French Calvinist Philosopher Responds to Critics

All right. Welcome back to another episode of Revealed Apologetics. I'm your host Elias Ayala and today

I'm super duper excited because I have Guillaume Bignon Which took me a while to properly pronounce his name and perhaps he can just give me a thumbs up if I got it

All right. Good. Very good. Very good. And so we're gonna be talking about a interesting topic where I kind of promoted it as kind of Guillaume who is a

French Calvinist and I call him French Calvinist because you're gonna notice he's French just by when he opens his mouth but he's also a philosopher, right and He's going to be interacting with three friends actually, but have a completely different perspective

We'll talk a little bit about them in just a few moments But by way of announcements, I am going to be having a couple of in good interviews coming up That will be covering a wide variety of topics most of which will relate to apologetics, but that's my primary focus in With Revealed Apologetics, and so I'm looking forward to that.

I just received a text not that long ago I know a lot of people enjoyed the the episode that I had with Chris Bolt on the topic of presuppositional ism

And so I will be having him on at a future date. Hopefully we can lock that in I'm still

I'm still I'm still fighting for dr James Anderson from Reformed Theological Seminary to talk about the nature of transcendental arguments

So that should be fun as well. And so there's a lot of good things coming up in the near future

I'm also if you have someone a scholar or an apologist a philosopher that you'd like me to have on the

Revealed Apologetics show Please email me at revealed apologetics at gmail .com And I will reach out to those folks and hopefully

I can provide for the listeners what they want to hear so that it can be educational informative edifying and Just works towards equipping us to think better as Christians loving the

Lord our God with all of our mind I'm in a super good mood Not just because of the guests that I have today

But I was just telling our guests that because of this whole quarantine lock -in thing I have actually convinced my wife to watch the

Star Wars movies from beginning to end So we just finished the the prequels episodes 1 through 3 and this is this praise

God praise God because if anyone knows my wife She does not like those type of movies.

So I am very very excited That that we made it through those first three films.

All right. Well that aside let's let's jump right in I have with me today Guillaume Bignon Why don't you tell folks a little bit about yourself and and then we'll take it from there

Hey, thanks for having me About myself. Well, I guess my accent already betrayed that I'm French You've already called me out on it, which is a really mean thing to say.

I would never call you French So I'm I guess I'm a Calvinist that's going to be the topic of the interview

I'm I guess a philosophical theologian or theological philosopher, whichever way you want to prime it

So I think that just Philosophy is thinking very hard about things and you don't you do that about God and that's a theologian

So philosophy and theology coming together During the day, I work on Wall Street.

I live in the New York City area So I'm a director in the corporate and investments bank

And at night and I guess on the weekends, I'm a philosopher and think about those I'm also a father of four young kids.

And so you're not foreign to that situation with the wall lockdown on the outbreak It's quite a lot of fun to have all these kids running around So basically you what you work on Wall Street and you have a really boring day job but at night you are a

Calvinist superhero fighting crime of libertarianism and all the different kinds of Molinist running around and our minions running around.

So that's basically what you do, right? That's right I don't think I don't know if libertarianism is a crime and maybe a felony.

I don't know We need to look at the law for that. All right. All right. Well, we'll look into that later on Maybe a topic for another another episode

Well, okay. So all joking aside now, we're gonna be covering three individuals and I would say that that they are

Mutual friends of mine. I've had Tim Stratton of free thinking ministries on my show a few episodes back to talk about Molinism and of course

Guillaume knows much about Molinism He said I remember he said it in a particular context that Molinism is his favorite of the false views

And and you know what I have to be honest out of all the false views out there it is my favorite as well

And so we'll be taking a look at Tim Stratton from free thinking ministries. Who's a great guy very sharp guy and We're gonna be taking a look at Braxton Hunter from Trinity radio

And we're gonna take a look at some of his arguments against Calvinism. And of course The infamous

Leighton flowers. I he knows I love him, but we'll be looking at Leighton flowers as well so we have a lot to cover in this in this show tonight and I'm I actually

I usually don't drink coffee this late, but I drank coffee So I'm ready if you're ready

I'm ready And I'm sure the people listening are going to enjoy the content whether they agree or disagree all that to say

This is done in brotherly love. We are not the sorts of Calvinist that You know resigned and non

Calvinist to the pits of hell, of course, right where this is an in -house discussion But an important one and I think

Guillaume would agree with that. So we're going to Begin now, so let's start with with Tim Stratton.

Okay. I've spoken with with Tim and he says that he's interacted with with your work and Are you familiar with the work that he's put out in response to you and his free thinking ministries website?

So I've met him very briefly a couple of times at the annual meeting of the

Evangelical Theological Society and Evangelical Philosophical Society So friendly guy

I have not Read extensively his material.

I do know that he had put out some material against my book after it came out So we can focus on that for the arguments of the evening

But that's just about the extent of my engagement with him But yeah

Yeah, very friendly guy definitely the kind of guy you want to just like chill out and watch a movie with or you know grab something to eat or Something I very very nice guy

But okay, so let's jump in So so the overall topics that we're gonna be covering as you interact with Tim with Braxton and with Layton are the topics of free

Moral responsibility issues of determinism issues of incompatibilism compatibilism and libertarianism now

We're using these terms under the assumption that the majority of people who are gonna be listening to this are somewhat familiar with these debates

But if we can just quickly define those concepts for us, and then we'll start interacting with With Tim Stratton's work that kind of makes comments on on his perspective of your work.

Yes. Okay, so a few words on Preliminaries, let's say to understand those concepts. So free will as is normally understood in the philosophical literature is the control condition for moral responsibility

So it's a bit of a mouthful, but let's start then with moral responsibility and that will help us understand what free will is so moral responsibility is

What you have when you are suitable for praise or blame So if when you make choices you you do actions

You choose to do something That action may be praise worthy or blame worthy

And you in order to be praised or blamed that is in order to be morally responsible

You need to be properly in control of what you're doing And so that element of you controlling the decision to engage in those actions is what we call free will it's the control condition for moral responsibility now an

Interesting way of contrasting it is simply to realize that for you to be morally responsible That is for you to be praiseworthy or blameworthy for what you do

You need to satisfy the control condition the free will condition But there's also additional conditions that haven't that don't have to do with how you control your decision

But more with what you know, so there are epistemic conditions for moral responsibility

I'll give you a quick example You can freely choose to do something

But if you if you lack some very important pieces of information about your action that you're carrying out

You may be excused for something that if you had known you would be blameworthy So let's imagine that I'm pouring some sugar in my wife's coffee, but unbeknownst to me the jar has been replaced with poison

I'm doing the action freely. So I control what I'm doing. So I have free will I satisfy the control condition but I am not aware of very important facts about the matter and Therefore I would not be blameworthy because I just didn't know it was poison

So there's epistemic conditions for more responsibility and control condition and the control condition is what we say is free will if you have free will if you act freely then it's

Necessary for to be more irresponsible. Mm -hmm. And okay, so that's free will moral responsibility

Determinism this is thrown out a lot in the discussions different kinds of determinism, but just basically what is determinism and How are we using it within this with this particular context?

Yes, so determinism is the question It's one of the questions that's at the heart of the debate between Calvinists and non -Calvinists

Determinism is the view that Everything that happens including our choices because that's the area on which we're interested tonight

Everything that happens is necessitated by prior facts so everything that happens in this world everything that we do and choose in the era of of human choices is

Determined by antecedent factors by prior facts about ourselves. So the way that the world is

When you know, let's focus on choices again when I'm about to make a choice The Determinist view is going to say that the outcome of my choice is determined it's necessitated by all the facts about my own makeup my bringing the conditions in which

I'm placed, you know my thoughts and desires Inclinations on the moment of choice all of those taken together and obviously on a

Christian view that also includes God's Providential activity in my heart his own drawing of my own

Volition all of that put together determines the outcome of my choice

Okay Okay, so free will moral responsibility determinism now just to clarify the the debate between the

Calvinist and the non -calvinist is not that one affirms free will and another denies it rather we have different Understandings of free will yeah, that's exactly right

And that's why it's important to define free will in the way that I've just done which is the completely standard way of defining free

Will in the literature, it's agnostic as to whether or not that is Compatible with determinism.

And so this is where we enter into those concepts of incompatibilism and compatibilism which are very simply the views that free will and moral responsibility as I've defined them are either

Compatible or incompatible with determinism Okay, so you just define there for incompatibilism and compatibilism.

All right, that's right So incompatible is talking to say that if you're determined then you cannot be morally responsible

You cannot have free will and then the compatibilist will simply say no No, no, you could be determined and still have free will and moral responsibility

So it's a disagreement on not on whether we have free will or not I think that most Christians will want to say that we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for what we do that We do have free will in that sense

But they will strongly disagree as to whether or not that namely free will and moral responsibility is compatible with determinism so we have

Compatibilism which is a form of determinism, right? No, so compatibilism is just a thesis that free will and Determinism are compatible

Okay, so it doesn't actually commit you to saying that you either have free will or that you even are determined, right?

So it's just saying the two could be true together But in itself, it doesn't commit you to affirming that in fact either is true now more often than not compatibilists tend to Affirm that they're compatible because they happen to be true

And so if both of them are true, then obviously both of them are compatible But technically compatibilism isn't the thesis that they are in fact true.

It's just a thesis that they're compatible all right now, can you define for us the difference between determinism and soft determinism

Yes And and libertarianism and soft libertarianism because that's gonna come that's gonna come an issue later on when you interact with Particular versions of libertarianism as they come

Within the context of Tim's work and others. Yes. Okay. So Determinism is simply the view that as I described it, everything is determined.

Everything is necessitated by prior antecedent factors What is called soft determinism is simply the combination of determinism plus compatibilism

So it's a soft determinist is someone who says we are determined. So it's affirming determinism and also

Compatibilism is true. Therefore. We could have free will even though we are determined and so soft determinism is the combination of compatibilism and Determinism and that is really what

I take to be the standard Calvinist view that is that is the affirmation That's overall. We are determined to do everything that we do, but we are still morally responsible

So we are from compatibilism and determinism. That's soft determinism.

All right, very good. So we have good Did you want to have another thought there? No. Well, you also asked about libertarianism.

So yes, that's right. Okay. Yeah libertarianism and soft libertarianism Yeah, so libertarianism is the one that we haven't defined yet Libertarianism is another combination of those two.

So libertarianism is the thesis that incompatibilism is true and Also, some of the choices we make are free so libertarianism is the view that Determinism is incompatible with free will and moral responsibility and also some of the time we have free will and moral responsibility

From which it follows that determinism is false Okay, so that's the standard definition of libertarianism now with respect to soft libertarianism

I don't think it's as widely used in the literature as the expression soft determinism

So, I'm not all that certain that I can give you a standard understanding of what it means for a libertarianism to be soft

As opposed to be hard That we'll have to see I don't think it matters for the evaluation of the arguments that we're looking at tonight

But well the soft hard Terminology is clear for determinism where you can say well, by the way

It's a good contrast to draw soft determinists are the ones that are determinists and compatibilists and that is in opposition to what is called hard determinism and that is folks were from determinism and incompatibilism

So there are folks who say we are determined and it is incompatible with moral responsibility and free will

Therefore we don't have free will no one is really blameworthy or praiseworthy And so that's that's obviously not the view that I affirm.

I affirm soft determinism the one that is compatible is tick Okay now regardless if People understand what you said or not with the details and all the intricacies about the definitions

I think definitions are important everything you said sounds right because of your accent so you have the advantage automatically, right?

Just saying I don't know about that In order to sound smart

I'm told you need to have a British I know but in a French accent when you have a French Accent, I'm told you sound smug which is okay or maybe arrogant

I don't know. All right, or you could just have I'm Puerto Rican, but I have no accent. So I'm like weird.

Yeah, anyway So let's jump right into into the issue here so Tim wrote an article kind of critiquing

Some of your your work and his article can be found on his website free thinking ministries and and I would encourage people even as a

People who know a little bit about myself in regards to apologetic methodology. I'm a presuppositional list And I'm not a classic list, but Tim is a classic list and has great apologetic resources there

So I still find his work very valuable and I encourage people to kind of go there You'll find all sorts of articles that would be helpful for apologetics and things like that Of course, we have the disagreement here on the issue of Calvinism and determinism and how that all hashes out but I've heard

Tim say and others say with regards to your work Guillaume that your Your work provides perhaps one of the best defenses of compatibilism and so That if anything that should encourage people who are interested to check out your book which is excusing sinners and excusing sinners and blaming

God and bookstores new Advertising now now it's not a walk in the park sort of read.

