Interviewing Tim Stratton: A Respectful Response to James R. White (Molinism Discussion)

All right, welcome to another episode of Revealed Apologetics. I'm your host, Elias Ayala.

And today we have a guest here. Last week, I think it was a, what week was it?

I think it was the week before Christmas, we had Dr. James White from Alpha and Omega Ministries to talk about the topic of Calvinism and Molinism.

And so if Molinism doesn't sound familiar to you guys, you can watch the other episode where a

Calvinist defines for you what Molinism is. But I'm going to ask our guest today who is a

Molinist to define Molinism for us. But the majority of this discussion is so that I can provide my friend here,

Tim Stratton from Free Thinking Ministry to provide a response, a respectful response to Dr.

James White and his criticisms of Molinism. Now, I'm a Calvinist, I am on Dr.

White's side, yet look what we're doing here. Look what we're doing here. You have a Calvinist and a

Molinist getting along and talking about the issues. And so if anything else, regardless of where you stand on this issue, hopefully interactions like this can just encourage people to look past some of the differences without compromise, of course, and talk about these issues.

And who knows, in many cases you will find that we may have a lot more in common than you think.

And this is why I decided to have Tim Stratton here because when I think of Tim Stratton, I think of two things.

I think of Jason Statham. Okay, I am the transporter, okay.

And I think of a bridge builder. I know that sounds completely opposite, right?

I think of a bridge builder. Whether one agrees with him or not, Tim really,

I think, believes in building bridges between various theological perspectives because really we're really concerned with kingdom work and the less division that we have,

I think the better. And so I'm just going to provide Tim an opportunity to introduce himself and maybe say a little bit about his ministry.

And then we'll take it from there. So welcome and thank you for coming on, Tim. Man, thanks for having me on your show,

Eli. You know, the two of us have been friends for several years now. And we've had some fantastic conversations off the record.

So it's cool now to officially be on the record with you. And you've really had a big impact on many people.

In fact, my colleague, Timothy Fox, who's one of the other regular contributors on Free Thinking Ministries, he told me the other day that if it wasn't for you,

Eli, he doesn't know if he'd be in apologetics today. He doesn't know if you would have gone to Biola University.

And if you wouldn't have done that, we would have never met. And who knows if Free Thinking Ministries would be a thing.

So really, Eli, maybe you're responsible for this whole mess I found myself in. But, you know, what's cool is, you know, you used to be a

Molinist and now you're a Calvinist. I used to be a Calvinist and now I'm a Molinist. And so we've kind of, you know, we passed each other for a while.

We were right on the same page for a while because we were passing each other, you know, but we still aren't too far away.

And like you said, I'm really interested in building bridges behind the doors of the church because we live in a day where if the church isn't united, we are in trouble.

We have to, we have some big threats out there that you want to take us down.

So while I love debate behind the doors of the church, really,

I'm more concerned with truth. You and I have talked about this before. We're more concerned with truth than we are with being right.

And if you're concerned about truth primarily, then even if somebody shows you that you're wrong, well, it's a win -win situation.

But so, well, all that to say, I love having debates behind the doors of the church with brothers and sisters in Christ because that's what iron sharpening is all about.

We're, you know, I think I'm right, you think you're right, but we're gonna have a respectful sparring match.

You know, I used to do MMA, you know, since you brought up Jason Statham, we'll bring in some martial arts.

I used to do martial arts for a living, even competed in MMA professionally for a little bit.

Only two fights, I was one and one. I'm actually black belt in karate movies.

So. Yeah, nice, I can't contend with that.

But, you know, when you spar with your friends, you're not trying to injure them.

You're trying to make them better because you want them to make you better. You wanna continue, you wanna train again the next day.

If you injure them, you're not gonna train together again the next day, you've lost a sparring partner. So you're not trying to injure your friends, you're trying to make them better.

You might be trying to win the sparring match, but you're doing so respectfully. And so that's how I look at these conversations with brothers and sisters in Christ who disagree.

In the end, we're trying to make each other better. We're trying to make, we're trying to strengthen the other individual.

We're trying to strengthen ourselves and we're trying to strengthen the body of Christ in general. So I think you and I are cut out of the same cloth in that respect.

And so speaking of respect, I do want to offer my respect to the person whose view

I'm gonna criticize a little bit today. So speaking of James White, I respect him immensely.

First of all, just let me say that Dr. White and I are, so to speak, classmates.

We both attend Northwest University. As far as I believe, I believe he's enrolled doing some

PhD studies at Northwest University. And I just submitted my doctoral dissertation at Northwest University.

So while we don't have any official classes together, we're both at the same university. So, but really, although I respect him immensely, the biggest issue

I have with James White is that he thinks Star Trek is better than Star Wars. So, I don't know.

That is blasphemy, right? I mean, come on. Plus, I'm saying we're on the same side in that regard. He has no taste in movies whatsoever.

Oh man, you know, I really loved the last Star Wars movie. As far as the visuals were concerned,

I think it was the best Star Wars movie ever made. Yes. And really the only thing that wrecked, well, there's two things that wrecked it for me.

I'm not even gonna say it wrecked it. There was two problems I had with it. One was the gratuitous gay kiss at the end.

I mean, come on, we didn't need that. All right, fine, all right. Do you wanna push that on me? Fine, I'll just pretend

I didn't see it. The only other problems, if I were to say it was a problem, was that it was trying to fix the mistakes of the previous movie.

And The Last Jedi, which I thought was a horrible movie. In fact, I would say, I think that was the worst movie ever made that belonged to a bigger set of other movies.

Okay. But this last one, The Rise of Star... The what? The Rise of...

The Rise of Star Trek. The Rise of... All right. The Rise of Skywalker as a standalone movie might be one of the, it's at the top of the list as far as movies are concerned.

And I think one of the best Star Wars movies. It's actually, I know this might blow people's mind and be like, you're ridiculous and I can't trust anything else you say.

But actually, Rise of Skywalker was my favorite Star Wars. Not because it had the best characters, but I watched

Star Wars for action. Yeah. Some of the philosophy of the force. So the Empire Strikes Back really captured that the best.

That's my favorite, yeah. But when I watched the last of the Skywalker saga, I'm not looking for something deep and penetrating.

I'm looking to go out with a bang and enjoy myself. It had action. We already know the characters, so I don't need a long explanation.

It was fast paced and it feels like it would have, I can see myself watching it multiple times.

So that I enjoyed it. Yeah, I've seen it three times already and it actually gets better each time.

So yeah, in some regards, it's the best Star Wars movie ever.

But the original trilogy was great because the story was cohesive. This last trilogy wasn't, thanks to Rian Johnson.

So - Thanks a lot, Rian. Yeah, man, come on. You know, it would have been interesting to see what he would have done with an entire trilogy, but we didn't really have a trilogy here.

I think - Probably would have killed Chewbacca. Yeah, probably. So yeah,

I love Star Wars. And in fact, on my website, I did an article called

Five Reasons Why the Force is Strong with the Rise of Skywalker. And I tie it into some theology.

And also, man, the Mandalorian. Yes. Definitely, he's become my favorite Star Wars character.

And the entire saga, he's my favorite character. And I did an article called 10 Reasons Why the

Mandalorian is my favorite Star Wars character. So if anybody wants to check those out, you can go to freethinkingministries .com

and check this. And I definitely, I tie it, most of the 10 reasons have theological significance.

And I could just interject real quick, what I like about, and I really do suggest people to check out

Freethinking Ministries. Is it ministry or ministries? Ministries. Ministries, yeah.

What I love, what you're able to do is to tie in pop culture with theological issues.

And that's really hard because theology could be really dry. And I think you do a very good job in capturing theological themes and philosophical themes within movies like The Avengers or something like that, but when

I was watching the end game and I was thinking about Doctor Strange, I was thinking, someone should write an article about the possible world.

And guess what happened? Tim Stratton wrote an article on Molinism relating to Doctor Strange, which I thought was, again, even as a

Calvinist and I don't hold to Molinism, I thought it was brilliant. And it was a very creative way to explain that perspective using a popular medium like a big movie like Avengers.

So I thought that was, people should really check out your website. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.

So yeah, I guess all of that to say, it's probably my biggest disagreement with James White, the

Star Trek versus Star Wars. Yes, yes, I agree. Yeah, but in all seriousness,

I wanna say this about Doctor White. I think he gets a lot of things right. And his work, for example, it's been several years now, but if I remember correctly, there was somebody that came into my office when

I was still at the church and they were telling me that the King James only, or the King James version was the only

Bible that we ought to use. And I believe I gave him Doctor White's material on why that's a bad view.

I have a copy. Let me just grab that real quick. Oh dear. Maybe watching this on YouTube when I post it, but this bad boy here, right?

Yep, that's exactly it. The only controversy. Excellent book. Excellent book. Yeah. So I think he does great work in that field.

Let's see what else. He's done some great work against cults and against Islam.

So keep up the great work there. And actually, I shared some of his stuff on my social media.

In fact, a video he did against abortion. Well, he's actually,

I think, speaking to the city council in his area or something like that. Gave a fantastic talk.

And I'll tell you what, I will stand side by side next to him and oppose those who advocate abortion.

One of the greatest evils to ever exist on this planet. You know, he and I are on the same page.

So, I mean, I could go down the line. I'm sure there's other things that we would agree upon.

And I just wanna say, I think he's a brilliant mind and a great scholar. And in fact, on the

Free Thinking Ministries site, I didn't write it, but there was another author who asked me if he could write an article defending

James White when he was, I thought, unfairly attacked. So anyway,

I just wanna make it clear that although I disagree with James White on the Calvinism versus Molinism debate, that I really do respect

Dr. White. And we've had a little interaction after an article that I wrote before I even started

Free Thinking Ministries, probably about four or five years ago now. But I would look forward to talking to him again someday.

I think we'd get along quite nicely. But I'll just say this, when it comes to Molinism, I do think he's working with, let's just call it an incomplete set of data, which

I think leads him to reach some false conclusions on the topic. So I hope our conversation today can kind of set the record straight.

Maybe we can complete his data set today. So, you know. Well, just real quick,

I just wanna let people know, Tim had expressed to me that once we did the interview with Dr.

White, that he was watching the video and taking copious notes. And he was doing this on Christmas day, and the family is so cool that they're okay with him watching theological material on Christmas day, which

I think is hilarious and awesome at the same time. They weren't just cool with it.

I mean, so my mom and dad actually wanted to watch the whole thing with me.

And I actually had to leave to get back to my wife's side of the family. We got about,

I don't know, halfway through it, maybe. And my parents continued watching it without me.

