(Part 2): Guillaume Responds to Leighton Flowers, Tim Stratton, & Braxton Hunter.

All right, welcome to another episode of Revealed Apologetics.

I'm your host Elias Ayala and today I have with me

Guillaume Bignon who came on the show a while back to take on

the the arguments over Libertarianism and determinism and we we

kind of dealt with some of the objections to the Calvinist position from Tim Stratton

Braxton Hunter and Leighton Flowers.

And so today we're gonna do a part two and so if you guys have been following this discussion, you'll you'll know

that Leighton Tim and Braxton made a made three videos of their

own responding to our very large Discussion.

I think it was close to two hours.

Maybe it was over two hours I'm not sure but this particular discussion this interview that there I'm gonna be conducting

with Guillaume Presupposes and you guys know I'm presuppositional.

That's right.

It presupposes that you have background knowledge of that previous discussion.

So we're not going to be defining terms and things like this this particular interview is going to be

based upon the assumption that folks are either familiar with the topic or have already watched the previous videos and

again if you've been Following if you've already watched the video responses that Braxton Tim and Leighton have

put on Their respective social media platforms most notably YouTube

and so Guillaume took the time to go through those videos those

responses and has now Was willing to come back on and kind of address those now

again.

This revealed apologetics is focused on apologetics.

And of course, I'm a reformed Christian I'm a Calvinist and so I do think these topics kind of Spill into

you know spill into each other.

But I don't want this ministry to be focused merely on these topics.

And so this is going to be the last response by Guillaume.

Specifically to you know this little back and forth that that's going on here.

So again, we we want to just set forth the disclaimer.

We see Braxton Leighton and Tim as brothers in Christ their friends I speak to all three of them on a fairly

regular basis.

They're they're great guys.

We just have disagreements and so I'm very excited to have someone like Guillaume who is very knowledgeable in this area

to be a Representative of the Calvinist side and to provide some responses to their many many objections.

Especially if you guys are familiar with soteriology 101 Leighton flowers

Spends a significant time critiquing the Calvinist position which Calvinist should welcome.

You know if we believe our position is correct, then we should be willing to engage Some of the

criticisms and critiques that are offered now real quick by way of some announcements.

You guys hopefully caught my last interview with Pastor Doug Wilson where we talked about the biblical foundation of presuppositional

apologetics.

I did have Jeff Durbin for the 29th, but Unfortunately, I had to reschedule so

I am Connecting with him behind the scenes to reschedule that.

Please stay tuned for the updates with Jeff Durbin because the focus I want to I want to have there is.

How does presuppositional apologetics apply to?

Different religions.

So when we talk about, you know, the use of the transcendental argument for the Christian worldview, right?

How does this look when we're applying it to things like Islam Mormonism Jehovah's Witness or any other

non -christian position?

So, please stay tuned for for that discussion.

I'll definitely let you guys know when that is put on the calendar on May 9th, I have dr. James

Anderson from Reform Theological Seminary to talk about the nature of transcendental arguments.

It is a common complaint of non -presuppositionalists.

Against the presuppositionalists that presuppositionalists say all sorts of things, but they never state the argument.

And so with dr. James Anderson, I want to Talk to him about how do we actually state the transcendental

argument?

What is its structure?

What are we trying to accomplish when we engage in that form of argumentation on May 12th?

I have dr. Gary Habermas.

He's going to be on to talk about the resurrection of Jesus and hopefully if this date is still good

Dr. Douglas Ruthiest, the author of Christian apologetics.

I don't have the book with me, but it's a giant Textbook on apologetics.

And so hopefully none of these will fall through and we'll have a very very awesome lineup.

Very in very close proximity.

I it's just God's providence, right?

All these guys happen to respond in this close time.

And so, you know, we're able to have these great interviews.

You know these past couple of weeks.

So without further ado, I want to welcome Guillaume.

Again, I always introduce Guillaume as the French Calvinist philosopher.

And if you know who he is, then yes, this is you know.

Of course, you know, he's French and if you don't know who he is.

You will automatically know he's French when he opens his mouth.

So Guillaume, why don't you say hi to everybody?

And tell folks very briefly a little bit about yourself and then we'll just pick off what pick up where we left off.

Hey, it's good to be with you Eli.

So a little bit about myself.

Well, I'm a French Calvinist philosopher.

All of that is true.

I'm actually during the day I'm a computer scientist and I work in finance on Wall Street

and at night I have a wife and four kids and a fifth on the way and.

Also, I do adjunct teaching in philosophy at Caldwell University.

So some of the responsibilities I have and try to juggle well.

I like how you mentioned your job and then you said at night I have a wife and kids.

They are very much during the lockdown.

I am very much reminded.

I have kids during the day when I work.

But normal times are not so much.

Okay, very good.

Well again folks I just gonna let you know again.

We're going to hit the ground running with this and we're just gonna jump into.

The responses made by Leighton Braxton and Tim Stratton of free thinking

ministries.

Of course Braxton hunters over at Trinity radio and Leighton flowers is over at soteriology 101.

So we're just gonna hit the ground running with this.

So let's begin with Leighton's video response and most of the video is really on your sketch

of the case you made for Determinism.

So how would you respond to what Leighton says?

And of course the audience assuming that they have watched it or they will watch it in the near future.

How would you address Leighton's words on your case for determinism?

Yeah.

So the most of the video was on the sketch that I gave for the case for determinism.

And it wasn't really part of our actual presentation in the interview.

But I gave that sketch as a brief response to Leighton in the Q &A.

Leighton had asked on the computer Where the Bible supports determinism

and in response, I quickly listed several points.

I said that determinism is supported by texts teaching God's providential control of all things

including evil.

That it's supported by biblical teaching on election and predestination.

That it's supported by two philosophical arguments that have biblical premises.

So there was the argument from Luther the argument based on original sin and the argument by

Jonathan Edwards the argument from divine impeccability.

So they are both philosophical arguments which have biblical premises.

And then there was my cheeky claim that Paul anticipates the two main objections to determinism right there in

Romans 9.

Why is where do you wait.

Does God still find fault for who can resist his will and is there unrighteousness in God?

So these are kind of the sketch I gave for a case for determinism.

Yeah now now in the the video response, I believe that all three of them were on the on the the episode.

I watched the first one most of it a while back when they first You know released it, but I

remember dr. Hunter.

He said in this regard.

He says.

First he says that you presume a lot in your response.

You presume an interpretation of election, right?

You bring to the table your Calvinistic understanding.

You presume an interpretation of predestination and all those other related issues.

How would you respond to that?

Yeah, I don't really so much presume.

It's just that I sketched the line of argumentation.

So yes, it would need to be supported.

Which I obviously didn't do or try to do in the tiny segment of the Q &A that they respond to.

But I don't think it would be presuming is just that it would need to be argued in fact.

Yes, the debate hasn't really been settled on those fronts.

Okay.

But they say that providential control doesn't logically entail determinism and that predestination and election don't

logically entail determinism.

So, you know that a lot of people think that there's a a necessary connection there other people try to point out.

Well, there isn't a necessary connection.

How would you respond to that?

Yeah, I think that's fine.

I don't say that each of these items logically entails determinism.

Suggested briefly that there are evidence for it.

So the Calvinist can mount a good cumulative case based on all those biblical elements.

So they say I presume my position is a given but then they correctly anticipate exactly what I'll respond in the video.

They say Guillaume may say that all of this would need to be debated.

Yeah, I think that's true.

So I don't presume it after all just that it would need to be debated.

Now a couple of those items do logically entail Compatibilism the arguments from Martin

Luther and Jonathan Edwards.

So, let's see how they respond to my sketch of these arguments in their video.

Okay?

Well, let's take a look at the argument from from Luther.

Leighton says the argument from Luther does in fact.

It says does the fact that we ought to perfectly obey the law but cannot obey the law refute libertarianism.

And they say no.

And Braxton says you assume a view of original sin.

That's not held by all our orthodox believers.

Yeah, so I don't know which view of original sin.

He thinks that the argument needs and which view he himself affirms.

To see if he can escape the argument, but all the argument needs is that we'd be incapable of living a

sinless life.

So does his view of original sin.

Not at least until that we can't leave a sinless life.

I think Leighton's view does.

I think he grants that we can that we cannot leave a sinless life.

In the way that he asked the question right does the fact that we can't leave us in this life until that.

So it's the dilemma for the proponent of the principle of alternate possibilities.

That's this so -called principle that says that if that moral responsibility requires the

categorical ability to do otherwise.

So if you were from that you have a dilemma facing you because we either have the categorical Ability to

leave a fully sinless life or we don't.

If we do it denies original sin and affirms a palladian ability to work ourselves to a non guilty

verdict at the final judgment.

Okay.

But if we don't have the ability and more responsibility requires the ability.

Then we cannot be blamed for sinning at all.

And so you result in universalism.

So it's kind of pick your poison here.

Depending on whether you affirm we have the ability or we don't.

Either we have the ability and you're in you fall into palladianism or you deny that we have it.

But then you result in universalism because we cannot be blamed for it so.

Before finishing their answer to the to the argument from Luther in that video.

They take a break and they criticize the idea that the conditional ability is sufficient for moral responsibility.

And there is multiple manipulation arguments.

So but we'll deal with those a bit later on and then they come back to Luther's argument.

Okay, Layton offers this response though.

He says anytime that I'm faced with a choice even as a lost person I can lie or I cannot

lie logically.

It's possible for him to tell the truth.

What's not feasible is that a sinful lost person in a fallen state would feasibly always choose to do the right thing.

But in any given situation, I think we can say yeah, it's logically possible for him to choose the right thing in

any given situation.

How would you respond to that?

Yeah.

No, so that that response is actually logically incoherent.

So if you have the ability to avoid sinning on any given situation on any one

situation That successfully aggregates to your ability to avoid sin for your entire

life I show this in my book with an argument by recurrence.

So you do it for once and you show that if you have it for one then it's true for the next one and so On and you move on through

recurrence to the entirety of your life and that argument is sound and so it shows that it aggregates

successfully.

My friend W Paul Frank's who is himself a Molinist proves the same thing.

Then me that you cannot just say we cannot leave us in this life, but we can avoid every individual sin.

He shows it with a slightly different route.

But basically reaches the same conclusion you we cannot say that we can avoid any given sin and

yet somehow not be able to Leave us in this life.

So the one demonstrably entails the other.

Well Leighton continues.

He says the point of the scriptures is that even if he does do all the right things all the time It's not sufficient to earn

or merit his salvation.

Even a baby who's never had a moral choice to make they still need Jesus.

They still need the blood of Christ because guess what?

No one gets to heaven through just their natural abilities or their their merit.

That's what Leighton's.

That's what Leighton said.

Yeah, it's a bit surprising so we're looking at a person who now successfully lives their entire life

without ever sinning and He's saying that this person would still not be saved.

I mean that sounds strange to me.

If you never do wrong, you don't need to earn salvation.

You don't need salvation, right?

You don't need to be saved from the wrath of God, which you don't deserve.

Christian salvation is the forgiveness of sin.

So death is the wages of sin.

If you don't sin, you don't need forgiveness.

So it seems I don't know how he would reconcile those two.

But if seems to me like if you are fully sinless and live a fully sinless life You don't need to earn anything because you

don't need salvation.

You don't need forgiveness.

You don't need redemption if you are actually sinless.

But he says that the law has never been the means of salvation.

It's a tutor to point you to Christ.

Yeah, so that's in the scriptures obviously and the way that the law points you to Christ is by

revealing your sin.

Paul says I would not have known my sin unless the law hadn't taught me.

This is what you ought to do.

So we're told in Romans 7 that The law points you to Christ by revealing

your sin.