I mean you you engage with some pretty You know complicated issues here and you deal with some philosophical issues that take a little work to kind of plow through But it is a worthy read.

I'm still in the in the middle of reading it at the moment And I Guillaume Guillaume shared with me the other night that when he takes notes, he takes handwritten notes

So so I tried it and I like it But I don't know if I can plow through a handwritten notes because there's just so much there to write down I might have to just punk out and start typing but be that as it may okay

So Tim has a lot to say with regards to your work but let's jump into his article that he kind of Focuses on on your your book here and he talks about the consequent argument and if I can give kind of a very brief lay person's

Presentation of the argument the consequent argument it goes something like this that if determinism is true The knowledge is impossible, right?

Because no, no, that's that's not the one. So, okay. Yeah. Yeah good Yeah, so the the consequent argument is is not the argument that Tim Stratton actually defends himself.

That's right So the consolation wagons, right? That's correct. Yes. Yes. Yes So the consequence argument is one very famous argument in favor of incompatibilism.

Okay, so in my book I do Engage with Peter van in wagons consequence arguments because I need to explain what

I think is wrong with the arguments. Okay, so That's that Tim Stratton has written his blog post

And I will explain what the consequence argument is and what when my response is to the consequence argument

But I first want to point out that that's not even relevant Here because Tim Stratton doesn't engage even a little bit with my treatment of the consequence arguments

So here's what he said. I mean you want to read the the yeah, I'll read it and just real quick to differentiate between Tim's argument and Peter van in wagons argument

Peter van in wagons argument if I'm if I'm correct is an argument against naturalistic determinism, right?

Yes, it is. Although it can very easily be modified and hits the theological determinants

So which is what Tim tries to do Tim Tim will write so I don't know I don't know if Tim has defended the consequence argument because it doesn't really engage with my response in this blog post

But yes, it's very common to use the consequence argument in favor of incompatibilism

I mean he talks about the laws of nature But then if you replace that with God's full providential activity you'll find with the exact same situation

Where it determines the outcome of your choices So gotcha the argument it definitely it would not be a good move for the

Calvinist to say well, no It's not talking about my view. It's not including God. It's just the laws of nature

No, the argument really hits the Calvinist if it's successful Okay, all right, so let me read a portion of the article and then

I'll give you an opportunity to respond to it Okay. All right. So here is a little chunk from the article

He says well, I have read my friendly enemies interaction with the consequent argument. You are the friendly enemy

To put it bluntly. I am unimpressed This is because being young affirms exhaustive determinism and I'm convinced that Rationality let alone knowledge does not exist

If all thoughts and beliefs are ultimately causally determined by something external to the person possessing the thoughts and beliefs

In fact, I've argued that a determinist cannot possess knowledge that determinism is true

Even if determinism is true if that is the case then all that remains for the determinist our question begging

Assumptions what say you? Okay, so so it's important to understand.

What's the dialectic here? So Peter van in wagon offers an argument in favor of incompatibilism

It's called the consequence argument and we'll get to it in just a moment I provide a full response to this argument in my book and here what

Tim Stratton does is that he says There are other reasons to think that determinism is false

Right, so he's just he's diving into his arguments the one that you need to be able to freely think

Otherwise so that you could not have knowledge that determinism is true even if determinism is true So that's his argument, but that's not the consequence argument

So what he's saying is that there's other reasons to think determinism is false But that's not relevant to the merits of my response to the consequence argument

Right when I explain what's wrong with the consequence argument the merits of my response have nothing to do with whether incompatibilism is true

Okay, because you can suppose for a second that Incompatibilism is true. It could still be the case that the consequence argument is a bad way of proving it

So I could successfully show that the consequence argument doesn't work even if its conclusion is true

Okay, so what Triton Stratton does when he simply says well look you affirm determinism

And there are reasons not to think that it's false It does positively nothing to explain why my response to the consequence argument is

I quote an impressive All right So an easy way to see that is the case is imagine that he is here now in a different context imagine that he's offering

He's so -called free thinking arguments. They were the one that we've just read In against determinism and then

I response that I I respond that I find his argument unimpressive Because Tim affirms libertarian free will and libertarian free will is refuted by Romans 9 don't you know?

So that would be changing the topic, right? So it's not supporting at all why it was okay to be unimpressed by the free thinking argument

And the same goes for his response to my treatment of the consequence argument So this blog post was really odd in that sense is that he claims to be unimpressed by my response to the consequence argument

But he touches none of it. He simply seizes the fact that I affirm determinism, which is quite obviously true and then says well there are other reasons to think that determinism is false or at least not justified and But that's really missing the point of the arguments that I'm offering against the consequence argument.

So, okay, so that's so let's look Let's look at the consequent the consequent argument itself.

What would you what would you how would you respond to that? okay, so the consequence argument is Peter van in wagons claim that if Determinism is true.

Then everything that you choose can be seen as the mere consequences of things that preceded you

And so if you didn't have the ability to change those things the past You no more have the ability to change their necessary consequences.

So you don't have the ability to do otherwise than you do Right, that's that's the gist.

So when in wagon offers it in different forms as at least three different versions in his essay on freewill

But they're all sharing that essential that that core of the reasoning is that if you're determined then you are

Your choices are the consequences of things that preceded you you cannot change what preceded you and therefore you cannot change their consequences either

Namely things that follow necessarily from those So the core of my response to this

Requires you to understand a very important distinction Between two two things that we call the ability to do otherwise, but they're quite different So there's two ways of unpacking the ability to do.

Otherwise One is the so -called conditional ability to do. Otherwise, the other one is the categorical ability to do otherwise, so it's very important to get that when you engage in conversations on free will and There's this claim that you need the ability to do otherwise or to change, you know to choose

Otherwise or to here is the ability well really in van in wagons word. It's the ability to do.

Otherwise It's that there's the conditional sense of ability which says you Could do otherwise if you had desired to do.

Otherwise, okay, so It's a very mild sense of ability It's simply saying if you had wanted if you had the desires the inclination to do otherwise than you do

Then there's nothing else that would have prevented you from doing it Alright, so you can imagine we're taking that's conditional.

That's right. That's the conditional Meaning the conditional sense of ability to do. Otherwise, it's it's the one that says if you had wanted to you could have done

Otherwise, there was nothing but your will to to prevent you so an example of that would be if we're taking a vote and My hands are handcuffed behind my back

And we're asking me. Well, why didn't you raise your hand? then I can point out that I did not have the conditional ability to do the wise because Even if I wanted to raise my hand there was the handcuffs preventing me from raising my hand

So I did not have the conditional ability to do. Otherwise, so that's a fairly mild sense of ability and then there's a stronger sense of ability to do otherwise, which is the

Categorical ability to do otherwise and this one says you must be able to do otherwise than than what you in fact do

All things being just as they are at the moment of choice Including everything about you inside and out

That is you're no longer supposing that your desires are different You're saying like exactly everything your inclination you'll make up your character all the influences working on you at the moment of choice

Being held just as they are you could have chosen otherwise, so that's the categorical sense of ability

Okay. Okay. And so once you've laid out that there are those two understandings of ability

Here is the key piece the categorical sense of ability If you have that kind of ability you are indeterminate

That is that that sense of ability is incompatible with determinism and you can see this fairly straightforwardly

If you are determined then all things about you at the moment of choice Determine the one and only outcome that is possible and that will in fact happen

So you don't have the ability categorically to choose something else all things being just as they are so the categorical sense of ability is incompatible with determinism and that is the one that Incompatibilists must convince us is necessary for moral responsibility right, but And then the conditional sense of ability that one

I Agree is necessary for moral responsibility that is that if I don't even have the conditional ability to do otherwise, then

I Cannot be praised or blamed for doing what I do or failing to do what I fail to do so the conditional sense of ability is necessary for free will and moral responsibility and The categorical sense of ability is incompatible with determinism

So you would say the Calvinist has the conditional ability not the categorical, right? so yes, and the

Calvinist and and that the conditional the conditional ability is still provides a foundation for Moral responsibility.

Yeah, so the the conditional sense of ability is necessary necessary for moral responsibility

But it is compatible with determinism and so that's the key so you can you can affirm that moral responsibility and free will

Require the conditional sense of ability so there is a sense in which the Calvinist says you need to be able to do otherwise but it's a milder sense of Ability than the one that is actually incompatible with determinism namely the categorical sense of ability so you have those two senses and therefore there's a big fat equivocation in many of the anti -calvinist arguments because they simply speak of the ability to do otherwise without distinguishing which one is in view and My big claim against fine in wagon and against a lot of the other writers that I engage in my writing is that if they mean

The conditional ability to do otherwise then I don't disagree. I say yes, it's more it's necessary for more responsibility

But then nothing follows interestingly Against Calvinism or determinism and if they mean categorical sense of ability then they are begging the question

Hmm because I don't agree that the categorical ability is necessary for more responsibility and therefore we need an independent

Argument for that. I see. Okay, and that's my response to the consequence argument

All right, and that's why it's important to be Is to define our terms and to use those terms

Consistently in these debates people talk about free. It's kind of like the you know when people say, you know

Calvinist will sometimes say, you know, we believe in the sovereignty of God as though non -calvinist reject the sovereignty of God and both both parties

Understand we believe in the sovereignty of God, but there's different understanding same thing with with free will ability and things like that I think that's very very important to keep in mind

But but Tim goes on he says it's too bad that been young did not conduct the Google search

Or talk to our mutual friends, which we share many who are aware of the arguments. I've advanced supporting the

Incompatibilist thesis these arguments are offered in abundance on freethinkingministries .com.

Don't you know about that website Kian? What's wrong with you to be fair? Although two of these arguments are being published in theological journals later this year

He did not have access to these arguments in published literature before writing his book as noted above I will address these arguments soon

But since they do exist been young must account for them and interact with them before jumping to conclusions

That is to say that the burden of proof has been shifted to his Shoulders, so don't you use the internet

Guillaume? Don't you don't you look up? websites first before you do something foolish like publish a book on the topic of Calvinism and then determinism what's wrong with you man?

Yeah, it's a bit funny So it's actually all in response to one sentence that he took out of context in my book and the sentence was like this

The burden of proof is still firmly on the shoulders of the incompatibilist and we are still looking for an argument to support the

Incompatibilist thesis. So this is something I said in response to the Consequence argument precisely because of what

I've just explained that there are those two senses of ability and that people are claiming so as the

Conclusion of the consequence argument does it's claiming well if determinism is true. You don't have the ability to choose

Otherwise, boom determinism should not be affirmed because you don't have the ability to do Otherwise, you cannot be morally responsible.

So in my explanation of this Equivocation on the sense of ability I then explained look once we've understood that there are those two senses

It doesn't suffice for the incompatibilist to tell us that moral responsibility requires the ability to do

Otherwise, it's still begging the question if they mean the categorical sense of ability And if they only mean the conditional sense of ability then it's compatible with determinism

So it leads nowhere. And so that's why that's where I say we still need an argument They still have the burden of proof of for the incompatibility thesis now

Tim Stratton says I should have googled him So that I would have known learned that there are arguments for incompatibilism

That's funny. Of course. I know there are arguments for incompatibilism. I wrote a full book responding to the best of them

I mean, he's presumably holding the book. I suppose he's read it I deal with the consequence arguments the pets and puppets arguments the coercion arguments multiple versions of the manipulation arguments

The principle of alternate possibilities the direct argument for incompatibilism. All of those are responded to in my book

So i'm aware that there are Arguments for incompatibilism and I don't think

I needed to google Tim Stratton to learn that But the The affirmation that I'm making here when

I say that we still need an argument. The burden of proof is still on them Is something you can see in many of the incompatibilities, right writers.

They are going to be Finding the this claim that moral responsibility requires the ability to do.

