in favor or against certain beliefs we hold to to be true.
And this is possible within a determinist framework. So in conclusion, if God has predetermined us to be mistaken, we won't self -correct.
However, if the proponent of libertarian free will is mistaken, he won't self -correct either if he does not know he is mistaken.
And therefore, this particular point is uninteresting as both the determinist and the libertarian free willer are in the same boat on this point.