And they called me when they got done, like, yeah, we finished it. And so, yeah, my family, we're full of theological nerds,

I guess. Awesome. My parents had a big impact on me growing up. Awesome, that's awesome. Yeah, so.

So, yeah. I will say that I think he's working with an incomplete set of data.

Sure. My only criticism is, I think he bears some responsibility for that because I think the data is out there.

But I know that I do the same thing too. And there's a lot of things that, I mean, you just don't have time to be an expert on everything.

You could only say so much too, when giving a criticism, you can't cover all of the ground. And I think some of the responsibility is on those who misunderstand and should know better.

And I'm not saying, we'll let you give the criticism and people can take it for what it is and look into it.

But I think for people who are interested in these topics and really are interested in getting down to the issues, there's a responsibility for them to actually go and read the material.

I don't think that people's theological training should merely be watching YouTube videos and people critiquing other people.

Those are helpful. But people really need to get down to the nitty gritty and read a little bit. And kind of look at the sources and allow both sides to kind of have that context where they're able to spread out the entirety of their view, which takes work by the listener to actually dig into those issues.

Because a lot of objections that people have against Calvinism, that people have against Molinism, some of them could be answered if they avail themselves of the literature instead of just isolating their exposure to it by watching

YouTube videos and things like that. So I think it's a little bit of both the audience and the people interacting on these very important ideas.

Yeah, I agree. Well, I'll tell you. Yeah, go ahead. Is it all right, Eli, before I start talking about White's comments,

I noticed a couple of things that you said. If you don't mind, I'd like to address those that you said during your interview.

Is that cool? Are they way of critique? Maybe encouragement a little bit.

Okay, because I wanted to begin with you from a

Molinist perspective, defining Molinism for us, and then maybe you can share that, and then we can go from there.

Well, I do have it in my list of things to say to properly define Molinism, but I guess, yeah.

So, I mean, one thing you said, and the reason why I think this is important is because sometimes

I feel the same way, but you, and I think many others do as well, but you made a comment that you felt like you might be, what did you say, drowning in philosophical waters?

Yes. Or something like that. And I think that's, I mean,

I felt like that too. I mean, I was a Calvinist when I first heard about Molinism, and I first heard

Dr. Craig talk about it. I think this was in 2010 or maybe slightly before.

And anyway, I devoted almost a year of my life to try to refute it because I was a

Calvinist. I was a five -point Calvinist who also affirmed what

I call exhaustive divine determinism. And so I wanted, once I found out what

Molinism was, I wanted to refute it. And I studied it for so long, and it just, the philosophy,

I did feel like I was starting to drown in these philosophical waters. But then

I kind of felt like I was getting swimming lessons along the way. And I became a stronger swimmer in philosophy, and really, namely, logic.

And so I just wanna encourage people to, even if you're feeling like you're drowning in these logical waters, they're tough waters to swim in, but I think as Christians, we should try to become the strongest logical swimmers we can, you know?

And so I feel your pain. It is deep, philosophical, logical waters at times, but I think

Christians are, and Eli, I think you are a good thinker. I think you do quite nicely when it comes to philosophy and logic.

So I just wanna encourage you to continue swimming in those waters, and your listeners as well.

But it is tough. It is a tough subject. The other thing is, you mentioned something about inconsistent exegesis, or that you heard

Dr. White bring that up in a debate he was having with another friend of mine, and who's not a

Molinist. We're talking about Leighton Flowers. I don't believe Leighton would classify himself as a

Molinist. I don't know for sure. He sees it as a viable option amongst the various ways that you could understand these issues, right?

Yeah, yeah, yeah. So he's very friendly to it. But, you know,

I don't wanna get into this right now, but the first chapter of my dissertation is showing how

I believe that Molinism does the best job of keeping a consistent hermeneutic throughout the entirety of scripture.

So maybe when the dissertation's released, you can have me on to discuss that topic. Yeah, that'd be great.

Yeah, cool, very cool. So I just wanted to get that out of the way. All right, so let's go to some things that Dr.

White said. Well, real quick, did you wanna define Molinism first?

Let's see. And by the way, I'm just saying that from a listener's perspective, but you can feel free to go whatever.

If you think there's a different route you wanna go that might be more helpful, you can go for it. Well, no, we can do that, and I'll probably get back to this.

But I like to start with what I call mere Molinism. Okay. And I think it's pretty easy to define.

Mere Molinism, excuse me. Mere Molinism entails two essential ingredients, which if one can be proven to be false, then the entire system's gonna collapse.

So yeah, mere Molinism, two essentials. One, logically prior to God's decision to create the world,

God knew everything that would happen in any possible scenario he could create.

And if that's true, then this entails middle knowledge. And two, as beings created in the image of God, humans, like God, possess libertarian freedom, which simply means the ability to choose between a range of options, each compatible with one's nature.

So that's how I define mere Molinism, is by offering those two essential ingredients.

So - I have a question. Yeah. So I mean, I guess I'll mention names, but I'm not gonna,

I don't wanna put words in their mouth, but I had spoken to Eric Hernandez, who's a

Molinist, and he helped me out a lot in understanding Molinism as a view of God's omniscience.

But it didn't necessarily entail anything about libertarian freedom in just its bare definition.

Like, it applies. So would you say that middle knowledge and the issue of libertarian freedom are two essential features of Molinism, or can you have

Molinism without libertarian freedom? You can have, so I'm good friends with Eric.

You can use, so middle knowledge is what's, middle knowledge is required here, but if Molinism is actually true, that if it actually describes reality, then humans will possess libertarian freedom.

And so that's what I'm talking about when it comes to mere Molinism. Now, and one thing

I'm gonna talk about with something that Dr. White said later on is he says that,

I can't remember. I have it in my notes as we go. I'll make sure I get it right. But he says that it assumes the reality of free creatures that middle knowledge does, and that's just not true.

You can have a completely determined world, completely determined creatures across the board, and God could still have middle knowledge if he possesses the power to create free creatures, even if he never does.

Because then if he's omniscient, so if God possesses the power to create a free creature, even if he never does, and God just determines creatures across the board, but he could have created a free creature.

Well, if he's omniscient and he knows how that free creature would have freely chosen, then he's got middle knowledge.

But I don't think Molinism is true. I just think middle knowledge is true at that point. So I just argue for those two essentials, that if Molinism describes reality the way things are, then

God will have middle knowledge and humans will possess libertarian freedom. And libertarian freedom can be defined several different ways, right?

You've got source of libertarian freedom, which even if for some weird and strange reason, no one could actually choose otherwise, but if they are the real source of their choices, then you've still got libertarian freedom.

Can I ask a question? And I apologize. Sure. I don't wanna throw you off track with my questions, but I gotta be honest.

I wanna take advantage. You can say something. So you make a distinction between Molinism and middle knowledge?

It seemed, it sounded like you made a distinction. Well, yeah. Molinism requires middle knowledge. So if mere

Molinism is true, what I argue for, mere Molinism is true, then God has middle knowledge and humans possess libertarian freedom.

And usually, I mean, cause there's Calvinists who believe that God has middle knowledge, and there's determinists who could also believe that God has middle knowledge.

There could be exhaustive divine determinists who also affirm that God's got middle knowledge. So for Molinism, for mere

Molinism to describe reality, the way things are, God needs middle knowledge and humans need libertarian freedom.

And typically, so I said, there's several ways to understand libertarian freedom. You got the sourcehood, and I think sourcehood is vital, but I also define libertarian freedom as the ability to choose between a range of options, of alternative options, each compatible with human nature or each compatible with an image of God nature.

So anyway, so that's mere Molinism. And I can say more about that later as we go on.

Sure, so let's define Molinism for someone who hasn't listened to the previous thing.

And we don't have to stay on the definition too long. Just let us define our terms first, and then maybe we could jump right into some of the things that you thought that Dr.

White was off on in his criticism. And then of course, if people are familiar, if they're not familiar with what he disagreed with, they can go back and listen to the original content.

Okay, so I just did define Molinism as those two essentials.

Those two essentials. So you said middle knowledge and libertarian freedom.

Humans possess. I guess, maybe I missed it. Did you describe the three moments of God's knowledge in that? Oh, not yet, but I'll get to that.

Okay, that's what I was thinking. I figured that that's kind of gives people the framework. Well, what are you talking about? What? Yeah, right, right, right, yeah.

I will get to that. So yeah,

I think some of the preliminary comments here that Dr. White made, and this isn't an exact quote,

I don't think, but basically saying that we're complaining that not all Molinists from the same flavor of Molinism, because he's talking about he wants to debate

Dr. Craig and others will say, well, okay, Dr. Craig believes that about Molinism, but you need to talk to this

Molinist. And so yeah, it's true. Not all Molinists are created equal. And I'm friends with many

Molinists and we disagree on several aspects of Molinism. But quickly,

I'd say the same is true for Calvinists. I think it's probably worse in the

Calvinist camp. Maybe, I don't know, maybe I'd like your thoughts on that, but there's disagreement on the five points.

You got five -point Calvinists and four -point Calvinists, and the five -point Calvinists will say, well, you're not really a

Calvinist, and that goes back and forth. But there's also five -point Calvinists who also affirm limited libertarian freedom.

So not only is there disagreement regarding the five points, but you have those who affirm all five points, but who disagree on exhaustive divine determinism and limited libertarian freedom.

And Calvinists who affirm libertarian freedom in a limited sense would include guys like Oliver Crisp and Mueller and Kevin Tempe.

And he's told me in some aspects, he would consider himself a

Calvinist. Alan Plantinga, Greg Cockel, the Stand to Reason is a great example.

These guys are all examples of Calvinists who affirm limited libertarian freedom.

In fact, I know some Calvinists who also affirm Molinism. For example,

Kirk McGregor's wife. She's in the Presbyterian church, and is a minister in the

Presbyterian church. She affirms Calvinism, five -point

Calvinism, and also affirms Molinism, if I understand Kirk correctly. So at least what

I refer to as mere Molinism and how I described it. So I want to get that out there.

But the next of White's comments that I think demand a response is when he mentioned that William Lane Craig won't debate him.

And Dr. Craig, he's kind of been like a mentor to me. But Dr.

Craig has had it as a policy for a long time that he doesn't want to debate fellow brothers and sisters in Christ in an academic forum like he does against guys like Christopher Hitchens and Sam Harris and guys like that.

He wants to show that atheism is false in the public square. He wants to show that Christianity is true in the public square, and he doesn't want to get sidetracked.

He knows his mission, and he wants to stay focused on that. But White went on to say that something like that, he couldn't find anybody who's,

I think he said, really representative of Molinism who's willing to debate him on the topic. And you know,

Kirk MacGregor, who literally wrote the book on Molina, and in my opinion, is the leading expert in all things

Molinism today, because unlike Dr. Craig, Molinism is really his primary focus.