Otherwise, it's called the principle of alternate possibilities They find it so convincing because I think the conditional sense of ability is hiding right there

And so it is true and they affirm that but then they slide over to affirm the critique the the categorical sense of ability

Um, but they find it so plausible that sometimes they just leave it out there as if that's it That's the the debate is done and um, they find it obvious and they don't support it

So that's what i'm calling out. But uh, you can take a very famous example that I point out in my book jerry walls was a libertarian a very let's say vocal critic of calvinism, uh,

And uh, and and he affirms that principle of alternate possibility as a properly basic belief that cannot

Be supported by arguments Uh, would you like me to read the quote there? Yeah, sure. Sure the quote by jerry walls.

Okay This is this is jerry walls. He says quote we believe that libertarian free will is intrinsic to the very notion of moral responsibility

That is a person cannot be held morally responsible for an act Unless he or she was free to perform that act and free to refrain from it

This is a basic moral intuition and we do not believe there are any relevant moral convictions

More basic than this one that could serve as premises to prove it yeah, so that's the type of claim that I Address here and I say no, it's not obvious It's not true

And if you need me to buy it, I will need an argument not just an affirmation And until there's a further argument to support the principle of alternate possibilities

Then the burden of proof is still on the incompatibilist So in my refutation of the consequence argument,

I say that the consequence argument is successful in showing And so this is something that tim stratton then quotes, uh, it's successful in showing what

I happily concede Namely that libertarian free will the categorical ability to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism

But falls short of refuting compatibilism So let's let's take a look at his quote here.

Uh where he he makes that that reference here He says this claim is quite significant In fact,

I believe it is a game changer since binyong affirms that determinism and libertarian free will are logically incompatible

And mutually exclusive concepts then it follows that if one of these concepts is true Then the other is necessarily false since binyong affirms compatibilism

He also affirms that divine determinism is true and that nothing is undetermined by god and yet somehow we are still responsible

Be that as it may since his view of compatibilism entails determinism and since determinism is logically incompatible with libertarian free will

Which binyong affirms now all one must do is provide just one argument deductively concluding that humans possess at least

Soft libertarian free will or that god does not always causally determine all things about humanity

If just one argument passes then determinism and thus compatibilism must be false

How would you respond to that? So I think the philosophical term is uh, lol lol

Uh, I mean I I affirm that libertarian free will is incompatible with determinism and he says that's a game changer uh

No, it's not that's baked in the definition. So all i'm doing here is affirming something that's definitional

And he says, oh, I mean i'm flattered in a sense that when i'm so Influential in the field of philosophy that when

I affirm a definition, it's a game changer for everybody I wish uh, but no, it's really there's the beginning of the conversation here

So again, we've seen why his response is misguided. He thinks he's got a good argument against determinism

You know the other argument that he's offering the free thinking argument So my affirmation of determinism is seen as the end of the debate when it really should be the beginning here

So that leads him to leave aside my response entirely to the consequence argument and he offers his arguments for incompatibilism

So, okay. So i'm saying let's look at them They were not really the topic of either the consequence argument or my response

But now he's using them to say like this is what's going to really do and do his view So let's have a look.

So he's going to present his free thinking argument and his uh his omni argument, right? Yes Okay, so let's take a look at the free thinking argument.

I have the premises here premise one If humans do not possess libertarian free will then humans do not possess the ability to gain knowledge via the process of rationality premise two

Humans do possess the ability to gain knowledge via the process of rationality therefore three humans possess libertarian free will

Right, so it's an argument that i've seen him offer a couple of times um And there's let me make a few comments in response to that.

So um first I want to point out that even if the argument even if it's successful, it's not an argument for incompatibilism

It's an argument for indeterminism and not even that it's actually an argument against the rationality of affirming determinism

So by its own admission, the argument doesn't claim to tell you that determinism is false It's uh, it aims to show you that even if it's true, it wouldn't be reasonable to believe it

So at most it's an argument against determinism But it's not an argument for incompatibilism

Okay, so even even if successful it doesn't get you to incompatibilism Um, the second thing

I just want to point out in passing It's not so much a refutation, but I I think it's a comment that ought to be made

It's a bit odd that team stratton claims the argument as his Uh, because he plainly enough did not invent the argument.

I mean it can be found in multiple sources that precede him Uh to just say in american apologetic writings

It's at least in print by william lane craig or greg kukul that he quotes both of them in the uh in the article

Um, it was discussed by uh, richard swinburne in 1997 Uh, swinburne says that you can find it in jbs haldane in 1930s

So I think team stratton was pretty young in the 1930s I was too young to remember whether the argument was already on freethinkingministries .com

at the time But clearly the argument has been offered before Um, so I i'm a little bit

Uncomfortable saying well, this is the freethinking argument by team stratton I think this is just a common claim that determinism somehow is not reasonable to believe

Because your your belief are improperly determined But let's let's uh, let's grant him that at least he's got his own

Formulation of the premises maybe that's you know, let's that's his version of the argument So let's let's deal with it.

Well, what's wrong with the argument? so, uh just in the context of his response, I should point out

I have actually responded to uh that argument, uh in writing in the blog post, uh

That is called can calvinist determinists trust their cognitive faculties And it quotes william lane craig's defense of that very argument

So if you're going to say my position is refuted by this argument now

You could use a google search to see if I didn't treat that very argument in writing

So it's out there. Uh, but let's let's dive into the argument So, uh, the argument says that if determinism is true, uh knowledge is impossible

But in fact knowledge is possible Therefore determinism is false Now it's obvious which premise the calvinist is going to dispute.

It's premise one If determinism is true knowledge is impossible The indeterminist must support that premise, uh with further premises that I accept all the argument remains completely question begging

Um, so then when the incompatible list, uh is asking so how do you know anything on determinism?

Um, the calvinist can answer with a number of possible accounts of knowledge You can be an internalist or an externalist.

Uh, you can be a classical foundationalist. You can be a reformed epistemologist Whatever floats your boat.

None of these accounts have anything to say about whether determinism or indeterminism are true

So the the calvinist can describe the mechanism of deliberation And it would go something like this.

I how do I how did I come to know x? Well, I used my god -given brain to consider the evidence and rationally think about the facts and I concluded what

I think is right Now stratton may be tempted in response to say ah, but all that was still determined Right, but that's only a good retort if you already accept that determinism is incompatible with knowledge

So that's still begging the question Okay. Now doesn't tim have a longer defense of the argument, right?

There's more he has a longer version of it Yeah, so let's dive into some of that material. Yeah. All right.

So let's take a look at it Now, I just want to let people know whoever's listening. Um Please type in a question.

We will be taking questions. We're covering three people today. Uh, we uh, we're uh, Guillaume is covering tim presently right now.

We're going to be covering. Uh, dr Braxton hunter from trinity radio and then layton flowers. Um, so in between each, um, i'm going to try to get a couple of questions where Guillaume will be able to interact with some of some of your questions and I think layton, uh is watching

And uh, he asked a really good question that i'm very much interested in and i'm sure you're interested as well I think many criticisms of your work and it's not so much a criticism, but it is um something that people still say

Okay, this is all well and good, but where's the biblical support for compatibilism? And so maybe we could address that Um shortly when we go through uh, some of the questions and things like that.

I think that's important Obviously we want to be biblical not merely just talk about the philosophical ramifications and all these implications and things like that so hopefully we can get um

Uh, we can get uh get to that at some point but let's let's take a look at tim's longer.

Um, uh argument here Uh premise one. Okay, if naturalism is true

The immaterial human soul does not exist premise two if the soul does not exist libertarian free will does not exist

Three if libertarian free will does not exist rationality and knowledge do not exist four

Rationality and knowledge exist five therefore libertarian free will exists six therefore the soul exists seven therefore naturalism is false and eight the best explanation for the existence of the soul is

God and he says premise three is synonymous with if all things are causally determined then all uh, you know

Then that includes all thoughts and beliefs. Okay, so it's a bit of a longer version.

I think that he aims to uh, to offer this argument against atheism, uh, But the the section that is really relevant to debates with calvinist is premises three four and five

Where you have if libertarian free will does not exist rationality and knowledge do not exist That's premise three then premise four is rationality and knowledge exist premise four which

I said the calvinist is going to Accept and affirm and therefore libertarian free will exist which is the conclusion that calvinists deny

So let's just focus on those three four five and so you said premise three is he says is synonymous

With if all things are causally determined then that includes all thoughts and beliefs Well, that's not at all synonymous premise three is the big claim of the argument which the calvinist of course rejects

Uh, that's the the conditional if libertarian free will does not exist rationality and knowledge do not exist

So that's the the strong premise that's the big claim that calvinist reject And uh, whereas the sentence if all things are causally determined then that includes all thoughts and beliefs that's utterly obvious All right.

It's just a claim that all things are determined if determinism is true Um, so you may claim that one entails the other and i'll disagree and the argument will be immediately question begging

But you can certainly you certainly cannot claim that they are synonymous That's demonstrably not the case

Well, he goes on to say he says, uh, if our thoughts and beliefs are forced upon us and we couldn't have chosen better beliefs

Then we're left assuming that our determined beliefs are good. Let alone true Therefore we can never rationally affirm that our beliefs really are the inference to the best explanation.

We could only assume it Knowledge is defined as justified true belief and if you don't have warrant or justification

Then it's not knowledge If one cannot freely infer the best explanation then one has no justification that their belief really is the best explanation without justification

Knowledge goes down the drain. All we are left with is question begging assumptions a logical fallacy

How would you respond to that? Yeah, so so this is there's a couple of blunders there and I want to Proceed a bit cautiously.

I'm uh, i'm a philosopher of free will not an epistemologist But even with my layperson's understanding of the philosophy of knowledge there's a couple of really strange statements here the

First he seems to say that all knowledge is inferred, right? So if one cannot freely infer the best explanation, then there's no justification.

There's no knowledge Well, it could well be that you have knowledge without inferences, right? Not all knowledge is the result of an inference

To the best explanation some of our knowledge is like that, but not all my not all of our knowledge

I mean, I don't infer that You know what my date of birth is. I don't infer that my wife loves me.

I Know those things more directly. This is not the result of an Empirical survey and then

I have an inference to the best explanation, but let's let's leave that completely aside Uh The the other thing that he says that's a pretty strange here is that he says we're left with question begging assumptions a logical fallacy

But that's that's not right. I mean fallacies have to do with arguments, right?

You beg the question only in a debate Your beliefs don't beg the question

All right. He's suggesting that we need arguments in support of all of our beliefs If that's the case, that's obviously wrong

I mean there's plenty of things that I know or that at least believe rationally and with justification

That I don't have any arguments for this is very famous claim by alvin plantinga All sorts of things are properly basic and you know them but you don't have an argument in favor of it

So the absence of argument is not the problem here that he's trying to to call out but more generally

I think it seems clear his misconception comes from a desire to affirm the ability to think otherwise

So we're back to that idea that you need to have the ability. So this time it's not to do otherwise

It's to think otherwise, but it's the same concept. He's trying to press against determinist so He goes on to say here

Here's the point If one does not possess any ability to think otherwise at least some of the time then one is forced to affirm that a current

Thought cannot be otherwise Even if it should be moreover if all thoughts cannot be otherwise Then this includes evaluating and judging thoughts one has regarding their own thoughts and beliefs all of them

Rational deliberation becomes illusory and thus any so -called knowledge one supposedly gains via this this illusion of rational deliberation

Is also illusory Yeah, so we see that it's still playing on the equivocation between conditional and categorical abilities

So i'm very happy to say that if you're coerced To affirm x so that you will believe x no matter what your reasoning tells you

All right, so then you would be lacking even the conditional ability to believe otherwise let's say

Then your belief in x is not warranted. Yeah, if what you believe is Such is determined to be such no matter what your reasoning tells you

Then this is not warranted. You don't have knowledge But in the normal cases god can determine you to believe x through all the right mechanisms of rational thinking and deliberating

In a way that does not exclude rationality at all so it's in a way that you could have believed otherwise if Conditionally if something had been different namely the evidence, right?

So the key is that your cognitive faculties are determined, but there are still reasons responsive

That's a key phrase that's coined by uh fisher and raviza About free will they say that the mechanism the mechanism of your decision making is reasons responsive that is that it is determined, but it is such that if Reasons had been different then you would have chosen differently.