But if someone never sins then the law doesn't work like that for him because the law would tell him he's actually

righteous.

He's passing all will fly in colors.

So it's not pointing you to Christ if you are in fact sinless.

But but then he says the difference between heaven and hell isn't whether you sin right since we all sin rather.

He says it's whether you have faith.

Yeah, I meant to that.

I obviously affirm that and he's the one who says it doesn't have to be like that because he's saying that

a fallen child of Adam is capable of living a sinless life and.

Therefore making it false that we all sin.

Well, but then he says the Calvinist You know accused us the Calvinist wants to say you can't have faith because

you can't obey the law.

That's the Calvinist Calvinistic leap he says.

And if if we have a chance to talk to bing young.

He says a bit and then they did have a chance.

Okay, but he said he'd want to push push you on this point.

So what do you think?

Yeah.

So it is the the Calvinist wants to say you can't have faith because you can't obey the law and know the the

Calvinist doesn't say that he he says that you don't need the ability to avoid sinning in order to be blameworthy for

sinning and.

That does follow logically from our inability to live a sinless life along with our blameworthiness for that failure.

So that refutes the principle of alternate possibilities and from that compatible ism logically follows.

So that's the claim of the Calvinist.

Yeah, what about this issue of divine impeccability?

Attempt that there's Nothing causally determining God even if it's true that he cannot sin.

Yeah, so here we've moved on to the argument by Jonathan Edwards and it's based on the fact that God is

impeccable.

Is he could not sin and yet he remains praiseworthy.

So we see that praiseworthiness does not require the categorical ability to do otherwise than acting

righteously.

And so Stratton said there's nothing causally determining God even if it's true that he cannot sin.

And I'm fine with that.

I'm not.

I'm just saying God refutes the principle of alternate possibilities.

I don't need to convince you that God is determined only that he cannot sin and yet he is praiseworthy for acting

righteously.

Right, so he has the ability.

He doesn't have the ability to do other than what he does, which is good yet.

He's worthy of praise.

Yes, that's right.

He so and it's not just just of Inability to do other than what he does because that

yes.

We might interpret that to mean he's determined and we don't need to debate that just yet.

Here all I need is to say that he does not have the ability to Act unrighteously,

so he always acts righteously and does not have the categorical ability to do anything less than that.

And so if that's true, then that refutes the principle of alternate possibilities.

Okay, but then Tim goes on to say that the problem is not all Christians are going to agree with what what you say here.

Right.

It's an assumption.

You need you need an argument.

You can't just assume it, right?

Yeah, but I mean I just gave the argument right.

God cannot fail to act righteously and God is praiseworthy for acting righteously.

Therefore moral responsibility doesn't require the ability to do otherwise.

So he needs to tell us which premise he disagrees with.

Oh, well, it's apparently the first premise right.

Because he then approves of a quote he attributes to Dallas Willard, right?

Well, of course God can sin but why would he want to right?

Yes, so that's what the the quoted Dallas Willard is saying this and I thought this is pretty amazing because

To salvage the principle of alternate possibilities in the case of God.

He's now using the conditional sense of ability.

Because first to avoid my argument you would need to maintain God's categorical ability to sin

so it doesn't work.

But also I should point out in those three videos they spend all their energy Arguing that the conditional

ability doesn't work and it's not worth the name ability if you categorically can't do it.

And then here they use it as perfectly meaningful about God.

Right.

Well, of course, I agree.

It's meaningful to say God or Jesus could sin if he wanted to.

But it remains that he doesn't have the categorical ability to do otherwise and yet he's praiseworthy.

So there goes the principle of alternate possibilities and the claim that he's making here.

The quote is literally.

I mean, it's obviously the conditional ability, right?

He could sin but only if he wanted to but in fact, he cannot possibly want to

therefore.

There's no categorical ability to sin here.

What he says.

He doesn't understand what it would mean for God to sin since sin is missing the mark of God's.

Standard.

Yeah, great.

So we agree that it's incoherent to say that God sins and that's my point.

There is no possible world in which God sins.

Well, God must have libertarian freedom.

There was nothing external to God to determine him.

That's the next claim.

Yeah.

So, of course if God is determined it's from his own nature.

It's not from the outside.

So I agree.

It's a difference with determined humans who are determined by someone outside of them, right?

So if humans and God are determined if then there's still a big difference in that humans would be

determined by God.

But God would be determined only from the inside from his inner nature.

He's necessarily good nature and not by something or someone outside himself.

But just because God isn't determined from the outside It doesn't follow that he has libertarian free will

because if he's determined from the inside It's still determined and praiseworthy.

So compatibilism Follows and libertarianism requires compatibilism to be false.

So if God is determined from the inside That's not libertarian freedom because that's compatible with determinism.

Okay.

What.

Braxton's then tries to affirm the principle of alternate possibilities for God by saying God can pick among two good

things, right?

So that seems to be.

The pap as you would call it, right?

Yeah, so that's a that's a pretty standard move and what my response is that it's

not relevant to my argument.

I say that God is praiseworthy for acting righteously as opposed to sinning.

And I'm clearing that there's no praise in the picking of a good.

Over an equal good if there are no other options, right.

If you have two options that are both good.

But there's nothing else that's available.

Then there's no praise in picking one over the other.

But the reason that it's praiseworthy when he picks a good it's because it's in opposition to picking something bad.

Even though he doesn't have the categorical ability to pick something bad.

Okay, but Tim says if you can show there's two options for God then it seems that he would have

libertarian free will.

Yeah, but that's also irrelevant here because I use God's inability to act unrighteously as

Premise to refute the principle of alternate possibilities.

I don't argue here that God is fully determined and never has two options categorically accessible.

My argument leaves that question open.

So even if God has sometimes two options categorically available, they don't need to be those that are used for

my immediate argument.

All right.

Well, let's let's turn to Romans 9 then.

Okay.

They turn to your cheeky claim.

Okay about Romans 9 anticipating the main two objections against Calvinism and people who are familiar with

Romans 9 would imagine what?

What that is about?

Engage them on Romans 9.

Yeah, so Layton then tries to offer a plausible account for why Paul would anticipate these objections.

You know is there unrighteousness in God and why does he still find fault for who can resist his will and.

That's fine.

We don't need to turn that part into a debate.

I do think that Romans 9 supports the determinist view, but again, I didn't really support the claim in

our interview.

So there wasn't much for him to respond to.

I said it's kind of a cheeky remark that he that the main arguments against Calvinism Sure sound a

lot like those anticipated by Paul when he teaches on God's sovereign choice of election in Romans 9, but that's

all I mean, it's fun.

It made for a catchy book title right.

My book called excusing sinners and blaming God.

But at this point we still haven't really touched my actual responses to his debate on Calvinism.

Okay.

But by the way, excusing sinners and blaming God can be purchased at Amazon and bookstores near you.

Actually, don't go to the bookstore, but you could order it online.

Well, they eventually get to that point, right?

So so let's let's deal with the issue of.

The question rather does choice entail in determinism, right?

There's a big hullabaloo about.

Well choice seems to entail.

Okay, things aren't determined in the way that the Calvinist thinks it is.

Yeah, so that that was part of that was part of the initial argument that Layton had brought in his

debate that we responded to.

So I responded that choice doesn't entail in determinism.

You still make choices on determinism.

So do you want to read Layton's reply?

Well, he says.

But who's determining your choices?

It's not what you have decided.

Yeah, so as Lords if God determines it's not really you choosing right?

Yeah, that's the claim that's made here.

So let me answer that question who's determining your choices answer.

It's God.

But of course, it doesn't follow that.

It's not what you have decided.

They make that claim a number of times in this video and in that of Tim Stratton, I believe.

So it's important to address it here.

But I need to point out this if God causes you to choose X You didn't choose X.

That's their claim.

But that claim isn't just question begging because I disagree with the the truth of the

claim.

But it's actually self -refuting.

Look at the wording of the objection if God causes you to choose X it actually logically

follows that you choose X.

I mean you can tell that they don't like it and there may be some coherent way of framing and objection somewhere in the neighborhood of What

they say but as they phrase it the objection is self -refuting.

If I cause my pen to fall on the floor Does it follow that my pen didn't fall on the floor?

Well, of course not.

Not only it doesn't follow that my pen didn't fall but it does follow that my pen did fall.

So if I cause my pen to fall on the floor my pen falls on the floor.

Similarly if God causes me to choose X it is not only compatible with my choosing X.

It actually logically entails that I chose X.

Yeah, but your argument has been determined by God.

We hear this all the time.

Everything you just said was determined.

So, you know, they do the point of kind of highlighting.

It's all irrational anyway, because you've been determined to say everything you just said.

Yeah.

So yes, it has been determined by God.

But that's not an argument.

I'm aware that God determines all things on determinism.

There's no debate on that.

So it's not very helpful to have them repeat all the time as a matter of fact.

The only one who seems not to know that determinism means all things are determined is Tim Stratton.

And we'll see that when we get to his video.

But until we have a successful argument to support that determinism excludes choice or free will.

It's pointless to keep hammering that on my view.

It's God who determines all things.

Yes, he does and I don't shy away from that.

Okay, but then they bring in a text that wasn't mentioned in the original debates and that's Genesis chapter

4.

Okay Braxton says in our debates We gave some of the same text but we gave texts that

imply not just that man has choice.

But choices in the Bible where it really does seem like libertarian freedom is the type of choice we're talking about.

Genesis 4 reads thusly.

And the Lord had regard for Abel and his offering but for Cain and his offering he had no regard.

So Cain was very angry and his face fell.

The Lord said to Cain Why are you angry and why is your face fallen if you do?

Well, will you not be accepted and if you do not do well sin is crouching at the door.

Its desire is contrary to you, but you must rule over it.

So Braxton goes on to say now granted God didn't say you can do well.

But surely the point of the text is this is before the murder has yet taken place and what he's implying

to Cain is Yes, your offering wasn't accepted, but you can do well.

If you do well, your offering will be accepted.

So this has to be understood as a libertarian choice as Braxton says for the following reasons if

God is saying this to Cain.

But God knows that Cain in one sense of could or the other isn't capable of doing or it's been

Determined that he won't do it then at best God is being deceptive with Cain and at worse.

It's just an outright lie to imply that he could do otherwise when in fact he he obviously can't.

Yeah.

Yeah, so here I deny that the categorical sense of can is implied in this text

here here again.

What is explicit is the conditional if you do?

Well, you will be accepted if you don't do.

Well sin is crouching at the door.

It doesn't imply that he can do it all things being just as they are which is what the categorical ability

Requires.

All things about the person at the moment of choice inside and out must be held in place exactly as they are.

And they still can do it.

So it doesn't imply that kind of strong ability here.

Just the text.

It says you must rule over it.

But it doesn't entail you have the categorical ability to rule over it because again the ridic show comes back to

bite us.

We must leave a sinless life but it doesn't entail we actually can all things being equal.

And.

If you object further by saying that Cain could complain if God doesn't also grant the antecedent of the

conditional, right?

If God doesn't also grant the if in if you do well, then you again literally arguing Why does

God find fault for who can resist his will?

I don't think.

Then they spend a bit more time arguing that if you freely choose God, it doesn't mean you're earning your salvation.

It doesn't mean you're meriting it.

Sarah Layton even says it's the wall Calvinist arguments, but I'm not arguing any of this.

So it's not really relevant and we can skip over that part.

But in the debate you were responding to Layton said the word choice is all you need and you

don't need a philosophy degree.

And you responded No, obviously, it's not all you need.

And the Calvinist is fine with the Webster's definition of choice.

Which Layton quoted.

Layton double downs and and he says the word choice is all you need if determinism isn't injected

into the picture.

