(Part 2): Guillaume Responds to Leighton Flowers, Tim Stratton, & Braxton Hunter.

All right, welcome to another episode of Revealed Apologetics. I'm your host Elias Ayala and today

I have with me Guillaume Bing Yong who came on the show a while back to take on the the arguments over Libertarianism and determinism and we we kind of dealt with some of the objections to the

Calvinist position from Tim Stratton Braxton Hunter and Leighton Flowers.

And so today we're gonna do a part two and so if you guys have been following this discussion, you'll you'll know that Leighton Tim and Braxton made a made three videos of their own responding to our very large

Discussion. I think it was close to two hours. Maybe it was over two hours I'm not sure but this particular discussion this interview that there

I'm gonna be conducting with Guillaume Presupposes you guys know presupposition list, right?

It presupposes that you have background knowledge of that previous discussion So we're not going to be defining terms and things like this this particular interview is going to be based upon the assumption that folks are either familiar with the topic or have already watched the previous videos and again if you've been following If you've already watched the video responses that Braxton Tim and Leighton have put on their respective social media platforms most notably

YouTube and so Guillaume took the time to go through those videos those responses and has now

Was willing to come back on and kind of address those now again This revealed apologetics is focused on apologetics.

And of course, I'm a reformed Christian I'm a Calvinist and so I do think these topics kind of Spill into you know spill into each other

But I don't want this ministry to be focused merely on these topics. And so this is going to be the last response by Guillaume Specifically to you know this little back -and -forth that that's going on here

So again, we we want to just set forth the disclaimer We see Braxton Leighton and Tim as brothers in Christ their friends

I speak to all three of them on a fairly regular basis. They're they're great guys. We just have disagreements and so I'm very excited to have someone like Guillaume who is very knowledgeable in this area to be a

Representative of the Calvinist side and to provide some responses to their many many objections Especially if you guys are familiar with soteriology 101

Leighton flowers Spends a significant time critiquing the Calvinist position which

Calvinist should welcome You know if we believe our position is correct, then we should be willing to engage

Some of the criticisms and critiques that are offered now real quick by way of some announcements

You guys hopefully caught my last interview with Pastor Doug Wilson where we talked about the biblical foundation of presuppositional apologetics

I did have Jeff Durbin for the 29th, but Unfortunately, I had to reschedule so I am

Connecting with him behind the scenes to reschedule that Please stay tuned for the updates with Jeff Durbin because the focus

I want to I want to have there is How does presuppositional apologetics apply to? Different religions so when we talk about you know the use of the transcendental argument for the

Christian worldview, right? How does this look when we're applying it to things like Islam Mormonism Jehovah's Witness or any other non -christian position?

So please stay tuned for for that discussion. I'll definitely let you guys know when that is put on the calendar on May 9th,

I have dr. James Anderson from Reform Theological Seminary to talk about the nature of transcendental arguments

It is a common complaint of non -presuppositionalists Against the presuppositionalists that presuppositionalists say all sorts of things, but they never state the argument.

And so with dr. James Anderson, I want to Talk to him about how do we actually state the transcendental argument?

What is its structure? What are we trying to accomplish when we engage in that form of argumentation on May 12th?

I have dr. Gary Habermas. He's going to be on to talk about the resurrection of Jesus and hopefully if this date is still good

Dr. Douglas Ruthiest the author of Christian apologetics. I don't have the book with me, but it's a giant

Textbook on apologetics. And so hopefully none of these will fall through and we'll have a very very awesome lineup

Very in very close proximity. I it just it's God's providence, right? All these guys happen to respond in this close time.

And so, you know, we're able to have these great interviews You know these past couple of weeks.

So without further ado, I want to welcome Guillaume Again, I always introduce a

Guillaume as the French Calvinist philosopher and if you know who he is, then yes, this is you know

Of course, you know, he's French and if you don't know who he is You will automatically know he's French when he opens his mouth.

So Guillaume, why don't you say hi to everybody? And tell folks very briefly a little bit about yourself and then we'll just pick off what pick up where we left off Hey, it's good to be with you

Eli. So a little bit about myself Well, I'm a French Calvinist philosopher.

All of that is true. I'm actually during the day I'm a computer scientist and I work in financing on Wall Street and at night

I have a wife and four kids and a fifth on the way and Also, I do a junk teaching in philosophy at Caldwell University So some of the responsibilities

I have and try to juggle. Well, I like how you mentioned your job and then you said at night I have a wife and kids

They are very much during the lockdown I am very much reminded I have kids during the day when

I work but Normal times are not so much Okay, very good. Well again folks,

I'm just gonna let you know again We're going to hit the ground running with this and we're just gonna jump into The responses made by Leighton Braxton and Tim Stratton of free thinking ministries

Of course Braxton hunters over at Trinity radio and Leighton flowers is over at soteriology 101

So we're just gonna hit the ground running with this So let's begin with Leighton's video response and most of the video is really on your sketch of the case you made for Determinism.

So how would you respond to what Leighton says? And of course the audience assuming that they have watched it or they will watch it in the near future

How would you address Leighton's words on your case for determinism? Yeah So the most of the video was on the sketch

That I gave for the case for determinism and it wasn't really part of our actual

Presentation in the interview, but I gave that sketch as a brief response to Leighton in the

Q &A Leighton had asked on the computer Where the

Bible supports determinism and in response, I quickly listed several points I said that determinism is supported by texts teaching

God's providential control of all things including evil That it's supported by biblical teaching on election and predestination

That it's supported by two philosophical arguments that have biblical premises So there was the argument from Luther the argument based on original sin and the argument by Jonathan Edwards the argument from divine impeccability

So they are both philosophical arguments which have biblical premises And then there was my cheeky claim that Paul anticipates the two main objections to determinism right there in Romans 9

Why is where do you wait does God still find fault for who can resist his will and is there unrighteousness in God?

So these are kind of the sketch I gave for a case for determinism Yeah now now in the the video response,

I believe that all three of them were on the on the the episode I watched the first one most of it a while back when they first You know released it, but I remember dr.

Hunter. He said in this regard. He says First he says that you presume a lot in your response you presume an interpretation of election, right?

You bring to the table your Calvinistic understanding you presume an interpretation of predestination and all those other related issues

How would you respond to that? Yeah, I don't really so much presume. It's just that I sketched the line of argumentation

So yes It would need to be supported Which I obviously didn't do or try to do in the tiny segment of the

Q &A that they respond to But I don't think it would be presuming is just that it would need to be argued in fact

Yes, the debate hasn't really been settled on those fronts Okay But but they say that providential control doesn't logically entail determinism and that predestination and election don't logically entail determinism

So, you know that a lot of people think that there's a Necessary connection there other people try to point out.

Well, there isn't a necessary connection. How would you respond to that? Yeah, I think that's fine. I don't say that each of these items logically entails determinism

I suggested briefly that there are evidence for it So the Calvinist can mount a good cumulative case based on all those biblical elements

So they say I presume my position is a given but then they correctly anticipate exactly what I'll respond in the video

They say Guillaume may say that all of this would need to be debated. Yeah, I think that's true So I don't presume it after all just that it would need to be debated now a couple of those items do logically entail

Compatibilism the arguments from Martin Luther and Jonathan Edwards So, let's see how they respond to my sketch of these arguments in their video.

Okay? Well, let's take a look at the argument from from Luther Leighton says The argument from Luther does in fact

It says does the fact that we ought to perfectly obey the law but cannot obey the law refute

Libertarianism and they say no and Braxton says you assume a view of original sin. That's not held by all our orthodox believers

Yeah, so I don't know which view of original sin He thinks that the argument needs and which of you he himself affirms

To see if he can escape the argument, but all the argument needs is that we'd be incapable of living a sinless life

So does his view of original sin not at least until that we can't leave a sinless life

I think Leighton's view does I think he grants that we can't that we cannot leave a sinless life

In the way that he asked the question right does the fact that we can't leave a sinless life until that So it's the dilemma for the proponent of the principle of alternate possibilities

That's this so -called principle that says that if that moral responsibility requires the categorical ability to do otherwise so if you were from that you have a dilemma facing you because we either have the

Categorical ability to leave a fully sinless life or we don't If we do it denies original sin and affirms a

Pelagian ability to work ourselves to a non -guilty verdict at the final judgment Okay But if we don't have the ability and moral responsibility requires the ability

Then we cannot be blamed for sinning at all. And so you result in universalism. So it's kind of pick your poison here

Depending on whether you affirm we have the ability or we don't either We have the ability and you're in you fall into Pelagianism or you deny that we have it

But then you result in universalism because we cannot be blamed for it so Before finishing their answer to the to the argument from Luther in that video

They take a break and they criticize the idea that the conditional ability is sufficient for moral responsibility

And there is multiple manipulation arguments. So but we'll deal with those a bit later on And then they come back to Luther's argument.

Okay, but Leighton offers this response though He says anytime that I'm faced with a choice even as a lost person

I can lie or I cannot lie logically It's possible for him to tell the truth What's not feasible is that a sinful lost person in a fallen state would feasibly always choose to do the right thing

But in any given situation, I think we can say yeah It's logically possible for him to choose the right thing in any given situation.

How would you respond to that? Yeah, no, so that that response is actually logically incoherent

So if you have the ability to avoid sinning on any given situation on any one situation

That successfully aggregates to your ability to avoid sin for your entire life I show this in my book with an argument by recurrence

So you do it for once and you show that if you have it for one then it's true for the next one and so On and you move on through recurrence to the entirety of your life and that argument is sound and so it shows that it aggregates successfully

My friend W Paul Frank's who is himself a Molinist proves the same thing

Then me that you cannot just say we cannot leave us in this life, but we can avoid every individual sin

He shows it with a slightly different route But basically reaches the same conclusion you we cannot say that we can avoid any given sin and yet somehow not be able to Leave a sinless life.

So the one demonstrably entails the other Well Leighton continues he says the point of the scriptures is that even if he does do all the right things all the time

It's not sufficient to earn or merit his salvation even a baby. Who's Never had a moral choice to make they still need

Jesus They still need the blood of Christ because guess what? No one gets to heaven through just their natural abilities or their their merit

That's what Leighton's that's what Leighton said Yeah, it's a bit surprising so we're looking at a person who now successfully leaves their entire life without ever sinning and He's saying that this person would still not be saved

I mean that sounds strange to me if you never do wrong, you don't need to earn salvation

You don't need salvation, right? You don't need to be saved from the wrath of God, which you don't deserve

Christian salvation is the forgiveness of sin So death is the wages of sin if you don't sin, you don't need forgiveness

So it seems I don't know how he would reconcile those two But if seems to me like if you are fully sinless and leave a fully sinless life

You don't need to earn anything because you don't need salvation. You don't need forgiveness You don't need redemption if you are actually sinless

But he says that the law has never been the means of salvation. It's a tutor to point you to Christ Yeah, so that's in the scriptures obviously and the way that the law points you to Christ is by revealing your sin

Paul says I would not have known my sin unless the law hadn't taught me This is what you ought to do.

So we're told in Romans 7 that The law points you to Christ by revealing your sin

But if someone never sins then the law doesn't work like that for him because the law would tell him he's actually righteous

He's passing all with flying colors. So it's not pointing you to Christ if you are in fact sinless

But but then he says the difference between heaven and hell isn't whether you sin right since we all sin rather He says it's whether you have faith

Yeah, I meant to that I obviously affirm that and he's the one who says it doesn't have to be like that because he's saying that a fallen child of Adam is capable of living a sinless life and Therefore making it false that we all sin.

Well, but but then he says the Calvinist You know accused us the Calvinist wants to say you can't have faith because you can't obey the law

That's the Calvinist Calvinistic leap. He says and if if we have a chance to talk to being young He says and then they did have a chance.

Okay, he said he'd want to push push you on this point So what do you think? Yeah So it is the the

Calvinist wants to say you can't have faith because you can't obey the law and know the the Calvinist doesn't say that he he says that you don't need the ability to avoid sinning in order to be blameworthy for sinning and That does follow logically from our inability to leave a sinless life along with our blameworthiness for that failure

So that refutes the principle of alternate possibilities and from that compatible ism logically follows

So that's the claim of the Calvinist. Yeah, what about this issue of divine impeccability? attempt that there's

Nothing causally determining God even if it's true that he cannot sin Yeah, so here we've moved on to the argument by Jonathan Edwards and it's based on the fact that God is impeccable

Is he could not sin and yet he remains praiseworthy so we see that praiseworthiness does not require the categorical ability to do otherwise than acting righteously and so Stratton said there's nothing causally determining

God even if it's true that he cannot sin and I'm fine with that I'm not I'm just saying God refutes the principle of alternate possibilities

I don't need to convince you that God is determined only that he cannot sin and yet he is praiseworthy for acting righteously

Right, so he has the ability. He doesn't have the ability to do other than what he does, which is good yet He's worthy of praise.