So it's responsive to reasons So a very straightforward example. I come back home

I smell bread coming from the kitchen and I infer that my wife has made bread which she does quite often

It's delightful. And this is actually what we had for dinner I am determined to do that on calvinism

But through a cognitive function that is such that I would not have believed that my wife had cooked the bread

If I had not smelled the bread My belief could have been otherwise if the evidence had been otherwise and now this is actually a point where I can turn on the heat on the uh,

On the incompatible is here on the indeterminist and say that this account I just gave is very straightforward

It's the opposite that is actually counterintuitive Where there's actually a charge that one's belief is arbitrary if it's not molded by the evidence

That is that there's a charge of arbitrariness that can be leveled against the libertarian view. I smell the bread

But I freely choose to believe no one baked the bread I don't think that's more rational as a mechanism, right?

So on my view the evidence molds your belief it determines what you're going to do in a way

That is still resound responsive But if all the evidence being just the way it is you say well,

I could just on a whim Believe otherwise then it doesn't seem like you're really guided by the evidence, right?

Okay, so Did you have did you want to finish a thought there? No, that's just about right. Let's proceed.

Okay for for the purposes of time If I were to summarize kind of just in a in a the popular way that is presented.

Hey if determinism is true How can we have knowledge about anything because everything we think we know the entire reasoning process is is itself determined So if if even if determinism is true, we're not in a position to know that determinism is true

How would you give a kind of a quick summary response to that? Just as I laid it out there Yes, so there's obviously a few concepts that were needed to explain before that but to put it in very quick fashion one we can say it's

It's begging the question that is that it's it's constantly repeating if we're determined why I think that you can know

Well, there is no reason to think that determinism prevents you from knowing so we need additional arguments

Otherwise, the argument is question begging second. It's equivocating on the sense of ability if we're now

Talking about the ability to believe otherwise then the correct response is to say even the determinist can say that you can

Believe otherwise if something had been different namely the evidence so your beliefs are determined But they're actually following the evidence, which is really what's important in justification and rationality and then so Yeah, so there's this equivocation.

There's the sense of ability. It's conditional and then you can simply say that the your

Cognitive faculties Can be determined through all the right mechanisms Uh, it's not in spite of the deliberation

That you're determined So there's no dilemma between god determines you to believe x and you've assessed the evidence and concluded x

It's not either one or the other it's actually one through the other So it's two different levels of explanation for the same thing namely that you're determined to believe x

But you're still justified because you've done this through all the right mechanisms Okay, and again, this is a this we can go back and forth forever people who disagree

There's going to be points and that's why it's important to to hash these things out and it's okay to go back and forth

Through uh people who agree and want to clarify and things like that now for the purpose of time i'm going to uh,

Move on to uh some questions and then we're going to move on to to braxton hunter, uh from trinity radio

Um to interact with some of his some of his stuff so we have a couple of questions here This is a a softball one.

Okay, it's up there on the screen Why do you think people reject calvinism? And that's kind of a subjective sort of thing because people can reject the position for all sorts of reasons

But why do you think? Well, it started with adam. So he he disobeyed and there was this dramatic dramatic consequence on all of us

That we became sinners and we started to uh act wrongly and believe wrongly So I I don't know why people reject calvinism

Obviously, I know some of the arguments that are offered against it and some of them have some teeth, right? So I think that People can be very strongly impressed by the merits of the arguments against calvinism and say well, it doesn't seem right

Therefore i'm going to reject calvinism and in a sense trying to avoid that is what I do with my book

And I take the best arguments against calvinism and I explain what I think is wrong with them And hopefully that uh encourages people to say well actually no, there's no really strong reason to reject it

Okay. Now, um, this one's from from latent flowers and if he's sleeping Someone wake him up.

Okay. He's he's asking someone wake me up when they start talking about why Compatibilism is theologically necessary based on scripture and you know

I appreciate that question very much. Um, and of course this this very question or a comment rather can take an entire

Podcast episode because you're gonna have to debate the various. Um, the various texts and how we understand that How would you begin to if layton was was sitting here with you right now and asking it's like, you know, uh,

How is this how is compatibilism theologically necessary based on scripture? How would you answer that? Yeah, uh, so there's a couple of things to say here.

Uh, the first one is that well, I don't know if he's uh, Telling me that i'm I am putting him to sleep because i'm engaging in the philosophy

I'm responding to philosophical arguments. I think it's fair play if I use philosophy to explain what's wrong with them um, but with respect to the the bible,

I think the first thing also is to point out that um, We find ourselves in the exact doing the same exact exercise.

That is that there is biblical data There's a number of affirmations in there. None of them come out right and tell you

Philosophically here is the deal, you know god determines all things or god leaves libertarian free will uh, there is no discussion of incompatibilism compatibilism

Determinism indeterminism. None of those terms are used in the scriptures. So we both libertarians and Compatibilists we both find ourselves having to look at the text figuring out how we take the statements unpack their likely consequences in philosophical concepts and try to uh coherently defend that this view is

Reasonable true justified, you know coherent all of those good virtues of philosophical thesis

But there's not something special that i'm currently doing by going in all this philosophy

Both of us have to really do that. We take the biblical data and then we infer that there are

Conclusions on a philosophical level. So if I had to give a sketch, you know, like this is to try to humor him

What are some of the biblical things that are best explained or that most likely entail compatibilism and determinism

There's a number of things. I mean, I don't think any of them is going to be groundbreaking for if he's

Listened to any amounts of calvinists debating, uh those matters in the literature or online um, but you know personally, let's say biblically, what does that look like I would say that um,

Determinism is the best explanation of a number of texts that claim that god is actively controlling and bringing about the outcomes of all things uh good and evil

In very explicit terms. And so I think that those texts are far better explained by the deterministic view

Uh, I believe that this is also the best explanation of all the text on election So obviously it's going to be on the wide debate biblically on how best to interpret the doctrine of election and predestination

But these terms are in the bible in very strong texts declaring that we are

Predestined and elected. Um, and I think that they are best explained by a determinist account of human free will um

I would say that there's a couple of Philosophical arguments that find their premises in the biblical teachings.

So in my book I defend two arguments that i've Taken from uh, martin luther and jonathan edwards, which are fairly, uh, fairly famous claims that um

That so martin luther argues that uh, if uh incompatibilism is true So he doesn't use those terms obviously, but he says that if moral responsibility requires the ability to do

Otherwise then it means that you can live a fully sinless life and therefore that denies original sin um, so he's saying if you're actually

Morally obliged to live a sinless life, but you don't have the categorical ability to do that Then it shows that you don't have incompatibilism.

This is what I try to impact So obviously he does a sketch of that, uh in his writing luther I try to put precise and rigorous philosophical premises and to defend the argument

But I think that that's a philosophical argument that has a biblical premise Namely the fact that we are we ought to live a sinless life

We are morally demanded to do that and yet we lack the categorical ability to do that Because we are fallen sinners and it's not just very hard to work ourselves to heaven

It's literally categorically impossible for us sinners to do that So that a refutation of the principle of alternate possibility which in turn refutes libertarianism

And then the similar claim can be done with the teaching that god is praiseworthy even though he's impeccable

So god does not have the categorical ability to sin Uh, he cannot Um, he cannot avoid being wonderfully righteous and yet he is praiseworthy for this righteousness of his

So we have an independent refutation of the principle of alternate possibilities right there that I think refutes libertarianism

And therefore supports the compatibilist thesis. Okay, and then obviously then there's the cheeky, uh

Claim that I put in the introduction of my book and in the title of it Really, uh, it's the fact that the two main arguments against uh determinism

Against compatibilism the main the most famous ones are the fact that if we are determined god cannot blame us or praises for what we do

All right That's the compatibilist debate and the second is that if he determines what we do that includes our sin and therefore that makes him inappropriately involved in evil

And what I point out is that those two main objections against calvinism are the two very objections that are anticipated by paul in romans 9

And so I think that's also showing some philosophical credentials of the view that if you find yourself objecting against it

With those two very specific arguments you're in the camp of the guy that paul is rejecting

So I think that those are some of the biblical things that I think supports the philosophical views

But you know the libertarian really should be doing the same exercise Tell us what are the texts that none of them speak of libertarianism compatibilism or incompatibilism but what are the teachings that you think supports the philosophical view you affirm and then

We obviously can then debate as to whether or not they support those views But then we can take those views and assess their coherence in a philosophical level and both of those things should happen

That's right. Good. And and of course, uh, layton is asking this question So everyone familiar with uh with layton flowers soteriology 101.

He has a lot to say with regards to uh, Romans 9, uh, which we would obviously take issue with but that's part of the discussion, right?

Right, and you we do precisely what you just said look at the text and then and take it from there We'll take one more question before we move on to braxton hunter and this question comes from Uh, well, he's got a kind of a screen name there.

I guess kranman I I think I believe he was on uh, the unbelievable show with uh with james white Um talking about a similar topic,

I think but here's what he asks. He says, uh, first corinthians chapter 10 verse 13 proves libertarian free will paul says every time no, it doesn't

Okay Okay, first corinthians chapter 10 verse 13 proves libertarian free will paul says every time you sin

Another option was available contra causal choice. So the bible itself refutes determinism

Yes So this is precisely trying to do what I just said should be tried to do to be done by the uh,

The libertarian right to try to take text and say well, it seems to teach something that supports libertarian free will

So what would I say about that text? Well, it says that there is another option available namely you could have done

Otherwise and we're back to that equivocation. What kind of ability is in view here? Is this a conditional sense of ability or is this a categorical sense of ability?

The text obviously doesn't tell you and so it's perfectly fine for the calvinist to say yes I do have the ability to do.

Otherwise if I wanted to I would do otherwise, right? There's no gun on my forehead Forcing me to choose against my will it's through my will so now obviously there's lots of philosophical questions

You know is god's activity on your will Appropriately respecting your moral responsibility

Are there manipulation style arguments that could be mounted against that view all of those claims I deal in my book

But the text itself claiming that we have the ability to do Otherwise doesn't tell you one bit whether it's one view or the other that is uh refuted here

So I don't think that this text teaches libertarian free will no. Okay. All right.

Very good. All right So, um, you're doing you're doing great Uh, i'm sure many things that you said people would take issue with and that's just part of the discussion

But I hope uh, some of the things that you're saying if people disagree with me, I should Yeah Just just a shout out to tim.

Um, because we're wrapping up tim now if if you think he uh, That guillermo is misrepresented.

I would really love to get you guys together and host an interaction between uh, the the two of you I think that'd be very uh fruitful given the fact that at that case you can clarify and say hey wait

That's not what I what I think and and I think that would be a very um, A great conversation to to have um, you guys are both knowledgeable in the area and very respectful

So, um, hopefully, uh, we can get something like that going if you haven't already um subscribe to the revealed apologetics youtube channel if you like the content, uh,

So far in past videos and the current one you're you're now watching Um, I greatly appreciate that and I hope you guys are enjoying this conversation so far now

A lot of people are saying well, man has so much time on tim. Well, we're trying to do a ginormous

Undertaking here responding the three Uh, very good thinkers and they they have arguments that require a little bit of interaction.

So yeah bear with me. Um, we're gonna um, Start on with uh, braxton hunter now and uh, braxton is is a good friend of mine

He's a sharp guy an awesome apologist. You should definitely check out, uh, the trinity radio, uh, youtube channel

Um, I believe there's a podcast as well. I need my trinity radio fix when it comes to apologetics and again

Braxton and uh, jonathan pritchett They're classical apologists, but I love their stuff in the areas where I do where I do agree

I find their material very helpful and useful And so I really do encourage you guys if if you don't know about trinity radio

You want to get yourself over to their youtube channel? Uh, push the subscribe button and check out their Uh their material.

Um that being said let's let's interact with uh with braxton hunter's material and I and I believe Um, you kind of gave a listen to one of his debates.

Did you not? Yes. Yes So this debate versus uh, joe mira or myra. I don't know how you pronounce that Okay, so I listened to that debate so we can go through his uh, his positive arguments together

Okay, so i'm just gonna write read a block of of braxton statements and then you can interact with them there. We'll move along Uh rather quickly.