Yeah, so what I think is going on here is that he's missing where the burden of proof is.

He's the one he is the one arguing that choice entails indeterminism.

So who's injecting anything into the word not me.

I don't need to inject determinism.

He needs to extract indeterminism and I say good luck doing that out of the mere word choice.

Okay, but in Layton continues.

He says the only reason we're having all this vernacular of libertarian freedom of the will and all of this

nuance and all this other stuff is because you you've Had people insert determinism and then come up

with new definitions of free will that aren't the basic intuitive understanding of what free will is.

Know that I didn't do that.

I gave you my definition of free will.

It's the control condition for moral responsibility.

It's perfectly meaningful and it should be yours too because it's neutral and uncontroversial.

The real debate then is on whether that is compatible with determinism.

Unless you just want to beg the question entirely by baking your view into the definition.

But then if so, then have at it, but I don't think you understand how debates work.

If that's satisfying to you.

Okay, and I think this is a big deal.

A lot of people say that Calvinist Redefined free will that this begs the question in favor of the

other person.

Yeah, we discussed that a little bit but I mean to bypass that entirely.

Yeah, what I do is I take the fully standard definition of free will it's the Control condition for moral

responsibility if you find this in the literature on both sides of the aisle and once we agree on that It's being the case

then we can debate whether that is in fact compatible with Determinism and all the arguments can then be unfolded but I don't think

you can bake that into the definition.

Otherwise, it's not really a meaningful debate.

Now in that discussion that we had the first time later on in the discussion. I asked you if the Bible is under

determinative With regards to this whole issue and Leighton paused to say.

And this is what Leighton says.

He says it's a great question.

Thank you late.

And and makes his point if you're not trying to draw a philosophical inference If you're just reading the text our view is

supported.

So he thinks that his view is just supported by a bare reading of the text.

Yeah.

So but that the man seems to be self refuting here again because to claim that your indeterminist view

is Supported by the text is to draw a philosophical inference.

So is it's not that he's refusing to draw a philosophical inference and then let the text speak and then it's supporting Indeterminism.

To say that it supports indeterminism is to draw a philosophical inference and if the Bible is under

Determinative then it calls for neither view.

So once more his own criticism applies directly to his own view.

Well Braxton says a good exegete Asks who the original audience was and the original audience wouldn't

have understood the distinction between categorical and conditional ability.

He sarcastically implies you must believe they'd be sophisticated philosophers.

I'm being a little bit snarky.

He says.

He's admitting that he's being a little snarky and that's that's fine.

But the good point I mean when you when you take a look at the original audience You don't think that they're they're thinking in these

categories of conditional and categorical.

How would you respond to that?

Yeah, so I obviously I don't suggest that the disciples would have done that philosophical work to.

All I'm saying is that the text doesn't teach indeterminism because there's a perfectly acceptable sense of ability

that is compatible with determinism.

And remember even they used that sense of ability when they said God had the ability to sin.

All right, so and they quoted Dallas Willard, so it's not some sort of a hair splitting device I'm using here created by a

crazy French philosopher.

It's a perfectly common usage of ability and in any case the mockery cuts

both ways, right?

Because I can turn this on to their own view and I could say well are we to understand that the original reader would have?

Heard the text and said this well.

Then there must be a possible world in which all causally relevant Influencing factors are held just as they are and the

outcome of the free choice is different in a way that is inconsistent with theistic determinism.

Well, no, of course not.

So let's be consistent let's not do this with their view and let's not do this with mine either.

Okay.

All right.

So what about this phrase your will be done?

Okay, Leighton said on Calvinism God's will is always done.

So it makes little sense to pray your will be done.

All this to affirm a so -called Divine decree that isn't found in scripture.

He says yeah, that was the one of the objections.

So I said let me not address any our initial interview.

I said let me not address the question of the decree and not being found in scripture.

To address the argument and then Leighton in his response interrupted it just at that point to say but that was the

most important part.

Because his point is that if the decree isn't taught in scripture, we don't need the philosophy.

No, that's not the most important point here.

He's in the middle of a philosophical argument based on the Lord's Prayer and God's will being done.

So I addressing his philosophical argument I naturally skipped over the side job that was not relevant to

his own argument on God's will being always done.

So I explained the equivocation on the decorative versus prescriptive wills of God.

And when I explained that we pray that God's prescriptions Would come to pass and the only

will that we say always comes to pass is his ultimate decree.

Which contains lots of things that do go against his prescription.

That was my response to his Allegation that somehow praying you will be done is incoherent if

God's will is always done.

So my distinction is perfectly coherent.

So let's see how he responds.

Well, here's what they respond.

They said Leighton says sarcastically once again, of course.

We know that the fisherman Peter who had a third grade level education probably understood that right the decreed of

will.

Not the prescriptive will.

But by the way before you even a judge, how does he know the education level of

Peter?

I don't know.

I Think we can grant that but I have already addressed the issue of the philosophical acumen of

the reader.

I don't think we need to presuppose that in order to broker here and.

Coherent distinctions.

Okay.

Oh, well.

Tim gives a story of when he was a calvinist.

He was going to pray for his friend's salvation and when his son asked him to play xbox instead He reasoned that if

his friend is elect god will save him.

Anyway, and if he's not then he won't so he went and played xbox.

Yeah, and so we agree that this decision is absurd.

So but I think that's that's nonsense even on calvinist premises.

What's important in petitionary prayer, right?

You're asking god to do something.

What's important here is that god would do things in response to prayer.

That he wouldn't do if he had if we hadn't prayed, right?

Let me repeat that what's important in petitionary prayer is that god does things in response to prayer.

That he wouldn't do if you hadn't prayed.

And that's compatible with determinism and indeterminism.

And I should point out on molinism, which is presumably their view.

The exact same problem occurs right either god has chosen a feasible world in which your friend is saved.

Or he hasn't.

If he has then your friend will be saved.

If not your friend will not.

So just go play the the xbox.

No, of course not.

And all you need and all I need.

Is that god's decision to act is taking into account the fact that we prayed?

That's all we need.

He's doing it in answer to our prayer.

God is doing that thing in answer to our prayers such that he wouldn't have done it if we hadn't prayed.

And that's what's rescuing the meaningfulness of petitionary prayer and it's compatible with both of our views.

Okay, so and then the the first video ends at this point, uh, and I they did miss, uh,.

My main two points, uh about the lord's prayer that uh, you know when jesus says your will be done.

There was two really strong points that were not addressed in their.

In at the end of the first response by these three gentlemen.

They themselves need to affirm that god has mutually conflicting wills.

All right.

That's a very strong point I made.

So that that must concede that my distinction is perfectly coherent on their own on their own view.

They must admit that god has mutually conflicting will now.

They don't call it the decorative will because they don't say that god decrees everything.

Well, actually maybe stratton says that but layton might not i'm not too sure but in any case.

No matter how they call it.

They do need to say that god has several different kinds of wills that sometimes conflict and so my that concedes that my

distinction is Perfectly coherent and then they skip all together the accusation that I made.

Which is that their argument here pressing the calvinist with the lord's prayer is actually self -defeating um

because.

That and that was really the strongest part of my argument here um I think they were they are they were pressed with

time.

Uh, so they didn't you know, they had to wrap up the video.

So i'm not accusing them of trying to dodge anything here.

But it's unfortunate because it cuts the video cuts right before my bing zinger on this argument

I argued this I said if you say god's will isn't always done.

Because libertarian free will leads to states of affairs that god cannot prevent without removing libertarian free

will.

Which is really what they're saying, right?

So they're accusing the calvinist saying um.

On your view god's will is always done because he controls and determines everything.

On our view his will is not always done because there are these things that happen that go against his will.

Because he cannot determine them to be otherwise.

So you're looking at those and you're saying he cannot bring about something.

But in that prayer you ask him to do it anyway.

So on the libertarian view here, you're saying lord, please do what I say you cannot do.

So forget merely begging the question that complaint is self -refuting once again.

All right.

Okay.

Well, that's uh.

That's a very very, uh interesting.

Uh again, they took a very interesting tact here.

We we did our our Our first interview just all in one shot.

And so they were more uh strategic in in Making uh multiple videos or as you would say

multiple videos back to some of my french accent um, and so I think

We're actually making really good time.

I think uh so, um.

Yeah, so so that's the first the first video.

Let's take a look at braxton's uh video.

Um Braxton put out a video again.

All three of them have separate videos that can be seen on their on their respective youtube channels.

So we're going to turn our attention to uh braxton's uh videos.

Uh, just as a complete side note again I I I do like to promote apologetics and um

good resources.

Uh trinity radio youtube channel is an awesome apologetic Resource you definitely want to check that out.

Braxton does a great job in um, responding to popular, uh, atheist objections to

christianity.

Um and the existence.

Yeah.

I'm, sorry to cut you here, but i'm gonna lend support to that.

I've now come to uh, discover the material of this, uh, these folks and uh I've watched a couple

of videos from braxton myself and I found them thoroughly enjoyable.

And so I recommend the resource as well, uh, you know, obviously we disagree on the free will question.

Uh, we do so charitably I Hope but uh, I do affirm that he produces a lot of really good

material.

So keep doing the good work brother.

It's it's really good.

Yeah.

No, I agree.

So let's let's turn our attention to braxton's video.

In layton's video there were two big interludes on manipulation arguments.

Okay, where they uh criticized your conditional ability to do otherwise.

So let's treat them here, uh, since it's it's also where braxton's show begins.

So, how would you uh enter into that?

Yeah.

Yeah, so so that is precisely the move, uh that I said actually couldn't work against my use

of the conditional ability um.

Twice in the interview. I rudely interrupted you, uh eli.

To step out of my way and make it clear that I do not affirm that the conditional ability is

sufficient for moral responsibility.

I I only say that it's necessary and that the categorical ability to do otherwise is not necessary.

So if you say it's sufficient.

Then you know if you say that the conditional ability to do otherwise is sufficient then you're exposed to manipulation

arguments.

Because if a mad scientist controls your brain to make you do something.

It remains that you could have done.

Otherwise if you had wanted.

And I say I say you're not responsible.

So it shows that the conditional ability isn't sufficient.

So that is what I carefully clarified twice, uh when I interrupted you to really make that strong point.

I don't say it's sufficient.

So you can't use a manipulation argument to criticize my defense of the conditional ability.

But of course they went ahead and did exactly that repeatedly.

They offered just that sort of manipulation argument multiple times throughout the shows.

Layton spoke of a man who takes a woman in a bar and forces her to come out with him.

And he said there's no relevant difference with using a love potion to take her out willingly.

So it's clearly a manipulation with love potion type argument here uh team stratton agreed

and he says well, yeah, that would be rape and then he brings in the uh, The example of harley quinn was

manipulated by the joker.

So here again a manipulation argument case.

And in the other show he uses an analogy with a star wars droid, uh reprogrammed.

Braxton used the reboot of robocop films where someone puts a chip in him and gives him thoughts.

And we he says we wouldn't hold robocop, uh responsible for what he does.

And all throughout they used the analogy of the mad scientist controlling you with brain electrodes.

So it's a festival of arguments by analogy.

So let me slow down and explain exactly how arguments by analogy work.

Because there's some confusion especially at the beginning of braxton show.

So this is how arguments by analogy work.

You have god determines a human choice and calvinists say that the person is morally

responsible.

That's our view.

And then the objector Offers an another case that's the analogy.

In which the person is not morally responsible.

And so the analogy case is a little bit different and a little bit the same as the normal case.

Um, so what do you need to make the argument work?

You need to give your analogy.

That's a little bit like the normal case.

And the analogy in the analogy, uh, the person is not morally responsible.