He is ready and willing to debate Dr. White. And in fact, I believe MacGregor has reached out to White's camp to let him know that he is willing to have this discussion.

Now, if he hasn't got that message, pass that along to him, that Kirk MacGregor would love to have that conversation with him.

And also, if he wants to get close to debating Dr. Craig, well, Kirk, like me, we're both licensed reasonable faith chapter directors under Dr.

Craig. So yeah, I think Kirk MacGregor is the guy, and I'd be willing to have that conversation too, but really,

Kirk is at another level. I always thought, and of course, Dr. White is free to debate whomever he wants, just as Dr.

Craig has his goal and mission, I'm sure Dr. White has his own goal and what he wants to focus on. But if he really wanted to debate the issue of Molinism, I would see a debate with Dr.

MacGregor as a strategic move in getting Dr. Craig's attention as to some of the serious criticisms, that if they're that serious, and don't hold up against someone like Dr.

MacGregor, maybe Dr. Craig would comment on that and maybe have, so maybe not even a debate, kind of like my dream interaction would be

Dr. Craig and Dr. White kind of have a sit down discussion, kind of like what he did with Lawrence Krauss on the topic of Molinism and Calvinism, and then a separate talk on apologetic methodology.

I think those two, great and interesting, more kind of in a casual setting, although in a perfect world, right?

This is not one of the possible worlds, you can't actualize that world. Yeah, I think he's very equipped to debate those issues with Dr.

White, and I just wish that that was an option, but be that as it may, we're talking about it, and so if we can't get two people to debate these issues, then why not just talk about it and have the dialogue going where people can interact with these ideas to the best of their ability.

Yeah, I agree. So let's jump in. So what are some of the specific areas that, because we really haven't touched at the core complaint of Dr.

White, what did you perceive his core complaint against Molinism to be?

And once you lay that out, how would you respond to those critiques? Well, the first thing is defining

Molinism. In your interview, you asked to define it, and Dr.

White said something to the effect of, we don't have enough time for that. Well, I've already defined it.

It didn't take very long, it only takes a few seconds. And I think it's dangerous when we don't define what we're going to attack, because when we don't define things that we're attacking, it's really easy to attack a straw man and not the real thing.

And I think that's what happened. So again, basically,

I mean, to keep it very simple, to affirm mere Molinism is, you know,

I mean, there's two things that are essential to Molinism. I already mentioned them. And that's, you know, every

Molinist worthy of the label is going to affirm these two things, God's middle knowledge and human libertarian freedom.

And again, I'll say this to clarify, mere Molinism entails two essential ingredients. One, logically prior to God's decision to create the world,

God knew everything that would happen in any possible scenario he could create. And this entails

God's middle knowledge. And two, as beings created in the image of God, humans, like God, possess libertarian freedom, which simply means the ability to choose between a range of options, each compatible with one's nature.

Actually, it doesn't even mean that much. Like I said, you could just have source said libertarian, but that's the definition of free will that I spend the most time defending is the ability to choose between a range of options, each compatible with one's nature.

And like I said, with, you know, when we're talking about humanity, our image of God nature, which allows us to do this.

So the debate really needs to begin here with those two essential pillars or ingredients, if you will.

But let's see. Just real quick, your definition of libertarian freedom, for those who are more philosophically subtle in their definitions, what you've defined is soft libertarian freedom.

We don't have to go into the soft and hard differences, but am I correct that there's a difference between hard libertarianism and soft libertarianism?

You just defined soft libertarianism, right? Well, you know, it depends on who you talk to. And I just like to keep it simple because I think when you get into hard and soft, that confuses people.

So yeah, I just, you know, the most essential thing to libertarian freedom is if there is no external causal deterministic factor.

So yeah, if I am the source of even some of my thoughts and it's not somehow either directly or indirectly causally determined by someone or something else, if I can actually think and evaluate a concept, if I can actually think and evaluate a concept, say the concept of libertarian freedom or the concept of middle knowledge, if I am doing that on my own and nothing else is doing that for me, then

I've got libertarian freedom, even if for some reason I kind of think otherwise or do otherwise. If I am the source, then

I've got libertarian freedom. But like I said, I'm more interested in arguing for, you know, some people say this is a fancy way of saying the ability to do otherwise.

I just like to say, hey, if you've got the ability to choose between a range of options, each of which is compatible with your image of God nature, then you've got libertarian freedom.

Okay. So what specifically, okay, so we have libertarian freedom. You defined it the way you did.

Yeah. What is the specific objection of Dr. White? I think because, for example, when you talk about libertarian free acts and you talk about God's knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, which exists logically prior to his divine decree,

I think what he was getting at is how is that possible? How is their knowledge of what a creature would do independent of a decree?

It would seem as though in order for God to know what someone would do, he would know what they would do because that is a world that he would have decreed.

There seems to be this idea that there are the truth values of what this hypothetical creature would do, but it's independent of a decree, which really acts as the creative plans and intentions that God desires to carry out.

How would you respond to that, what we call the grounding objection? Yeah. Well, I've got a lot to say on this.

And so I've written out a whole bunch of things I want to get to, and that's down on my list, but I'll quickly, no, but just know that I'm going to get to more of this later if you don't mind.

Sure, sure. But that's a how question. That's a interaction objection. And, you know, theologians, including

Calvinists, are fine with appealing to some mystery here and there. But I would say if one denies, well, it comes down to this.

Does God, does an omnipotent God have the power, right? The ability and the power to create a being in his image who can make choices, who can choose between a range of options, each compatible with his image of God nature?

Does God have the ability and the power to create that being? Now, if he doesn't, then

God's not omnipotent. I don't think he wants to go there. But if he does, it raises another question.

Does God possess the knowledge? Does he have the intelligence to know? What this free creature within God's ability to create?

Does this free creature that God could create, who would possess libertarian freedom, does

God then possess the knowledge of how this free creature would freely choose even if God never creates him?

Now, if one says no, then they're denying omniscience. Well, that assumes, it seems to me, that the notion of a person who can choose certain things, they can choose certain things, you can correct me if I'm wrong, independent of a decree, that God could have knowledge of what these persons and people would do independent of a decree.

So - No, I affirm the decree. You do. Yes. But God's knowledge is logically prior to the decree.

So I guess the question is, how do we make sense out of what a person would do logically prior to a decree?

It seems like what they would do is a result of God decreeing a world in which they use their

God -given ability to do precisely what they do. All right, so the bottom line is this.

Does God have the power to create a free creature? Well, it depends. Well, it would say that does

God have the power to create a libertarianly free creature? Right. That's the question. If you're asking me personally,

I don't know because I don't know if it's, I don't know if it's a coherent concept because a lot of -

Oh, let me stop you there. It's gotta be a coherent concept unless - Say it again. It's gotta be a coherent concept if God's omnipotent because omnipotence by definition means that God has options and it stands to reason that God does not do all that he's powerful enough to do.

I mean, for example, God could have at least not created the universe.

Obviously, we know he did since we're having this conversation. But to say that God had to create this universe would bring us into some severe theological problems.

God doesn't need us. He was completely fine without us. And it's just by grace alone that he chose to create.

So God has a range of options, each of which is compatible with his divine nature.

He can at least create or not create. And he chose to create.

So God has libertarian freedom. He can choose between a range of options, each compatible with his nature. So the question or the concept is not incoherent at all because God has it.

So the question now is, can God create humans in his likeness who can also choose between a range of options, each compatible with our image of God nature?

Now, I don't expect you to answer that right now, but that's what I'm gonna push. That's what

I want Dr. White to answer. Now, I believe that if one says, no, God does not have that power, then you run into problems.

You're denying, one would deny God's omnipotence. So most of the

Calvinist theologians I have talked to will affirm, yes, God does have the ability to create a free creature, but he didn't.

And I say, fine, I disagree with you there for several reasons, and I'll talk about some of those later.

But if I grant you that, and you affirm that God has the power and ability to create a free creature, then

I ask the next question. God, since he's omniscient, doesn't he know how that free creature within his power to create would, how he would freely choose?

If he doesn't, then you've got some flavor of open theism on your hands, and I know

James White would be against that because he and I both oppose open theism. That's correct. And you don't wanna even,

I don't even think you wanna affirm open theism in some possible worlds. So you gotta have middle knowledge.

Middle knowledge is the only way to make sense of this. So I've argued at length on my website, and I'll get into this more later as we talk.

But I think - Can I ask a real, can I ask a quick question though? I'm sorry. Hold that thought. I just wanna say if you affirm omnipotence and omniscience logically prior to creation, then you've got some flavor of Molinism.

Go ahead. Yeah, I guess this is, I guess a personal question.

I don't see that if God has libertarian freedom, and if you were to ask me that question, I don't know the answer to that.

If God eternally knows what he's gonna do, he knows what he's gonna do from all eternity. Could he do something different?

I think hypothetically, there's nothing that lacks within his nature. But if he's eternally determined within himself to do something, he will never do other than -

All right, well, listen. But before, but that's not my question. But nothing is, yeah. I'll just say that that's still libertarian freedom because nothing else is causally determining him.

That's fine, that's fine. Yeah. But my question is that if God were to have libertarian freedom,

I don't see it, and I'm not saying it's false, but I don't see that it logically follows that therefore derivative creatures can have that sort of freedom since God is original in his action, whereas we are derivative.

Anything that we, and you get into whole issues of being, you have that whole creature, a creator -creature distinction.

So I'm kind of seeing, I'm not saying libertarian freedom is false. The same thing is true with God's knowledge. It logically entails that creatures have it.

It doesn't logically entail that we do. But since the concept would be logically coherent, and God being omnipotent can do all logically coherent things, can do all things logically possible.

He can, doesn't mean he does, but he can. Right. Right there. So to say that the idea of libertarian freedom is coherent for God does not logically entail that it's logically coherent for a derivative creature.

Well, okay. It doesn't have that logic. Well, look, it doesn't logically follow that we are free, but if it's logically possible for God to be able to choose between a range of options, each compatible with his nature, right?

So the concept then of libertarian freedom is coherent and logically possible, or it's logical.

And if God can do all things logically possible, then it stands to reason, unless I have some good argument against it, that God could, if he wanted to, and even if he never does, that God could create creatures who possess an ability to choose between a range of options, each compatible with their image of God nature.

And this is an image of likeness. It doesn't mean we have the ability to do, obviously humans can't create universes from nothing, right?

But we can create some things, right? We have an image, we have a likeness, we are creators. We don't have middle knowledge, but we do actually possess counterfactual knowledge, to high degrees of certainty anyway.