Okay. So here's what braxton says He says calvinism requires a redefinition of established terms and ideas leading to theological contradictions the term free and all its

Derivatives must be redefined the notion of freedom that we use every day is called libertarian freedom

This means that man is genuinely free to choose between two or more options However calvinists understand god's foreordination and predetermining of all things to override man's freedom in such a way

That what calvinists mean when they say we are free is that man will do whatever his desires and influences dictate that he will do

But he is never able to make a genuinely free choice to do anything This is known as compatibilism and all consistent calvinists who understand this recognize that they must be compatibilists

It means that man really isn't free. In fact, it's called soft determinism

He must do whatever his desires mandate, but his desires were determined for him. How would you respond to those statements by dr hunter?

Yeah, so this is more definitions. Uh, so there's a great deal that's correct here I mean, I agree that the calvinist must be a compatibilist.

I think that's the Sensible position to take and so you do affirm determinism. Yes It's not a dirty word

But it is the calvinist view, but there's a couple of problems in just the definitions here So the first thing is compatibilists don't claim that following one's strongest desire is a sufficient condition for free will

That's an important piece to catch Um when I speak of the conditional sense of ability to do otherwise, right?

I could do otherwise if I wanted to I say that that's necessary for moral responsibility. I do not say that it is sufficient for moral responsibility

And one way to see that is because if you did affirm that then your view would be so the calvinist view

If they were affirming that that would fall to what's called manipulation argument.

So there's a number of arguments about So it's an argument by analogy that if you're manipulated

Well, let's say a brain scientist was just putting electrodes in your brain and making you do something

That's allegedly you're not morally responsible for that. But if you are finding yourself in this situation

Then it is the case that you have the conditional ability to do otherwise namely that you could have done otherwise if you had wanted to but now you couldn't have wanted to because of the electrodes of the

Mad scientist but with a manipulation case like this Um, you cannot say that he is morally responsible now

Obviously, I think that the mad scientist and god are not relevantly analogous So that that's my response to the manipulation arguments

But we can see that it's not sufficient to affirm that you have the conditional ability to do otherwise

That's not a sufficient condition for moral responsibility But obviously it doesn't follow that therefore you should have the categorical sense of ability

I'm, just saying that the conditional sense in itself is not sufficient. You need other caveats in order to affirm moral responsibility so that's just a

Very important piece to point out. We don't say that following one's strongest desire is a sufficient condition for free will

We claim it's necessary okay, and then the other piece that's problematic in his definition is that he says that uh,

It's at at the expense of genuinely free choices And it's not it's not just his incompatibilities criticism here

It seems to be in the definition, but no the compatibilist will not say that this is not genuinely free choices

We affirm free choices That are determined we affirm compatibilism So that's just a couple of remarks on the definitions itself, but I don't think we're too far off.

So Okay, and definitions again is is important and without definitions you lose you talk past each other

So that's very important good reminder For us to keep in mind now. He continues Uh, dr. Hunter says evil

Is according to the will of god in the calvinist position, right the holocaust a child molested It's according to the will of god every aborted child every case of cancer every traffic accident

Uh, he kind of lifts to kind of some premises here. He says One if calvinism is true, then sin is the will of god two, but sin isn't the will of god three

Therefore calvinism must be problematic. How would you respond to that? Uh, I guess a deductive argument, right?

He's kind of Okay. Yeah, so it's a deductive argument The the first thing that I want to point out is that there's a couple of affirmations in there that are actually self -refuting

Okay, when he talks about uh aborted child Okay That means that the abortionist and maybe the the parents of the children

Have free will and have their libertarian free will on his view But when he complains about every case of cancer or every traffic accident, there's no free will involved in those, right?

Cancer cell does not have free will I mean an automobile does not have libertarian free will so neither of those two things actually matter with respect to the debate between calvinists and non -calvinists, so if uh, you can blame god for Uh, can't the cases of cancer and traffic accidents, um on calvinism then equally so on libertarianism

So I think that those cases need to be taken out. I believe that jerry walls also in his writings complains about god causing car accidents, uh, but The automobile doesn't have libertarian free will so that's irrelevant in the debate between libertarians and compatibilists um, the the second piece and how

I would more fundamentally respond to the uh, the Deductive argument here is that it's equivocating on the will of god

That is that uh, there's two different things that philosopher and theologians have called the will of god

This is quite standard. I'm sure that it's not new for many of your listener. There is the uh,

Prescriptive will of god which is what god says he um commands us to do That's what he on some degree desires that we do he tells us do this, you know

Love your neighbor as yourself do not commit adultery do not murder Those are commands and that's the prescriptive will of god

And then there is the decorative will of god which on calvinism is the one that is always done

That is that it's the decree. It's the ultimate will of god that is going to come about at all the time and so, uh here there's clearly an equivocation between premise one and premise two

If calvinism is true, then sin is the will of god. Well, which one is it? It's the decorative will of god

Yes, but sin isn't the will of god. This is the one that is prescriptive That is that that's in that sense that it's not the will of god.

So the calvinist doesn't find himself caught by this That by this deductive argument he affirms that premise one and premise two are both true

But in different senses of the will of god, so the argument is committing an equivocation Now, can

I jump in real quick and I think the point so so braxton kind of typed in I know I wanted to let you finish first, but um,

I was thinking this too when you're talking about cars Don't have libertarian free will but I was thinking but surely the driver has libertarian free will

Right. How would you if someone were to say well, what about the driver? How does that affect what you just said with regards to?

Yes, so a couple of ways so, um if the driver is making a wrong choice, all right, so he's making the wrong choice to actually like turn turn around or cut somebody off or and then that causes the the car accident then yes, that is a that is a relevant case, um, but uh, first of all

That that would be in the risk taking right but he's not actually making the decision to get into a car accident

He's just making a decision at best to drive recklessly Um, but also the car accident example, so maybe braxton doesn't go there.

Um, but um the Example that jerry walls is using with the car accident is that he says that the brakes didn't function, right?

So the brakes were jammed on the car. Well, surely that is not the fruit of libertarian free choices it's just the decay of the pieces the design that was

Simply getting old and the car is just breaking down and that's just dysfunctioning. So there's no libertarian free will involved in that So if braxton is more careful in what he meant with the car accident automobile accident

And he's just talking about the reckless driver who's making a free choice to do something wrong

Then yes that can be that's no longer self -defeating now I think it's still missing the that's still falling prey to the equivocation on the will of god for the same argument

But at least it's not self -refuting. However, the the case of the cancer cells Those are self -refuting because the cancer cells don't have libertarian free will, right?

So the that a even if libertarian free will is true, even if incompatibilism is true So let's imagine that calvinism is entirely false and you just have the libertarian incompatibilities view god can still

Heal or prevent cancer, right cancer is not defying god's providence by being indeterministic in some fashion

So god is fully sovereign over that and you need to explain it just as much as the calvinist does

Okay, how about how about this one braxton says on calvinism? God loves the elect not everyone unless You redefine love now even just at a surface reading of uh of that comment

It almost sounds like there's a question begging assumption in that Uh, how would you tease that out a little bit if you think there is a question begging assumption?

When he says something to the effect that you have to redefine love just like they often say, you know

Well calvinists believe in free will but you have to redefine freedom which almost seems to beg the question in favor of their specific understanding

Yeah a little bit like that. Uh, I think that charitably you can interpret that by saying something like I think uh

Was that yeah, I think that was the opening by braxton where instead you have to redefine free or redefine free will

I think? the charitable interpretation of that is to say it's the um majority view it's the common view or the view of the folks on the street that uh

That you are not determined or that you know This is what love means and so when you have to redefine it they say well, you know

You have to deny what seems to be the common sense view Now i'm I actually don't think that this is the common sense view

I don't know that people really have thought about determinism or indeterminism. I think if you just ask them Well, do you need the ability to do?

Otherwise they're still the big fat equivocation on what kind of ability we're talking about So then they will say yes, we need the ability to do

Otherwise, you can't write them down as libertarians here because they're still the same equivocation with respect to love

Um, I don't know. Let's let's not focus on the idea of redefining it But let's look at what argument we have been given here.

I say that On calvinism god loves the elect not everyone But in fact, you should affirm that god loves everyone because he's maximally great

That's actually the only argument from tim stratton that we skipped earlier It's being addressed here by saying if we don't have libertarian free will then libertarianism is not the reason why god finds himself not sending everyone to heaven

But then we cannot say that god loves everybody if he doesn't do that So, um a quick response to that I would say that This is making love into a binary thing, which it is not that is that if god, you know

God loves the elect or he doesn't love them Um love there are complexities in love that even libertarians must admit

It obviously is not binary, right? So john was loved by jesus So if that's the case it's pointless for us to know that he was loved by jesus

But there's a special love that's affirmed in the bible, right? In the same way that god loves israel with a special love god loved jacob in the way that he didn't love esau

Even if the romans 9 text that esau I hated doesn't actually mean hate but just loveless

It still remains that there are degrees and different kinds of love. So yes, god doesn't have a saving love for the elect

He has an overriding purpose not to save them You mean the reprobate you said that he doesn't yeah.

Yeah. So yeah for the reprobate Yeah, so so he has a saving love for the elect and he doesn't have that saving love for the reprobate

And I think the calvinist can affirm that But it's not shocking to see different kinds of love and different degrees.

Um, so but but even then you could say so the The libertarian is going to immediately retort.

Well, he loves them, but he doesn't save them. What kind of love is this? Uh, he just doesn't want to save them

Um, I would say that even the calvinist can affirm that god has some desire that they would be saved, right?

But he has an overriding purpose not to save them All right, so you can say that that god has a mutually exclusive Desires that they are not compatible with one with another and yet he chooses one purpose is more important than another

In the exact same way that the libertarian is going to do with libertarian free will right? Because the libertarian says exactly the same concept same thing is saying that god wishes everyone were saved

He desires everyone was saved But there's something else that he desires more than saving everybody

He desires more to give them libertarian free will which now in turn entails that he cannot save everybody

So so in the same parties both parties have to affirm that god can desire one thing, but he has a higher purpose

Exactly an excuse by the calvinist both none whatsoever. You have to do that as a libertarian uh, so now the specific difficulty that's presented to the calvinist here is that well then god means it means that god has a

Higher purpose than saving everybody and that higher purpose is not to give them libertarian free will there's something else

And so the libertarian can rush in and say well then you calvinist tell me what that purpose is

What is so important that he doesn't save everybody if it's not libertarian free will? Um, there's a couple of things that you can respond there.

Um, one is that uh, There are some clues as to what that might be in romans 9, right?

so when god says when the bible says, uh That it's to demonstrate his power and make known his righteousness his wrath.

So those things are To a degree addressing that same question But more generally the calvinist doesn't even have to tell you what the purpose is.

It's perfectly coherent to say. Um God wishes to do something but he doesn't do it because he has a greater purpose

And if I don't know what that purpose is, it doesn't follow for a minute that That purpose cannot be there and the reason why it should be obvious to the libertarian that this response is

Perfectly sensible is that that's exactly what they respond to the problem of evil against the atheist Now we'll deal deal with that in just a moment with braxton's braxton hunter's.

Um, Pressing of the argument from evil, but uh, you have to look at natural evil

That is, you know, whether it is an earthquake or a disease or you know, the so -called cancer cells that we talked about earlier

God is fully capable of healing the cancer, right? As we said the cancer cells don't have libertarian free will but so in the very strong sense you want to say god desires to heal the cancer

But he has a overriding reason not to and just because we don't know what that reason is

It doesn't follow that. He doesn't have a reason right? and so if you don't accept that kind of reasoning with the uh, the problem of the

Reprobate when the calvinist says god has a greater purpose And I don't need to tell you what that is for me to be reasonable in saying that he does have a greater reason

Morally sufficient he has exactly he has morally sufficient reasons to do that I think he does tell us a little bit about that in romans 9

But I don't even need to say that it's the full enchilada i'm saying it's a part of the reason Okay, but if you deny this kind of reasoning by pointing to ignorance saying god has a better reason

But I don't know what that is Then good luck when dealing with the problem of natural evil against the atheist because that's exactly the same response you provide

All right Let's let's move a little let's move a little quickly here where uh, he says that calvinism fails to explain god's judgment and actions in scripture, so braxton says

Um since scripture so frequently gives the impression that man is not only free but responsible

It seems to support some version of libertarian and not compatibilistic freedom If this were not the case then a number of biblical passages become awkward

Genesis 6 god is found disappointed and grieved at man's wickedness Does that sound to you like a god who planned and ordained all the events of the earth beforehand?