And then you need to do at least one of two things.

Either you need to show that there is a relevant similarity between the normal and the analogy.

Or you need to show that there is no relevant difference.

So these are really the two routes in order to make the argument work.

You need to show that there is a relevant similarity or you need to show that there is no relevant difference.

So it's important to catch this.

So let me spell it out a relevant similarity Is a property of your analogy

case.

That excludes moral responsibility.

And is also present in the normal case.

So if that's that's shown then yeah, you successfully show that the normal case should exclude moral responsibility.

So you can show that there is one of those and then you win the other way to win is to show that There is no relevant

difference.

And the relevant difference is now a property of your analogy case.

That excludes moral responsibility and is not present in the normal case.

So that would be a relevant difference and if you show that there is no relevant difference.

Then here again that would need to mean that the normal case excludes responsibility as well.

So these are the two strategies.

And my response to those and that's really applicable.

You've seen in my book I do that with all the arguments by analogy not just the manipulation argument my

claim is that There is a relevant similarity that so Sorry, my

my response is this when they claim that there is a relevant similarity.

They tend to remain question begging.

Either because we're not told what that similarity is.

And so now it's your word against mine.

You say there is a relevant similarity.

I don't agree.

We get nowhere if you don't tell me which one it is.

Um, so it's your word against ours or because the alleged similarity is

being determined.

But that's obviously the debated question at hand.

So, for example, Tim Stratton hammered the objection in each case, but they're both determined.

Yes.

But that gets us nowhere because the relevance of determinism is the question before us.

And so that's for the mild claim that there is a relevant similarity.

Now if you take the second approach, which is the bolder claim that there is no relevant difference.

Then it's also question begging.

Because you know you say there's no relevant difference.

Maybe I disagree.

I just need to be convinced and it's very hard to prove that there is no relevant difference.

So it tends to remain question begging as well.

But now you go beyond that because now it's even open to outright refutation.

Because now I can produce a relevance difference.

And therefore that shows that there is in that there is in fact a relevant difference.

It's denying the claim that there is no relevant difference.

And if I produce one of those I produce a property so it's a relevant difference.

It's a property of the analogy case.

That's enough to exclude more responsibility in the analogy case, but it's absent from

the normal case.

So and that's exactly what I do explicitly in my book for all the uh, the analogy cases.

So the the pets and puppets arguments the robots the coercion.

Manipulation the mental illness arguments by analogy.

And I in each case I I explain the structure of the argument.

I show that it's really question begging and then when they press the bolder claim that there is no relevance difference

I offer what I take to be exactly what they ask a relevant difference between the analogy.

And the normal case so it's a property of their analogy that is in itself removing moral

responsibility.

And yet is absent from the normal case.

So let me list them quickly, but they can go and see again in my book for the pets and puppets argument.

It's the lack of self -consciousness.

For the for the coercion arguments.

It's the use of physical force or threats.

For the manipulation argument.

It's the bypass of your god -given character and desires.

And for the mental illness argument, it's the inability to distinguish between right and wrong.

So I provide those and that explains, you know I think that layton was really eager to try to understand what

makes a good or a bad analogy argument.

I've really broken it down.

Carefully here and in each case.

This is exactly what you want.

You want to press one of those two claims the mild or the bold claim that there is a relevant similarity or

that there is?

No relevant difference if you do the first one it remains question begging because determinism is still debated.

If you do the second one, it's still question begging.

But now I can also refute it by offering my relevant differences and i've done so in my book for all those arguments.

Okay.

So, um again, they say they've read my book.

Um, much of their criticism shows that they must have missed those parts.

Uh, but let's look at what they say.

Okay.

Well layton responds.

Uh that an analogy isn't meant to have full correspondence.

Yeah, of course and and I don't claim that it does.

Um, so I think he's so used to having people criticizing his analogies.

That he doesn't really see that this response is irrelevant to what I said.

I said the manipulator isn't relevantly analogous and i've just explained to you what that means and how i've

proven that.

Okay, so when you said that the manipulator isn't relevant, uh relevantly analogous he then asks, uh, is

it just how you feel?

Is it a feeling?

No, and so we go beyond that.

And if he's read my book, I offer a full explanation of what it means to be relevantly analogous.

I identify the relevant properties of each analogy.

And show that the claim that there is a relevant similarity is question begging.

And the claim that there is no relevant difference is question begging and refuted by counter examples.

By providing those relevant differences that I have identified myself.

Okay, so braxton goes on to say of course we can take any particular analogy and show that something is not directly

analogous.

Yeah, we can but that's not what I do.

Uh, I show that it's not relevantly analogous.

So it's not just a matter of picking apart.

Hey, but this is not really like that.

I show what is relevant or not.

So, um the I show that there's a property of the analogy that

excludes moral responsibility.

And that same property is not present on determinism.

So that's exactly what you want to see in a response to an analogy.

Well braxton goes on to say and all these analogies the thing that's the same.

Is that something external to the agent is determining what the agent will do?

Yes, that's one thing that is the same but the claim that being determined is what removes moral responsibility.

Is your view and I reject it?

So the point of the argument by analogy is to claim that there can be no relevant difference if you reject

incompatibilism.

And I show that it's wrong.

So, um, then he says that my response to electrodes is our experience, you know, like

uh the the my response to the manipulation case where the Mad scientist controls my

decisions with electrodes.

He says that my response would be but our experience as humans isn't like that.

But that's not at all what i'm saying.

What i've explained is that there is a relevant difference I provide it which is that it's the bypass of our god -given

characters and desires and that is a property that is uncontroversially present in the manipulation

cases.

That we all agree is sufficient to exclude moral responsibility.

So that's not controversial either.

But then that same property is absent from my normal case of being determined by god.

So obviously the incompatibilist also thinks that when it's not bypassing my god -given characters and

desire.

But when it's purely god determining me that it's excluding moral responsibility.

That's their view.

But at least they agree that when we do bypass my god -given characters and desires it does

exclude moral responsibility.

So that provides me with exactly what they ask a relevant.

Difference between the normal case and the analogy case.

Okay.

All right.

Um, I think he concludes though.

He says of course that's somewhat different.

That's why it's just an analogy and not the same thing.

Yeah, so it's the same incomprehension as layton here the I don't ask that the analogy be the

same thing I ask that it be relevantly analogous and show that it's not.

Oh, so layton goes on to say he says you don't escape the problem of the analogy to begin with by pointing out all these Differences between you and the

robot.

Yeah, no, you don't.

Not by pointing out there are differences.

But definitely by pointing out that there are relevant differences.

Your properties present in the analogy that exclude moral responsibility.

And are absent from the normal case.

Again, all of this is explained in my book.

Uh, you can go back, you know.

Read it slowly and see it addresses all these arguments by analogy.

Read it very slowly because your book is.

A lot in the park.

The upside is my book does not come with the french accent.

So the.

You can choose your own accent when reading the book.

I I choose the british accent and let the words flow up nice and smoothly.

But uh.

All right.

Oh, so so let's turn to this issue on on god willing evil.

Okay, so the argument was if calvinism is true evil is according to god's will but evil is not

according to god's will.

So calvinism is false.

It would seem.

Yes, and so in response to that argument I had pointed out the equivocation in his syllogism.

Between the decorative and the permissive will of god once again.

So on calvinism god wills evil as part of his decorative will but he doesn't will evil as part of

his prescriptive will.

So the two premises of his syllogism are true only in different senses of the will of god.

So it commits an equivocation.

Okay, so layton goes on to say everything that happens according to the decree.

Uh, but several passages, uh say that god did not desire or even decree certain things,

uh, jeremiah 19.

I did not command these things nor did I decree it.

And it's uh, he says it's in the esv and it goes on to say.

Um, it's calvinist bible.

Basically.

I'm, sorry the esv the calvinist bible.

That's right.

That's right.

I.

That's right.

Uh, he says.

It goes on to say that it didn't.

He did.

It didn't enter my mind god says so it strongly suggests That god didn't have anything to do with it whether prescriptive

or decretive.

Yeah, so we already talked about that text.

Um, so what do I make of it?

I think that god is using very strong language to describe how much these actions go against his

commands.

But in attacking calvinism, you can't press that language so literally that it refutes your own view in the

process.

Unless you are an open theist.

It's not true that their action didn't even enter god's mind.

Now arguably even even on open theism god knew it in his mind as a possibility.

But if you're all the more if you're a moulinist, then the action is foreordained too, right?

Stratton at least is clear on that god foreordains everything that happens.

Only you can tell that every time he says that flowers looks really uncomfortable.

I don't think that they're in line on that point.

But but back to the question of two wheels even on libertarianism.

You're committed to saying that god permitted it.

And therefore he willed it in some sense.

So he could have prevented the sin with a more dramatic, you know more drastic measure, but he didn't.

So he must have preferred that the evil happened.

And in that sense it must have been his permissive will so the complaint is self -defeating here.

Because even on libertarianism god has several mutually exclusive desires.

It's not the will of god that people be nailed to the two crosses.

And yet somehow the bible says it was the will of the lord to crush him.

So they don't see that they need that distinction themselves.

And so I think they launch a full -front attack on the idea of two wills in god in the clips that follow.

If you want to read the uh, the next case.

Layton goes on to say a lot of times calvinists will create aspects in order to unfalsify their

views.

So two kinds of love two kinds of callings two kinds of will.

And so stratton in his uh Yeah, it would be gentle but in a seemingly mocking voice He says

yeah.

God desires all people to be saved, but he has a greater desire for his glory.

Yeah, so so it seems to be a criticism.

Of the the view that somehow it's creating two Different wills in god and we can't have any of this

but they must say the same thing.

This is a you know, um, yeah god, you know, so like his sentence.

Yeah, god desires all people to be saved.

But he has a greater desire for his glory.

Is that what he complains about in the calvinist view.

But they must themselves say yeah god desires all people to be saved.

But he has a greater desire to give libertarian free will to humans.

So the concept of two wills is exactly there and you know, we can imagine the universalist now

complaining against their view.

Uh by saying oh, but uh, tim stratton is making his views unfalsifiable by having two

wills like this.

He wants to save everyone, but he doesn't save everyone.

So obviously I don't agree that this criticism is valid.

But he's taking issue with the same thing that tim stratton criticizes us for which is that god has

two wills about two conflicting things and one prevails.

So, uh.

And with respect to the uh, the accusation that we you know Find two kinds of love or two kinds of callings.

Two kinds of will uh more generally detecting equivocation.

And drawing drawing coherent distinctions is the main job of the philosopher to avoid confusion.

Their complaints that i'm drawing distinction amount to them saying it's really hard to refute calvinism

without committing an equivocation.

Yeah, yes.

It's very hard indeed.

And I think it's interesting too that uh, you know, the suggestion that the two wills categories is made

for the purpose of being unfalsifiable, it's just it.

Those are distinctions that have to be made given what we see in the text.

Am I right?

Yeah, I think so.

Uh, I mean when the bible says that god will something but then he also brings about something else.

It seems like we have those two senses of god's will and once again.

It's something that uh, the libertarian must affirm himself.

So it should really not be this big of a controversy.

Okay.

Well tim goes on to say, uh, he says when I think about the prescriptive versus the descriptive will it?

Doesn't make sense to me.

I may be missing something if god says this is how you ought to think and act.

But hey, i'm going to punish you for acting the way I determined you to act that doesn't seem intuitive.

Yeah, so the intuition is going on here.

I don't think he's objective to the two wills of god.

Um because I as I said if he were just objecting to that that would be self -defeating.

Because the concept is Obviously coherent that god has some desire for x but a greater desire to not

do x.

I think here he's objecting more to the denial of the principle of alternate possibility.