So we're not completely free, but we have limited libertarian freedom. And even most

Calvinistic theologians would say that Satan had the libertarian freedom to choose to reject

God or not, or that Adam and Eve did. And many Calvinists, including, and I go into this in my dissertation,

Calvin and Luther, and especially Melanchthon, these great reformers, do,

I have the block quotes to make my case, they affirm limited libertarian freedom.

That is the ability to choose between a range of options, each compatible with their nature, not applied to salvation issues.

So they're gonna affirm the five points of TULIP, but, and like, you know, Greg Koukl does this really well, and Oliver Crisp, and a few others,

Mueller. But Greg Koukl, I think, does a great job in his book, Tactics. He is a five -point ardent

Calvinist. I've argued with him, we've gone round and round. He's a five -point Calvinist, but to his credit, he affirms that humans must possess limited libertarian freedom, or else we can never make any rational affirmations.

And believe me, towards the end of our conversation, I have a whole bunch I wanna say about that, because you brought this up to Dr.

White in your conversation. But there are, I mean,

I would contend that the vast majority of Calvinists would at least contend that God has the ability to choose between a range of options, each compatible with his nature, that follows from omnipotence, and that he at least has the power to create creatures who can choose between a range of options, each compatible with our image of God, nature, even if that's not applied to salvation.

So you can still keep your five points and still affirm that God's got middle knowledge, and even affirm that we've got libertarian freedom in some things, even if it's not applied to salvation, and therefore, you've got some flavor of Mullenism, which

I call mere Mullenism. So I contend that you can be a five -point Tulip Calvinist and a two -point mere

Mullenist, and I know these people. I know these people that affirm both. So - That's seven points, man. That's too many points.

Yeah, that's right. That's right, that's right. So we can get into more of that.

I'm a seven -point Calvinist Mullenist. That's right. A lot to go through. And I'll tell you, I mean, if I were convinced that I was wrong about applying

Mullenism to salvation issues, that's exactly what I would do. I would go back and affirm the five points of Tulip, and also affirm what

Calvin and Luther and Melanchthon said about what I call limited libertarian freedom, and then

I would appeal to middle knowledge to make sense of that. So there does not have to be a debate.

You can be a Mullenist and a Calvinist, and in fact, that's why I'm at the same Reformed University that James White is at.

So, you know, they seem to have, I mean, we went round and round about that.

If I can be Reformed or not, and in the end, I think I made my case.

And so I - Well, you have the beard, so you're okay in my - Yeah, I got it started here, you know? I'm on the right track.

So let's zoom into a couple of the main contentions with Dr.

White. So let's continue down that route. So what's the next point you'd like to respond to in regards to something that he said?

You know, he said something to the effect that Mullenism was never derived from scripture. You know, gosh,

I - Which is the biggest issue for Calvinists, and which was linked to my personal study.

I think there's an answer to why many Mullenists today come off as being overly philosophical and not as biblical as many

Calvinists would feel comfortable with.

I'm not saying that it's necessarily wrong or anything, all truth is God's truth, and if something's philosophically coherent, it's philosophically coherent, and it's true if it reflects the scriptures.

But when I studied Mullenism, I felt like I wasn't, it felt like it was an attempt to answer a theological and philosophical puzzle as opposed to something that is derived from the text.

It's almost as though it's something that can fit with the text when you're trying to answer this question, but not so much derived from the text itself.

Real quick, before you interject, and I'm excited to hear how you would respond to that, because I'm not the only one who feels that way.

It's my idea, or kind of my understanding, that because Mullenism has been popularized by Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig, and comes primarily through the philosophical works of Molina, that when people catch onto Mullenism from a popular level, that's their exposure to it.

As Dr. McGregor said, when I spoke with him a few years back, he said that a lot of Molina's works in regards to his biblical defenses haven't been published.

And so when people learn about Molina, they're coming at it primarily from that philosophical bent, and then they latch onto that, and that's kind of how

Mullenism is presented, this purely philosophical perspective. And so how would you kind of respond to something like that and kind of put some

Calvinists at ease and say, wait a second, there's some biblical support here, because that's definitely something that we struggle with.

Yeah, that's a great point. How Mullenism has been popularized might have actually done some damage in that sense.

So I think that's, you might be onto something there. You know, Molina himself, I can't remember how many pages,

I think it was 60 -some pages is what he started with of biblical data.

So he started with biblical data as his foundation. And when it comes to my dissertation, which is focused on this subject, the first chapter is all about key concepts, and really

I spent a bunch of time regarding hermeneutics and how to have a logically consistent hermeneutic. And if you want truth,

Christianity is true, it will always be logical because truth and logic are inextricably linked.

You can't have one without the other. That doesn't mean we'll always be able to, you know, connect all the logical dots, but that doesn't mean the logical dots aren't out there to be connected.

So, and maybe you'll disagree with this, but it seems to me that both

Mullenism and Calvinism are both philosophical attempts to try to make sense of biblical data. But maybe there's some pushback there, but I guess

I would say, you know, I started out in my dissertation about talking about how to do a correct hermeneutic that I believe, especially, that Calvinists are going to affirm.

Second, I go through all the biblical data. Well, maybe not all of it, but I have a really long second chapter.

And I start out by looking at all the verses that might, you know, influence one to affirm determinism or exhaustive divine determinism, which many

Calvinists affirm. And then I look at all the verses that might lend us somebody saying, no, we have a real ability to choose between a range of options, each compatible with our image of God nature, limited libertarian freedom.

And then I look at some that even, you know, some that apply determinism when it comes to salvation, some that even imply libertarian freedom when it comes to salvation issues.

And I don't, in the second chapter, I don't try to make any conclusions. I just have all these categories.

And I like, look, there's biblical data across the board that, well,

I mean, there's biblical data, both Old and New Testament that the determinists can point to. And there's biblical data, both Old and New Testament that the libertarian freedom fighter can point to.

That's all I - I'm sorry about that.

You're the empire, you're the revolution. So, you know,

I mean, so ultimately, you know, I say these are either contradictions, which nobody wants to affirm, right?

I don't affirm that. And I know James White wouldn't affirm it either. And I know you wouldn't. But I say, you gotta have a view or you can't promote a view that doesn't make sense of all of them.

And so I believe that this philosophical view of Molinism, when you view the entirety of scripture through that lens, it makes sense of the whole thing.

It can make sense of every passage. And I don't think a deterministic view, an exhaustive divine deterministic view, whether it be

Calvinism or any other view like that, I don't think that's going to work across the board.

It will make sense of big chunks of scripture. I don't think it will for all of it.

But that's, I do think Molinism is biblical.

I do make that case then in my dissertation. And I've got a short, relatively short, pop -level beginners article on my website called

Molinism is Biblical, where I go through the passages of scripture that would affirm both

God's counterfactual knowledge and human limited libertarian freedom.

And then I say, okay, if God's got counterfactual knowledge and if he has that knowledge, now this is philosophical here because the

Bible doesn't say, God possesseth middle knowledge. But it doesn't say

God possesses, right, right, right. But so you've got to take, and it doesn't say

God possesseth natural or free knowledge either, which we'll get into soon. And I know Dr. White will say that God has.

So you look at the biblical data and then you try to think about it logically, which is simply what it means to make philosophical sense of it.

We're thinking about it logically. How do you logically make the most sense of all the biblical data from Genesis to Revelation?

And so that's my goal. I mean, and I'm not a philosopher.

I'm a systematic theologian who takes philosophy and logic quite seriously.

So I just think that Christians should be not just committed to excellent theology and biblical exegesis and hermeneutics, but also committed to logic and good philosophy, not a shallow philosophy, but good

God -honoring philosophy that makes sense of biblical data. I think it's important for, and I'm not saying that I agree with your explanations necessarily.

You know, we're giving an opportunity for you to share your thoughts and definitely I will continue to think about these things. But I think a lot of Calvinists need to understand because, you know, stereotypically speaking, stereotypically speaking,

Calvinists tend to be biblically minded. I'll say stereotypically because we have our philosophies as well and things like that.

But we need to be very careful to talk down against philosophy because the Bible does not teach that we should avoid philosophy.

Rather, it teaches us to avoid a particular kind of philosophy, a philosophy that is according to worldly principles and things like that.

Now, is Molinism that? That's the argument. Is Calvinism that?

That's the argument. And so that's why we have these discussions. But we don't avoid philosophical reflection.

We can't pow -pow, you know, give the tap on the hands of the Molinists for using, you know, logical priority and things like that.

But then the Calvinist gets away with speaking about superlapsarianism and all these other sorts of things.

So we have to play fair in these kinds of discussions. But go ahead, what were you gonna continue on?

Go ahead. Well, that's just well said. I think that's one of the reasons why you and I get along so well. But, you know, and you've mentioned this, we should probably, for those of your listeners who might be new to this conversation, we need to explain what middle knowledge is in the middle of.

And I just made some comments about natural and free knowledge. So let's describe all this.

Natural knowledge is all that God could do. That's how I like to define it.

God knows everything that he could do, right? So if God's got natural knowledge, he knows based on his, he knows he's omnipotent and he's also omniscient.

So he knows everything he could do. Middle knowledge is all that would happen if, right?

What would happen based on all the things that God didn't do, right? What would happen based on everything that God could do?

And then you've got the divine decree, God's decision. So, and then you've got free knowledge after that, and that's

God's knowledge of all that actually will happen. So, you know, Dr. White made some comments.

You know, he said, traditionally, theologians recognize God's natural knowledge and his free knowledge, and talked about even into the

Middle Ages, what people thought about it. And just really, that's irrelevant.

What matters is, is if God knows everything he could do, and it stands to reason then that, you know, there's a whole bunch of things

God could do, even that he never did. But if God knows, so imagine for your listeners who know the

Kalam cosmological argument, you know how the Kalam gets us all the way back to, to God existing in what

I like to call a static state of aseity. That's God existing alone as a

Trinity, and nothing else, right? Nothing else actually exists. But in that static state of aseity,

God knows everything he could do. He's both omniscient and omnipotent. So that means that God knows everything he could do, and he knows all that would happen if he did it, any of those things that's within his power to do.

Then God chooses, and this is not chronologically speaking, but logically speaking,

God makes a choice. What is he gonna create? He makes that choice, and now God has free knowledge, and that just simply means that God knows everything that actually will happen, and I contend that also means everything, he knows all that I will freely choose, right?

Even if I'm free to do otherwise, and even if for some reason I don't have the ability to do otherwise, even if I'm the source,

God knows all that I will freely do. So predestination is a big part of Molinism.