It doesn't to me Jeremiah says I did not command and it did not enter into my mind.

That's the one that's one that you hear often I'm, not saying god is an omniscient braxton says but it doesn't sound like a god who ordained these things.

How would you respond to that? Yeah, so he's clearly prefacing or saying i'm not saying it's that god is not omniscient

But it doesn't sound like a god who ordained these things, right? But it doesn't sound either like a god who foreknew these things.

So what do we do? And on molinism, it's important to say that he not just foreknows them, right?

So because braxton is a molinist so on his view god selected a world in which he knew that would happen

So I guess it entered into his mind for that So the the text here clearly must be taken differently, uh, and I don't think that the libertarian has a advantage there if he affirms knowledge of counterfactuals and molinism the way that uh, braxton hunter does

Um, but uh, yeah, maybe we can take a couple of more of the scriptures He brings into that same line of reasoning and i'll give you a more general response to the the claim here

Okay, braxton uses jeremiah 36 3 says perhaps the house of judah will hear all the calamity which

I plan to bring On them in order that every man will turn from his evil way Then I will forgive their iniquity and their sin perhaps braxton says god says

Is he just playing games with them perhaps means that there is a genuine possibility involved.

So what's going on there? Uh, well, so here again I want to just press that same claim against his view because perhaps read in that strongly literal sense

Until the outcome is not known, right? So if you know for sure it will rain you don't say perhaps it will not rain

So, um, you can't press that strong so strongly because it refutes your own view here and then with respect to the genuine possibility

Involved once again, uh the possibility to do something else the possibility that something else happens can perfectly be seen as conditional rather than categorical and so it doesn't really

Arbitrate between calvinism and non -calvinism. Would you say then that we'd have to be careful with words like perhaps if we're going to push it to Um literally then we're giving kind of ammunition to the open theist.

Yeah, that's right. Yeah, right And obviously braxton rejects open theism. Yeah, and rightly so and uh, you know props for that.

So good That's right. So he also says act 1730 says that all men everywhere are to repent god

God is here angry and grieved and punishing men when calvinists say that man could not choose god

This contradicts god's nature in my view. That's what braxton says yeah, yeah, so this one and many of the preceding scriptures that he's quoted really try to um, bring home the fact that God commands people to do something and he

Really blames them for failing to do it. Uh, and that presupposes that they had the ability to do that.

Sorry, so He's really presupposing the principle of alternate possibilities here And we've already discussed that there's the equivocation on conditional versus categorical abilities

And then that very same principle as i've said is refuted by the two arguments that i've defended in my writing

Uh, the fact that a fallen sinner is still expected to leave a sinless life

And then there's the praiseworthiness of an impeccable god So the fallen sinner does not have the categorical ability to leave a sinless life and god is impeccable

But he's praiseworthy for acting righteously rather than acting unrighteously So those two things refutes the principle of alternate possibilities that braxton is trying to press here with those scriptures, okay

All right He also says that calvinism fails to adequately address atheistic arguments from evil and then he lists four possible responses to the problem of evil which include

Uh character building heaven will render earth a veil of tears Uh, he says the calvinist response people in hell glorify god because he can exercise judgment and then he says my view libertarian free will

And then he presents at the odyssey there it says the first three still place god is the author of evil God acts in opposition to his own nature and is the direct cause of evil in this world

Without libertarian free will the free will answer is not available Um, yes,

I agree with that. So I agree that without libertarian free Will the free will answer is not available to respond to the problem of evil?

Yeah, okay Then he says well he says the cash value of this is that without belief in some form of libertarian free will

The free will answer is not available If the free will answer is not available then calvinists are left with no adequate answer to atheistic arguments from evil

Yeah, so I think here the first conditional is true and the second one is false So yes, the cash value of this is that without belief in some form of free will the free will answer is not available

That's true And the second one is if free will is not available Then calvinists are left with no adequate answer to the atheistic arguments from evil.

No, that's false We are not left without an adequate answer. We give the exact same response that you give to natural evil

God has sufficient reasons for evil and good purposes or good intentions, right with the classic genesis 50 text, you know what you meant for evil, uh got meant for good so Um We're saying that god has sufficient reasons for evil and he has good purposes and good intentions in bringing it about and it's important to note that um, so Braxton here is saying libertarian free will is his theodicy.

He's not just a defense Uh, that's an interesting strong claim to make because a theodicy is an account of how you think that god

Why do you think god actually allows evil in this world? You know evil happens because and then fill in the blank that's a theodicy as opposed to just a defense

Which alvin plantinga draws the distinction between those two planting us as a defense is just an account of what?

Could possibly be the case To show that evil and god are not incompatible You say here's the possible reason that he could allow this to show that if that's reason if that reason were true

Then the two would be uh compatible and true So we show that the evil and god are not

Incompatible by saying this but we're not committed to saying that's the reason we're just saying that's a possible coherent reason

So here, uh braxton is not saying that free will is his defense. He's saying it's his theodicy

So he's saying this is the reason why god allows evil. So now he needs to be careful I don't know if he takes it this far or if you know, if it's just a quick statement in a debate

I don't want to press too much But he needs to be careful that libertarian free will does not explain all evil even on his view

Right. There's actually a great deal of suffering and evil that happened in this world That is not immediately explainable by libertarian free will so all of the natural evil the earthquakes the diseases all of those things happen

Fully deterministically and god even on his view could fully prevent them without stepping on anybody's free will

So he needs to also affirm what I say is the case on calvinism namely god has sufficient reasons morally sufficient reasons for the evil that he allows and Obviously, we rarely know what those reasons are, but I don't think that the libertarian knows much more than us

Yes, he has one resource. We don't have you could say some of it is caused by libertarian free will but We're certainly not left without an end a response when we don't have that one because for the overwhelming majority

I would say at least a great deal of evil. We give exactly the same answer So we simply take it to everything saying

All the evil that happens god has morally sufficient reasons and we rarely know the reasons but obviously it doesn't follow that they don't exist

Okay. All right. Well, we're going to uh, we'll move a little bit. Uh quickly here as we don't want to go too far past Hopefully we'll just get a little under two hours.

We'll see I I anticipated that this would be a big nice chunky episode that people can go back and and listen to and I already see in the comments.

There are people who uh, Some of the comments by uh, layton and and tim that there's some misunderstanding there, but that's okay.

That's going to happen um as they're not here to Explain and expand on their position which they are more than welcome to at a later point

We could we could organize that. Um, but i'm looking for a question here. Uh I think

I think layton asked it with regards to the decree And causality i'm trying to find it because it might have been all the way up here

Because there's a lot of comments here that which is good and i'm glad everyone's uh Okay, so let me just find the the most recent one that he put here.

I think it's a good one, too Oh, he says does the decree cause

He says does the decree cause what is decreed? Does the decree cause what is decreed?

So i'm inclined to be fine with that and saying yes, the problem I have is that the uh understanding of cause um

Cause is a very complex word Philosophically, there's lots of different ways that this can be unpacked so I fully agree with peter van inwegen who says that causality is a morass in which

I I refuse to step foot unless I am pushed and so Affirming causality to me is not

Well, it's I don't think it's guilty So that's why i'm saying I don't think I have a problem with saying that that yes

God causes in some sense everything that comes to happen. It decrees and it is causally determined But I don't think that speaking of causality is adding much to what i'm saying.

So I am affirming determinism, right? This is as strong as it gets and I don't think that speaking of causality is is much different What where i'm careful here is that sometimes people think of causing as something that is completely immediate or or that is somehow

Agreeing that there's a transfer of blameworthiness, which I obviously deny So god causes that causes us to do some evil things

Well, is that causing action something that transfers to blameworthiness? I obviously deny it

So this is my qualms with the word cause but obviously that question is just a yes or no

So I don't know if he's then eager to take my yes and to Use it as a premise in an argument that says well if he says yes to this now

Here's why it's a problem. I don't know where that goes. But this is my two cents on causality. I don't love the word

It's too ambiguous. And so I follow peter van inwagen in saying i'm not even getting there unless I am pushed

Okay. Oh layton continues here. He says uh with regards to god might have sufficient reasons for allowing something he says

Sufficient reason to allow freedom is much different than god causally determining moral evil

Yeah, obviously that's the case but what i'm saying is that you affirm exactly the same thing, uh about everything that doesn't include more

Libertarian free will right so you're talking about natural evil, you know earthquakes twisters everything that Does not involve immediately libertarian free choices

There's a great deal of suffering that happens and that you cannot plausibly blame on libertarian free choices

And you would respond to that So if you find yourself debating the atheist about those evils, you would say exactly what

I affirm of everything including our free evil choices I would say god is

Controlling all of that. He's sovereign over all of that, but he has morally sufficient reasons to Desire this to bring about this you could use the language of permission

I have a great chapter in my book about whether that's compatible for a calvinist to speak of permission But that's another story but really the non -liberal the non -calvinist affirms exactly that you know when in 2004

There's the asian tsunami with hundreds of thousands of people instantly dead By a big wave that god could have perfectly well stopped

So there was no libertarian free will in the wave, you know, the wave was not rebelling against his creator

There was really just a natural process that resulted in hundreds of thousands of people dead.

Um, so what does uh, Layton and any libertarian respond to an atheist who says well god is evil because there's that thing

You would say no god had morally sufficient reasons to permit that wave And while I don't know what those reasons are it doesn't follow that god is evil for that And I say exactly the same thing for all

Evil that happens moral and non -moral. Okay, good one more question and then we're moving on to layton flowers

Which is our our he is our last uh gentleman to critique. Uh, here's a question from vincent He says could god have chosen to create a world in which these libertarian free will choices are different Uh, well,

I guess that's a question for a libertarian, right? So these libertarian free will choices are different than they in fact are so that's presupposing that they are in fact libertarian in this world

So it's not something I affirm. So i'm gonna have a hard time telling you what would be the case. Otherwise Um, so I I guess it's a question for libertarian

Okay. All right Um, all right, so let's move on to layton flowers guys, I I again i'm gonna

I say this before I anticipated that this would be uh a long episode and of course i'm sure

Layton and others might want to break it up and find the time stamps there and respond to various portions and that's and that's fine

And that's welcomed as long as we're having a uh, respectful interaction and learning Um and getting closer to the truth and communicating with clarity.

I think those are are good things now Um, let's begin here so we're going to be uh, well guillaume is going to be responding to uh,

Some of the comments of layton's uh, layton flowers comments with regards to a debate he did against two calvinists.

Is this correct? Yeah, that's right. And maybe as an opening I should extend the Props to layton because that debate that I watched so it was a two -on -two debate, right against two calvinists um,

I'm I was facepalming, uh for most of the debates, uh, the two individuals that Represented the calvinist view were just just horrible.

I mean They came out swinging saying no, this is heresy. Uh, you guys are not even our brothers in christ and I was shaking my head so, uh props to layton for facing that uh, that's not the kind of argument or that the kind of view that you would uh,

See from me, but yeah, right It was quite bad. So that was the debate with layton flowers and jonathan pritchett

And I think that was uh, they were debating sonny hernandez and theodore Zakir I keep

I keep messing up his last name. Okay. All right. So, um, sorry, but that was just yeah very bad opposition

But uh, I mean there was still the opening opening statements. Uh, okay. Okay So layton tried to make the point that the bible teaches that we make choices and that's obviously an important issue with regards to the nature of choices and and the different debates between you know, compatibilism and libertarianism, uh, and um

You would of course agree that the bible teaches that we make choices. There's no there's no argument there. No, that's right.

So He said this um all throughout the scriptures. We see the concept of choice As my colleague pointed out it's sometimes called libertarian free will but the word choice is really all we need here

You look in webster's the ability to select between available options. You don't need a philosophy degree to get this.

It's very simple You have a choice to make we see choice throughout all the scriptures So here no the word choice isn't all you need

Uh, yes, obviously the bible speaks of choice all over the place and the calvinist will say well, yes and amen

Not only we make choices we affirm that we make free choices So we agree on all of that where we disagree is with honor that's compatible with determinism so, um the the affirm, you know,

The calvinist also affirmed that very definition from the webster's, you know, we select between available options

It's obviously what happens when you have the conditional ability to do Otherwise you choose something and you could have chosen something else if you had desired to do something else

Okay, so that's really so so all of the affirmations of choice really don't discriminate one way or the other between determinism

So the argument typically is from the from the libertarian that uh on calvinism

You make a choice But you really couldn't choose otherwise and so you really didn't have a choice

And at that point you would make the the distinction between the categorical ability and the conditional ability

That's right that the calvinist has the conditional ability and the conditional ability is sufficient for moral responsibility

While the i'm sorry, okay, so that's Okay, it's necessary necessary not sufficient.