And he's saying that his rejection is not intuitive.

Uh, you know, he says if god says you ought to think and act but hey I'm going to punish you for acting the way I

determine you to act.

He seems to say well.

It's not fair for god to blame us if we don't have the ability to do what he is asking us to do.

Um and Here again, i'm going to press the fact that yeah, maybe it's not intuitive.

I don't know.

But is it intuitive that god would blame us for failing to live a sinless life?

When our fallen nature makes it categorically impossible.

I think you have the same same Counterintuitiveness here and yet I think they're committed to those

biblical teachings.

Sure.

Uh, well braxton goes on to say he says speaking about uh, two wills of god makes sense if libertarian free will is in play.

Okay, so good.

Uh, he sees that he needs to say that on his own view.

Uh evil is according to the permissive will of god.

So I think he's more reasonable than the other two here except that you don't need libertarianism to affirm That

there are two wills in god.

All you need is two conflicting desires with one carrying the day.

That doesn't need to involve free will.

God doesn't want you to suffer at the dentist.

But he wants you to have good teeth.

That's there you have two wheels.

But there's no there's no need for libertarian free will to show that the concepts are coherent and this Concept

is what the calvinist affirms of all evil across the board.

Okay.

Uh, well braxton offers, uh an analogy of bob of bob ross painting which by the way I used to love that show used to be

on as soon as I got home.

We got this nice afro guy painting nice little happy.

Yeah I did.

I did not grow up in the united states, but I have come to discover bob ross.

People have showed me what the the whole thing is and i'm all on board.

That's awesome.

Well, he offers an analogy of a bob ross painting where the painter says I want a painting with only happy clouds and trees.

But then he paints and puts ugly or sad trees in it.

What sense does it make to say he wants only happy trees?

He anticipates that you would say this we aren't brushes.

Brushes don't have a conscious experience.

Brushes do make choices.

Even if they're determined.

And in that sense, you're absolutely right.

Yeah, but no, I wouldn't say that.

Uh, I think I think that would be clearly false.

Making a choice is possible on determinism.

I maintained but it's not possible if you're not at least self -conscious.

So that's a necessary condition for choice.

So brushes don't make choices.

No.

But here's what I would say to his actually good illustration.

I would say that it's perfectly meaningful to affirm that the painter wants ugly trees.

Uh, and he also doesn't want ugly trees in two different senses one in isolation.

And one considering the full picture.

So locally, it's not pretty.

But in the full picture, there's a greater benefit of having the ugly tree that

magnifies the overall picture.

So it paints a more beautiful overall picture.

You can imagine that this be quite coherent and I I affirm that similarly god does not

like it when I sin.

Uh considered in isolation, but in the grand scheme of things.

There's he has more than sufficient reasons to prefer the scenario in which there was that sin.

And in the end he finds it more glorious that I mean personally that I was a wretched

sinner who didn't believe in god who seemed like there was no tomorrow and That I was found

and saved by him.

It's a more glorious story like that.

And I think jesus puts it like this.

He says there's more joy in heaven for a sinner who repents than for 99 righteous that don't need to

repent in the first place.

Well laden goes on to say, uh, what if you told your wife and daughter you want your daughter to go to college?

But behind the scenes you manipulate everything to prevent her from going.

I would be fond of that.

Yeah, so we're back to the principle of alternate possibilities here but I would say you know the same thing

applies to the Counterintuitiveness of being unable to live a sinless life and yet being demanded that we do.

What if you told your humans that you want them to live a sinless life?

But behind the scene you curse them with a sinful nature that prevents it from happening.

Uh, and then after that clip, there's there's a bit more of team repeating that thoughts are determined on exhaustive divine

determinism.

Um, so but we'll address that a bit later on.

Uh, so move.

Let's move on to the next argument here.

Sure.

So let's move on to the issue of god's love.

All right, so braxton's argument was that on?

Calvinism.

God doesn't love uh.

The elect but god loves everyone.

So, um calvinism is false.

Okay.

So you responded that love isn't binary like that.

That there are different degrees and kinds of love in the bible and that it's just the electing love.

That god doesn't have for the reprobate, but it's still meaningful to say he loves them as part of his creation.

So they respond as anticipated if god doesn't save them then what.

Then what love is this?

So what what would you say to that?

Yeah, okay, so, uh, we don't have much to do here.

I I don't want to overstate the love of god for the reprobate.

Admittedly, they are getting the short end of the stick and it's under god's providential control.

Still we can say that god has some desire to save them, but he has another purpose that's

incompatible with it.

So they they say we are in our rights to say god does not love the unelect and

fine.

Uh, you're in your right to say it but it's a premise in your deductive argument.

So it doesn't work if I don't buy it.

And there are different kinds of love and a blanket philosophical statement of god as all loving

is not going to work.

Uh, and it may even be self -defeating again.

If it's pressed against various biblical pronouncements that god hates evildoers, you know in psalm 5 5.

And god hates the wicked in psalms 11 5.

So It's important that we don't take a perfect being theology of saying, you know, god is the greatest

conceivable being.

What does that entail?

Um, that's a perfectly legitimate exercise to think okay.

What would a perfect being do and we have intuitions about that?

But it's very important that we don't take those intuitions about perfect being theology to override the more

precise revelation in scripture and I think that our intuition about perfect being theology needs to be

Guided and educated by the clear revelation of scripture.

Now, what do you do with regards to something like psalm 5?

Uh 5 5, you know, you hate the worker of iniquity.

I.

I heard a lot of people who want to affirm god's universal love for everyone kind of this blanket love, right?

And they'll take verses like that and kind of uh.

Claim that it's just poetry or a form of exaggeration.

Yeah, I I don't need to debate the exegesis here.

I think that's the general warning i'm offering is that you don't want a

blanket statement of god's universal loving kindness to be in

conflict with Some of the distinctions that the scriptures draw.

So even if you know, it's not like maybe it's an overstatement.

Or just the same thing is said in romans 9 right.

So about jacob.

I love you.

So I hate it um, you know where The the claim is made.

I think i've heard layton say that in one of his videos that it's not really hate.

It's really just loving less, right?

It's just a matter of degree and that's fine.

That's acceptable, but there are degrees, right?

So we're saying that no matter what god's love is here.

There is one that he loves more than the other.

But that that seems to be countered to our general intuition that well if he's maximally good.

If he is maximally loving then he should love maximally everyone in the same way.

All right.

So what i'm saying is don't take those intuition of purely perfect being theology.

Unbridled by more specific examples in scripture because they should educate what the

perfect being who exists and we agree God is perfect.

They educate us about what that actually looks like in practice.

All right.

Well stratton goes on to say if someone loves a person ultimately that includes a desire for their eternal flourishing.

So if you don't care if they make it to heaven, then it's not love.

Plain and simple.

Yeah, so here even the calvinist can affirm that God has an overriding purpose, but it's not the

case that he doesn't care or that he doesn't have a desire that they may be saved.

So I think that the calvinist can say that and doesn't say what's.

Uh, tim is saying we.

If it's going to be said that god loves someone but doesn't desire their ultimate flourishing then god doesn't actually love that

person, right?

Yeah, and that's fine.

The calvinist can grant that and still say that he loves the reprobate in that very sense since he does

desire their ultimate flourishing.

It's just that he has an overriding reason not to bring it about.

Okay, but tim goes on to ask why is it needed for humans to suffer eternally for his own glory?

Yeah, so I I already answered that in part of our interview and I said that part of the reason.

That god has may be in romans 9 Where he says that it would be to show his wrath and make known his power.

It really seems to be addressing that very question.

And then part of the answer is we don't know from which he doesn't follow that the reason doesn't exist.

So that's the standard move called skeptical theism.

And skeptical theism isn't some desperate calvinist attempt to rescue god's righteousness.

It's formulated by peter van inwagen alvin plantinga and william lane craig and they're all libertarians.

So it's really what I do with that question of what is god's morally sufficient reasons for evil.

Uh in general and more in particular eternal evil of damnation.

That's the answer I provide.

Well, let's move on to the issue of evil and and braxton's free will theodicy.

Braxton had argued that when calvinists are debating The problem of evil with an atheist, uh, they can't use free

will and so if they can't use free will Then they don't have a successful response to the atheist argument where they bring up the

issue of evil us calvinists.

We're determinists so you can't say, you know, there's evil because there's free will.

How would you respond to that?

Yeah, so I responded that the calvinist has a fine answer That god has morally sufficient reasons to

allow evil and even if we don't know the reason it doesn't follow that.

There is no reason so that's the standard move.

I said it's called skeptical theism and I went on to argue that it's the same answer that they must give to.

Uh, but that's where there's a bit of pushback.

Okay, but now they say they they go further than this, right?

They say they they do know the reason god always allows evil.

Free will so they agreed free will isn't just a defense.

It's it's their theodicy even for for natural evil.

Not just moral evil.

Yeah, so here my my claim my the most modest claim I make is that libertarian free will can do some of the

lifting In your theodicy, but it cannot do all so I said that there's no free will in a tsunami or

the earthquake.

Or the cancer cells or the virus.

So god is in full control of those things that cause terrible amounts of suffering.

And even when it comes to human free actions, I think that there's limits to how much damage they cause against god's will

uh, so When you think of a terrible case of a little girl getting kidnapped and then for years and

years and decades being abused and raped by a rapist kidnapper

kidnapper um.

You want to ask also?

To the molinist, uh, you know, why doesn't the molinist god kill the rapist after the first rape,

right?

Or after the first year or the first decade.

He he might not be able to make the rapist freely refrain.

But surely god can just strike him dead so he can use means that avoid that and yet he

doesn't.

So there are some limitation to just how much uh free will gets out of hand

for god if it's indeterministic um.

So I don't think it's plausible to say that god just has too much respect for the rapist free will that he just lives.

It completely unbridled like that.

So he most likely has another reason and that's much harder to link to free will.

So I I ultimately said that it's too ambitious to link every single instance of evil to free will.

And I don't know I mean at least I didn't know of any libertarian philosopher who does that.

I mean that I can tell peter van inwagen doesn't do that.

Uh, william lane craig doesn't do that um plantinga doesn't do that either so.

Yeah, when plantinga he uses his uh, the free will of demons, uh to explain all of natural

evil.

When he does that it's a defense.

It's not a theology.

It's not suggesting that there's actually a Demon behind every bush.

Uh, he's saying it's just a logically possible option.

So it serves as a defense and not a theology.

So now I I do think that there's something to be said for braxton's pushback here.

Because uh, there may be a path for him to say that free will is involved in all evil

um, there's actually Two different ways that uh, he can link evil to liberty and free will.

So let's clarify those two those two ways in which he can do that.

The first way is this he can say god cannot avoid a certain evil x.

Because evil x is the result of an indeterministic human choice.

That's the one that I said isn't really available for natural evil.

Because the tsunami doesn't have free will the cancer cells don't have free will etc.

So god fully controls them those natural evils in the same way that he controlled human choices on

calvinism.

All right, it's fully deterministic so.

Even you have to say that god brings about those natural evils because he has a morally sufficient

reasons.

Even braxton right has to say that god brings about those natural evils because he has a morally

sufficient reason.

And I say even if we don't know that reason it doesn't follow that.

It's not there but uh.

Then what I think braxton is trying to do Is to link all of it to liberty and free will in a

different way in the second way that would go something like this God permits that evil.

Not because he cannot control it.

Uh because he wants it to be but so.

It's not because he cannot control it, right?

So in the same way that they say the rapist has liberty and free will and god doesn't determine the outcome of his choice.

So this things get out of hand, right?