We affirm predestination across the board. In fact, I affirm double predestination, which many

Calvinists are scared to do, right? No, you don't, come on. I do, I do,

I affirm predestination of all that happens across the board. Okay, so what

I reject is exhaustive divine determinism, or Ed, E -D -D, is what

I call it, so. You make it sound like it's a disease. Ed, hey,

I have friends named Ed, so it's okay. So yeah, ultimately

I think this comes down, I think I mentioned it earlier, but I think it boils down to this question for the

Calvinists, and I'd love to hear Dr. White answer this question. Does an omnipotent

God who has the ability to choose between a range of options, each compatible with his nature, possess the ability, the power, to create creatures in his likeness who possess the ability to choose between a range of alternative options, each compatible with our image of God nature?

So if God merely possesses this ability, even if he actually never creates creatures in his likeness, then

God, if he's necessarily omniscient, must possess middle knowledge.

And then, you know, you could say that some flavor of Molinism's gotta be true at that point. But I add, it doesn't, it's not, you know, again,

I haven't proven human libertarian freedom here. I just say that it's possible for humans to possess limited libertarian freedom.

But then I have other arguments that show that we do possess limited libertarian freedom, just as Calvin, Luther, and Melanchthon would affirm.

So if that's the case, then some flavor of Molinism has gotta be true, even if five -point

Calvinism's true. So another thing I'd like to mention that White said is he made a statement and he said, how we act is derived from who we are.

Now, I just wanna say, why think a thing like that? Or at least ask that question. Why think a thing like that? In fact, you know, if this is part of his argument, it would be, it seems to be an example of a begging the question.

But I'll give the benefit of the doubt there and not say that that is exactly what's going on here. But -

Can you repeat the phrase again? He says, how we act is derived from who we are.

That assumes causal determinism. Usually, anyway, and I think this is what he means.

I'd like to hear him flesh this out a little bit more, but I know many Calvinists, when they say things like this, assume that libertarian freedom is impossible.

And, well, I'll explain here a little more. Because I think White seems to be assuming compatibilistic determinism is true with a statement like that.

But why can't compatibilistic libertarianism be true? And by the way,

I describe myself as a compatibilistic libertarian. So I affirm compatibilism in a sense.

So oftentimes, compatibilism and libertarianism are offered as opposites or things that oppose each other.

But I like to nuance things here a little bit, because, I mean, if you listen to the way

I've defined libertarian freedom, the view that I like to argue for, again, listen to it, the ability to choose between a range of alternative options, each compatible with an image of God nature.

So based on that definition, I affirm a flavor of compatibilism here. And oftentimes,

I think there's a lot, I don't reject compatibilism when there's only one thing capable with my nature to do at all times.

I think sometimes that's true. I think this Edwardsian view from Jonathan Edwards is often true.

I just argue that you cannot apply it across the board exhaustively. So I think compatibilism often described when conjoined with determinism is often true or an inability to do something else.

I think that view of compatibilism is often true. But then I say, well, even with limited libertarian freedom, you still have a flavor of compatibilism, because if this is the case, then our range of thoughts and actions might be determined by who we are, which is ultimately not up to us, this range of options.

I don't have the ability to jump to the top of a 50 -story skyscraper.

That's not within my ability, but I do have the power to jump. I can jump or not jump.

You know? So there's some things I can't do. Based on who

I am, it shrinks. I'm not omnipotent, right? But I do have the power to do some things and many things that I don't do, arguably.

So anyway, if this is the case, then the range of thoughts and actions might be determined by who we are, and that is ultimately not up to us, but we still have a range of options from which to choose.

That is up to us. That's each compatible with who we are. So God creates us with a nature, arguably, that can choose between a range of options, each compatible with our nature.

So that range of options isn't up to me, but how I choose within that range is up to me.

And again, I think Calvin Luther and Melanchthon would agree, and I know there's scholarly

Calvinists out there today. I've listed some of them already who would affirm that also. So it's not just, you can't just dismiss it.

What do you mean, up to me? It seems as though, on your view, God decrees. And so the specific thing that you choose, you choose it because God created a world in which you would choose it.

In which I will, yeah. In which you will choose it. So God created a world in which he knew how I would freely choose.

So God, okay, so let me say it this way. God knows how I would freely choose if he creates me, and even if he never does create me.

So God knows how I would freely choose if. Creative decree. Now God knows, it goes from God knows how

I would freely choose, now it is transformed into God knows how I will freely choose. So just because would changes to will, the word freely doesn't magically disappear.

The word freely is still there. And so if God knows how

I will freely choose, based on a range of alternative options, each compatible with my nature. If he creates me, and then he creates me,

I still have that range of options, each compatible with my nature. But now it's how I will freely choose among those range of options.

I guess so. It's predestined and guaranteed. It's just not causally determined. Yeah. And that's where the debate is, really.

Right. I guess I don't wanna jump ahead, because I know you're gonna get there. But I guess in the back of my mind is this idea of the grounding objection.

I'm trying to connect the dots of what you're saying without jumping there, because I know you're getting there.

Yeah, I am gonna get there. But man, I'll tell you. Well, yeah, so bottom line though, bottom line, that's not a biblical objection.

That's a purely philosophical objection. Okay, but here's the thing.

And I don't think it's a good objection. But I'm just saying, it's not biblical. Okay, well, it is biblical to employ your mind to determine what's true or false.

So I would say whether it's a philosophical objection or a biblical objection, if philosophically, it doesn't work, then by definition, it's false, even if it's not a biblical definition.

Okay, I'll give you that. And I'm not saying it is, I'm struggling. And I'm not saying this as kind of like, give me an answer, or I'm just saying,

I'm having difficulty connecting the dots as you're explaining the choice. Because I know that really, one of the reasons why if man is libertarily free, that's largely connected with the idea that because God's counterfactual of creaturely freedom, it is located prior to the decree.

And so because it's located logically prior to the decree, it seems as though a sort of libertarian free will would follow.

Otherwise, if God's knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are logically located after the decree, then a determinism would seem to follow.

Right. So I'm trying to connect the dots. How do we understand God's knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom logically prior to the decree?

How can they have truth values independent of the decree? Even though you're gonna get there, because we haven't gotten there yet, that's the roadblock that is holding me back from interacting with everything else you're saying in regards to the freedom choices and stuff, if that makes sense.

Yeah, well, if you don't mind, I mean, you're the boss here, but if you don't mind, I'd like to wait, because I do have -

That's fine, you can take your time. You're the guest, so it's not that I'm the boss. You're the guest. That's why I haven't said much here.

I'm not trying to give too much pushback. I want you to explain your view. If you're getting there, then go ahead.

Yeah, I promise we're gonna get there, and I will point to other sources that will go into much greater philosophical depth than I will today, but I'll get there, and I'll have some things to say.

And real quick, if I have Calvinist friends who will be listening to this and watching this, and perhaps you're frustrated that I'm not giving pushback where they think

I should be giving pushback, my intention with having you on when you suggested that you wanted to come on was never to give pushback necessarily.

I just honestly wanted to know how do you respond to the various points that Dr. White responded to, and I wanted to give you the opportunity to do that.

So if people are upset that I'm not giving as much pushback, that was never my original intention.

I really am curious how, when you get to that point, how you get there, and I wanna understand it as best as I can.

Yeah, yeah, that's awesome. And I promise I'll get there. I just have a list of things, mostly in order that James White said.

So I guess the next thing I wanna address is when White said, if middle knowledge is before the divine to create a create, then it's going to limit what

God can and cannot do to get to a certain end. I would respond by saying, if God has the power to create a free creature, whom is not always causally determined to think or act, then

God middle knows what this free creature would do. And clearly, this seems to be a great making property as opposed to a so -called limitation.

I just don't understand how this is a limitation on White's view, because this doesn't seem to be a limitation at all.

It seems to be what contributes to a maximally great being. After all, if God doesn't like what a certain free creature would freely do, then

God can either causally determine this creature in a certain instance. I'm not opposed to that.

Or God can create or choose not to create that creature or this world with that creature in it.

God's not limited by this. He's got the power. He can choose to actualize a free creature or not.

And if he's got middle knowledge, then he would know if he wants to create this creature or not. And he can also choose to create a free creature and determine them occasionally.

I'm not, yeah, like I said, I'm not opposed to that, but God is not limited by knowledge. I don't even know what that means to say that anybody could be limited by knowledge.

I mean, it seems crazy to assert that knowledge limits anyone because knowledge is power, isn't it?

I guess he sees, as I understand him, I guess he sees that the knowledge that God has of what a free creature would do limits the possible world that God can create.

I don't want to put words in his mouth, but it seems as though that might be his objection. Kind of like there's a certain world that God won't create because it would conflict with what a libertarianly free creature would choose.

And you're trying to come up with a view that kind of holds these in a compatible way. So it seems as though he's limited by hypothetical choices that an uncreated, undecreed person would hypothetically choose given a certain set of circumstances.

That's not a limit because, so say God knows how free creatures would choose if he creates them.

And he's like, ah, that's horrible. Then he doesn't have to create them. Or he can create them.

And maybe he's like, oh, creatures will freely choose according to my perfect plan in all these instances, except for this one.

Okay, then I'm going to step in and causally determine this guy. You can still do that. So there's no limits.

I mean, God is the maximally great being. So if God could causally determine an individual. Then that person's not free in that sense.

Right, but would that, say suppose God causally determined someone to do something and that person is damned.

Does God have a right to damn such a person that he causally determines? Okay, different question. I mean, so let's just say

God wanted a guy to wear a blue shirt, but he freely would have chosen a red shirt. Well, God can step in and say, nah,

I'm wearing the blue shirt today. Right. Right, but now jumping to the other topic.

I'm sorry. Damnation. You don't have to answer it if you think it goes way too off topic. Yeah, I think it does.

That's fine. But I think in my notes, I get there eventually actually start talking about.

That's why. So basically I should just be quiet because your notes go to all the questions. Well, I don't know.

I should have sent you my notes before we started. That would be great. I'd take them anyway afterwards. I'll send them to you.

I'll send them to you. All right, so I don't see middle knowledge as a limit at all.

I think knowledge is power and it adds to his maximal greatness. God's not limited by anything.

He knows everything that he could do, all things that are logically possible. And he also knows all that would happen if he did it.

This entails middle knowledge and it's just what follows from an omnipotent and omniscient being.

If God is omnipotent and omniscient, he's gonna have middle knowledge and this is no limitation at all.

In fact, I've got, I can't remember off the top of my head what it's entitled, but it has to do with the topic of if Molanism and middle knowledge limits

God. And I think I, so yeah, search my website. I do discuss this in more depth and detail.

But another thing that White said is that middle knowledge partakes of elements of both natural and free knowledge.

And I don't like that wording. I think it causes more confusion to the masses.