Yes, that's right. He so and it's not just just of Inability to do other than what he does because that yes

We might interpret that to mean he's determined and we don't need to debate that just yet Here all

I need is to say that he does not have the ability to Act unrighteously, so he always acts righteously and does not have the categorical ability to do anything less than that And so if that's true, then that refutes the principle of alternate possibilities

Okay, but then Tim goes on to say that the problem is not all Christians are going to agree with what what you say here

Right. It's an assumption. You need you need an argument. You can't just assume it, right? Yeah, but I mean I just gave the argument right

God cannot fail to act righteously and God is praiseworthy for acting righteously Therefore moral responsibility doesn't require the ability to do otherwise.

So he needs to tell us which premise he disagrees with Oh, well, it's apparently the first premise right because he then approves of a quote he attributes to Dallas Willard, right?

Well, of course God can sin but why would he want to right? Yes, so that's what the the quoted

Dallas Willard is saying this and I thought this is pretty amazing because To salvage the principle of alternate possibilities in the case of God.

He's now using the conditional sense of ability Because first to avoid my argument you would need to maintain

God's categorical ability to sin so it doesn't work But also

I should point out in those three videos they spend all their energy Arguing that the conditional ability doesn't work and it's not worth the name ability

If you categorically can't do it and then here they use it as perfectly meaningful about God Right.

Well, of course, I agree It's meaningful to say God or Jesus could sin if he wanted to But it remains that he doesn't have the categorical ability to do otherwise and yet he's praiseworthy

So there goes the principle of alternate possibilities and the claim that he's making here The quote is literally

I mean, it's obviously the conditional ability, right? He could sin but only if he wanted to but in fact, he cannot possibly want to therefore

There's no categorical ability to sin here What he says he doesn't understand what it would mean for God to sin since sin is missing the mark of God's Standard.

Yeah, great. So we agree that it's incoherent to say that God sins and that's my point

There is no possible world in which God sins. Well, God must have libertarian freedom

There was nothing external to God to determine him. That's the next claim. Yeah So, of course if God is determined it's from his own nature.

It's not from the outside So I agree. It's a difference with determined humans who are determined by someone outside of them, right?

So if humans and God are determined if then there's still a big difference in that humans would be determined by God But God would be determined only from the inside from his inner nature

He's necessarily good nature and not by something or someone outside himself But just because God isn't determined from the outside It doesn't follow that he has libertarian free will because if he's determined from the inside It's still determined and praiseworthy.

So compatibilism Follows and libertarianism requires compatibilism to be false.

So if God is determined from the inside That's not libertarian freedom because that's compatible with determinism

Okay But Braxton's then tries to affirm the principle of alternate possibilities for God by saying

God can pick among two good things, right? So that seems to be The pap as you would call it, right?

Yeah, so that's a that's a pretty standard move and what my response is that it's not relevant to my argument

I say that God is praiseworthy for acting righteously as opposed to sinning

Right, and I'm clearing that there's no praise in the picking of a good over an equal good if there are no other options

Right, if you have two options that are both good, but there's nothing else that's available Then there's no praise in picking one over the other

But the reason that it's praiseworthy when he picks a good it's because it's in opposition to picking something bad

Even though he doesn't have the categorical ability to pick something bad Okay, but Tim says if you can show there's two options for God then it seems that he would have libertarian free will yeah, but that's also irrelevant here because I use

God's inability to act unrighteously as a Premise to refute the principle of alternate possibilities

I don't argue here that God is fully determined and never has two options categorically accessible

My argument leaves that question open So even if God has sometimes two options categorically available, they don't need to be those that I use for my immediate argument

All right. Well, let's let's turn to Romans 9 then okay They turn to your cheeky claim

Okay about Romans 9 anticipating the main two objections against Calvinism and people who are familiar with Romans 9 would imagine what?

What that is about. So how would you engage them on Romans 9? Yeah, so Leighton then tries to offer a plausible account for why

Paul would anticipate these objections you know is there unrighteousness in God and why does he still find fault for who can resist his will and That's fine.

We don't need to turn that part into a debate I do think that Romans 9 supports the determinist view, but again,

I didn't really support the claim in our interview So there wasn't much for him to respond to I said it's kind of a cheeky remark that he that the main arguments against Calvinism Sure sound a lot like those anticipated by Paul when he teaches on God's sovereign choice of election in Romans 9, but that's all

I mean, it's fun. It made for a catchy book title right my book called excusing sinners and blaming God But at this point we still haven't really touched my actual responses to his debate on Calvinism Okay, but by the way excusing sinners and blaming

God can be purchased at Amazon and bookstores near you Actually, don't go to the bookstore, but you could order it online.

Well, they eventually get to that point, right? so so let's let's deal with the issue of Or the question rather does choice entail in determinism, right?

There's a big hullabaloo about well choice seems to entail Okay, things aren't determined in the way that the

Calvinist thinks it is Yeah, so that that was part of that was part of the initial argument that Layton had brought in his debate that we responded to So I responded that choice doesn't entail in determinism.

You still make choices on determinism So do you want to read the latest reply?

Well, he says but who's determining your choices? It's not what you have decided Yeah, so Words if God determines it's not really you choosing right?

Yeah, that's the claim that's made here So let me answer that question who's determining your choices answer.

It's God But of course, it doesn't follow that it's not what you have decided They make that claim a number of times in this video and in that of Tim's Triton, I believe

So it's important to address it here. But I need to point out this if God causes you to choose

X You didn't choose X that's their claim, but that claim isn't just question begging because I disagree with it the truth of the claim

But it's actually self -refuting Look at the wording of the objection if God causes you to choose

X it actually logically follows that you choose X I mean you can tell that they don't like it and there may be some coherent way of framing and objection somewhere in the neighborhood of What they say but as they phrase it the objection is self -refuting if I cause my pen to fall on the floor

Does it follow that my pen didn't fall on the floor? Well, of course not not only it doesn't follow that my pen didn't fall but it does follow that my pen did fall

So if I cause my pen to fall on the floor my pen falls on the floor Similarly if God causes me to choose

X it is not only compatible with my choosing X It actually logically entails that I chose

X. Yeah, but your argument has been determined by God We hear this all the time.

Everything you just said was determined So, you know, they do the point of kind of highlighting It's all irrational anyway, because you've been determined to say everything you just said.

Yeah, so yes It has been determined by God, but that's not an argument. I'm aware that God determines all things on determinism

There's no debate on that So it's not very helpful to have them repeat all the time as a matter of fact

The only one who seems not to know that determinism means all things are determined is

Tim Stratton And we'll see that when we get to his video But until we have a successful argument to support that determinism excludes choice or free will

It's pointless to keep hammering that on my view. It's God who determines all things Yes, he does and I don't shy away from that Okay, but then they bring in a text that wasn't mentioned in the original debates and that's

Genesis chapter 4. Okay Braxton says in our debates We gave some of the same text but we gave texts that imply not just that man has choice

But choices in the Bible where it really does seem like libertarian freedom is the type of choice we're talking about Genesis 4 reads thusly and the

Lord had regard for Abel and his offering but for Cain and his offering He had no regard.

So Cain was very angry in his face fell. The Lord said to Cain Why are you angry and why is your face fallen if you do?

Well, will you not be accepted and if you do not do well sin is crouching at the door Its desire is contrary to you, but you must rule over it

So Braxton goes on to say now granted God didn't say you can do well But surely the point of the text is this is before the murder has yet taken place and what he's implying to Cain is

Yes, your offering wasn't accepted, but you can do well if you do well, your offering will be accepted so this has to be understood as a libertarian choice as Braxton says for the following reasons if God is saying this to Cain But God knows that Cain in one sense of could or the other isn't capable of doing or it's been

Determined that he won't do it then at best God is being deceptive with Cain and at worse It's just an outright lie to imply that he could do otherwise when in fact he he obviously can't

Yeah, so here I deny that the categorical sense of can is implied in this text here again

What is explicit is the conditional if you do well, you will be accepted if you don't do well sin is crouching at the door

It doesn't imply that he can do it all things being just as they are which is what the categorical ability requires all things about the person at the moment of choice inside and out must be held in place exactly as they are and They still can do it.

So it doesn't imply that kind of strong ability here. Just the text It says you must rule over it

But it doesn't entail you have the categorical ability to rule over it because again the ridic show comes back to bite us

We must leave a sinless life but it doesn't entail we actually can all things being equal and if you object further by saying that Cain could complain if God doesn't also grant the

Antecedent of the conditional right if God doesn't also grant the if in if you do well Then you again literally arguing.

Why does God find fault for who can resist his will? I don't think Then they spend a bit more time arguing that if you freely choose

God, it doesn't mean you're earning your salvation It doesn't mean you're meriting it Sarah Layton even says it's the wall

Calvinist arguments, but I'm not arguing any of this So it's not really relevant and we can skip over that part in the debate you were responding to Layton said the word choice is all you need and you don't need a philosophy degree and you responded

No, obviously, it's not all you need and the Calvinist is fine with the Webster's definition of choice Which Layton quoted

Layton double downs and and he says the word choice is all you need if determinism isn't injected into the picture

Yeah, so what I think is going on here is that he's missing where the burden of proof is He's the one he is the one arguing that choice entails in determinism

So who's injecting anything into the word not me. I don't need to inject determinism

He needs to extract Indeterminism and I say good luck doing that out of the mere word choice

Okay, but in Layton continues he says the only reason we're having all this vernacular of libertarian freedom of the will and all of this nuance and all this other stuff is because you you've

Had people insert determinism and then come up with new definitions of free will that aren't the basic intuitive understanding of what free will is

Know that I didn't do that. I gave you my definition of free will it's the control condition for moral responsibility

It's perfectly meaningful and it should be yours too because it's neutral and uncontroversial

The real debate then is on whether that is compatible with determinism

Unless you just want to beg the question entirely by baking your view into the definition But then if so, then have at it, but I don't think you understand how debates work if that's satisfying to you

Okay, and I think this is a big deal. A lot of people say that Calvinist Redefined free will that this begs the question in favor of the other person

Yeah, we discussed that a little bit but I mean to bypass that entirely Yeah, what I do is I take the fully standard definition of free will it's took

Control condition for moral responsibility if you find this in the literature on both sides of the aisle and once we agree on that It's being the case then we can debate whether that is in fact compatible with determinism and all the arguments can then be unfolded

But I don't think you can bake that into the definition. Otherwise, it's not really a meaningful debate Now in that discussion that we had the first time later on in the discussion.

I asked you if the Bible is under determinative With regards to this whole issue and Leighton paused to say and there's what

Leighton says he says it's a great question Thank you late and and Makes his point if you're not trying to draw a philosophical inference if you're just reading the text our view is supported

So he thinks that his view is just supported by a bare reading of the text Yeah So but that the man seems to be self refuting here again because to claim that your indeterminist view is supported by the text

Is to draw a philosophical inference So it's not that he's refusing to draw a philosophical inference and then let the text speak and then it's supporting in determinism to say that it supports indeterminism is to draw a philosophical inference and if the

Bible is under Determinative then it calls for neither view. So once more his own criticism applies directly to his own view

Well Braxton says a good exegete Asks who the original audience was and the original audience wouldn't have understood the distinction between categorical and conditional ability

He sarcastically implies you must believe they'd be sophisticated philosophers. I'm being a little bit snarky.

He says He's admitting that he's being a little snarky and that's fine But the good point

I mean when you when you take a look at the original audience You don't think that they're they're thinking in these categories of conditional and categorical.

How would you respond to that? Yeah, so I obviously I don't suggest that the disciples would have done that philosophical work to All I'm saying is that the text doesn't teach indeterminism because there's a perfectly acceptable sense of ability that is compatible with determinism

And remember even they used that sense of ability when they said God had the ability to sin

All right, so when they quoted Dallas Willard, so it's not some sort of a hair splitting device I'm using here created by a crazy

French philosopher It's a perfectly common usage of ability and In any case the mockery cuts both ways, right?

because I can turn this on to their own view and I could say well are we to understand that the original reader would

Have heard the text and said this Well, then there must be a possible world in which all causally relevant

Influencing factors are held just as they are and the outcome of the free choice is different in a way that is inconsistent with theistic determinism

Well, no, of course not so let's be consistent let's not do this with their view and let's not do this with mine either

Okay All right. So what about this phrase your will be done? Okay Leighton said on Calvinism God's will is always done

So it makes little sense to pray your will be done all this to affirm a so -called Divine decree that isn't found in Scripture.