Okay, we're saying the other one is not necessary. I got you Okay, but we're not committing ourselves to saying what's necessary because that's actually another question

It's a really difficult one Like if you have to say here are all the conditions for somebody to be morally responsible

That's really difficult to stress and there are all sorts of philosophers on both sides are trying to do that And you can always find some sort of corner case a weird situation that refutes it and it's like ah, what am

I missing? So I don't I don't try to do that exercise so I don't claim I know what is sufficient for moral responsibility

I'm saying that more that the conditional ability is necessary And that's the categorical ability is not necessary and that's all

I need to claim, okay Layton, uh continues he says from the very beginning in the garden We see god finished creating mankind in his own image and god declared that it was very good

God made man good and mysteriously that couple chose To sin that's free will he could have resisted the temptation, but he chose to rebel.

That's libertarian free Will choice is not only seen in the garden. It's also seen throughout all the prophets

Isaiah 118 for one example says come now. Let us reason together says the lord though Your sins are like scarlet.

They will be white as snow. In other words, this is soteriological He says though they are red like crimson

They will be made like wool if you consent and obey you will be blessed you will eat of the land

But if you refuse and rebel you will be devoured by the sword. There is uh, he points out choice

Deuteronomy 30 as jonathan just mentioned I well, he's this is a quote from the debate

Uh, just jonathan pritchett that is just mentioned I set before you life and death blessing and curses

Choose life an emphasis there God says ezekiel says cast away from you all the transgressions that you've committed by making yourself a new heart and a new spirit

Why would you die? Oh house of israel for I have no pleasure in death of anyone declares the lord god so turn and live

Joshua called out to the people saying choose you this day whom you will serve and jesus Of course, he came along saying whosoever believes will not perish but have everlasting life

He goes on to say come to me all who are weak and heavy laden and I will give you rest The apostle paul continues this message by saying in second corinthians 5 20.

We are ambassadors for christ God making his appeal through us. We implore you we beg you on behalf of christ be reconciled to god

Choice is implicit in each of these and so many more passages throughout the entire bible

Yes. Yeah Amen to all of that choice choice choice. Yes And none of this is relevant because choice doesn't tell you whether that's compatible or incompatible with determinism.

Okay So he's just pointing out something that we all agree and just thinking but this is the this is the sorry to interrupt you

So this is the exercise we were discussing earlier in response to layton's very question that is that he's taking some biblical text and then trying to draw the inference to the

Philosophical view that he thinks is supported by them and i'm simply responding. No, it's a non sequitur

Yes, all those choices are affirmed that there's the commandment. You need to choose this but obviously nothing

Follows about whether or not they are determined or not. That's a separate philosophical question. That's not addressed here

So now would you say the question of libertarian freedom? Or compatibilist freedom or compatibilist view

Scripturally speaking is under determinative Okay, and so we take the scriptures and then we have to Draw philosophical implications to see which best fits.

I mean, what what do you well the the second thing you said? Yes, the first one I said I said no so I don't think it's under determinative because I do think that the bible tells us enough that we can know

Okay, I think that there are there is enough teaching in the bible that we can conclude that in fact The determinist compatibilist view is correct.

I think that calvinism is entailed by the biblical teaching, uh, but the second thing you said

I forgot exact wording you used but uh, I agreed with which is that you need to take the biblical text and then you need to assess

Okay, which one it best explains it but that's also that's really asking. Okay. Does it support positively one?

Does it entail one philosophically? And I think it does. Yes I I do think so and I try to give a sketch of how

I would go about Doing that connection earlier by mentioning a couple of the biblical teachings and philosophical arguments with premises in the bible

That I think supports, uh, the compatibilist, uh determinist view All right. So layton also presents an argument from the lord's prayer, right?

Basically, why pray let your will be done if god's will is always done So the argument is the calvinist believes god's will is always done because his will cannot be thwarted, right?

So then why pray let let you know, let your will be done He says free will choice is defending the holiness and goodness and the character of our god

And this is why the lord instructed his followers to pray for god's will to be done here on earth as it is in heaven

A prayer that makes little sense if indeed god is already meticulously controlling all that happens on earth by some quote unquote

Sovereign decree never mentioned in the pages of scripture Okay, so so let me not comment on the decree whether it's mentioned or not

But let's let's touch on that question of the will of god and why pray let your will be done

If your will is always done So the first thing to point out is that you find exactly the equivocation I mentioned earlier between the two kinds of wills of god

There's a decretive will of god and a prescriptive will of god here And so when you pray let your will be done

When the calvinist prays let your will be done when when the calvinist jesus prays, uh, let your will be done

Uh, and he has the beard and everything. I know exactly with the quarantine. I don't shave so I look extra calvinist tonight

So when the calvinist prays let your will be done, which will is he asking about he's asking about uh,

Your prescriptive will let that will come to pass, you know when you you tell us to love each other you tell us

You know you you prescribe the good to us Bring about that good. That's the kind of prayer we're talking about Notice how the bringing about is the decretive will and that's the one that is always done

But the prescriptive will that we're asking bring that one about this one is not always done

So it's it's not inconsistent to say bring about that one as if it always happened no matter what we do

So that's the first piece I would respond. But the second is that the objection is actually self -defeating now

So if the libertarian is trying to press this against calvinism He's using places in which there are some states of affairs

That go against god's will only because he cannot determine it to be otherwise All right, that's where we would disagree.

Are there such things so the libertarian says they are and he's using them in this prayer to um press us against our own view and he says

With those states of affairs that god cannot determine otherwise because we have libertarian free will and therefore his will is not done

Right. That's what the claim is then I'm going to say of all people

Why ask god to do anything when you think that he cannot do anything about that?

Right. So if that state of affairs is such that god doesn't get his will because Humans have libertarian free will and they are doing the wrong thing and god cannot determine that they do otherwise without removing their free will right he

Cannot determine that this they would do otherwise Then why would the other person ask god

To do something about that when we are in the same breath saying that he cannot do anything about that Of all the people to ask do something, you know, let your will be done

It's an odd thing to pray if you're if you're convinced that his will is not done because he cannot bring it about So it's literally self -defeating

So it makes much more sense to see it as the calvinist who has those two senses here of the will of god in view

And you're asking him to Bring about sovereignly something That he prescribed so you're asking him to align his will of decree to his will of prescription

You see bring about what you commended, you know I think that augustine is famous for praying this

I give what you command and commend what you will So this is exactly what you're talking about here. He's saying bring about what you prescribe and we're and we pray this confidently

As calvinist because precisely because we know that he can He has the ability to bring about his prescriptions

Now, obviously he doesn't always do that because he has morally sufficient reasons to not Agree to our prayer here, but that prayer is perfectly consistent

And if the non -calvinist presses it as an argument against calvinism It's self -defeating because he's asking god to change something that he says god cannot change

All right, that's all that's great. Now. There's a lot of stuff to cover here I I think i'm going to fast forward you were going to address layton flower's five reasons for leaving calvinism

Um and just in brief summary, I think you expressed that even if you were to grant the reasons

That doesn't warrant that calvinism is false, right? Can you kind of briefly summarize that and then I want to spend the rest of the time.

Um, To kind of take some shotgun questions, um from the side there so we can get some of the people who are listening in Get their comments.

Yeah, so so this is uh, i've listened to a latent flowers, uh talk Which I think he gave on a couple of occasions.

So it seems to be a fairly standard, uh expression of why he uh Seized being a calvinist why he left calvinism and he called it the five points out of calvinism and um,

I guess we don't really have time to get into them in detail now, but uh, What I found interesting about that presentation is that every single one of those so all five points even if true

Okay are not reasons to think that calvinism is false Okay, that's remarkable given as an account of why you ceased believing it

All five of them even if true are not arguments against calvinism At most if they're successful and obviously

I disagree with much of that. Um, if they're successful, they're simply undercutting

Some arguments some positive arguments in favor of calvinism But obviously all those reasons all those arguments could fail to establish calvinism and still being the case that calvinism is true and supported

By all sorts of other reasons, right? So that was just That that fell short that that account of why he left calvinism fell short of giving a reason to leave calvinism

It just it may at most it gave reasons to maybe stop, you know No longer affirm those arguments in favor of calvinism, but which still maybe well could be true

So yeah, we're running out of time So maybe on another occasion we can go into the details of those five which obviously have call for much additional comments

Right my general, uh, that's my general feedback here yeah, well where you tried to set out something very ambitious where you covered three three people and of course, there's so much more to Be said and and clarification and responses and things like that So, um, we're just kind of wetting, uh wetting the whistle

So to speak for people who might be interested to look into this more in detail Um, so let's take some questions here. Um, i'll throw in some of my own and then uh, take a couple here in the comments someone

Said a question. Please interact with source libertarianism. Why don't you define that and uh,

There are there any issues with source libertarianism? yes, so source libertarianism, um is

It's a style of libertarianism That focuses less on the ability to do otherwise, right?

So we've seen that's the a core claim of The libertarian view is um i've described as uh, the principle of alternate possibility

That's a very famous argument against calvinism against determinism and that's the claim that's uh

In order to be free you need the categorical ability to do otherwise The source libertarians or the source incompatibilists are saying it's not so much a matter of being able to choose otherwise

It's a matter of being the ultimate source of your own free decisions so it's it's no longer focusing too much on the uh, categorical ability to do otherwise, but it's saying

You need to be such that your choice is not determined by sources that are antecedent or that that go

Outside of you and obviously that would be the case for human beings on calvinism You know our choices go back to god's providential control of our choices um, and so the source libertarian says

This is really what matters not the ability to do. Otherwise. It's the fact that you're ultimately

Determined by things that uh, you're not the ultimate source of your choices So can

I interact with that? Yes, and I have um, if folks want to Read that that there's a big chunk in my book that deals with source

Incompatibilism. We don't really speak of source libertarianism so much. It's more the source incompatibilism

But yes, that's a libertarian view A couple of quick comments here.

The first one is that I offer an argument for why if um indeterminism is true then so Indeterminism no matter how you slice it requires the presence of alternate possibilities

And so if moral responsibility and free will require indeterminism As is affirmed by even the source incompatibilist

Then like it or not. They are committed to affirming a principle of alternate possibilities

So that's my claim here And therefore that means that source incompatibilism is also refuted by my refutation of the principle of alternate possibilities

And I would very straightforwardly go like this source incompatibilism entails the principle of alternate possibilities

Whether they like it or not, and I show how that follows Okay, but in fact principle of alternate possibilities is false.

Therefore sourcing compatibilism is false as well if you want to really get technical in those and I suspect that the questioner is uh, familiar with the concept and technical because you know, you don't know about sourcing compatibilism if you've not read

A good deal like that and you want to see really how those positions are hashed out I recommend that you read my response to kevin timpy's review of my book

So my book is excusing sinner and blaming god. Uh, the philosopher kevin timpy has written a review in faith and philosophy the journal and i've responded then to his uh,

Review on my blog. So if you look just for guillaume beignet and kevin timpy You will find my response and there are between his critique of my book and my response to his review

You will see a lot of the comments that are relevant to source incompatibilism Its relationship to the principle of alternate possibilities and how

I would go about refuting sourcing compatibilism All right, very good. We're going to move quickly here. So here's another question.

Yeah You're doing really good. No, you're doing great. Um, what would you say to the statement?

There is no difference between hard determinism and compatibilism Well, if it's supposed to be a matter of definition, then that statement is demonstrably wrong.

That is that's a determinism Soft determinism is compatibilism and hard determinism claims that Incompatibilism is true.