So divine middle knowledge is simply what God knows with certainty regarding what would happen based on all he could do.

I guess you could say that it partakes of natural knowledge because it logically follows from it, but it's not the same thing or even part of the same thing.

You know, I'll just say it this way. Knowledge of the wood is philosophically different than knowledge of the could.

I'll say it again. Knowledge of the wood is philosophically different than knowledge of the could.

Those are two different things. So it doesn't partake. It doesn't definitely, I mean, like I said, if God knows all that he could do, then it follows that if he's omniscient, that he knows all that would happen based on everything he could do.

So that's a different thing. It just is different. It doesn't matter if the people in the middle ages believed it.

It doesn't matter if Augustine realized it. It doesn't matter if Molina ever came up with the idea at all.

It doesn't matter that he was a Spanish Jesuit priest. None of that matters. It just matters if it logically follows from God's knowledge of the could, everything he could do.

And so I don't like to get bogged down in people's intention. What was Molina's intention? And what did people through the last few centuries think about it?

That's irrelevant. All right, so moving on. Let's see.

White said something like, Craig's always asked the question if this is the best of all possible worlds and is

God saving the most people that he can. And this does get philosophical here.

And perhaps I messed up, and so correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think White clarified the difference between possible and feasible worlds.

I know that you're familiar with that distinction. But if one's going to pontificate about why this application of Molinism doesn't work, then one shouldn't ignore this vital difference.

And I believe that Dr. Craig has made it clear that this is not the best possible world.

Be that as it may, perhaps this is the best feasible world, or at least a tie for the best feasible world, as Kirk MacGregor would say.

That is to say, maybe I can say it like this, this is the best possible world God can create full of free creatures.

So that, and I think God would have reasons to create free creatures because I think it allows for a true, or maybe it's better to say a maximal love, which

I think is the essence of salvation. And because God thinks it's important to have moral and at least rational creatures.

And so I think libertarian freedom is vital for each of these concepts. But with that in mind, this could be the best possible world

God can create full of free creatures. So that means the best feasible world. But the best possible world is one in which nobody goes to hell.

That's possible. But given libertarian freedom, if God says, hey, it's important to me to create creatures with libertarian freedom, then what these free creatures will do, will freely do, even if it's possible for universal salvation,

God knows that it won't happen freely. And if freedom is important to God, then this could be the best feasible world, even if it's not the best possible world.

So anyway, possible worlds in which determinism does not always apply is how

I like to explain feasible worlds. And really, I think a good intro to the difference between possible and feasible worlds is a blog that I wrote on my website entitled,

Could Adam Avoid the Apple? It's what when people don't know the difference between the two, I like to start them with that article.

Could Adam Avoid the Apple? The key word is could. So, but here's the bottom line. No creature that actually exists limits

God. So God can freely choose to rule out some of his options on his own.

You can call that a limitation if you'd like. I don't, that's based on his will and his good pleasure, right?

But, but, but, you know, so God can rule out some of his options by choosing to create libertarian creatures, but he doesn't have to.

But this limitation might be according to his perfect plan to allow humans to be rational and moral agents capable of experiencing a true and maximal love, which

I, again, I say is the essence of salvation. But, you know, don't take this literally to everybody listening out there, right?

Don't say that Tim Stratton actually thinks this is how it works. So I just want to say this to kind of get people to think as an illustration.

But it's kind of like, or it's as if. Oh, I smell heresy coming.

I hope this doesn't get, you know, like the

God that's got to play the cards he's been dealt objection. But I'll just say it like this.

It's as if God before his creative decree said, it's important for me to create free creatures for several reasons.

With that in mind, let's see what my options are. Okay, now, God doesn't have to, he could examine his options.

Again, I'm using this as an illustration. He could go, because I don't think this is how it happens. God's got perfect knowledge.

He just knows. He's not going to look and see what's going on here. This is an illustration. So if he says, hey, it's important for me to create free creatures for many reasons.

So with that in mind, let's see what my options are. And if he sees his options are not good and nothing aligns with this perfect plan, then he doesn't have to create it.

He could just determine everything across the board. But let's say he's like, oh, look at this.

Here's a great world full of free creatures. I'm going to actualize this because once I actualize it, it's predestined.

It will happen even all the things that are happening freely. And so everything's predestined across the board.

Election is still true. It's just that we're not, we don't have exhaustive causal determinism.

You've just got predestination. And in one of the arguments I'll give later, I'll show, I think deductively conclude the predestination and causal determinism ought not be conflated, but I'll get to that soon.

So another thing that White said, and now I think we're going to get to what you wanted to talk about here,

Eli. He said, I've never heard anyone offer a meaningful basis for grounding this,

I believe, middle knowledge, not only in scripture, but in explaining where does this knowledge come from?

Do you think I quoted that basically correct? Yeah, that sounds right. So first of all, just to keep it simple,

God's knowledge comes from the same place God's power comes from. He simply has all power and all knowledge.

And I don't have to know how God has, I don't know how, I don't have to know how a maximally great being is maximally great.

We simply know that God is necessarily and always both omnipotent and omniscient.

We can derive that from scripture. And with this mind, White brings up what, you know,

I just referenced it, what he refers to as the most infamous of Dr. Craig's claims. And when

Dr. Craig said, God's got to play the cards he's been dealt. And Eli, I like how you pointed out that there's been much criticism of how

White objects to this illustration. And White jumped in and he said, well, it's not my illustration. And you clarified brilliantly,

I think. And you said, but I think people are familiar with your criticisms of it. I think

James White has made that quote famous. So because James White has made

Craig's car dealer illustration famous, or perhaps infamous, we need to discuss

White's criticism of this analogy. And we'll get into some of these grounding things too. So yeah,

I think many times folks don't really try to understand the proper context in which

Craig's comment was made or what exactly was meant by his comment.

And I don't think that's being charitable. So that's one critique I'd have respectfully saying, I don't think we're being charitable to Dr.

Craig here because charity demands we really try to find the best case scenario. What is the best that this person actually is meaning here?

And like I said, I don't want people saying, when I said, well, it's as if God was saying, it's important to me. I don't think that that's actually how it goes.

I'm just saying, hey, here's a way to start thinking about it that might help us make sense. I think Dr. Craig is trying to offer an illustration to help laymen wrap their heads around this.

And doing hermeneutics is that too. We want to aim at the correct meaning of what the author had in mind.

And Dr. Craig is simply using what he calls a façade de parler, and I don't speak French, but I guess that's

French for a figure of speech. The manner of speaking, yeah. Yeah, manner of speaking, yeah. That many

Molinists, or I should say anti -Molinists incorrectly take literally.

So Dr. Craig here is not implying that there's a literal cosmic card dealer, right? I've seen these memes going around saying that Dr.

Craig thinks there's actually a cosmic card dealer out there who's giving God cards to play. See, I never thought, well, even when

I first heard before Dr. White's criticism, I never looked at it.

When I saw like God, when he says God has to deal, he has to play the card that he's been dealt,

I always saw that as he's the card dealer because he desired A, he deals with the cards that he deals himself given his desire to have

A, namely Libertarian Lincoln Creekers. Even though I might not agree with the system, that's how

I understood it when I first thought there's not this abstract dualistic entity that's out there dealing him these cards.

So I never really understood it in that way. So I never found that objection to be, even as a Calvinist, I haven't -

Well, it's because you're a former Molinist, right? So I mean, seriously, Eli, of all the

Calvinists I know, you really seem to have the best idea of what it is you object to, you know?

And so you don't make the same mistake that I think White does, and at least his, at least many of his followers do when it comes to things like this because you understood what

Dr. Craig meant. And Dr. Craig, because of this, I'll read a quote here from his website.

He understood that people were taking this out of context. And he says, quote, in no way is this meant to imply that there are actual entities or things outside of God that he has to deal with.

This is simply an illustration of the fact that the truth value of these counterfactuals of freedom is not unilaterally determined by God.

The Libertarian freedom is truly possible, end quote. So let me bring those cookies down to the bottom shelf.

I'll try here anyway. I think what Craig means is that if God were to create creatures whom he would not always causally determine, which would be,

I contend, logically possible for an omnipotent God to do, then these non -determined and Libertarian free creatures would make some choices that God would not causally determine.

It seems to follow logically. Thus, these choices would be free in a Libertarian sense.

So there's no logical contradiction found in the proposition.

God has the power to create creatures who are Libertarianly free to think, choose, and act, right?

That's not like saying God created a married bachelor or drew a triangle with four corners or anything like that.

So there's no logical contradiction there. If one claims that God cannot create

Libertarian creatures, like I said earlier, it seems to imply that God's not omnipotent since it's a logically coherent concept.

For the sake of argument, even if humans do not possess Libertarian free will or Libertarian freedom in this world, like we've already discussed,

I believe it's possible for God to create worlds where creatures do possess

Libertarian freedom and can freely choose, it seems to me, one way or the other.

So with this in mind, free creatures, even if they were not actually created, would be free to choose one way or another.

If God really is omniscient and knows the truth value to all propositions, eternally, without beginning, then

God middle knows how these free creatures, if they were to be created, God knows how they would freely choose.

Now, on a side note, I have argued that at length on my website and in my dissertation and elsewhere and academic journal,

I've argued that God would want to create beings with Libertarian free will so that they could be in a true love relationship with him.

And I've gone into that in depth and detail that a true love relationship requires

Libertarian freedom. But moreover, I've demonstrated that Calvinists, I don't know if I should open this can of worms right now, but I'll do it anyway.

Calvinists such as John Piper run into a card dealer objection, if you will, with some of the things he said.

So I'll just point people to the article I wrote where I discussed this on my website.

It's called, Playing the Cards God's Been Dealt. I deal with James White. I deal with John Piper. And I show where the, you know, if this is going to be an objection, the bigger objection is going to be in the hand of the

Calvinist. Or I mean, it's going to be objecting to their cards that they've got or that they're objecting to.

So that is to say they've got the bigger problem. But anyway, let me get back to the main point.

It's vital to ask oneself two questions. Is God powerful enough to create free creatures?

Who can, so to speak, freely deal some cards, unless one can demonstrate some hidden logical contradiction.

If they deny this, then it seems to deny God's impotence, omnipotence, or so it seems to me.

And two, the second question is this. If God is powerful enough to create free creatures, is he intelligent enough to know how these free creatures would freely choose?

Or that is to say, what cards they would freely deal if God creates them. And like you said,

God's the ultimate card dealer here. He gets to decide. I mean, he knows how a free dealing card dealer, that makes sense.

A free dealing person with cards. He knows what they're going to deal and he can choose to create that world or not.

So again, there's no logical contradiction in stating that God knows the truth value to counterfactual propositions.