He says yeah, that was the one of the objections So I said let me not address any our initial interview

I said, let me not address the question of the decree and not being found in Scripture To address the argument and then

Leighton in his response interrupted it just at that point to say but that was the most important part

Because his point is that if the decree isn't taught in Scripture, we don't need the philosophy No, that's not the most important point here

He's in the middle of a philosophical argument based on the Lord's Prayer and God's will being done

So I addressing his philosophical argument I naturally skipped over the side job that was not relevant to his own argument on God's will being always done

So I explained the equivocation on the Decretive versus prescriptive wills of God and when

I explained that we pray that God's prescriptions Would come to pass and the only will that we say always comes to pass is his ultimate decree

Which contains lots of things that do go against his prescription. That was my response to his

Allegation that somehow praying you will be done is incoherent if God's will is always done.

So my distinction is perfectly coherent So, let's see how your response. Well, here's what they respond

They said Leighton says sarcastically once again, of course We know that the fisherman Peter who had a third grade level education probably understood that right the decreed of will not the prescriptive will but by the way before you even a

How does he know the education level of Peter? I don't know.

I Think we can grant that but I've already addressed the issue of the philosophical acumen of the reader

I don't think we need to presuppose that in order to broker here and Coherent distinctions.

Okay. Oh, well Tim gives a story of when he was a Calvinist He was going to pray for his friend's salvation and when his son asked him to play

Xbox instead He reasoned that if his friend is elect God will save him anyway, and if he's not then he won't so he went and played

Xbox Yeah, and so we agree that this decision is absurd

So but I think that's that's nonsense even on Calvinist premises what's important in petitionary prayer, right?

You're asking God to do something What's important here is that God would do things in response to prayer?

That he wouldn't do if he had if we hadn't prayed, right? Let me repeat that What's important in petitionary prayer is that God does things in response to prayer that he wouldn't do if you hadn't prayed

And that's compatible with determinism and indeterminism and I should point out on Determinism which is presumably their view the exact same problem occurs, right?

Either God has chosen a feasible world in which your friend is saved or he hasn't

If he has then your friend will be saved. If not, your friend will not so just go play the the

Xbox No, of course not and all you need and all I need is that God's decision to act is sticking into account the fact

That we prayed that's all we need. He's doing it in answer to our prayer God is doing that thing in answer to our prayers such that he wouldn't have done it if we hadn't prayed and that's what's

Rescuing the meaningfulness of petitionary prayer and it's compatible with both of our views So and then the the first video ends at this point and I they did miss

My main two points about the Lord's Prayer that you know when Jesus says your will be done

There was two really strong points that were not addressed in their in at the end of the first response by these three gentlemen

They themselves need to affirm that God has mutually conflicting wills and that's a very strong point

I made so that that must concede that my distinction is perfectly coherent on their own on their own view

They must admit that God has mutually conflicting will now They don't call it the decorative will because they don't say that God decrees everything

Well, actually maybe Stratton says that but Leighton might not I'm not too sure But in any case they no matter how they call it

They do need to say that God has several different kinds of wills that sometime conflict and so my that concedes that my distinction is perfectly coherent and then they skip all together the

Accusation that I made which is that their argument here pressing the Calvinist with the

Lord's Prayer is actually self -defeating Because that and that was really the strongest part of my argument here

I think they were they are they were pressed with time So they didn't you know, they had to wrap up the videos

I'm not accusing them of trying to dodge anything here But it's unfortunate because it cuts the video cuts right before my bing zinger on this argument

I argued this I said if you say God's will isn't always done Because libertarian free will leads to states of affairs that God cannot prevent without removing libertarian free will

Which is really what they're saying, right? So they are accusing the Calvinist saying On your view

God's will is always done because he controls and determines everything on our view His will is not always done because there are these things that happen that go against his will

Because he cannot determine them to be otherwise so you're looking at those and you're saying he cannot bring about something

But in that prayer you ask him to do it anyway So on the libertarian view here, you're saying

Lord, please do what I say you cannot do So forget merely begging the question that complaint is self -refuting once again

All right. Okay. Well, that's Very very interesting

Again, they took a very interesting tact here We we did our our our first interview just all in one shot.

And so they were more strategic in Making multiple videos or as you would say multiple videos

Back to some of my French accent And so I think we're actually making really good time.

I think so Yeah, so so that's the first the first video. Let's take a look at Braxton's video

Braxton put out a video again. All three of them have separate videos that can be seen on their on their respective

YouTube channels So we're gonna turn our attention to Braxton's videos just as a complete side note again.

I I do like to promote apologetics and Good resources Trinity radio

YouTube channel is an awesome apologetic resource. You definitely want to check that out Braxton does a great job in responding to popular atheist objections to Christianity And the existence.

Yeah, I'm sorry to cut you here, but I'm gonna lend support to that. I've now come to Discover the material of this this folks and I've watched a couple of videos from Braxton myself

And I found them thoroughly enjoyable. And so I recommend the resource as well, you know, obviously we disagree on the freewill question

We do so charitably. I Hope but I do affirm that he produces a lot of really good material.

So keep doing good work brother. It's it's really good Yeah, no, I agree. So let's let's turn our attention to Braxton's video in Layton's video

There were two big interludes on manipulation arguments. Okay, where they criticized your conditional ability to do otherwise

So let's treat them here since it's it's also where Braxton's show begins. So how would you enter into that?

Yeah Yeah, so so that is precisely the move that I said actually couldn't work against my use of the conditional ability

Twice in the interview. I rudely interrupted you Eli To step out of my way and make it clear that I do not affirm that the conditional ability is sufficient for moral responsibility

I only say that it's necessary and that the categorical ability to do. Otherwise is not necessary So if you say it's sufficient, you know, if you say that the conditional ability to do

Otherwise is sufficient then you're exposed to manipulation arguments because if a mad scientist controls your brain to make you do something it remains that you could have done otherwise if you had wanted and I say

I say you're not responsible. So it shows that the conditional ability isn't sufficient

Okay, so that is what I carefully clarified twice when interrupted you to really make that strong point

I don't say it's sufficient. So you can't use a manipulation argument to criticize my defense of the conditional ability

But of course they went ahead and did exactly that repeatedly They offered just that sort of manipulation argument multiple times throughout the shows

Leighton spoke of a man who takes a woman in a bar and forces her to come out with him and he said there's no

Relevant difference with using a love potion to take her out willingly. So it's clearly a manipulation with love potion type argument here

Tim Stratton agreed and he says well Yeah, that would be rape and then he brings in the the example of Harley Quinn was manipulated by the

Joker So here again a manipulation argument case And in the other show he uses an analogy with a

Star Wars droid reprogrammed Braxton used the reboot of Robocop films where someone puts a chip in him and gives him thoughts and we says we wouldn't hold

Robocop Responsible for what he does and all throughout they used the analogy of the mad scientist controlling you with brain electrodes

So it's a festival of arguments by analogy So, let me slow down and explain exactly how arguments by analogy work because there are some confusion

Especially at the beginning of Braxton show. So this is how arguments by analogy work

You have God determines a human choice and Calvinists say that the person is morally responsible.

That's our view And then the objector offers an another case

That's the analogy in which the person is not morally responsible And so the analogy case is a little bit different and a little bit the same as the normal case

So what do you need to make the argument work? You need to give you analogy.

That's a little bit like the normal case and the analogy in the analogy the person is not morally responsible and Then you need to do at least one of two things

Either you need to show that there is a relevant similarity Between the normal and the analogy or you need to show that there is no relevant difference

So these are really the two routes in order to make the argument work You need to show that there is a relevant similarity or you need to show that there is no relevant difference

So it's important to catch this So let me spell it out. A relevant similarity is a property of your analogy case that excludes moral responsibility

And is also present in the normal case So if that's that's shown then yeah, you successfully show that the normal case should exclude moral responsibility

So you can show that there is one of those and then you win The other way to win is to show that there is no relevant difference

And the relevant difference is now a property of your analogy case that excludes moral responsibility

And is not present in the normal case So that would be a relevant difference and if you show that there is no relevant difference

Then here again that would need to mean that the normal case excludes responsibility as well

So these are the two strategies and my response to those and that's really applicable

You've seen it in my book. I do that with all the arguments by analogy, not just the manipulation argument My claim is that there is a relevant similarity

So sorry, my response is this when they claim that there is a relevant similarity

They tend to remain question begging either because we're not told what that similarity is

And so now it's your word against mine and you say there is a relevant similarity I don't agree.

We get nowhere if you don't tell me which one it is So it's your word against ours or because the alleged similarity is being determined But that's obviously the debated question at hand

So, for example, Tim Stratton hammered the objection in each case, but they are both determined Yes, but that gets us nowhere because the relevance of determinism is the question before us

And so that's for the mild claim that there is a relevant similarity Now, if you take the second approach, which is the bolder claim that there is no relevant difference

Then it's also question begging because, you know, you say there's no relevant difference

Maybe I disagree. I just need to be convinced and it's very hard to prove that there is no relevant difference

So it tends to remain question begging as well But now you go beyond that because now it's even open to outright refutation

Because now I can produce a relevant difference And therefore that shows that there is in fact a relevant difference

It's denying the claim that there is no relevant difference And if I produce one of those,

I produce a property So it's a relevant difference. It's a property of the analogy case That's enough to exclude moral responsibility in the analogy case

But it's absent from the normal case And that's exactly what

I do explicitly in my book for all the analogy cases So the pets and puppets arguments, the robots, the coercion, manipulation, the mental illness arguments by analogy

And in each case, I explain the structure of the argument I show that it's really question begging And then when they press the bolder claim that there is no relevant difference

I offer what I take to be exactly what they ask A relevant difference between the analogy and the normal case

So it's a property of their analogy that is in itself removing moral responsibility And yet is absent from the normal case

So let me list them quickly, but they can go and see again in my book For the pets and puppets argument, it's the lack of self -consciousness

For the coercion argument, it's the use of physical force or threats For the manipulation argument, it's the bypass of your

God -given character and desires And for the mental illness argument, it's the inability to distinguish between right and wrong

So I provide those and that explains, you know, I think that Leighton was really eager to try to understand what makes a good or a bad analogy argument

I've really broken it down carefully here And in each case, this is exactly what you want

You want to press one of those two claims, the mild or the bold claim That there is a relevant similarity or that there is no relevant difference

If you do the first one, it remains question begging because determinism is still debated If you do the second one, it's still question begging

But now I can also refute it by offering my relevant differences And I've done so in my book for all those arguments

So again, they say they've read my book Much of their criticism shows that they must have missed those parts

But let's look at what they say OK, well, Leighton responds that an analogy isn't meant to have full correspondence

Yeah, of course. And I don't claim that it does So I think he's so used to having people criticizing his analogies that he doesn't really see that this response is irrelevant to what

I said I said the manipulator isn't relevantly analogous And I've just explained to you what that means and how

I've proven that OK, so when you said that the manipulator isn't relevant, relevantly analogous

He then asks, is it just how you feel? Is it a feeling? No. And so we go beyond that And if he's read my book,

I offer a full explanation of what it means to be relevantly analogous I identify the relevant properties of each analogy and show that the claim that there is a relevant similarity is question begging

And the claim that there is no relevant difference is question begging and refuted by counter examples by providing those relevant differences that I have identified myself

OK, so Braxton goes on to say, of course, we can take any particular analogy and show that something is not directly analogous

Yeah, we can. But that's not what I do I show that it's not relevantly analogous

So it's not just a matter of picking apart, hey, but this is not really like that I show what is relevant or not

So I show that there's a property of the analogy that excludes moral responsibility and that same property is not present on determinism

So that's exactly what you want to see in a response to an analogy Well, Braxton goes on to say in all these analogies, the thing that's the same is that something external to the agent is determining what the agent will do

Yes, that's one thing that is the same But the claim that being determined is what removes moral responsibility is your view and I reject it

So the point of the argument by analogy is to claim that there can be no relevant difference if you reject incompatibilism

And I show that it's wrong So then he says that my response to electrodes is our experience, you know, like my response to the manipulation case where the mad scientist controls my decisions with electrodes

He says that my response would be, but our experience as humans isn't like that But that's not at all what

I'm saying What I've explained is that there is a relevant difference I provided, which is that it's the bypass of our

God given characters and desires And that is a property that is uncontroversially present in the manipulation cases that we all agree is sufficient to exclude moral responsibility

So that's not controversial either But then that same property is absent from my normal case of being determined by God So obviously the incompatibilist also thinks that when it's not bypassing my

God given characters and desire, but when it's purely God determining me, that it's excluding moral responsibility

That's their view But at least they agree that when we do bypass my God given characters and desires, it does exclude moral responsibility

So that provides me with exactly what they ask, a relevant difference between the normal case and the analogy case

Okay All right I think he concludes though, he says, of course, that's somewhat different That's why it's just an analogy and not the same thing

Yeah, so it's the same incomprehension as Layton here I don't ask that the analogy be the same thing

I ask that it be relevantly analogous and show that it's not So Layton goes on to say, he says, you don't escape the problem of the analogy to begin with by pointing out all these differences between you and the robot

Yeah, no, you don't Not by pointing out there are differences But definitely by pointing out that there are relevant differences

You have properties present in the analogy that exclude moral responsibility and are absent from the normal case

Again, all of this is explained in my book You can go back, you know, read it slowly and see it addresses all these arguments by analogy

Read it very slowly because your book is not a walk in the park The upside is my book does not come with the

French accent So You can choose your own accent when reading the book

I choose the British accent and let the words flow out nice and smoothly But all right, so let's turn to this issue on God willing evil

Okay So the argument was if Calvinism is true, evil is according to God's will but evil is not according to God's will

So Calvinism is false it would seem Yes And so in response to that argument, I had pointed out the equivocation in his syllogism

Between the decorative and the permissive will of God once again So on Calvinism God wills evil as part of his decorative will but he doesn't will evil as part of his prescriptive will

So the two premises of his syllogism are true only in different senses of the will of God So it commits an equivocation.