The rapist does something that god would have wished really didn't happen uh, so in the case of natural evil,

it's not like that and so God permits that evil not because he somehow cannot

control it but because he wants it the Uh natural evil to

now be the influencer of another free choice that he cannot determine.

Right.

Do you do you catch the difference?

So in one way, it's simply god cannot control the human free choice.

Uh, and that clearly is not available when you say that when you're talking about natural evil and god does control that.

But he might want that suffering of the tsunami or the earthquake.

The the disease to be the influencer of another free choice and god

Arguably might not have needed that.

Natural suffering if calvinism had been true and god could have just you know zapped the person in making the right choice.

So if that second piece is what uh braxton is trying to do I think there's a coherent way that he can try to do that.

So I do accept some of his pushback if that's what he has in mind.

Now, um if they do insist that is their view that's fine with me and I accept the pushback I no longer have

an objection.

That their claim is self -defeating.

But you must remember that it's in the context of braxton positive argument.

That the calvinist doesn't have a good answer to the problem of evil.

So so the fact that I don't have a decisive argument against the implausible reason that they suggest.

Doesn't mean i'm left without a good answer to the problem of evil against the atheist.

Um, we both say god has morally sufficient reasons for all evil.

And even if we don't know those reasons, it doesn't follow that they don't exist.

So then they say that uh, free will is the only reason for all suffering always and everywhere, right?

That seems to be the the claim that they say it's a theodicy.

It's really for all.

Free will is the only reason for all suffering always and everywhere and I say it's a stretch.

But they might be able to get away with it.

And if so, I say great, you know use that against the atheist that's fine with me.

I just have to believe there's other reasons instead.

And that's fully available to the calvinist when arguing against the atheistic argument.

So I don't think i'm left without a good answer to the problem of evil just because I deny libertarian free will in that way

now at the end of the show hunter.

Hunter braxton.

Never call him hunter.

Uh braxton's dealing with the question of apparently, uh, gratuitous evil and he Discusses william rose version of

the problem of evil featuring a fawn burning in a forest fire caused by lightning with no human around.

And uh braxton says the calvinist would say to this exactly what what I would say.

And that is you have no way of demonstrating that there isn't some good that comes out of that that you just

can't see.

Yeah, he's right.

Uh, we would both say that so that's the standard.

That's the standard move of skeptical theism.

And that's my answer.

Indeed, well, so we're on the same boat so I say don't sabotage the boat.

All right, um now we come to the final video.

Now I want to I want it's up to you.

Would you mind taking some questions in between?

Uh, if if you think we want to if you want to keep pushing on uh, So that we finish, um covering the entire topic we

can do that as well.

And i'm sure our listeners would not mind one bit.

Yeah, maybe we should press on a little bit just so that we cover this in one coherent wall and uh,

I think we're covering enough ground that most of the questions will be addressed.

Um, but uh, good perfect.

No problem.

All right.

So we're moving on to tim's uh video.

Um, here's the the question here calvinism isn't determinism.

So stratton says that he finds it odd, uh that you conflate calvinism with exhaustive divine determinism.

Because some calvinists don't affirm a determinism.

He has greg kolko, richard muller oliver crisp in mind.

And he says that you're responsible.

Being young is responsible for this widespread confusion and i'm working hard to clean this up.

All right, so i'll be nice and just said that the accusation is unhelpful.

Um, so first of all crisp isn't a libertarian.

Oliver's crisps only defends the compatibility of libertarianism with the reform tradition.

So it's a different project, but he doesn't affirm libertarianism himself.

Secondly, it's it's not like i'm being deceptive and smuggling in my definitions and counting on the fog of

confusion here.

I come out of the gates with very clear definition and I stipulate clearly that I take The determinist

the determinist view to be the calvinist view.

So there's no confusion here.

I just say this is my assumption here.

And third in response to that, I think that braxton himself Invalidates that accusation right

away in the interview.

He notes that consistent calvinists Affirm the tulip the five points of calvinism must

affirm determinism.

And yes, I think that's my view.

So i'm either responsible for a mass confusion or i'm just calling people to be

consistent and I don't think it can be both.

So layton says the same thing in that same clip.

He says that that it is the consistent calvinist view so then the microphone comes back

to Tim and he says yeah, that's well said but it seems to me that this has refuted the

accusation of confusion.

Because I agree with them i'm not You know deceiving with my definitions or what have you i'm really

just calling them to be consistent.

Calling calvinists to be consistent.

Uh, that is that I think that they should affirm determinism and that is the calvinist view.

Well stratton then says uh, calvin isn't a determinist but edwards is but you should call yourself an

edwardsian not a calvinist.

Yeah, uh, so look I I disagree about the interpretation of calvin here, but I don't need to debate him on the labels here.

Uh, it's not because you know, it's not because calvin is teaching it that I affirm determinism.

I actually have a fun story about this.

Once william lane craig asked me if I affirmed calvinism because john calvin was french.

No, it's not because he was french it's because he was right.

And in the end Tim himself affirms that determinism falls from the five

points of calvinism.

So I don't think that there was much marriage to the accusation that i'm sowing confusion here.

Okay, so so on this issue of definitions, uh, layton says lots of calvinists use the same words as we do.

But give them different meaning and then stratton says it's like talking to a mormon.

I guess the analogy there is that mormons.

Uh, for example, we'll use terms like the trinity, but they'll mean something completely different.

Yeah, so they say we have to constantly be defining our terms, but it doesn't tell us which words we twist,

right?

So we started our initial interview you and I by giving very clear definitions and they're completely

standard.

So I define determinism as the thesis that everything that happens is necessitated by antecedent factors,

um, you know.

And.

That you know team added there that it includes all our beliefs.

Yes, everything we do.

There's no debate there.

So I don't I don't know which of my definitions you might find issues with but I don't think that

we're.

You know twisting words like mormons to create confusion.

I think our definitions are quite clear.

Says but the debate is about the fact that some calvinists like myself and you affirm, um Exhaustive

divine determinism and the majority of christians reject this view.

Yes, so we affirm divine determinism.

So uh team repeatedly refers to it as edd for exhaustive divine determinism.

That's a bit heavy -handed mostly because that's redundant.

So determinism is the thesis that everything is determined, right?

So the exhaustive is baked into the determinism but apparently stratton

doesn't realize that because that leads him to make some Somewhat confused statements like

compatibilism is sometimes true But cannot exhaustively describe reality.

That's a direct quote.

And no, that's not consistent with his view because if compatibilism is true at any time, it's true at all

times.

If it's true that everything is determined Then it does exhaustively describe reality.

So determinism Isn't the thesis that some things are determined?

It's the view that all things are determined and we'll get we'll get back to that because that matters in some of the formulation of the

arguments.

Okay.

Well this this raises a question.

Then so did god causally determine calvinists like cocal chris muller, etc to disagree with

you.

Uh, the answer is yes, all things are determined.

So yes.

He determined that.

Okay, and it also raises another question, uh Layton you and and and uh,

I both used to be calvinist they say right?

Uh, they claim to be calvinists back.

Yeah.

Yeah.

Yeah, that's fine.

And I again I can take that as their word.

I didn't know them.

I don't have any reason to doubt that they were sincere calvinist in the past.

But he has to answer that question again.

He's asking well that raises a big question of conundrum somehow for the calvinist.

Uh, you know, did god determine us to leave calvinism?

And yes, I take them at their word.

I say yes god determined that too.

Determinism means all is determined.

Uh, so.

Just get this out of the way.

Determinism means that everything is determined.

Well, it makes no sense to ask.

Well, did god determine that?

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes, the answer the answer is yes.

Okay, so then they play your definition of compatibilism where you explain that it's the Compatibility of determinism and

free will and it's not technically saying that either is true only that they're compatible.

And stratton says he he aims to show that this thesis referring to compatibilism While it might occasionally be

true. It cannot exhaustively describe reality.

He says I do not reject the thesis.

I simply argue that thesis cannot exhaustively describe reality.

I actually affirm Compatibilistic freedom in some cases he says.

Yeah, no, so that's a strong misuse of the word compatibilism.

This is exactly the confusion.

I was describing.

He doesn't see that determinism refers to everything that happens.

And compatibilism is the thesis that determinism understood like that is compatible with moral responsibility.

So it's not accurate for him to say that he's sometimes a compatibilist.

Compatibilism refers to the compatibility of Determinism which is all things are determined.

So it's not something that changes with time.

He was going to say I contend that a thesis of compatibilism cannot always or exhaustively explain reality.

So guillaume might offer one instance of knowledge that doesn't require libertarian freedom.

That's fine.

I might affirm some of them.

However, he needs to discount all of them to rationally maintain his thesis of compatibilism or that

this thesis of compatibilism exhaustively Describes all instances of reality all the time.

He asks the others.

Does that make sense to you guys?

Yes, and no, I don't think it makes sense.

That sentence doesn't make sense because of what i've just explained that it's not about exhaustively describing reality.

Determinism is about all things and compatibilism is the compatibility of determinism with moral

responsibility.

Layton goes on to say just because god determines one thing.

It doesn't mean he determines everything.

Yes, that's true.

Uh, but nobody denies that right?

So i'm not i'm not affirming that just because god determines one thing then he must be determining everything.

Um, so nobody affirms that just because god determines one thing.

He he determines everything.

Certainly not me.

Um,.

Well, then they play your definition of libertarianism where you say.

It's the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that we sometimes are free from which it follows that determinism is

false.

And tim said he he only sort of agrees but uh, it wouldn't follow from this that determinism never

results.

Yeah, so we see here again that he doesn't understand that determinism is a thesis about all things.

So if determinism is true at any time, it's true at all times.

He says he's opposed to exhaustive but the exhaustive is baked into the determinism.

Okay.

Well, can I ask let me ask question then?

Can it can't it be the case that god can determine some things?

And not others.

Yes, it could be.

But then that would not be determinism, right?

Determinism is the view that all things are determined.

That's the distinction.

All right.

Well, he says this is what I mean when I speak of libertarian freedom one's ability to choose between or among a range of alternative

Options each of which is compatible with one's nature.

So you see I affirm a version of compatibilism and I jokingly refer to myself as a libertarian

Compatibilist.

What do you say to that?

Yeah, I mean Here I have to say who's creating mass confusion now.

I mean it is a completely different meaning of compatibilism.

So I don't think he should go around calling himself that it's it's really silly here.

Okay.

Then they turn to your response to peter van inwagen's consequent argument at the beginning of the video stratton.

It said bin yon defines free will as the control condition for moral responsibility.

I'm not primarily concerned with moral responsibility.

I'm concerned with rational responsibility and it seems that bin yon misses this major point.

He says it leads you to attack a caricature of his argument.

Yeah, no, that's complete nonsense.

Um, he speaks much of this of uh his time.

You know, he really spent a lot of time playing my responses to the consequence argument.

And he deals with it as if I were responding to his free thinking argument.

So that's a really big confusion.

There's no caricature whatsoever.

He just has a hard time following what arguments we're talking about in the interview.

He he said perhaps it's my fault for being uh for not being as clear as possible.

But no, he was very clear what he was arguing and I was very clear in my responses.

So in the interview, I first responded to the consequence argument.

For the benefit of the audience because I didn't want to appear like I was dodging the consequence argument.

Just because tim didn't defend it in his blog post.

So up until that point I was obviously responding to peter van inwagen's consequence argument.

That's not a strawman of the so -called free thinking argument.

That's just a different argument altogether.

Okay, but he insists that if you're you're missing the point, right?

So he says it was not my intention to debunk his interaction with peter van inwagen's consequent argument.

As a matter of fact, I granted for the sake of argument bin yon's treatment of the consequent argument is granted to ultimately show that

determinism and Compatibilism cannot exhaustively describe reality and since being young misses my intention.