Right. It might be a mystery as to how God knows these things, but it's also a mystery as to how

God created the universe from nothing. So, so, okay. So there, there is where, okay. So if I were, if you're walking down the street and I happen to recognize you and I say,

Hey, Tim, I got to ask you a quick question. I just want you to give me a straight, straightforward answer without explaining the details.

Just assume I have background knowledge. If I were to say, what is the answer to the grounding objection?

Would you say, of course you'd have to expand on stuff. Would you say, it's a mystery?

On the street. He's like, if we're on the street, if we're on the street passing by each other, and I don't have time to talk.

The first thing I'm going to do is say, go look at my journal article on perichoresis 16 .2. Point me to your article.

Yeah. Yeah. So in that, my coauthor and I, Equibus Erasmus, offers probably a couple of pages worth or more of why the grounding objection doesn't work.

So I'm going to point my point, your listeners to that article too. They can also find an article that he wrote on free thinking ministries on that.

But if I don't even have time to say that, I'm going to say, yeah, I don't know how God knows.

I just know that he knows. I just know that he's omniscient. By the way, I don't know how God created the universe from nothing either, but I know

God's omnipotent. So we know that God's omnipotent and thus can create the universe from nothing.

And we know that God is omniscient and therefore knows the truth value to all propositions, including counterfactual propositions.

But the bottom line is this, when it comes to this car dealer thing, and I'll talk more about this grounding thing.

But when it comes to the car dealer thing, I would just say, let's be charitable and make a sincere attempt to properly understand what

Dr. Craig means when he offers a metaphor in order to make a hard subject easier to understand the lay person.

So that's all I want to say about the car dealer. But so yeah, let's get back to this.

I think we can do this with what White says, at least next on my notes here. I think this is an unsupported assertion that he said.

He said, so yeah, you have to have a creature to know what a creature is going to do.

All right, now this gets us into the grounding objection. And let me just say, the grounding objection is not one of my primary focuses of study.

I have colleagues that do laser focus on this. I think what I offer in my dissertation in my academic journal article,

I think it's sufficient to refute it or to at least not feel its force. But I have friends that go deep into those philosophical waters and some have written on the

Freethinking Ministries website. John Limonto, for example, is quite a bit on this topic.

Pardon me? I said, he's a very sharp guy. We've had some private conversations over Facebook Messengers.

He knows his stuff. Yeah, he's just like 18 years old and scary, way smarter than I'll ever be.

It's not fair, right? But when

White says you have to have a creature to know what a creature is going to do,

I think that's quite the claim, at least about God. This claim might be true regarding humans.

I don't think it's always true though, for example. I mean, I don't have a daughter, but I know that if I had a daughter, she would freely choose to sin.

So I know some things. Well, freely, you don't know libertarianly.

All right. Okay, well, bracket that. Let's assume for the sake of argument that she would possess libertarian freedom.

So I know if I had a daughter who possesses libertarian freedom, that she would freely choose to sin.

Maybe you don't like that example, but I don't even think that's the big issue.

Here's the big question. If you're gonna say, yeah, you have to have a creature to know what a creature is going to do, why think that's true regarding a maximally great being?

Why anthropomorphize and demand that this is the case for God? I mean, it's also true for humans that if we are going to create a house, we must use physical material that already exists.

But surely James White would admit that this is not the case for a maximally great being.

He can create ex nihilo out of nothing. I don't know how, but we know based on the

Bible and thinking theologically that of course God can create ex nihilo out of nothing.

He does not need previously existing physical material like humans do.

So surely if James White would agree to that, why would he anthropomorphize and then claim that since it's true for humanity, then it must be true for God.

Like I said, God can create ex nihilo out of nothing. So why can't God's knowledge operate in a similar manner?

And assertions don't cut it though. Arguments are required. And yeah, there's big debate out there.

But I'm just, at the end of the day, and I do know a minority of Christians who say, no, it's impossible for God to create out of nothing.

They say it's logically impossible. And so some will say there had to be preexisting material.

Others will say that idealism is true and that physical matter doesn't really exist. Well, I think we're justified in rejecting that.

And I don't think it's the same thing though, Tim. And I'm not saying you're wrong. I'm not saying it's the same thing. I'm saying, why can't it be similar?

Right, that's what I said. Why can't it operate in a similar manner? And so it is mysterious.

I don't know how God has the power to create out of nothing. And I don't know how God possesses his middle knowledge.

It could - But I affirm omnipotence and omniscience. Right. Well, it's possible that the idea is logically incoherent.

You have to admit that it's possible since you say it's mysterious. Here's the thing.

I think there's a lot - Okay, but it's not in the same vein as saying

God can create a married bachelor or a draw a triangle of four corners. There's no - Well, I'm saying, yeah.

You're arguing for a broad - You're not even arguing for it. You're asserting it might be broadly, logically impossible.

Well, all I'm saying is it seems to me, and I'm not saying that I'm right, but it seems to me that because God is a maximally great being and he's original, that I don't see how it's possible for him to create creatures that are completely, or at least in some sense, autonomous in their choice.

Maybe that's not what you're saying. Well, and White does this a lot too. We don't need to say autonomous.

What we're arguing for, let's stick with our definitions. Can God create -

I mean, I can give you a deductive argument that God has the ability to create, or that God has the ability to choose between a range of options, of alternative options, each compatible with his nature.

That's all you need to show that the concept of libertarian freedom is logically coherent.

So you don't see autonomy wrapped up in the idea - I don't like the word autonomy, and I think that creates -

Let's just stick with the definition, right? Time out, time out, time out, time out, time out, time out.

I have to say time out. That's like saying when - I remember we had a conversation a long time ago, and you might not remember, where you kept on using

God forces us. And I said, well, it's really not force. He's like, yeah, well, it's practically that. And I could have said, well, the force is not a helpful term.

But if you're convinced that that's what my view entails, then I think you have a right to use that word and show why you consider it that way.

In light fashion, the Calvinists, what I think - And I'm not saying that they're correct. I'm just saying that one of the things that bothered some

Calvinists is that when we do speak of libertarian free will, there seems to be, and I might be incorrect, there seems to be some notion how we understand autonomy, this kind of original choice and decision that seems to me underrived from God or in some way, or decrees or whatever.

And so maybe that's not the case, but that's what it sounds like. And it becomes a barrier in my mind to track with you.

And I'm not saying that's what it is. I'm saying I'm trying to track with you. And that idea is kind of creeping into the discussion.

Maybe it shouldn't be. Well, okay, I'll just say this. I mean, so to your first point, causally determined.

If God causally determined something, that's what I'm arguing against. And it seems to me that saying, if God causally determines me to raise my right hand, then he forces me to raise my right hand.

Now, you don't like that word. There seems to oppose us. There seems to assume in the word force that there's a struggle that I want to do one thing, but God forces me to do another.

No, no, I don't say that there has to be a struggle. You don't say that, but the word force seems to entail. Well, I'm saying that it's not necessarily entailed.

Okay. All right. So now when it comes to libertarian free will, I define that as the ability, just like God has this ability, the ability to choose between a range of options, each of which is compatible with our image of God nature.

Now, if one wants to say, well, that's autonomy. Fine. But what I mean by that, I mean, what

I'm going to argue for is God has the ability to create creatures who possess the ability to choose between a range of alternative options, each of which is compatible with our image of God nature.

If you say that means autonomy, fine. But do you think that autonomy is equal to my definition of libertarian freedom?

I don't know. I'd have to tease that out of it and think about it. Okay. So if autonomy equals my definition,

I say, fine, use it. But if there's any slight difference, then I say, get it out of here, because then it's the false conflation.

Okay. So now I don't see a false conflation between causal determinism and force, especially when you clarify and you're like, is there a struggle?

I said, no, it's not necessary. And so that's why I don't see a problem with using the word force, especially, you know,

I usually don't use the word force when I'm writing academically. I will write, I will use the word causally determined.

But in my head, that means force to me. And if somebody could show me why exactly that shouldn't follow.

So anyway, yeah. So I'll say it's a mystery to me as to how

God is omnipotent. It's also a mystery. I just know he is. And it's also a mystery to me how God is omniscient.

I just know he is. And we can use scripture to derive this. We can appeal to perfect being theology to derive this.

In fact, I've got an argument in my dissertation. It's on my website, too, if you want to go find it, where I argue that a maximally great being must possess middle knowledge.

And I go on to extensively argue why it's maximally greater to possess middle knowledge than not to possess it.

And I don't think you can run those arguments by saying, well, it'd be more maximally great to be able to draw a triangle of four corners.

I think that will eventually fall apart and show that's not a great making property. So anyway,

I point people to my website and my hopefully soon be published dissertation on that.

Let's see here. I'm going to skip a few things because how long we've been talking. It's been, it seems like it's an hour and 45.

So we do want to draw it to a close, not because I don't want it to continue, but because if it gets too long,

I'm not sure anyone, I'm not at that level yet. Like where I can put out a jumbo, a jumbo revealed apologetic.

We'd watch it. So I had a lot more I wanted to say, but man, you're just so much.

You're so easy to talk to. And we can just, we can talk about that. Let me jump to, let's see you.

I really appreciated this. And maybe you don't have me in mind. When I heard you ask me this,

I'm like, Oh, he's thinking of, of my favorite argument. Well, I spent the most time on the free thinking argument.

And, and you said, you asked Dr. White. You said, Calvinism is often associated with universal divine determinism.

I was thinking of you. I knew you would. Oh, that's awesome.

And, you know, you talked about, you know, that we're nothing but puppets on Calvinism and things like that. And then you asked, how would you respond to the idea that if this, you know, exhaustive divine determinism.

Yeah. By the way, I'm going to stop you real quick. And this might make you feel happy. I have to think about how

I would word it. And I don't think I'd be able to word it to your satisfaction because we're going to disagree over definitions. But, um, not that I disagree with Dr.

White's view in general. I did not find his response to my question as it stood in that conversation as persuasive.

I kind of, it kind of seemed, and I don't want to accuse him of dodging, but it seemed as though he dodged the import of my question.

And so I wasn't satisfied with how he responded. Although in a general sense, if we had a longer kind of more casual talk,

I probably would agree with his explanation. I don't think he gave a good one when we had a conversation there. I appreciate you saying that.

And I guess I don't really have to say too much because I'll say a little bit. But, uh, yeah,

I, I, I've listened to his response several times and it just, I don't even know, uh, what it meant.

Um, but you know, you, you asked him, how would you respond to this very common objection? Basically, you know, let me read it here.

He said, um, that you, if exhaustive divine determinism is true, you know, use that word.

But then he said, I think this is a quote here, then you cannot hold to Calvinism rationally since you've been determined to do that.