Okay, so Leighton goes on to say everything that happens according to the decree But several passages say that God did not desire or even decree certain things

Jeremiah 19 I did not command these things nor did I decree it and it's he says it's in the

ESV and it goes on to say It Calvinist Bible basically. I'm sorry the

ESV the Calvinist Bible He says it goes on to say that it did it he did it didn't enter my mind

God says so it strongly suggests that God didn't have anything to do with it whether prescriptive or decreed it

Yeah, so we already talked about that text So, what do I make of it? I think that God is using very strong language to describe how much these actions go against his commands

But in attacking Calvinism, you can't press that language so literally that it refutes your own view in the process

Unless you are an open theist It's not true that their action didn't even enter

God's mind now arguably even even on open theism God knew it in his mind as a possibility

But if you're all the more if you're a Molinist then the action is for Dane to Stratton at least is clear on that God for ordains everything that happens

Only you can tell that every time he says that flowers looks really uncomfortable. I don't think that they're in line on that point but but back to the question of two wheels even on libertarianism you're committed to saying that God permitted it and Therefore he willed it in some sense though He could have prevented the sin with a more dramatic more drastic measure

But he didn't so he must have preferred that the evil happened and in that sense

It must have been his permissive will so the complaint is self -defeating here because even on libertarianism

God has several mutually exclusive desires It's not the will of God that people be nailed to the two crosses and yet somehow the

Bible says it was the will of the Lord to crush him so they don't see that they need that distinction themselves

And so I think they launch a full -front attack on the idea of two wills in God in the clips that follow

Okay, if you read the the next case goes on to say a lot of times Calvinist will create aspects in order to unfalsify their views so two kinds of love two kinds of callings two kinds of will and so threatened in his

It would be gentle but it is seemingly mocking voice He says yeah, God desires all people to be saved, but he has a greater desire for his glory

Yeah, so so it seems to be a criticism of the view that somehow it's creating two different wills in God And we can't have any of this but they must say the same thing

You know, yeah God, you know, so like his sentence Yeah, God desires all people to be saved

But he has a greater desire for his glory is that what he complains about in the Calvinist view But they must themselves say yeah,

God desires all people to be saved But he has a greater desire to give libertarian free will to humans

So the concept of two wills is exactly there and you know We can imagine the universalist now complaining against their view by saying all but Tim Stratton is making his views

Unfalsifiable by having two wills like this. He wants to save everyone, but he doesn't save everyone

So obviously I don't agree that this criticism is valid But he's taking issue with the same thing that Tim Stratton criticizes us for which is that God has

Two wills about two conflicting things and one prevails so And with respect to the the accusation that we you know

Find two kinds of love or two kinds of callings two kinds of will more generally detecting Equivocation and drawing drawing coherent distinctions is the main job of the philosopher to avoid confusion

Their complaints that I'm drawing distinction amounts to them saying it's really hard to refute

Calvinism without committing an equivocation Yeah, yes, it's very hard indeed And I think it's interesting too that you know the suggestion that the two wills

Categories is made for the purpose of being unfalsifiable Just it those are distinctions that have to be made given what we see in the text.

Am I right? Yeah, I think so. I mean when the Bible says that God will something but then he also brings about something else

It seems like we have those two senses of God's will and once again It's something that the libertarian must affirm himself.

So it should really not be this big of a controversy Okay. Well Tim goes on to say he says when

I think about the prescriptive versus the descriptive will it doesn't make sense to me

I may be missing something if God says this is how you ought to think and act But hey, I'm gonna punish you for acting the way

I determined you to act that doesn't seem intuitive Yeah, so the intuition is going on here.

I don't think he's objective to the two wills of God Because as I said, if he were just objecting to that that would be self -defeating because the concept is obviously coherent that God has some desire

For X but a greater desire to not do X I think here is objecting more to the denial of the principle of alternate possibility

And he's saying that hits rejection is not intuitive You know, he says if God says you ought to think and act but hey

I'm going to punish you for acting the way I determined you to act He seems to say well, it's not fair for God to blame us if we don't have the ability to do what he is asking us to do and Here again,

I'm gonna press the effect that yeah, maybe it's not intuitive I don't know But is it intuitive that God would blame us for failing to leave us in this life?

When our fallen nature makes it categorically impossible. I think you have the same same Counterintuitiveness here and yet I think they're committed to those biblical teachings

Well Braxton goes on to say so speaking about two wills of God makes sense if libertarian free will is in play.

Okay, so good He sees that he needs to say that on his own view Evil is according to the permissive will of God So I think he's more reasonable than the other two here except that you don't need libertarianism to affirm that there are two wills in God All you need is two conflicting desires with one carrying the day that doesn't need to involve free will

God doesn't want you to Suffer at the dentist, but he wants you to have good teeth

There you have two wheels But there's no there's no need for libertarian free will to show that the concepts are coherent and this

Concept is what the Calvinist affirms of all evil across the board. Okay Oh, well

Braxton offers an analogy of Bob of Bob Ross painting which by the way, I used to love that show

He used to be on as soon as I got home. We got this nice afro guy painting nice little happy, but yeah, I Did not grow up in the

United States, but I have come to discover Bob Ross People have showed me what the the whole thing is and I'm all on board

Well, he offers an analogy of a Bob Ross painting where the painter says I want a painting with only happy clouds and trees

But then he paints and puts uglier sad trees in it. What sense does it make to say? He wants only happy trees.

He anticipates that you would say this we aren't brushes brushes Don't have a conscious experience brushes do make choices even if they're determined and in that sense, you're absolutely right

Yeah, but no, I wouldn't say that I think I think that would be clearly false Making a choice is possible on determinism.

I maintained but it's not possible if you're not at least self -conscious So that's a necessary condition for choice.

So brushes don't make choices. No But here's what I would say to his actually good illustration

I would say that it's perfectly meaningful to affirm that the painter wants ugly trees and he also doesn't want ugly trees in two different senses one in isolation and One considering the full picture.

So Locally, it's not pretty but in the full picture There's a greater benefit of having the ugly tree that magnifies the overall picture

So it paints a more beautiful overall picture You can imagine that this be quite coherent and I affirm that similarly

God does not like it when I sin considered in isolation

But in the grand scheme of things There's he has more insufficient reasons to prefer the scenario in which there was that sin and in the end

He finds it more glorious that I mean personally that I was a wretched sinner who didn't believe in God who seemed like there was no tomorrow and That I was found and saved by him

It's a more glorious story like that. And I think Jesus puts it like this He says there's more joy in heaven for a sinner who repents than for 99 righteous that don't need to repent in the first place

Well Layton goes on to say what if you told your wife and daughter you want your daughter to go to college? But behind the scenes you manipulate everything to prevent her from going

Yeah, so we're back to the principle of alternate possibilities here But I would say you know

The same thing applies to the counter intuitiveness of being unable to leave us in this life and yet being demanded that we do

What if you told your humans that you want them to leave us in this life? But behind the scene you curse them with a sinful nature that prevents it from happening

And then after that clip, there's there's a bit more of team repeating that thoughts are determined on exhaustive divine determinism

So but we'll address that a bit later on so let's move on to the next argument here

Sure. So let's move on to the issue of God's love. All right, so Braxton's argument was that on Calvinism God doesn't love the elect but God loves everyone so Calvinism is false

Okay So you responded that love isn't binary like that that there are different degrees and kinds of love in the

Bible and that it's just the Electing love that God doesn't have for the reprobate, but it's still meaningful to say he loves them as part of his creation

So they respond as anticipated if God doesn't save them then in what then what love is this?

So what would you say to that? Yeah. Okay, so We don't have much to do here. I don't want to overstate the love of God for the reprobate

Admittedly, they are getting the short end of the stick and it's under God's providential control Still we can say that God has some desire to save them, but he has an other purpose that's incompatible with it so they they say we are in our rights to say

God does not love the unelect and Fine, you're in your right to say it, but it's a premise in your deductive argument

So it doesn't work if I don't buy it And there are different kinds of love and a blanket philosophical statement of God as all -loving is not going to work

And it may even be self -defeating again If it's pressed against various biblical pronouncements that God hates evildoers, you know in Psalm 5 5 and God hates the wicked in Psalms 11 5 so It's important that we don't take a perfect being theology of saying

God is the greatest conceivable being What does that entail? That's a perfectly legitimate exercise to think.

Okay, what would a perfect being do and we have intuitions about that But it's very important that we don't take those intuitions about perfect being theology to override the more precise revelation in Scripture and I think that our intuition about perfect being theology needs to be

Guided and educated by the clear revelation of Scripture. Now, what do you do with regards to something like Psalm 5 5 5?

I know you hate the worker of iniquity I heard a lot of people who want to affirm God's universal love for everyone kind of this blanket love right and They'll take verses like that and kind of Claim that it's just poetry or a form of exaggeration

Yeah, I don't need to debate the exegesis here. I think that's the general warning

I'm offering is that you don't want a Blanket statements of God's universal loving kindness to be in conflict with Some of the distinctions that the scriptures draw

So even if you know, it's not like maybe it's an overstatement or just the same thing is said in Romans 9, right?

So about Jacob, I love you. So I hated You know where the the claim is made

I think I've heard Layton say that in one of his videos that it's not really hate. It's really just loving less, right?

It's just a matter of degree and that's fine. That's acceptable, but there are degrees, right? So we're saying that no matter what

God's love is here. There is one that he loves more than the other but that that seems to be countered to our general intuition that well if he's

Maximally good if he is maximally loving then he should love maximally everyone in the same way

All right. So what I'm saying is don't take those intuition of purely perfect being theology unbridled by more specific examples in scripture because they should educate what the perfect being who exists and we agree

God is perfect They educate us about what that actually looks like in practice All right.

Well Stratton goes on to say if someone loves a person ultimately that includes a desire for their eternal flourishing

So if you don't care if they make it to heaven, then it's not love plain and simple Yeah, so here even the

Calvinist can affirm that God has an overriding purpose But it's not the case that he doesn't care or that he doesn't have a desire that they may be saved

So I think that the Calvinist can say that and doesn't say what's Tim is saying We know if it's going to be said that God loves someone but doesn't desire their ultimate flourishing

Then God doesn't actually love that person, right? Yeah and that's fine the Calvinist can grant that and still say that he loves the reprobate in that very sense since he does desire their

Ultimate flourishing. It's just that he has an overriding reason not to bring it about Okay, but Tim goes on to ask why is it needed for humans to suffer eternally for his own glory

Yeah So I already answered that in part of our interview and I said that part of the reason

That God has may be in Romans 9 Where he says that it would be to show his wrath and make known his power

It really seems to be addressing that very question And then part of the answer is we don't know from which he doesn't follow that the reason doesn't exist

So that's the standard move called skeptical theism and skeptical theism isn't some desperate

Calvinist attempts to rescue God's righteousness It's formulated by Peter van in wagon. I've been planting and William Lane Craig and they're all libertarians

So it's really what I do with that question of what is God's morally sufficient reasons for evil?

In general and more in particular Eternal evil of damnation. That's the answer

I provide Well, let's move on to the issue of evil and and Braxton's free will theodicy

Braxton had argued that when Calvinists are debating the problem of evil with an atheist They can't use free will and so if they can't use free will and they don't have a successful response to the atheist

Argument where they bring up the issue of evil us Calvinist. We're determinists. So you can't say, you know, there's evil because there's free will

Yeah, so I responded that the Calvinist has a fine answer that God has morally sufficient reasons to allow evil

And even if we don't know the reason it doesn't follow that. There is no reason so that's the standard move

I said it's called skeptical theism and I went on to argue that it's the same answer that they must give to But that's where there's a bit of pushback.