He misses the point.

Yeah, I don't think that's true at all, I think you should read his blog again, uh, he tells you

The different story himself.

He says this whole thing started over lunch with apologist friends in rhode island.

Where he challenged me to respond to the consequence argument.

So I really didn't want to turn that lunch into a debate show.

So I told him he could read my refutation of the argument in my book.

And as a result he went and looked in my book at my treatment of the consequence argument.

And he said he was not impressed by it.

So I I repeat if my response to the consequence argument is successful and entirely granted here

In what sense is it unimpressive?

I don't think he tells us.

Okay.

So now what about this issue of the accusation of defending atheism, right?

So then they play the clip where you explain that peter van inwagen's consequent argument is aimed at naturalistic determinism.

But that it can be applied to calvinism as well.

And so stratton said calvinists are bending over backwards to save the naturalist view namely a big red

flag Should be raised if a christian finds himself defending atheism at least in a roundabout way.

Maybe something is wrong with your specific flavor of christianity.

He says if you find yourself defending atheism to hold on to your specific flavor of christianity.

Yeah, I think it's beyond the pale here.

I'm, obviously not defending atheism by refuting a bad argument that would have refuted atheism, right?

So otherwise we should rally behind every argument for theism even if they have false premises.

So, you know, I could look forward to tim stratton's video defending the banana argument from ray comfort.

I mean it supports the existence of god.

You don't want to bend over backwards to defend atheism in a roundabout way.

Do you?

So I I don't think it's really serious Ray comfort's banana argument.

There's something I can look it up.

Oh, yes.

No, this is a grand grand moment of apologetics.

But but the point is serious that uh, you can refute an argument without agreeing even if you agree with this

conclusion.

So the fact that I refute, uh, the The consequent arguments that might have otherwise

successfully Uh refuted atheism doesn't mean that i'm somehow defending atheism.

I'm just showing what's wrong with an argument.

Sure.

Now let's turn to this issue of the accusation of cultism and idolatry that was made in the video.

Stratton says, uh, defending five -point calvinism is barely defensible, but

defending exhaustive divine determinism is akin to idolatry.

Those who are devoted to Exhaustive divine determinism become cultish and then braxton says there's a

powerful connection between divine determinism and atheism.

The parallel needs to be examined with great deal of sobriety.

Yeah, I think all of this is also beyond the pale.

I really don't know what that means.

It's it's either irrelevant platitudes or guilt by association.

But there's not much to say either way so we can move on.

Well, then they say there there's a risk that calvinism can alienate atheists.

Some atheists have said if the bible is true Then calvinism is true and I couldn't worship a god like that and that could be

a stumbling block.

Yeah, um, I mean the problem is that the the atheist also don't like a god who is not a universalist.

Or a god who regulates sexuality or who permits suffering?

Um, so now what do we do?

Do we reject those beliefs too so that we can have atheists start liking the god of the bible?

I don't think so.

So yeah, I fully take the fact that maybe people don't like the god of calvinism.

And in that sense i'm happy to tell them look, you know.

To be quite open and just say look there's plenty of christians who disagree with me.

If you think that calvinism is beyond the pale for you.

I'd rather you become a christian and not a calvinist but yeah, I I do agree that the bible seems to teach

calvinism and I Work very hard to show why it's not a problematic view by defending the coherence of the of

the view.

Well, layton asks, uh, what practical purpose do you have in promoting a view that could cause people to stumble?

Well, I have a practical purpose in teaching what is true.

Um, and you know, I think I recall the gospel of christ crucified being a stumbling block too.

So I don't think it's problematic to defend something that could cause us could could cause unbelievers to

stumble.

Okay.

Well, uh tim goes on to say he says calvinists and molinists agree.

God predestines all things.

But calvinists have a weird commitment about how god predestines that it is by Determination by

determining all things.

Yeah, once again, the accusation is strange and it's entirely symmetrical, right?

So if it's true, then the molinist also has a weird commitment about how god predestines

through middle knowledge.

So of course not.

I don't think it's a weird commitment.

We just disagree.

So let's just stick to the arguments and instead of this childish accusation of cultism and idolatry, I don't

think it gets as much further.

All right.

Well, what's up with this unimpressive response to the consequent argument, right?

Stratton then reads your explanation that the truth of determinism is not relevant to the merits of your response to the consequent argument.

And he says.

I beg to differ.

I grant pin young's conclusion for the sake of argument and use his conclusion to argue my point.

Yeah, so I don't think he's understood really what the concern was.

Uh, there's no simpler there.

There is no simpler way for me to explain it than the way I did in our initial interview.

But you can be fully successful in showing that an argument is bad.

Even if the conclusion of the argument is true, that's right.

So if team just offers arguments against determinism He he does nothing to undermine my

refutation of the consequence argument.

So once again, you don't need the conclusion to be false.

In order to be successful in refuting an argument I can refute the banana argument by recomfort

without being an atheist.

That's the point.

Okay.

I really got to check out this banana argument.

If if if people are listening and know where that's found send me send me a link i'd be interested uh.

He says when I said I was unimpressed by being young's treatment of the consequent argument.

It's because it doesn't do anything to show that divine determinism exhaustively describes reality.

I would respond to that.

Well, of course my refutation doesn't do that right.

The consequence argument is an argument for incompatibilism.

So in refuting it.

If I don't also demonstrate that determinism is true.

It's unimpressive.

No, that clearly doesn't work like that.

Well, he says he didn't insult you.

You're a scholar and you're a very good one.

So there he thinks very highly of you which is.

No, that's that's fine.

I didn't take him to insult me.

I mean no one took the unimpressive here to refer to me.

It referred to my treatment of the consequence arguments and so it's Misguided since my treatment

of the consequence argument is entirely successful and team never disputes that he grants it.

So what's wrong with my treatment of the consequence argument.

That it's not also giving him everything he wants in life.

I mean, that's not the point of the refutation of the argument.

So sure.

Okay.

Well, then he starts making comments about his free thinking argument.

Okay, so, um, although it's still responding to my discussion of the consequence argument.

So I he hasn't really yet played some what i've had to say in response to his free thinking argument.

Um, but when I explained the conditional and the categorical abilities to do otherwise which were very important in my

response to the consequence argument.

He tried to criticize the conditional analysis with his free free thinking argument.

So Yeah.

Well, he says you could only believe otherwise if god had caused you to believe otherwise.

That doesn't allow knowledge.

He he thinks that that undermines the possibility of knowledge.

Yeah, but yes, it does.

Um, god wouldn't just cause me to believe otherwise regardless of the evidence, right.

So on the The claim here that is that I would believe otherwise.

If the evidence had been otherwise, uh because the mechanism of my brain, uh through which

god causes me to believe.

Something is what what I said is reasons.

Responsive.

So it would have responded to reasons if the reasons had been different.

I would have believed differently.

So it really makes an important point that we do need that.

That's a conditional ability and it does help in maintaining that we can have knowledge.

But then he says if all your thoughts and beliefs are always aimed at your greatest desires and they're not aimed at truth.

Then no one stands in an epistemic position to argue or rationally affirm that his claims are any good at all.

Yeah, and so he says if all your thoughts and beliefs are always aimed at your greatest desires and.

They are not aimed at truth.

But simply from determinism, you don't get that end.

You don't get the end.

They are not aimed at truth.

You get that you get that part.

From naturalistic determinism, okay, and that's alvin planting as evolutionary argument against

naturalism, which I affirm myself.

But being determined doesn't entail you're not aimed at truth.

Um, it's not hard to get.

Let me actually show you that with props that I take into the classroom.

For my intro to philosophy students when I teach epistemology.

Um, I I contrast a thermometer.

And a magic eight ball.

So I bring those in the classroom to really make that point, uh about cognitive faculties.

Um, so the magic eight ball, you know, you shake it and it gives you an answer to a very deep question.

Uh, usually a some sort of a yes or no answer.

And then the thermometer obviously gives you the the temperature.

Uh, and what I explain is that um, both are determined, right?

So the problem here with the magic eight ball.

So obviously both are determined and one is trustworthy to actually give you the truth, right?

You obtain actual knowledge from the thermometer and you wouldn't you know, if you're Actually reasonable

you wouldn't trust what the magic eight ball is telling you in response to your question.

And the problem is not that one is determined and the other isn't.

They're both determined.

But the problem is that the magic eight ball is not aiming at truth, right?

So, um similarly the reason that you can't trust your brain on naturalistic

determinism.

Is that it's not aimed at truth while on calvinist determinism it is.

So I think it's pretty much a slam dunk here that it's not you don't get the not aimed at truth from just being

determined.

Because the thermometer is fully determined, but it is tracking truth in the way that the magic eight ball doesn't.

So you'd say his confusion is that he's kind of almost assuming the naturalistic argument and imposing it upon the

calvinist.

Yeah, so I mean I think that the the argument is very similar here.

It's a claim that somehow you shouldn't trust your cognitive faculties For some reason and the some

reason is in the case of team stratton's argument is just that you're determined.

And in the case of planting gas evolutionary argument against naturalism Is to claim that your cognitive faculties

are not aimed at truth.

They're aimed at survival right.

Because they're the fruit of evolution on naturalism.

So I think that I affirmed the Argument by planting out which by the way gives me ammunition

against the atheist.

And I denied team stratton's argument because I think that the relevant piece here is not being determined.

The relevant piece is being aimed at truth.

Well, he repeats that if you claim to know some things then exhaustive divine determinism is false.

And I don't just state this I argue for it.

He says.

Yeah, so I hear a lot of reputation of that claim.

But it's very hard to see where the argument actually is here.

So I want to invite tim, you know show your premises.

Show me how that conditional follows from premises that I must accept.

It really is what's missing here in the argument.

Well, he plays some some more of your discussion of the consequent argument and repeats that he's not really interested in

moral responsibility.

He says i'm focusing on rational responsibility and not moral responsibility and until that's recognized. We're going to talk

past each other.

He says.

Yeah, so it's a bit strange.

It's what I explained.

So he takes my explanation on the consequence argument and he chastises me every time I talk about moral

responsibility instead of rational responsibility.

But it's the part where i'm explaining how to refute the consequence argument.

So His so -called free thinking argument is nowhere near at the moment in those clips.

So i'm not sure why he doesn't get that.

So we're evidently we're talking past each other here, but it's pretty clear whose fault it is at this point.

He constantly responds to my treatment of the consequence argument as if I were arguing against his free thinking

argument.

And then he blames me for the confusion, uh for confusing moral responsibility with epistemology.

It's it's a bit bizarre.

Okay.

He says bignon said that there's a big fat equivocation in many Anti -calvinist arguments that simply speak of the ability to do

otherwise without distinguishing which one is in view.

End quote.

That might be true.

But it's irrelevant here because I go out of my way to distinguish what is necessary for knowledge.

Bignon says.

Quote.

If they mean categorical ability then they're begging the question.

End quote.

That's false.

That's simply false because I offer deductive arguments.

I support them I defend them and i've been having these conversations with phd philosophers and theologians since

2012.

Would you uh speak to that?

Yeah, so it's a bit awkward because i'm the foreigner here and I do speak with an accent.

But here I think he's just has troubles following the simple flow of that english sentence.

I was talking about a good number of arguments That fail to distinguish between categorical and

conditional abilities.

I've listed several of them in my book by david whitaker peter van inwagen david kopp.

And so they all do that.

They give you a story where you have conditional ability.

You don't have the conditional ability to do otherwise and then You are not morally responsible and then they

generalize and say well.

Therefore you need the categorical ability to do otherwise and i'm saying it's a non -sequitur.

So i'm talking about that the fact that just Showing a story where you have conditional ability you lack the

conditional ability to do otherwise Doesn't give you incompatibilism.