That really just has a self -refuting foundation that even if it were true, you couldn't know, you couldn't know it to be true because you've been determined all the way around.

And then he said, how would you respond to that very common objection? And so thank you for asking that question.

Uh, White's response was, well, it's common, but it's not well thought out. And that just, oh,

I mean, man, that irked me, man, because, uh, because I've got an entire master's thesis focused on this argument and a

PhD dissertation, um, which focuses on this from the same university that James White attends that demonstrates that this objection is actually thoroughly thought out quite nicely.

Well, there's a big difference between saying it's not well thought out and it's false. It's thought out, but false.

Yes, exactly. Make it look like people haven't thought about this question. Yeah. Yeah. So, you know, what, what

Dr. White offered is, uh, uh, refutations of this argument. He said things that it was just an emotional feelings -based objection.

And that if you push it back far enough, uh, what the person is saying is, and this is a quote, unless you have creaturely autonomy and no decree at all, there can be no reality to anything that God does in time.

That's fundamentally what is being said. And then White concludes, quote, that fundamentally destroys the reality and importance of the actions of Jesus and the incarnation.

And I just don't understand this. I mean, I would love to have him flesh this out more, but let's, uh,

I'll say that the free thinking argument that I've spent years and years now, I mean,

I think I first crafted it in 2011 or 2012, maybe, um, and I've spent the majority of my academic work focused on this argument now.

And the free thinking argument has absolutely nothing to do with feelings or emotions. Absolutely nothing. It's a logically sound, it's valid, it's structurally valid and the premises seem to be true that thus it's a sound argument.

So it's got nothing to do with feelings or emotions. And second, he brings up the incarnation of Christ, but it has absolutely nothing to do.

The incarnation has nothing to do with the free thinking argument. So let's quickly examine the arguments premises to see if it's based on feelings, emotions or Christmas, you know, the incarnation.

So, um, uh, and I won't give the whole thing. I'm just going to give the core of the free thinking argument.

It's not against naturalism, not against Calvinism. It's simply for libertarian freedom.

It says nothing about God, Christianity, Calvinism, open theism, atheism, naturalism, or any other ism.

So here's the core. It's a two premises in the conclusion. One, if humans are not free in the libertarian sense, they cannot either rationally infer or rationally affirm claims of knowledge.

Two, humans can rationally infer and rationally affirm claims of knowledge. Three, therefore humans are free in the libertarian sense.

So I'm sure that white will want to affirm the second premise. So the key premise is the first.

But with that in mind, think about this. If all of our thoughts and beliefs are always forced, there's a word causally determined upon us all the time, and we can never have chosen better thoughts and beliefs, then we are simply left assuming that our determined thoughts and beliefs are good, let alone that our beliefs are true.

Therefore, then we can never rationally affirm that our beliefs really are the inference to the best explanation.

We can only assume it. And that assumption would not be up to you either. It's simply completely out of our control.

So here's the significant problem for the exhaustive determinist, whether it be naturalistic or divine, right?

It logically follows that if naturalistic determinism or divine determinism is true, then determinists, or anyone else for that matter, cannot possess justification for their specific beliefs, which is traditionally and typically minimally required for knowledge, for claims of knowledge.

So one can happen to have true beliefs. However, if they do not possess justification for a specific belief, then their belief then would not qualify as a knowledge claim, at least traditionally.

So with this in mind, if one cannot freely infer the best explanation, then one has no justification that their belief really is the best explanation.

And without justification for a belief, any claim of knowledge regarding said belief seems to go down the drain.

And all we're left with is question -begging assumptions, which I don't think is, you know, it seems that knowledge goes down the drain here.

But obviously, humans possess the ability to rationally affirm claims of knowledge, as I'm sure

James White agrees. On his Dividing Line show, he's always offering claims of knowledge, right?

So to argue against this would affirm it, as one would have to offer claims of knowledge to the contrary.

And moreover, if one rejects the ability to rationally affirm knowledge claims, well, why should anybody listen to him?

Anyway, I know that White's not going to do that. So therefore, if that's the case, then libertarian freedom is possessed by humanity, at least when it comes to thinking things through, right?

Does James White have the ability to evaluate and judge one way or the other, if Molinism is the inference of the best explanation or not?

Note the range of options from which to choose. And if one doesn't have a range of options, then you're left in no epistemic position to rationally affirm your thoughts and beliefs.

So a short thought experiment clarifies my point nicely, I think. I'm going to substitute

James White in here to help. So suppose a mad scientist somehow got control of Dr.

White's brain. And so this mad scientist now exhaustively controls and causally determines all of James White's thoughts and beliefs all the time.

And this includes exactly what White thinks of and about, and exactly how

White thinks of and about it. So all of White's thoughts about his beliefs and all of White's beliefs about his thoughts are caused and determined by the mad scientist.

And this also includes the next words that will come out of James White's mouth. So here's a question for Dr. White.

How can you, not the mad scientist, rationally affirm the current beliefs in your head as good, bad, better, the best, true, or probably true?

Note the range of options from which to choose without begging the question. Good luck with that.

It's impossible. So then I just say replace the mad scientist with physics and chemistry or God or anything else.

And one has the exact same rationality problems, but for different reasons. However, since James White does possess the ability to rationally infer and affirm knowledge claims and to argue otherwise as to affirm it, well, then we know that at least

James White possesses the libertarian freedom to think and take certain steps while deciding what he ought to affirm and believe.

And since libertarian freedom seems to be metaphysically impossible if humanity is nothing but physical stuff, we can rationally infer that humanity is more than merely the physical, and we can start to get into the soul and the image of God and what that means.

So anyway, with all this in mind, notice what is irrelevant to the freethinking argument.

I've not made any appeal to emotions or feelings, only facts and logic. And also notice that this argument has nothing to do with Christmas.

And it also says nothing about five -point Calvinism. So you can still be a five -point Calvinist and affirm the freethinking argument, and affirm limited libertarian freedom like Greg Kochel does.

He's an ardent five -point Calvinist, but he's going to agree with me when it comes to the freethinking argument.

So you can be a—I really, I don't think Calvinists should appeal to exhaustive divine determinism.

They can appeal to determinism when it comes to salvation. I disagree with that personally, but I will gladly say maybe

I'm wrong about that and say, okay, fine, keep that. Keep your toolet. But don't—I don't think you should affirm exhaustive divine determinism.

I don't think it's biblical, and it definitely doesn't make logical sense of all the data, from biblical data to logical data.

And I really, not only does Kochel and Crisp and other well -known

Calvinists, Mueller, they will affirm that today, but I really do believe that Luther, Calvin, and Melanchthon and other

Reformers 500 years ago, based on their own words, and I've got their, like So stay tuned for that, but I really believe they would affirm limited libertarian freedom.

So the question is then, if you've got limited libertarian freedom, which follows from the freethinking argument, and I can use biblical data to support this too, start with 1

Corinthians 10, 13. At least Christians have to seem to have this kind of freedom. But if there's any kind of limited libertarian freedom anywhere, the question is, did

God know those free choices logically prior to His creative decree?

Was God surprised by it? And did God predestine these free actions?

So if God's not surprised by it, and if He knew logically prior to His creative decree from eternity past, and God still is sovereign and predestines it, then

I don't see any other way to do it besides Molinism and middle knowledge.

So all that, you know, sorry for just preaching a little sermon there. No, that's fine.

Okay, cool. I wanted to ask you as we're creeping up on the two -hour mark, I could talk about this all night long, but we want to keep it, this episode's going to be specifically for the nerds who want to go in.

We are big -time nerds, right? That's right, that's right. Do you feel that you have had an adequate opportunity to fairly lay out your position?

Yeah, I mean, I skipped a bunch of things I wanted to say, and some of the comments that White made,

I skipped over for the sake of time. But I feel pretty, I'm happy with this, and I think it's a good place to start.

People disagree with me, at least start here, and we'll see where it goes.

Right, and I'm glad you said that, because the fact that you feel that you had a fair opportunity to kind of lay out the basic,

I mean, obviously you can't cover everything. That means that it's mission accomplished, right?

Yeah, right. It's not all, and I gave a little pushback, only because I had questions on the spot.

Well, you're a good host. A good host has to do that a little bit, right? I think there is great value in having the ability to listen without the immediate desire to respond, so that you could just hear the case laid out.

And at the end of the day, you know, you guys listen to this podcast, and I'm sure there are people who probably listen to it more than once, even though it's going to be a little over two hours.

You come at the end of your rope, and you say, yeah, I don't know if I buy that. You know what? Mission accomplished, and I think you agree with that as well.

But as long as you've had a fair opportunity to lay those issues out, you obviously are someone who's committed to upholding

Christian truth. It's just because we differ on this issue doesn't make you a heretic or someone who's putting the philosophy of man before, you know,

God. Listen, we come on different, we end up on different sides of the fence on this debatable issue with the household debate.

And, okay. I'm not a Calvinist. I'm a

Molinist. Okay. Yeah, let's go out. Let's go out and evangelize people in the street.

Let's go share the gospel. That's right. That's right. So, again, and that's not to minimize the importance of the issues.

Obviously, I hold my position with conviction, just as you hold your view with conviction. But we need to be able to desire unity over unnecessary division.

Yeah, there's some things that are necessary. Right. And this isn't one of them. Yeah, it's important.

But I don't think it's an issue that we, you know, that I'd kick you out of the kingdom and vice versa.

Right, right, right. So, with that said, if you guys are interested in looking at some of Tim's articles, which

I mean, I'm a Calvinist and I'm a presuppositionalist in my apologetic methodology.

I have some debates on my podcast episodes. If you're interested in seeing how that works out and how it differs from a more classical approach, you could have listened to some previous podcasts, the three or four debates that I've done.

I'm coming from that perspective. I still can say without shame whatsoever that I greatly benefit from my classicalist brothers and what

Tim puts out on his website. When he goes over some of those issues, I think he does a wonderful job.

And I think it would be foolish for someone who identifies as a presuppositionalist to see literally no value in bailing yourself of the material that some of our classical brothers have and vice versa.

So, check it out. Freethinkingministries .org,

is it? Dot com. I think both will get you there. Yeah, dot com. Is there anything else that you'd like to say before we close?

I just really appreciate this conversation, Eli. I think you're making some waves for God's glory in this world.

I really love you as a brother. I respect you as an academic, as a Christian thinker.

And you sharpen me like iron. And I got your back. I got your back, brother. Thank you.

Well, I've seen those pictures of you with the going out and shooting. I'm glad you got my back. You're much tougher than I am.

It's all a show. It's all a show. All right. Well, I'm going to stop the recording here, but you can stay on.