Okay, but now they say they they go further than this, right? They say they they do know the reason God always allows evil

Very well, so they agreed free will isn't just a defense. It's it's their theodicy even for for natural evil.

Not just moral evil Yeah, so here my my claim my the most modest claim I make is that libertarian free will can do some of the lifting in your theodicy, but it cannot do all

So I said that there's no free will in a tsunami or the earthquake or the cancer cells or the virus so God is in full control of those things that cause terrible amounts of suffering and Even when it comes to human free actions,

I think that there's limits to how much damage they cause against God's will So when you think of a terrible case of a little girl getting kidnapped and then for years and years and decades being abused and raped by a rapist kidnappers kidnapper

You want to ask also to the Molinist, you know Why doesn't the

Molinist God kill the rapist after the first rape right? Well after the first year or the first decade

He might not be able to make the rapist freely refrain But surely

God can just strike him dead so he can use means that avoid that and yet he doesn't

So there are some limitation to just how much? free will gets out of hand for God if it's indeterministic

So, I don't think it's plausible to say that God just has too much respect for the rapist free will that he just leaves it

Completely unbridled like that. So he most likely has another reason and that's much harder to link to free.

Well, so I Ultimately said that it's too ambitious to link every single instance of evil to free

Well, and I don't know I may at least I didn't know of any libertarian philosopher who does that?

I mean that I can tell Peter van Inwagen doesn't do that William Lane Craig doesn't do that Plantinga doesn't do that either.

So Yeah, when planting he uses he's a free will of demons to explain all of natural evil when he does that It's a defense.

It's not a theology. It's not suggesting that there's actually a Demon behind every bush is saying it's just a logically possible option

So it serves as a defense and not a theology So now I do think that there's something to be said for Braxton's pushback here

Because there may be a path for him to say that free will is involved in all evil

There's actually two different ways that he can link evil to libertarian free

Well, so let's clarify those two those two ways in which he can do that The first way is this he can say

God cannot avoid Certain evil X because evil X is the result of an indeterministic human choice

That's the one that I said isn't really available for natural evil because the tsunami doesn't have free will the cancer cells don't have free

Will etc. So God fully controls them those natural evils in the same way that he controlled human choices on Calvinism It's it's fully deterministic

So even you have to say that God brings about those natural evils

Because he has a morally sufficient reasons even Braxton Has to say that God brings about those natural evils because he has a morally sufficient reason and I say even if we don't know that reason it doesn't follow that.

It's not there but Then what I think Braxton is trying to do is to link all of it to libertarian free will in The different way in the second way that would go something like this

God permits that evil not because he cannot control it Because he wants it to be but so it's not because he cannot control it, right?

So in the same way that they say the rapist has libertarian free will and God doesn't determine the outcome of his choice

So this things get out of hand, right the rapist does something that God would have wished really didn't happen

So in the case of natural evil, it's not like that and so God permits that evil not because he somehow cannot control it, but because he wants it the

Natural evil to now be the influencer of another free choice that he cannot determine

Right. Do you catch the difference? So in one way, it's simply God cannot control the human free choice

And that clearly is not available when you say that when you're talking about natural evil and God does control that But he might want that suffering of the tsunami or the earthquake the the disease to be the influencer of another free choice and God Arguably might not have needed that natural suffering if Calvinism had be true and God could have just you know

Zapped the person in making the right choice So if that second piece is what Braxton is trying to do

I think there's a coherent way that he can try to do that So I do accept some of his pushback if that's what he has in mind now

If they do insist that is their view that's fine with me and I accept the pushback I no longer have an objection that their claim is self -defeating

But you must remember that it's in the context of Braxton positive argument that the

Calvinist doesn't have a good answer to the problem of evil So so the fact that I don't have a decisive argument against the implausible reason that they suggest

Doesn't mean I'm left without a good answer to the problem of evil against the atheist We both say

God has morally sufficient reasons for all evil and even if we don't know those reasons It doesn't follow that they don't exist

So then they say that free will is the only reason for all suffering always and everywhere, right?

That seems to be the the claim that they say it's a theodicy. It's really for all Freewill is the only reason for all suffering always and everywhere and I say it's a stretch

But they might be able to get away with it And if so, I say great, you know use that against the atheist that's fine with me

I just have to believe there's other reasons instead and that's fully available to the

Calvinist when arguing against the atheistic arguments So I don't think I'm left without a good answer to the problem of evil just because I deny libertarian free will in that way now at the end of the show

Hunter Hunter Braxton Never call him Hunter Braxton's dealing with the question of apparently

Gratuitous evil and he discusses William Rose version of the problem of evil featuring a fawn burning in a forest fire caused by lightning with no human around and Braxton says the

Calvinist would say to this exactly what what I would say and that is you have no way of Demonstrating that there isn't some good that comes out of that that you just can't see.

Yeah, he's right We would both say that so that's the standard that's the standard move of skeptical theism and that's my answer indeed

So we're on the same boat. So I say don't sabotage the boat All right, um now we come to the final video now

I want to I want it's up to you Would you mind taking some questions in between if if you think we want to if you want to keep pushing on so that we finish

Covering the entire topic we can do that as well. And I'm sure our listeners would not mind one bit yeah, maybe we should press on a little bit so just so that we cover it in one coherent wall and I think we're covering enough ground that most of the questions will be addressed.

But good perfect. No problem All right, so we're moving on to Tim's video Here's the the question here

Calvinism isn't determinism So Stratton says that he finds it odd that you conflate Calvinism with exhaustive divine determinism

Because some Calvinists don't affirm a determinism He has Greg Kolko Richard Muller Oliver Crisp in mind

And he says that you're responsible being young is responsible for this widespread confusion and I'm working hard to clean this up All right, so I'll be nice and just that that the accusation is unhelpful

So first of all crisp isn't a libertarian Oliver's crisps only defends the compatibility of libertarianism with the reformed tradition

So it's a different project, but he doesn't affirm libertarianism himself Secondly, it's it's not like I'm being deceptive and smuggling in my definitions and counting on the fog of confusion here

I come out of the gates with very clear definition and I stipulate clearly that I take the

Determinist the determinist view to be the Calvinist view. So there's no confusion here. I just say this is my assumption here

And third in response to that. I think that's a Braxton himself Invalidates that accusation right away in the interview he notes that consistent

Calvinists who affirm the tulip the five points of Calvinism must affirm determinism and Yes, I think that's my view

So I'm either responsible for a mass confusion or I'm just calling people to be consistent and I don't think it can be both

So latent says the same thing in that same clip. He says that that it is the consistent

Calvinist view So then the microphone comes back to Tim and he says yeah, that's well said

But it seems to me that this has refuted the accusation of confusion because I agree with them.

I'm not Deceiving with my definitions or what have you? I'm really just calling them to be consistent good going

Calvinist to be consistent That is that I think that they should affirm determinism and that is the

Calvinist view Well Stratton then says Calvin isn't a determinist but Edwards is so you should call yourself an inwards

Ian not a Calvinist Yeah, so look I disagree about the interpretation of Calvin here, but I don't need to debate him on the labels here

It's not because you know, it's not because Calvin is teaching it that are you from determinism? I actually have a fun story about this once William Lane Craig asked me if I are from Calvinism because John Calvin was

French No, it's not because he was French it's because he was right and in the end

Tim's himself affirms that determinism falls from the five points of Calvinism So I don't think that there was much marriage to the accusation that I'm sewing confusion here

Okay So so on this issue of definitions Layton says lots of Calvinists use the same words as we do but give them different meaning and then

Stratton says it's like Talking to a Mormon. I guess the analogy there is that Mormons For example, we'll use terms like the

Trinity, but they'll mean could something completely different Yeah, so they say we have to constantly be defining our terms, but it doesn't tell us which words we twist

All right, so we started our initial interview you and I by giving very clear definitions and they're completely standard

So I define determinism as the thesis that everything that happens is necessitated by antecedent factors you know and That you know

Tim added there that it includes all our beliefs. Yes, everything we do there's no debate there

So I don't I don't know which of my definitions you might find issues with but I don't think that we're you know

Twisting words like Mormons to create confusion. I think our definitions are quite clear Says but the debate is about the fact that some

Calvinists like myself and you affirm Exhaustive divine determinism and the majority of Christians reject this view

Yes, so we affirm divine determinism so Tim repeatedly refers to it as Edd for exhaustive divine determinism

That's a bit heavy -handed mostly because that's written redundant So determinism is the thesis that everything is determined, right?

So the exhaustive is baked into the determinism but apparently

Stratton doesn't realize that because that leads him to make some Somewhat confused statements like Compatibilism is sometimes true, but cannot exhaustively describe reality

That's direct quote and no that's not consistent with his view because if compatibilism is true at any time

It's true at all times If it's true that everything is determined then it does exhaustively describe reality

So determine ism isn't the thesis that some things are determined. It's the view that all things are determined We'll get back to that because that matters in some of the formulation of the arguments.

Okay. Well this this raises a question then So did God causally determined Calvinist like Kochel, Krith, Muller, etc to disagree with you?

The answer is yes, all things are determined. So yes Determine that Okay, and it also raises another question

Layton you and and and I both used to be Calvinist they say right they claim to be

Calvinist Yeah, yeah, that's fine. And I again I can take that as their word. I didn't know them

I don't have any reason to doubt that they were sincere Calvinist in the past. But yes to answer that question again

He's asking well that raises a big question of conundrum somehow for the Calvinist, you know

Did God determine us to leave Calvinism? And yes, I take them at their word

I say yes, God determined that to Determinism means all is determined. So just get this out of the way

Determinism means that everything is determined. Well, it makes no sense to ask. Well, did God determine that?

Yes. Yes. Yes The answer is yes. Okay, then they play your definition of compatibilism where you explain that it's the compatibility of determinism and freewill and it's not technically saying that either is true only that they're compatible and Stratton says he

Aims to show that this thesis referring to compatibilism while it might occasionally be true.

It cannot exhaustively describe reality He says I do not reject the thesis. I simply argue that thesis cannot exhaustively describe reality.

I actually affirm Compatibilistic freedom in some cases he says yeah. No, so that's a strong misuse of the word compatibilism

This is exactly the confusion. I was describing He doesn't see that determinism refers to everything that happens and compatibilism is the thesis that determinism

Understood like that is compatible with moral responsibility. So it's not accurate for him to say that he's sometimes a compatibilist compatibilism refers to the compatibility of Determinism, which is all things are determined.

So it's not something that changes with time he goes on to say I contend that a thesis of compatibilism cannot always or Exhaustively explain reality.

So Guillaume might offer one instance of knowledge that doesn't require libertarian freedom. That's fine I might affirm some of them

However, he needs to discount all of them to rationally maintain his thesis of compatibilism or that this thesis of compatibilism exhaustively describes

All instances of reality all the time. He asked the others. Does that make sense to you guys?

Yes, and no, I don't think it makes sense That sentence doesn't make sense because of what I've just explained that it's not about exhaustively describing reality

Determinism is about all things and compatibilism is the compatibility of determinism with moral responsibility

To say just because God determines one thing. It doesn't mean he determines everything. Yes, that's true

But nobody denies that so I'm not I'm not affirming that just because God determines one thing then he must be determining everything

So nobody affirms that just because God determines one thing he he determines everything certainly not me well, then they play your definition of libertarianism where you say

It's the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that we sometimes are free from which it follows that determinism is false

And Tim said he only sort of agrees, but it wouldn't follow from this that determinism never results

Yeah, so we see here again that he doesn't understand that determinism is a thesis about all things

So if determinism is true at any time, it's true at all times He says he's opposed to exhaustive, but the exhaustive is baked into the determinism

Okay. Well, can I ask let me ask question then? Can it can't it be the case that God can determine some things and not others?

Yes, it could be but then that would not be determinism right determine ism is the view that all things are determined That's the distinction

All right Well, he says this is what I mean when I speak of libertarian freedom one's ability to choose between or among a range of alternative

Options each of which is compatible with one's nature So you see I affirm a version of compatibilism and I jokingly refer to myself as a libertarian

Compatibilist, what do you say to that? Yeah, I mean here I have to say who's creating mass confusion now

I mean, it is a completely different meaning of compatibilism. So I don't think you should go around calling himself that it's it's really silly

Okay, then they turn to your response to Peter van in wagons consequent argument at the beginning of the video

Stratton It said being young defines free will as the control condition for moral responsibility. I'm not primarily concerned with moral responsibility

I'm concerned with rational responsibility and it seems that being on misses this major point He says it leads you to attack a caricature of his argument.