It is begging the question if you do the jump to the need for a categorical ability to do otherwise.

That's what i'm talking about and I in that very same sentence I say so if they mean categorical ability

then they beg the question and This is not talking about stratton.

So he's really misunderstood that second part of the sentence here.

And if he wants a more immediate example of exactly what i'm talking about here of begging the question by doing that.

He doesn't have to go too far because braxton himself Did it in that very video he

offered a story Where he's sitting on the couch and asking his daughter to carry the couch into her bedroom.

And he says if I ask my daughter to carry the couch to her bedroom while i'm sitting on it I can't

blame her because she can't do it.

But you can see she doesn't have the conditional ability to do it.

She cannot do it even if she wanted to.

So braxton uses it to conclude that calvinism calvinism is false.

And I say it's a non -sequitur because of that very equivocation on the conditional versus categorical ability

right, so so I continued in maintaining that the affirmation of Conditional principle of alternate

possibilities isn't sufficient and we need additional arguments.

So then tim responded very loudly.

Well, there were several arguments in my blog post.

Yes, i'm aware that there are arguments for more for incompatibilism or for indeterminism.

And he's offered some i'm saying that the mere affirmation of conditional principle of alternate

possibility Isn't one and that's beyond dispute I think and he's offering different arguments doesn't

refute that.

Well, what about on this this uh.

Comment of of being a game changer, right?

Then they discussed the controversy over the phrase game changer and if people watch the first video they know what what i'm referring to here.

Yeah, so he says he didn't use game changer, uh in his dissertation.

Uh, so he said that we would be happy there but in a blog article he did.

So I affirmed that determinism and libertarianism are incompatible.

And that's purely definitional and he called that affirmation that concession a game

changer.

And I explained that it's ridiculous to say my affirmation of definitions is a game changer.

That should have been the end of the story, but apparently he insists and he says this he says it is a

game changer.

For those who are playing the game and arguing that exhaustive divine determinism Does or

does not always describe reality?

That's the game i'm talking about.

Um, and i'm really not too sure how to interpret that sentence, but I Cannot think of any

interpretation that removes the absurdity of calling my affirmation of definitions a game changer.

So I went on and you know kind of jokingly put on twitter a meme that a friend of mine had done.

Where he put a picture of tim stratton doing a mic drop.

And the the caption reads, uh, my opponent admitted that bachelors are unmarried.

Game changer, uh, and I think it made the point that affirming a definition isn't a game changer

for any debate.

Sure, but then he goes on to say guillaume's remarks are game changing when you take all of them together.

So all of it you know, yeah, yeah, I mean.

I don't think this is what he meant.

Uh, it's clear in the blog, you know, read the article again in your game changer sentence.

He's explaining explicitly.

Take is he is explicitly talking about my affirmation that compatibilism and libertarian free will

are incompatible.

He's not talking about all my statements together whether in my book or in my interview.

It's really about that I ask, uh,.

Does it make sense to you guys?

Maybe I shouldn't have used the words, uh.

Game changer braxton responds.

There's nothing wrong with using provocative language to have your words be heard.

After all he used a meme, right?

Yes.

Yes, absolutely.

And of course, that's not the point at all that i'm making here.

I'm i'm not objecting because it's provocative language.

I mean actually the phrase game changer is not even provocative.

I'm objective i'm objecting because it's absurd to call the affirmation of definition a game changer.

Okay, then braxton says again that you fail to hit stratton's view because you're talking about moral responsibility.

I guess the issue of moral rationality as opposed to responsibility.

Yeah.

Yeah, so it's the same bizarre criticism.

Um so far I was only responding to the consequence arguments in the in the video.

So then yes, we are about to turn to the so -called free thinking argument.

But he hasn't even played a sentence of my response to it so far.

So I don't think it's really relevant right after right?

They finally play a response to it eventually, right?

Yeah, so they get to the free thinking argument.

So let's let's transition to the free thinking argument.

Then they first respond to your claim that it's not an argument for incompatibilism.

Yes, so I had mentioned initially that um, the the the argument that uh team offers which he called the free

thinking argument.

Um, he is it's not an argument for indeterminism.

It's not for its truth, but it's impossibility of affirming it rationally.

So it's he's saying it's the claim is that determinism could be true.

But then it would still be irrational to affirm because knowledge claims would be impossible.

And in response, uh, they say but bignon is making knowledge claims.

So yes, of course, I don't plan to use this as an escape i'm just laying out the logic of the argument.

I do maintain that we make knowledge claims and therefore I don't want to say determine is true.

And I just cannot rationally affirm it.

No.

Certainly.

I want to rationally affirm it.

So I was just explaining the structure of the argument and I don't plan to use this as an escape.

Um, I'll tell you full well which escape I actually take of the argument.

I deny the conditional that if determinism is true, you can't have knowledge or draw rational

inferences.

That's my response to the argument.

Okay.

Well, then tim says that he argued that compatibilism entails determinism, but determinism is refuted by the free thinking

argument.

So it does refute compatibilism.

Yes, and that's fine.

I think he's missing a few premises to go from compatibilism to determinism.

But that's acceptable to me.

I have tried to offer these premises myself in the past.

I just note that we're still not in my refutation of the argument.

It's just my explanation of the claims.

Okay.

Well, then they they say you were uncharitable when you accused him of claiming too much ownership of the argument.

Which you said he didn't invent.

Uh, and they say everyone uses what came before us.

Stratton says he stands on the shoulders of giants.

And he offered his own formulation of the syllogism.

Yeah, so I don't want to dwell too much on that.

Uh, the problem with the argument is that it's bad.

It's not that it's unoriginal, but I I do believe he claims too much ownership.

I mean, um in my book, you know to take similarly the same kind of exercise in my book I offer my

formulation of luther's argument that original sin refused the principle of alternate possibilities.

But I don't say that I came up with the slave choosing argument and I don't launch the slave choosing ministries.

So, uh, I don't think there's need to insist here, but i'd rather focus on the refutation of the argument.

Okay.

Uh, you'd said it's obvious which premise the calvinists will refuse if the termitism is true.

Knowledge is impossible.

Tim says you didn't include the words rationally inferred and affirmed.

Yeah, that's fine with me.

So in that case, it might look like he's no longer targeting all knowledge.

And maybe I had misunderstood that piece of his if that's the case.

Um, but he's only targeting a subset of that and saying it's only our knowledge obtained by inference.

And yeah, I do insist that knowledge obtained by inference is compatible with determinism.

So we have the relevant disagreement to resolve here.

So the argument is not really affected by that.

We are just focusing on one more specific type of knowledge.

But I do affirm that we have it even if we're determined so there's still the relevant disagreement here that needs to be

debated.

Yeah.

Well any quotes you're saying, uh, the indeterminist must support the premise or the argument remains question begging end quote.

And he says that's true.

I agree.

Yeah, so we're clear now on what he needs to do.

Then he needs to support the claim that determinism excludes knowledge or rationally inferred knowledge.

With premises that the determinist accepts.

Otherwise, it's question begging Right, but he never really offers those premises that should make me

accept that determinism excludes knowledge.

He only hammers the same question, you know, it says if a mad scientist determines everything god guillaume

believes.

How can guillaume not the mad scientist rationally affirm any of his beliefs without begging the

question.

So first it's a question.

So it's not an argument.

And I need to be given some premises that I must accept and then which entail the truth of the

disputed conditional Right.

So this is really what what's missing here.

And second that that question that he asked is actually quite easy to answer.

How do I rationally affirm any of my beliefs?

For the sake of argument I can just buy fully into let's say alvin plantinga's account of of what knowledge is and I

could say Exactly this I have a belief Formed by cognitive faculties functioning

properly in an environment that is suited to them.

According to a design plan aim that truth.

It's a bit of a mouthful, but it's planting as account of knowledge.

And I could say exactly that none of it is incompatible with determinism.

And then if he takes the the case of the mad scientist and he says that the mad scientist Does

exclude exclude any of those items that are important for knowledge?

Then yes, it's going to exclude knowledge, but then it shows that the Mad scientist case is

now disanalogous to the normal case that I affirm Where the calvinist god does give us cognitive

faculties designed to track truth and give us a preponderance of true beliefs.

So that would be how I answered his question and simply ask for an argument that supports

that conditional that's controversial.

Well, he does anticipate that you you would give that sort of response.

And so he says this.

If guillaume's next words are externalism I'd interrupt and say i'd like to talk to guillaume, please not

the mad scientist.

Yeah, so this is really obnoxious and apparently They've in the video.

They seem to discuss a little bit that you know with the and and he doesn't really understand why his opponents

Keep rolling their eyes when he does that.

So let me explain precisely why it's so obnoxious and that perhaps may stop.

He may perhaps stop doing it to other poor chaps who engage with him on this argument.

So he affirms a conditional.

If knowledge is possible, then determinism is false.

I obviously dispute that conditional.

I affirm the antecedent.

That says knowledge is possible.

And I deny the consequence that says determinism is false.

Okay, right so I dispute the conditional.

Uh, I deny the consequence and I affirm the antecedent.

But every time I open my mouth with the assumptions that the antecedent is true He mocks me for

my denial of the consequent as if I were also denying the antecedent.

So it's really misguided and a way to simplify and illustrate is imagine that I keep

claiming something.

That's obviously absurd.

But imagine that I claim.

If someone speaks english without a french accent, then everything they say is false, right?

That's that that's the crazy conditional but let's imagine that I claim that.

And then I interrupt them every time they voice an english sentence.

Ah, no french accent.

Why are you saying false things all the time?

Are you not interested in the truth?

It's extremely obnoxious because the debate is on the conditional.

It's not on whether I affirm the antecedent which I obviously do.

Or whether I accept the consequence which I obviously don't so that's really why it's not

really profitable to simply Catch you in your sentences like oh you say that well.

Yeah, but since I don't I don't buy the conditional.

It doesn't really help for that you point out that I affirm the antecedent.

Well, then he quotes, uh an epistemologist Kelly Fitzsimmons Burton who says this quote proper

functions of our cognitive faculties must first rule out the deterministic influences of outsiders.

Such as alpha centurion cognitive scientists cartesian evil demons and also internal influences such as a

brain Lesion or even the influences of mind altering substances.

All of these influences may cause one's faculties to fail to function properly.

Right.

So I think that evil cartesian demons and brain lesions May cut the link between the

evidence And the belief so that the cognitive faculties are not functioning properly

and they fail to respond to the evidence.

But god's determining providence isn't like that in the normal cases.

So what what makes the cognitive faculties dysfunction in the case of brain lesions and cartesian demons?

Is that they are no longer in line with their design plan to track truth?

So with those kinds of worries You would have a defeater on determinism only if you

believed that god makes your cognitive faculties Dysfunction a majority of the time but but

no one thinks that in the normal cases God doesn't interfere with your proper function of our

cognitive faculties.

And so his deterministic influence is not a defeater for our belief.

Okay well.

Then they play a clip where you give a simple account of coming to know x I use my god -given brain to consider the evidence and

Believe x and then stratton interrupts the clip.

He says not so fast.

Keon binyong.

Did binyong the thing he refers to as I consider and evaluate the evidence or was he caused

and determined by the mad scientist?

Yeah, and it's a false dilemma.

So we've seen already it's it's an obviously false dilemma since even his own wording

entails that both Forms of the dilemma are true.

If I am caused to do x then I do x you know.

We saw if I cause my pen to fall it is the case that my pen falls.

Okay.

Well, then he says if he is free and not caused and determined by the mad scientist or anything else.

Then binyong is free and liberated to think so this french philosopher I say welcome to the land of free

in a libertarian sense.