So the the compatibilist says that determinism and moral responsibilities are compatible And the hard determinist says that moral responsibility and determinism are incompatible

So a hard determinist is somebody who says we are determined and therefore we don't have free will Whereas the compatibilist says we are well at least the soft compatible the soft determinist says

We are determined and we it is compatible with moral responsibility So there's a big difference one says we

Have free will and moral responsibility. The other one says we don't So obviously there's a big difference here at the level of definition

Now obviously this person is probably pressing this as a claim to say well No, because if you both are from determinism, then you're both committed to saying there is no more responsibility and free will

Fine, that's what he says. I disagree So there's clearly a difference here and the debate is at the center of the compatibility question

Here's a question from tim stratton. He says i'm not sure if you're familiar with this He says eli. Can you offer my specific mad scientist thought experiment?

Are you familiar with the mad scientist thought experiment? Tim you have to stop claiming arguments that are not yours mad scientist.

This is a basic Compatible. It's a it's a manipulation arguments completely middle of the road

I don't know if you've come up with some groundbreaking version of the manipulation argument But this is standard fare in the manipulation literature.

So mad scientists, uh, there's love potions, uh, you you have the

Yeah with the electrodes in your brain, uh, you have the so in the literature in the philosophical literature

You have the so -called four case arguments. It's a manipulation argument by derek perry boom Um, there is just very standard.

So I don't know if you know of a specific version that you want to throw at me Yeah, I do deal with the um,

I do deal with manipulation arguments on my in my book So yeah, I do think he says he has a specific one so i'm not aware of that specific one and that's that's uh,

We can see that but if you're interested in I mean obviously I think that tim has read my uh, My book and he's he's interacted with it.

So you see my manipulation argument in there. Um, That's all I can say for now.

Now, would you be okay? Uh, he actually messaged me the argument If you if you don't i've asked people if they're okay that we're going, uh, you know

Uh a little bit long and people seem to be okay and I I don't want to overstep the time that you have but Um, if people are enjoying these questions,

I I don't mind going a little bit longer if you don't mind But that's completely up to you Okay, I mean addressing a long manipulation argument like this might be a bit hard just off the cuff and very quickly

I'm happy to attempt a succinct response to a brand new argument I haven't heard but if it's a mad scientist manipulation type argument, it's quite straightforward

So I mean it's it's what i'm saying is this is the kind of manipulation argument that I treat in my book

But let's see if there's something original I haven't seen so So I I asked the people I asked the folks if they were okay it was going along people like we're okay

Okay, they want to read tim's argument. I'm going to do it. And of course, I don't know if it's sarcastic but Keeping that in mind.

I believe believe it or not I'm, not sure if you're familiar with this sort of stuff that goes on. Uh online people really do enjoy these kinds of conversations

Um, it's super super interesting for folks. So, um, i'm gonna read uh, what tim sent me here Uh, he says bignon complains stop complaining.

You know, what's wrong? What's wrong with you? Uh bignon complaint french I can't help it Not my free will is just being french.

I will complain. That's right Okay, so he says bignon complains that I haven't really dealt with his response to the consequent argument

However, the reason why I include it is because it leaves us with the following summary quote if determinism is true

Then all of our thoughts and following actions are ultimately the consequences of god's will and acts of causation

But it is not up to us what god wills or what he has caused

Therefore the consequences of these things including our own thoughts and actions are not up to us.

They are up to god He continues and then there's a question. So I need to set it up With that in mind if that's a bad summary or not suppose a mad scientist exhaustively controls causally determines

All of bignon's thoughts and beliefs all the time This includes exactly what bignon thinks of and about and exactly how bignon thinks of and about it

All of bignon's thoughts about his beliefs and all of bignon's beliefs about his thoughts are caused and determined By the mad scientist we get it determinism is true

This is also this also includes the next words that will come out of bignon's mouth.

So here's a question How can you? Not the mad scientist Rationally affirm the current beliefs in his head as good bad

Better the best true or probably true note the range of options from which to choose.

That's his question Okay, so I I stand corrected. It's not a manipulation argument here It's just trying to because the manipulation arguments in the literature are again trying to support incompatibilism

So there are arguments that that claim that if god determines what we do It's relevantly analogous to someone else like a mad scientist or determining everything that we choose

And since we are saying that the in the case of the mad scientist determining what we choose Presumably we're not morally responsible

In the same way when god does the determining then we should also affirm that we're not morally responsible That's the standard manipulation arguments with mad scientists and love potions and that type of a thing

That's not what he's claiming here He's trying to salvage his free thinking argument by saying that we cannot have knowledge

If we are determined and so he is trying to now describe a mad scientist Determining all of our thoughts and claiming well

How could you claim to know anything if the mad scientist is the one who determines every thought in your mind?

And my response believe it or not is going to be the exact same one as if it were god so obviously

I there's there's a Wide avenue to claim. Well, god is not relevantly analogous to the mad scientist here, but without even going there

Yeah, the argument is still half -baked the mad scientist determines all of your beliefs.

How could you claim to know anything? Well, it depends how the mad scientist determines all of my beliefs if the mad scientist is just just shoving beliefs in my brain

Independent of any sort of proper mechanism to acquire those beliefs based upon the evidence based upon proper perception

Then yeah, sure enough. I cannot know any such thing But if he determines me by using proper mechanism that do track the evidence

Then that's not a reason to think my cognitive faculties are not reliable to track the truth

So how can I claim? I don't necessarily claim until you tell me what kinds of determination the mad scientist is in view but certainly if you now try to take that and bring it to the analogous allegedly analogous situation where god determines my beliefs then

Here that obviously doesn't carry over god does on calvinism determine my beliefs at least in the majority of cases by simply bringing about my beliefs

Through the proper mechanisms of my reasoning and cognitive faculties So there's no successful argument here to press that somehow that undermines knowledge

Okay, very good. That wasn't that bad Okay, I have a question, uh, this is for myself and so i'm going to ask it and I know that other people have asked

As well, so i'll post it up there. Does god have free will if so, what kind of free will does god have? Yeah, it's a it's a great question so, uh, does god have free will in the very agnostic sense that i've defined free will at the beginning of this, uh, conversation, uh, it's obvious that a

Christian in his right mind is going to affirm. Yes, right if it's the control condition for moral responsibility

Then god has free will he's free in the actions that he performs. He is morally responsible for them

He is praiseworthy for what he does, you know, praise god for he is good. Uh, he does

Uh all good all the time Um, if so, what kind uh, so what kind I suppose it's the same question libertarianism compatibilism determinism

Um here, I don't really feel comfortable declaring too much there. Um, I Think that there are some very strong disanalogies between our will and god's will um in the sense that he is at least

Um to some extent outside of time so you might affirm god is timeless or Without creation and then gets in time with creation or you might say he's always timeless.

Um, Whichever view you do there are some Difficult concepts here so that when we talk about what possibly could determine god's will we're not dealing with factors that preceded in time

Uh, so there are a bit of complexities there that incline me to be somewhat cautious when

I start to talk about god's free will So here are some of the things that i'm prepared to say one He does have free will he is praiseworthy and he definitely controls enough his actions that he is morally praiseworthy for them

Two I do think that uh, he's free will um

In conjunction with the fact that he is impeccable Successfully refutes the principle of alternate possibilities

Okay. Um, so I think that's uh is bringing in god here works We can see that there's a being god who is praiseworthy for acting righteously

Even though we maintain that it's categorically impossible for him to act unrighteously

So I think that that's the import of god there as to whether God is in some fashion determined Uh in similar fashion,

I don't know for a fact that he is determined in all things um, I do think that we want to say when some some action is better than another and And also there might be the question of how many of those better options are there?

Like is there an infinity of good things? each of them getting better, uh that gets into very thorny philosophical questions, but When there are good options and bad options god cannot given who he is pick the bad options

So that's a limitation that I think you can press into an argument against the principle of alternate possibilities

But whether god is fully determined, uh in light in that light, I don't know uh, and If I were to say he's fully determined.

Is there anything bad that follows from that, right? sometimes we speak of modal collapse to say that well if god is determined and all of the

All of the actual state of affairs that he brings about were determined as well. So all is necessary you have modal collapse

Um, I don't see anything that's incoherent as a result of that. But yeah, it's it's seen in a bad light

So i'm i'm a bit cautious about what are you from there or not? I'm not too sure uh, but i'm open to Arguments one way or the other

All right out of respect for your time. There's gonna be one more question And then we'll wrap things up and uh two hours and five minutes so far

That is I I think you did an excellent job summarizing again This will be a lot of good food for thought for people to go back and listen to Um, so i'd really do appreciate that i'm just going to give you one last question from layton and it's in regards to Uh the mad scientist

He says suppose the mad scientists use the same mechanisms That god does and then answer the question with regards to the mad scientist.

Does that make any difference? Well, yeah, and the answer is yes, I would know and you still need to give me an argument for why

I should believe that those mechanisms that god and the scientists are using which are I remind you using my

Brain that has been designed to acquire true belief to weigh the evidence and draw some reasonable conclusions all of that Why would that be undermined by knowing that this is determined, you know, it's molded by the evidence it's the opposite view that is that strikes me as Undermining warrants because now you have to say that given all of those evidence

Given all the reason the proper reasoning of it. You can just freely choose to disregard it

So, um if god if the mad scientist using the exact same mechanism as god does then that mechanism is proper it's the proper properly functioning cognitive faculties you use

Verbatim planting a language. It's the proper function of your cognitive faculties That's knowledge.

And so if there's an argument to think that somehow determinism removes that warrant. I haven't heard it

All right, um, I am i'm not gonna i'm not gonna lie I was impressed and yet like I said before your accent, uh makes you sound very smart

Your book is pretty impressed, but I I actually am i'm impressed that you were able to cover three individuals

Of course, there's so much more that we can cover But um, I guarantee people are going to find this useful and helpful whether they agree or or disagree

Um, I say this from the bottom of my heart as a brother. Thank you so much for giving me your time Uh, I don't just do these things for people who are interested

I I do these things and I try to invite people on that. Um That I think can provide good answers to questions that I that I ask and so i'm going yes

I'm that guy who goes back and listens to his old episodes To make sure I could process everything

Things like that perhaps let me say a kind word in in conclusion to all three of those gentlemen

Uh, it's been enjoyable to listen to the arguments. Uh, they defend them with passion they clearly seem to genuinely believe, uh their view and they they are passionate about defending the righteousness of god and You can tell they have a good heart.

I'm criticizing their arguments But I thoroughly enjoy them and I wish them well

Hopefully my interactions have helped them sort out some of their critiques and that will sharpen it and that would be positive for them as well but I certainly extend my affection to them and uh,

And I hopefully that they don't uh leak their wounds and uh They can forgive me, uh while they put their stitches on their argument

And relax just in case uh people go crazy in the comments he's just messing around But um, and then yeah, and they also in some of the material i've listened

They also had some really kind things to say about my own work and my own Arguments so that was also very kind of them

Yeah, and unfortunately we couldn't cover everything because there was a section in which you respond to uh, william lane craig's argument

As well, uh the whole vertigo setting in yeah, but that's the same argument. So I wanted to show that I Whatever william lane craig says is no more convincing that what tim stratton says in his defense of the same argument.

So, okay Yeah, um, well the offer is on the table if you're willing to do it and tim is willing to do that I would love to get you guys both

Would you be willing to do that if we can get if we could reel him in because I know you guys are busy Would you be willing to to do a moderated discussion?

Uh So the the in in practice in concept? Yes, uh, there's going to be a matter of scheduling and finding the right time for me

So it worked out tonight. Um, i'm trying to not do this too much with the kids and the wife, uh

And the responsibilities of work, but if we can work it out in the schedule, yeah, I have no objection and Obviously, yes, it's like there wouldn't there was no alternate voice here to be uh,

For him, so I successfully convinced and already convinced calvinist Maybe I can do better with uh, if you throw a live debater at me and we'll see what happens.

Sure All right. Well, thank you so much guys if you've enjoyed this, uh, please subscribe to the revealed apologetics youtube channel

Also, I will be taking this audio and transferring it into my revealed apologetics podcast episode so you can download that On itunes as well

And again, if you have any ideas for future guests to have on the show, please Let me know you could email me at revealed apologetics at gmail .com

And if you have any bible questions theology questions for me You could email me as well and I will make a response either via a response in your email or Cover it as a topic in a future episode.

Well, thank you so much. Guillaume. I really really appreciate your time and uh, I wish you well, hope we can do something again soon.

My pleasure. Thank you. Eli All right, god bless brother and god bless everyone else. Thank you so much for listening in.