Yeah. No, that's complete nonsense He speaks much of this of his time

You know He really spent a lot of time playing my responses to the consequence argument and he deals with it as if I were

Responding to his free -thinking argument. So that's a really big confusion. There's no caricature whatsoever

He just has a hard time following what arguments we're talking about in the interview He said perhaps it's my fault for being for not being as clear as possible

But no, he was very clear what he was arguing and I was very clear in my responses

So in the interview, I first responded to the consequence argument For the benefit of the audience because I didn't want to appear like I was dodging the consequence argument

Just because Tim didn't defend it in his blog post. So up until that point I was obviously responding to Peter van in wagons consequence argument.

That's not a strawman of the so -called free -thinking argument That's just a different argument altogether. Okay, but he insists that if you're you're missing the point, right?

So he says it was not my intention to debunk his interaction with Peter van in wagons consequent argument

It's a matter of fact I granted for the sake of argument then y 'all's treatment of the consequent argument is granted to ultimately show that determinism and Compatibilism cannot exhaustively describe reality and since being young misses my intention.

He misses the point Yeah, I don't think that's true at all. I think you should read his blog again.

He tells you the different story himself He says this whole thing started over lunch with apologist friends in Rhode Island Where he challenged me to respond to the consequence argument

So I really didn't want to turn that lunch into a debate show So I told him he could read my refutation of the argument in my book

And as a result, he went and looked in my book at my treatment of the consequence argument

And he said he was not impressed by it So I repeat if my response to the consequence argument is successful and entirely granted here in what sense is it an impressive?

I don't think he tells us. Okay. So now what about this issue of The accusation of defending atheism, right?

So then they play the clip where you explain that Peter van in wagons consequent argument is aimed at naturalistic determinism

But that it can be applied to Calvinism as well Calvinist are bending over backwards to save the naturalist view

Namely a big red flag should be raised if a Christian finds himself defending atheism at least in a roundabout way

Maybe something is wrong with your specific flavor of Christianity He says if you find yourself defending atheism to hold on to your specific flavor of Christianity Yeah, I think it's beyond the pale here

I'm obviously not defending atheism by refuting a bad argument that would have refuted atheism

So otherwise we should rally behind every argument for theism even if they have false premises

So I could look forward to Tim Stratton's video defending the banana argument from Ray Comfort I mean it supports the existence of God.

You don't want to bend over backwards to defend atheism in a roundabout way Do you so I don't think it's really serious

Ray Comfort's banana argument Something I can look it up. Oh, yes. No, this is a grand grand moment of apologetics

But but the point is serious that you can refute an argument without agreeing even if you agree with its conclusion so the fact that I refute the

The consequence arguments that might have otherwise successfully Refuted atheism doesn't mean that I'm somehow defending atheism.

I'm just showing what's wrong with an argument Sure now let's turn to this issue of the accusation of cultism and idolatry that was made in the video

Stratton says defending five -point Calvinism is barely defensible, but Defending exhaustive divine determinism is akin to idolatry those who are devoted to Exhaustive divine determinism become cultish and then

Braxton says there's a powerful connection between divine determinism and atheism Their parallel needs to be examined with great deal of sobriety

Yeah, I think all of this is also beyond the pale I really don't know what that means It's it's either irrelevant platitudes or guilt by association

But there's not much to say either way so we can move on Well, then they say there there's a risk that Calvinism can alienate atheists

Some atheists have said if the Bible is true Then Calvinism is true and I couldn't worship a god like that and that could be a stumbling block

Yeah, I mean the problem is that the the atheist also don't like a god who is not a universalist or a god who regulates sexuality or who permits suffering

So now what do we do? Do we reject those beliefs too so that we can have atheists start liking the

God of the Bible? I don't think so So yeah, I fully take the fact that maybe people don't like the God of Calvinism and in that sense

I'm happy to tell them look to be quite open to say look There's plenty of Christians would disagree with me

If you think that Calvinism is beyond the pale for you, I'd rather you become a Christian and not a Calvinist But yeah

I I do agree that the Bible seems to teach Calvinism and I work very hard to show why it's not a problematic view by Defending the coherence of the of the view

Well Leighton asks what practical purpose do you have in promoting a view that could cause people to stumble?

Well, I have a practical purpose in teaching what is true And you know, I think I recalled the gospel of Christ crucified being a stumbling block, too

So I don't think it's a problematic to defend something that could cause us could could cause unbelievers to stumble

Well, Tim goes on to say he says Calvinist and Molinist agree God predestines all things but Calvinists have a weird commitment about how

God predestines that it is by Determination by determining all things. Yeah, once again, the accusation is strange and it's entirely symmetrical, right?

So if it's true, then the Molinist also has a weird commitment about how God predestines through middle knowledge

So, of course not. I don't think it's a weird commitment. We just disagree So let's just stick to the arguments and instead of this childish accusation of cultism and idolatry

I don't think it gets us much further All right. Well, what's up with this unimpressive response to the consequent argument, right?

Stratton then reads your explanation that the truth of determinism is not relevant to the merits of your response to the consequent argument

And he says I beg to differ. I grant the young's conclusion for the sake of argument and use his conclusion to argue my point

Yeah, so I don't think he's understood really what the concern was There's no simpler there.

There is no simpler way for me to explain it than the way I did in our initial interview But you can be fully successful in showing that an argument is bad

Even if the conclusion of the argument is true, that's right So if team just offers arguments against determinism

He does nothing to undermine my refutation of the consequence arguments So once again, you don't need the conclusion to be false in order to be successful in refuting an argument

I can refute the banana argument by recomfort without being an atheist. That's the point

Okay I really got to check out this banana argument if people are listening and know where that's found send me send me a link

I'd be interested He says when I said I was unimpressed by being young's treatment of the consequent argument

It's because it doesn't do anything to show that divine determinism exhaustively describes reality

Well, of course my refutation doesn't do that. The consequence argument is an argument for incompatible

ISM So in refuting it if I don't also demonstrate that determinism is true.

It's unimpressive No, that clearly doesn't work like that. Well, he says he didn't insult you. You're a scholar and you're a very good one

So there he thinks very highly of you, which is no that's that's fine. I didn't take him to insult me

I mean no one took the unimpressive here to refer to me. It referred to my treatment of the consequence arguments and so it's

Misguided since my treatment of the consequence argument is entirely successful and Tim never disputes that he grants it

So what's wrong with my treatment of the consequence argument that it's not also giving him everything he wants in life

I mean, that's not the point of the refutation of the argument Sure Okay.

Well, then he starts making comments about his free -thinking argument Okay. So although it's still responding to my discussion of the consequence argument

So I he hasn't really yet played some what I've had to say in response to his free -thinking argument

But when I explained the conditional and the categorical abilities to do otherwise which were very important in my response to the consequence argument

He tried to criticize the conditional analysis with his free thinking argument so Well, he says you could only believe otherwise if God had caused you to believe otherwise that doesn't allow knowledge

He thinks that that undermines the possibility of knowledge. Yeah, but yes, it does God wouldn't just cause me to believe otherwise regardless of the evidence right so on the

The claim here that is that I would believe otherwise if the evidence had been otherwise

Because the mechanism of my brain Through which God causes me to believe something is what what

I said is reasons responsive So it would have responded to reasons if the reasons had been different.

I would have believed differently So it really makes an important point that we do need that That's a conditional ability and it does help in maintaining that we can have knowledge

But then he says if all your thoughts and beliefs are always aimed at your greatest desires and they're not aimed at truth

Then no one stands in an epistemic position to argue or rationally affirm that his claims are any good at all yeah, and so he says if all your thoughts and beliefs are always aimed at your greatest desires and They are not aimed at truth

But simply from determinism, you don't get that end. You don't get the end They are not aimed at truth.

You get that you get that part from naturalistic determinism Okay, and that's

Alvin planting as evolutionary argument against naturalism, which I affirm myself But being determined doesn't entail you're not aimed at truth

It's not hard to get let me actually show you that with props that I take into the classroom for my intro to philosophy students when

I teach epistemology, I Contrast a thermometer and a magic 8 -ball

So I bring those in the classroom to really make that point about cognitive faculties So the magic 8 -ball, you know, you shake it and it gives you an answer to a very deep question

Usually a some sort of a yes or no answer and then the thermometer obviously gives you the temperature

And what I explain is that Both are determined right? So the problem here with the magic 8 -ball

So obviously both are determined and one is trustworthy to actually give you the truth, right?

you obtain actual knowledge from the thermometer and you wouldn't you know, if you're Actually reasonable you wouldn't trust what the magic 8 -ball is telling you in response to your question

And the problem is not that one is determined and the other isn't they're both determined But the problem is that the magic 8 -ball is not aiming at truth, right?

So similarly the reason that you can't trust your brain on naturalistic determinism is

That it's not aimed at truth. Well on Calvinist determinism it is so I think it's pretty much a slam -dunk here that it's not

You don't get the not aimed at truth from just being determined because the thermometer is fully determined But it is tracking truth in the way that the magic 8 -ball doesn't

Hmm, so you'd say his confusion is that he's kind of almost assuming the naturalistic argument and imposing it upon the

Calvinist Yeah, well, so I mean I think that the the argument is very similar here it's a claim that somehow you shouldn't trust your cognitive faculties for some reason and the some reason is in the case of Tim Stratton's argument is just that you're determined and in the case of Plantinga's Evolutionary argument against naturalism is to claim that your cognitive faculties are not aimed at truth

They're aimed at survival, right? Because they are the fruit of evolution on naturalism. So I think that I affirmed the

Argument by Plantinga which by the way, it gives me ammunition against the atheist And I denied

Tim Stratton's argument because I think that the relevant piece here is not being determined The relevant piece is being aimed at truth

Well, he repeats that if you claim to know some things then exhaustive divine determinism is false and I don't just state this

I argue for it. He says Yeah, so I hear a lot of reputation of that claim, but it's very hard to see where the argument actually is here

So I want to invite Tim, you know show your premises show me how that conditional follows from premises that I must accept

It really is what's missing here in the argument Well, he plays some some more of your discussion of the consequent argument and repeats that he's not really interested in moral responsibility

He says I'm focusing on rational responsibility and not moral responsibility and until that's recognized.

We're gonna talk past each other. He says Yeah, so it's a bit strange. It's what I explained So he takes my explanation on the consequence argument and he chastises me every time

I talk about moral responsibility instead of rational responsibility But it's the part where I'm explaining how to refute the consequence argument

So he's so -called free -thinking argument is nowhere near at the moment in those clips

So I'm not sure why he doesn't get that. So we're evidently we're talking past each other here

But it's pretty clear whose fault it is at this point He constantly responds to my treatment of the consequence argument as if I were arguing against his free -thinking argument

And then he blames me for the confusion For confusing moral responsibility with epistemology.

It's a bit bizarre He says been young said that there's a big fat equivocation in many anti Calvinist arguments

But simply speak of the ability to do otherwise without distinguishing which one is in view and quote that might be true

But it's irrelevant here because I go out of my way to distinguish what is necessary for knowledge Benyamin says quote if they mean categorical ability and they're begging the question and quote that's false

That's simply false because I offer deductive arguments. I support them I defend them and I've been having these conversations with PhD philosophers and theologians since 2012.

Would you speak to that? Yeah, so it's a bit awkward because I'm the foreigner here and I do speak with an accent

But here I think he's just has troubles following the simple flow of that English sentence I was talking about a good number of arguments that fail to distinguish between Categorical and conditional abilities.

I've listed several of them in my book by David Whittaker Peter van Inwagen David Kopp And so they all do that.

They give you a story where you have conditional ability You don't have the conditional ability to do otherwise and then you are not morally responsible and then they generalize and say well

They're therefore you need the categorical ability to do otherwise and I'm saying it's a non sequitur so I'm talking about that the fact that just Showing a story where you have conditional ability you lack the conditional ability to do otherwise

Doesn't give you incompatibilism It is begging the question if you do the jump to the need for a categorical ability to go

Otherwise, that's what I'm talking about and I in that very same sentence I say so if they mean categorical ability, then they beg the question and This is not talking about Stratton.

So he's really misunderstood that second part of the sentence here and If he wants a more immediate example of exactly what

I'm talking about here of begging the question by doing that He doesn't have to go too far because Braxton himself

Did it in that very video? He offered a story where he's sitting on the couch and asking his daughter to carry the couch into her bedroom

And he says if I ask my daughter to carry the couch to her bedroom while I'm sitting on it

I can't blame her because she can't do it But you can see she doesn't have the conditional ability to do it she cannot do it even if she wanted to So Braxton uses it to conclude that Calvinism Calvinism is false

And I say it's a non sequitur because of that very equivocation on the conditional versus categorical ability right, so so I continued in maintaining that the affirmation of Conditional principle of alternate possibilities isn't sufficient and we need additional arguments

So then Tim responded very loudly. Well, there were several arguments in my blog post

Yes, I'm aware that there are arguments for more for incompatibilism or for indeterminism and he's offered some

I'm saying that the mere affirmation of conditional principle of alternate possibility Isn't one and that's beyond dispute.

I think and he's offering different arguments doesn't refute that What about on this this

Comment of being a game -changer, right? Then they discuss the controversy over the phrase game -changer and if people watch the first video they know what what

I'm referring to here Yeah, so he says he didn't use game -changer in his dissertation

So he said that we would be happy there but in a blog article he did so I affirm that determinism and libertarianism are incompatible and that's purely

Definitional and he called that affirmation that concession a game -changer

And I explained that it's ridiculous to say my affirmation of definitions is a game -changer

That should have been the end of the story, but apparently he insists and he says this he says it is a game -changer

For those who are playing the game and arguing that exhaustive divine determinism does or does not always describe reality

That's the game. I'm talking about And I'm really not too sure how to interpret that sentence but I cannot think of any interpretation that removes the absurdity of calling my affirmation of Definitions a game -changer

So I went on and you know Jokingly put on Twitter a meme that a friend of mine had done where he put a picture of Tim Stratton doing a mic drop

And the caption reads my opponent admitted that bachelors are unmarried

Game -changer And I think it made the point that affirming a definition isn't a game -changer for any debate

Sure, but then he goes on to say Guillaume's remarks are game -changing when you take all of them together.

So all of it, you know Yeah. Yeah, I mean, I don't think this is what he meant

It's clear in the blog, you know read the article again in your game -changer sentence He's explaining explicitly

Take is explicitly talking about my affirmation that compatibilism and libertarian free will are incompatible

He's not talking about all my statements together whether in my book or in my interview. It's really about that.

Yes Doesn't make sense to you guys. Maybe I shouldn't have used the words Game -changer

Braxton responds. There's nothing wrong with using provocative language to have your words be heard after all he used to mean right?

Yes Yes, absolutely. And of course, that's not the point at all that I'm making here. I'm not objecting because it's provocative language

I mean actually the phrase game -changer is not even provocative. I'm objective I'm objecting because it's absurd to call the affirmation of definition a game -changer

Then Braxton says again that you fail to hit Stratton's view because you're talking about moral responsibility

I guess the issue of moral rationality as opposed to response. Yeah. Yeah. So it's the same bizarre criticism so far

I was only responding to the consequence arguments in the in the video So then yes, we are about to turn to the so -called free -thinking argument

But he hasn't even played a sentence of my response to it so far. So I don't think it's really relevant

It's right after right? They finally play a response to it eventually, right? Mm -hmm. Yeah, so they get to the for thinking argument

So let's let's transition to the free -thinking argument then they first respond to your claim that it's not an argument for incompatibilism

Mm -hmm Yes, so I had mentioned initially that the the the argument that team offers which he called the free -thinking argument

He is it's not an argument for indeterminism It's not for its truth, but it's impossibility of affirming it rationally

So it is saying it's the claim is that determinism could be true But then it would still be irrational to affirm because knowledge claims would be impossible

And in response they say but Bignon is making knowledge claims So yes, of course,

I don't plan to use this as an escape. I'm just laying out the logic of the argument I do maintain that we make knowledge claims and therefore

I don't want to say determine is true And I just cannot rationally affirm it. No, certainly.

I want to rationally affirm it So I was just explaining the structure of the argument and I don't plan to use this as an escape

I'll tell you full well, which escape I actually take of the argument I deny the conditional that if determinism is true, you can't have knowledge or draw rational inferences

That's my response to the argument Okay. Well then Tim says that he argued that compatibilism entails determinism, but determinism is refuted by the free -thinking argument

So it does refute compatibilism. Yes, and that's fine I think he's missing a few premises to go from compatibilism to determinism

But that's acceptable to me. I have tried to offer these premises myself in the past I just know that we're still not in my refutation of the argument.

It's just my explanation of the claims Okay Well, then they say you were uncharitable when you accused him of claiming too much ownership of the argument

Which you said he didn't invent And they say everyone uses what came before us Stratton says he stands on the shoulders of Giants and he offered his own formulation of the syllogism

Yeah, so I don't want to dwell too much on that the problem with the argument is that it's bad

It's not that it's an original but I I do believe he claims too much ownership I mean in my book, you know to take similarly the same kind of exercise in my book

I offer my formulation of Luther's argument that original sin refused the principle of alternate possibilities

But but I don't say that I came up with the slave choosing argument and I don't launch the slave choosing ministries

So I don't think there's need to insist here, but I'd rather focus on the refutation of the argument.

Okay? You'd said it's obvious which premise the Calvinist will refuse if the term is true

Knowledge is impossible then says you didn't include the words rationally inferred and affirmed.

Yeah, that's fine with me So in that case, it might look like he's no longer targeting all knowledge

And maybe I had misunderstood that piece of his if that's the case but he's only targeting a subset of that and saying it's only our knowledge obtained by inference and Yeah, I do insist that knowledge obtained by inference is compatible with determinism

So we have the relevant disagreement to resolve here. So the argument is not really affected by that We were just focusing on one more specific type of knowledge

But I do affirm that we have it even if we're determined so there's still the relevant disagreement here needs to be debated

Yeah, well then he quotes you saying the indeterminist must support the premise or the argument remains question begging end quote

And he says that's true. I agree. Yeah, so we're clear now on what he needs to do

Then he needs to support the claim that determinism excludes knowledge or rationally inferred knowledge

With premises that the determinist accepts. Otherwise, it's the question begging, right?

But he never really offers those premises that should make me accept that determinism excludes knowledge

He only hammers the same question, you know, it says if a mad scientist determines everything got

Guillaume believes How can Guillaume not the mad scientist rationally affirm any of his beliefs without begging the question?

So first it's a question. So it's not an argument And I need to be given some premises that I must accept and then which entail the truth of the disputed conditional

Right. So this is really what's what's missing here and second that that question that he asked is actually quite easy to answer

How do I rationally affirm any of my beliefs? for the sake of argument

I can just buy fully into let's say Alvin Plantinga's account of what knowledge is and I could say exactly this

I have a belief formed by cognitive faculties Functioning properly in an environment that is suited to them according to a design plan and that truth

It's a bit of a mouthful, but it's planting as a count of knowledge and I could say exactly that none of it is incompatible with determinism and Then if he takes the the case of the mad scientist and he says that the mad scientist

Does a clue exclude any of those items that are important for knowledge? Then yes, it's going to exclude knowledge

But then it shows that the mad scientist case is now dis analogous to the normal case that I affirm where the

Calvinist God does give us cognitive faculties designed to track truth and give us a preponderance of true beliefs

So that would be how I answered his question and simply asked for an argument that supports that conditional that's controlled for sure

Well, he does anticipate that you you would give that sort of response And so he says this if Guillaume's next words are externalism,

I'd interrupt and say I'd like to talk to Guillaume Please not the mad scientist Yeah, so this is really obnoxious and apparently

They've in the video they seem to discuss a little bit that you know with it and and he doesn't really understand why his

Opponents keep rolling their eyes when he does that So let me explain precisely why it's so obnoxious and that perhaps may stop

Maybe perhaps stop doing it to other poor chaps. We engage with him on this argument so he affirms a conditional if knowledge is possible, then determinism is false.

I Obviously disputes that conditional I affirm the antecedent That says knowledge is possible and I deny the consequence that says determinism is false

So I dispute the conditional I deny the Consequence and I affirm the antecedent

But every time I open my mouth with the assumptions that the antecedent is true

He mocks me for my denial of the consequent as if I were also denying the antecedent

So it's really misguided and a way to simplify and illustrate is imagine that I keep claiming something

That's obviously absurd But imagine that I claim if someone speaks English without a

French accent then everything they say is false All right, that's that that's the crazy conditional But let's imagine that I claim that and then

I interrupt them every time they voice an English sentence Ah, no

French accent. Why are you saying false things all the time? Are you not interested in the truth?

It's extremely obnoxious because the debate is on the conditional It's not on whether I affirm the antecedent which

I obviously do or whether I accept the consequence which I obviously don't So that's really why it's not really profitable to simply catch you in your sentences like oh you say that Well, yeah, but since I don't

I don't buy the conditional it doesn't really help for that You point out that I affirm the antecedent

Well, then he quotes an epistemologist Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton who says this quote proper functions of our cognitive faculties must first rule out the deterministic influences of outsiders

Such as Alpha Centurion cognitive scientists Cartesian evil demons and also internal influences such as a brain

Lesion or even the influences of mind altering substances all of these influences may cause one's faculties to fail to function properly

Right. So I think that evil Cartesian demons and brain lesions may cut the link between the evidence

And the belief so that the cognitive faculties are not functioning properly and they fail to respond to the evidence

But god's determining providence isn't like that in the normal cases So what what makes the cognitive faculties dysfunction in the case of brain lesions and cartesian demons?

Is that they are no longer in line with their design plan to track truth So with those kinds of worries

You would have a defeater on determinism Only if you believed that god makes your cognitive faculties dysfunction a majority of the time

But but no one thinks that in the normal cases god doesn't interfere with your proper function of our cognitive faculties

And so his deterministic influence is not a defeater for our belief Okay well

Then they play a clip where you give a simple account of coming to know x I used my god -given brain to consider the evidence

And believe x and then stratton interrupts the clip. He says not so fast kiyom binyong Uh did binyong the thing he refers to as I consider and evaluate the evidence or was he caused and determined by the mad scientist?

Yeah, and it's a false dilemma. So we've seen already It's it's an obviously false dilemma since even his own wording entails that both forms of the dilemma are true

If I am caused to do x then I do x you know We saw if I cause my pen to fall it is the case that my pen falls

Well, then he says if he is free and not caused and determined by the mad scientist or anything else Then binyong is free and liberated to think to this french philosopher

I say welcome to the land of free in a libertarian sense if it's true you say, uh, how did

I come to know x? Well, I used I emphasis on I use my god -given brain if you say that then you say

I Use my libertarian freedom to deliberate and consider the evidence Yeah, so no and you know here is repeating the disputed conditional claim ad nauseum

What I would say is give us premises that the determinist accepts and that supports that disputed conditional

And as a parenthesis, I should say that i'm quite happy in the land of the free. Uh, I enjoy my life in this

Wonderful country and i'm quite grateful that god has brought me here Praise god praise god man.

Awesome Well, he says now if binyong continues to be exhaustively caused and determined by the mad scientist then binyong is gone

I don't know where he went and all we're left with is question begging Yeah I mean,

I I don't know how like we're not told how any of this follows from premises that we must accept and again

I I don't think that beliefs beg the question but the fact that I would be gone or that uh, he doesn't know where i'm

I went it's a bit bizarre Okay. Well, then he offers another version of the free thinking argument the deliberation and liberation argument

So one rationality requires deliberation two deliberation requires

Liberation three therefore rationality requires liberation four. Some humans are rational five

Therefore some humans possess liberation that is to say some humans possess libertarian freedom this argument hinges on the word

Deliberation gives west webster's definition of deliberation to weigh in the mind to consider and examine the reasons for or against a measure to estimate and weigh

The weight or force of arguments or the probable consequences of a measure in order to a choice or decision to pause and consider

Yeah, and once again, nothing in there calls for indeterminism So i'm fine with that account of deliberation and it's perfectly compatible with theistic determinism.

Okay So next he asks a question. Is it truly possible to deliberate without libertarian freedom? Well, the answer emerges after dwelling upon the nature of determinism for if exhaustive determinism is true

Then the non -rational laws of nature and past events or god or god always exhaustively determines a person's considerations examinations and estimations all of one's thoughts about their beliefs and one's beliefs about their thoughts

If that's the case the person in the case the thing being young refers to as I Cannot rationally affirm or provide a justification that his belief really is the best or true including his belief that determinism is true

Yeah, no, no No, it's an ad nauseum repetition of the conditional right if this then that but there's nothing that the determinist needs to accept

Here the laws of nature are not rational. Yes, but god is And is the one who designed our cognitive faculties to obtain knowledge?

So there's no reason to think that this sort of determinism excludes knowledge Okay. Well, then they play your claim that when stratton keeps responding, but you're determined It's only a good retort if you're already convinced that determinism is incompatible with knowledge

Stratton responds, uh, let me remind you that an argument has been provided to show that determinism is in fact incompatible with rationally inferred and rationally affirmed claims of knowledge

Uh, no and and that's my point so we've only had repetition of the disputed conditional

And his new syllogism about deliberation, which wasn't offered in the article we were responding to in the first place

Um still says nothing to convince a determinist that deliberation requires libertarian free will

Okay. Well then bradson brings up a cartesian certainty saying knowledge doesn't require absolute certainty

Yeah, I agree and it's it's irrelevant Because they're not asking for absolute certainty and i'm not saying that they're asking for it.

So it's really a non -issue here Well, then they ask for the ability to choose Otherwise saying that if determinism is true all your beliefs are chosen by someone other than you and if that's the case

You couldn't have chosen better beliefs Yeah, so here again, it's only interesting if the ability is conditional

If your beliefs are what they are regardless of your reasoning and reflection Then yes, something is wrong and you can't have knowledge

But if he means that we need the categorical ability to choose Otherwise, then he's begging the question because I don't have to accept that premise

Okay Well, then he plays the clip where you're saying that only arguments beg questions beliefs don't beg questions in response

The inference to the best explanation is an abductive argument and fallacies apply to reasoning which include abduction

And then braxton says fallacies can happen even when formal syllogisms are not being brought Okay Yes, so I think they're right you can commit some fallacies in your reasoning

Even if you're not engaging someone else in a debate I'm, just saying that the specific fallacy of begging the question isn't really applicable to someone which just draws an inference to the best

Explanation, uh quietly in his own room, you know, uh, it's it's not a deductive reasoning anyway

So the drawing of the inference is already a non -sequitur in that sense Okay, so by affirming a conclusion that doesn't logically follow from the premises.

It doesn't follow logically You're just saying hey i'm drawing the inference because it's the best explanation So by drawing that uh inference you're already somewhat begging the question if it's intended to be deductive

But but I don't think it's uh relevant. So I I don't think team's accusation should say we beg the question

When we claim to draw rational inferences You should rather say that we're not being rational or that our inferences cannot be justified or cannot be trusted or something like that But begging the question only happens really when you presuppose a controversial premise when trying to tell the conclusion to sell

The conclusion to someone who doesn't already believe it. So and that's The very thing that he keeps doing with his repetition of the conditional which

I dispute if determinism is true then rational it is impossible So that's that's the proper understanding.

Okay. Well, he adds if we always choose according to our greatest desires all the time Then they're never aimed at truth

Yeah, okay. So now he's engaging with the relevant question for our cognitive faculties. Are they aimed at truth?

So this claim of his is now obviously false from our choosing according to our greatest desires all the time

It doesn't follow that they are never aimed at truth on the contrary God gave us thinking abilities that when they're functioning properly are tracking truth

They are driven by a desire to believe the truth Now, of course, it's not infallible and sometimes we believe what's convenient instead of what's true or we can fail in our reasoning

But the possibility of all of this doesn't exclude knowledge You know at some point when

I explained that even a mad scientist could determine me to know things If he does it through a mechanism that preserves knowledge

Tim stratton said the how is irrelevant You're determined But we see here that that what is important for cognitive faculties to be reliable is the how it's no

What is important is where they go not how they get there So so it's not the relevant piece here is that they must be aimed at truth

Regardless of of whether they travel toward the truth in a deterministic or indeterministic fashion

Right, right. What you want is your beliefs to land on truth No matter how you travel to them

Hmm Well, he goes on to say moreover on binyon's view God causally determines some people including some of the elect to hold true beliefs

And other people including some of the elect to hold false beliefs because even scripture talks about even the elect will be deceived, right?

Well with this odd view in mind How can binyam rationally affirm or argue that this deceiving god and I would use the word god there with a little g

Because that's clearly not a maximally great being cause I'm, sorry cause how can binyam rationally affirm or argue that this deceiving god has causally determined binyam to hold correct thoughts and beliefs

Through all the right mechanisms as opposed to tim stratton without begging the question. Well, good luck with that I don't even know what the word proper means here.

What does proper even mean if everything always happens exactly the way god makes it happen How would you respond to that?

Yeah, so it's quite simple. I mean, let's take my thermometer again, right? So, um

You have a thermometer that gives you the temperature deterministically And imagine that I also have one that's broken, right?

I break it in half and now it's well just you know, remove the battery or whatever. It's not functioning properly

Both the good functioning thermometer and the broken thermometer are determined But one is functioning properly and the other one isn't

That's what proper means here in the planting and language that the cognitive faculties are functioning properly

And obviously we see with the thermometer example that just because they're determined doesn't mean that they're not properly functioning

You could properly function and detect truth successfully even while you're determined Right.

Well it goes on to say it seems that even if one is causally determined to believe something false And believes it true then in the ultimate sense it is proper

There doesn't seem to be any functioning at all if something or someone else causally determines exactly how one

Always thinks of and exactly how one always thinks about it Yeah, so and I think that's obviously false

I think the thermometer that gives you the temperature is causally determined and it's functioning properly

The one that's broken is also determined and not functioning properly, but I don't think it's too hard to distinguish between those two

So that that's when I brought up in the interview. I brought her the language by Fisher and Raviza their criterion for more responsibility they say that your

Decision making mechanism must be reasons responsive, right?

It's a speak of reasons responsiveness And here I would say the broken thermometer doesn't give you a different number when the temperature changes

But the functioning thermometer does So so they are responding to a different condition in the input

So similarly our cognitive faculties are responding differently to different reasons when they're functioning properly

So Stratton plays me explaining this but he doesn't address what I say He just marvels that I would have been determined to accept

Fisher's view And it's the same annoying move that I explained earlier is really obnoxious and he repeats the claim ad nauseam

Which doesn't help to support it for someone who doesn't already accept that conditional. Okay Well, then he plays the clip where you say that beliefs are arbitrary if they're not determined by the evidence

Yes Although he misrepresents what I said here because he makes me claim that our beliefs must be determined by someone else

And I didn't I didn't say that So in response, then he takes god's beliefs and he says that they are not caused by someone else

But he's missing the point god's beliefs are not determined by someone else, but they are necessitated by the facts

So god doesn't have the categorical ability to think otherwise than what's true right, he only would think of otherwise if Conditionally the facts were different And that's precisely the conditional that I say is true of me on determinism if my cognitive faculties are resounded responsive

I'm saying if the evidence had been different and my Cognitive faculties are functioning properly to track them then they would have detected something else

So that I think is true of god that he knows all things perfectly And he would have known those things to be different if they had been different But he doesn't as it stands categorically have the ability to believe otherwise than what the truth is

His beliefs are necessitated by the truth But he goes on to say if you do not possess the ability to evaluate and reject false beliefs, then you don't have rationality

Yes, of course and the ability to evaluate and reject false beliefs is compatible with determinism

Okay, well then you said the categorical ability to believe otherwise with the same evidence is actually irrational

Right. I smell the bread and freely chose to believe no one baked the bread right stratton responded that you missed the point because He's not interested

Pardon in belief only in thinking it's the free thinking argument. Not the free believing argument.

He says Yes, but your thinking leads to belief, right? That's exactly the kind of thinking that he's been talking about the drawing of an inference to the best explanation

So there's evidence the the smell of bread in my example and then one draws a conclusion an inference to the best explanation and the explanation is

Someone must have baked the bread. So it's exactly the case that he's using in his arguments and therefore

I don't think that there's any faux pas in using this to say that Uh If you affirm that you actually have a categorical ability to believe otherwise to not to think differently

That you're really saying I smell the bread, but it's crucial that I have this categorical ability to say

No, there's a smell of bread, but no one really baked the bread and I say that's absurd and I don't think it's a condition for knowledge

All right. Well then he had he typed a question during our interview about the mad scientist thought experiment

All right, you initially thought it was the standard manipulation argument with a mad scientist and then you realized it was a different argument

So you responded to it and he says i'm glad the mad scientist made binyan realized that But i'm going to repeat it again because I want to speak to binyan.

What does guillaume mean when he says my response? It's not his response

Yeah, it's still the same object obnoxious objection. Okay, and then he says then there's more of where has been young Uh gone, where'd he go?

We'll see him on the milk carton soon because apparently Yeah So creative that was a good

I would have seen guillaume on a milk carton as long as I knew you were safe You would make a good place on a milk carton. I don't know my kids might be worried over their meals in the morning

Uh, but I think it's clear at this point It's over in the video and he's not really addressing the substance of what

I said It's just a rhetoric on the where is guillaume gone. So, okay So, uh, why don't we uh, i'll give you

Some time to to draw some conclusions Yeah, yeah so so you know, I think that we we've tried to go and go as fast as we could and it's already a pretty lengthy response and The best we could do to respond to almost seven hours of uh of their videos

Uh, but I think that there was enough substance to cover really the heart of all their objection

So let me just try to finish on a positive note. Um in the very end of the show Um braxton had a pretty interesting analysis of my belief in irresistible grace

In light of how quickly and spectacularly god had revealed himself to me when I was an atheist

So yes people don't necessarily know that but I I was an atheist until I was a young adult

And then through a series of very improbable and providential events God has basically grabbed me by the throat and made me a christian

Uh, so the the full story actually i'm uh, i'm in a contract with tindale publishers for a book to come out next year um that that kind of uses my conversion story as a springboard to Explain some apologetic, uh in responding to atheism

So, um, I I talk about some of the questions that I wrestled with as an atheist to come to christ and so it's kind of a

I'll tell you the fun story and i'll use it as a pretext to inject a lot of apologetic material for you to swallow that pill

Uh, so that that's uh, the the the book that's in preparation for next year.

Um, But yes, because god has acted so drastically to grab me as an atheist and to make me a christian

It's obviously a strong impact on My understanding of how god saves people and they kind of discussed that at the end of their video.

It's kind of touching Um and uh stratton agreed that this was important. He said that makes sense.

I think they're right So I don't base my theology primarily on my experience I base it on scripture and reason

But my experience does highlight, uh, this truth that I take to be biblical and it's the fact that god saves

And there's no sinner that's too far gone for god's irresistible grace to be turned on and to save one like that So one like me and it gives good very good grounds for humility about one's salvation um, so I think that this is one of the merits of calvinism that you can look at your own salvation and say look

It's not because I was somehow more spiritual than my brother Who's right there and who still doesn't believe it's not because I was a good person because I loved god

No, I hated god It's just that god has decided kindly in his grace to reach out and break out all of my defenses

Just change my heart take out my heart of stone. Give me a heart of flesh and makes me a christian um, so it gives really good ground to be grateful and to have humility about the fact that you are a christian and not

Look down on those who are not um, and there's a bit of a funny anecdote about this, uh, this feeling, um,

Is a conversation I had with uh, my late friend, uh, nabil qureshi I don't know if your audience was familiar with nabil.

He's the author of the book seeking allah finding jesus and uh, he also has a very radical conversion from islam to christianity and One day we were discussing a little bit about our conversion stories

Um, and uh, you know, we did we were also discussing a little bit about free will Um, and and I asked him the question very mildly.

I said nabil don't you think that god tried harder to save you and me

Than he does most any other believer any other non -believer and um nabil looked at me and he said yeah, when

I think about that I want to be a calvinist for me and an armenian for everyone else So so so we smiled

Um, and obviously I said you can't really do that But yes, when it comes to yourself be amazed that god made a believer out of you

His grace is pretty amazing and i'll leave it at that. Yeah Well, we have given um, well you have given a lot of um food for thought again

This is not going to end the discussion and um, who knows maybe they'll make another three -part video

Which we will not be uh having another um, you know response, uh, yes, i'm gonna i'm gonna do the i'm gonna do the french thing and uh and surrender here, so Maybe one day

A debate, I mean tim tim would be interested in a debate. Uh when his book comes out, um things like that But I mean who knows

I mean you you've given so much of your time to me and I do appreciate it And I know folks who enjoy this discussion and think it's important to appreciate it as well

That's why I have no problem that this went two hours and 15 minutes. Uh, And that as long as this is

I know people can find so many Good nuggets in here, even if they disagree with you. There's there's um, awesome clarification on various points

So I do appreciate your time. I appreciate your friendship and um, thank you so much for coming on I really

I really do appreciate it. It's my pleasure. Eli. Thank you very much. Well, i'm gonna minimize you I apologize

He's gone. There you go. Um Well, once again guys, thank you so much for uh, joining me here at revealed apologetics to listen to this very lengthy but uh,

Meaty discussion on the issue of free will and determinism calvinism and non -calvinism and all the related, uh issues

I hope you guys are finding this. Um helpful I do apologize for people who have questions in the live chat that we didn't cover as you would imagine there was so much to cover

Um, we would not have covered at all if um, we took questions as well. Um, but that's it for tonight

Um guys, please tune in i'm going to be having a couple of uh, Good interviews coming up that I mentioned at the beginning and um, that's all that we've got for you tonight.