Reforming Free Will

Introduction to the Book and the Interview Topic

Welcome back to another episode of Revealed Apologetics. I'm your host, Eli Ayala. And today I have a special guest. We're going to be discussing a book entitled Reforming Free Will by Paul Helm. And so I am delighted to have Paul Helm on today.

And so I'm looking forward to jumping into that topic. Now I know how live discussions go. We need to wait until folks are able to listen in. And so I'm just going to begin this episode just giving folks some reminders with respect to what's going on with Revealed Apologetics.

And so I just want to draw people's attention that it is, I think, four or five days away. I think June 1st is four or five days away. So if folks are interested in signing up for PreceptU, which is an online course that I teach on presuppositional apologetics, you can do that on my website, revealedapologetics .com.

And of course, if you look through some of the past videos on my YouTube channel, I give a kind of brief tutorial and summary as to how to sign up and what is specifically covered in that course. So if you're interested in that, definitely get yourself over to revealedapologetics .com and there's still time and space to sign up for that course.

All right. Also, I have dropped a couple of videos and there'll be some other videos coming out briefly, some short videos that summarize important and interesting facets of apologetics. They're in a more digestible format, five minutes, six minutes, 10 minutes.

I know some of my interviews and discussions can go pretty long. So I'm definitely trying to cater to those with a shorter attention span or folks who don't have time to kind of dive into some of the deeper discussions.

So definitely want to check that out in the next couple of days and couple of weeks. All right. Well, without further ado, I would like to introduce Paul Helm on the screen with me. How are you doing, Paul?

I'm well, thank you very much. Thank you. How is your life with you? I'm sorry? I'm pleased to be with you. Well, I'm pleased to be with you as well. And I'm very appreciative of the fact that you're probably a very busy guy.

And so I thank you for agreeing to come on.

Are you busy these days? I do. I'm doing a lot of little things at the moment. And so I have a list.

A lot of little things. That's still, you could still be pretty busy with a lot of little things. You add them up. They become one. I'm finding that. All right. Very good. Well, I just want to let folks know a little bit about who you are by reading some kind of just basic summary stuff about who you are and what you've done.

So for those of you who don't know who Paul Helm is, Paul Helm is a reformed British philosopher and theologian. You will know that he's British from his awesome accent. Okay. He taught at Regent College, having served as the first incumbent of the J .I. Packer Chair of Theology there from 2001 to 2005.

And he also served as Professor of Theology at Highland Theological College, Scotland, from 2007 to 2010, I believe. Okay. He's written many works, which are too many for me to just list off. But as it relates to this specific episode, I do want to mention his book, Reforming Free Will, A Conversation on the History of Reformed Views on Compatibilism from 1500 to 1800s.

And here's kind of a brief summary of that. This can be found on Amazon. You guys could order the Kindle version for 7 .99. That's pretty reasonable. And the paperback for 18 bucks or so. Okay. It says here in the summary, in the light of what powers and faculties are human beings responsible individuals in every day, in his theological, historical, and philosophical examination of reformed Orthodox views of free will and divine sovereignty, Paul Helm considers determinism and compatibilism and their historical development between 1500 and 1800.

He graciously tackles the views of Richard A. Muller and Antoine Vos to argue that compatibilism is deeply rooted and represents the mainstream understanding of the reformers conviction on the matter.

Okay. Now, I wanna begin this interview with my first question is, why did you write this book, Reforming Free Will? Why is this topic important? And what is kind of the nature of the discussion in your field with respect to this topic?

Thank you. Well, there is a story to the book, to generating the book. And that's a kind of personal side. I'm very, I'm a fan of Richard Muller, Muller's. And I've learned a lot from him and he's a friend of mine.

And I think he's a wonderful scholar in the field of reform scholastic theology and everything that impinges on it. But he has what I think is a weird view of free will. There's everything else is okay, but not that.

Okay. Well, I must say also on this personal topic or personal side of things, that I'm not aggressive as a person, I think. I don't, if somebody disagrees with me, they will, and has an argument against me, then they're entitled to hold it.

And who am I? So I'm a great advocate of the freedom of information and all that stuff in philosophy. And so I've tried in this way in the book to be a sort of conversation, as I put it in the title, a kind of gentlemanly kind of interaction.

And well, it wasn't an interaction because he didn't actively speak to the book. And I don't think I've convinced him, but I've learned a lot, as I say, with it. It's partly, that partly mirrors my career, really.

I was first and still first and last a philosopher. My first job was to be a pure philosopher in a university that had a very small faculty. Philosophy department. And so you had to give your hand at various courses and be prepared to take your turn at a new course.

If somebody went off on leave, it showed as it were in the department. And it was only when I got a post in King's College London, as the professor of the history and philosophy of religion, that I turned, though a Calvinist, I wasn't a sort of professional Calvinist in that sense.

And I got my interest in the philosophical background. Sure. To theologians and to theology. And I started off with Calvin and I've had other goes in the intervening years, four or five now books, I think.

And that was also part of the, why a book of this sort is of interest.

The Problem of Free Will, Determinism, and Human Responsibility

Sure. Now, again, free will is a hot topic, especially in the popular arena. I mean, I'm sure, I mean, there have been multiple books written at the scholarly level, but at the popular arenas, the debates between Calvinists and Armenians and Malinists and all the views in between, why do you think this topic of free will is such a hot topic?

And why do you think it's an important topic to address with clarity from, say, the reform perspective?

Well, it's interesting theologically and difficult, I think, for this reason, that there is no revealed doctrine of human nature. I mean, there are, of course, how it crossed up in soteriology, but people do not have, well, you have to buy induction, really, and we're taking some care to wonder what the nature of man is from the scriptures.

So would you say, so that with respect to scriptures, we're told about the nature of man, but the ins and outs, we need to use some kind of philosophical reflection to say, well, what does the scripture mean by this particular concept?

Or what's an entailment of, say, something like total depravity or something like that?

Yes, and even the equivalent of an adjective like natural and nature, these also are very ambiguous and kind of spongy kind of concepts. I don't know how many senses there are to nature, natural, but a lot, a lot, and likewise unnatural and able and enabled and so on.

So I think the reformed theological doctrine of, well, you might have to say, you know, anthropology, they're the kind of poorer and it's a less developed area of theology than the doctrine of God. Sure, sure.

In under-reformed auspices, as it were.

Sure. Now, you mentioned that Muller has a strange view, and so you wanted to address his strange view on free will. What is Muller's position on free will?

Oh, well, yes, he's an indeterminist, but a kind of scholastic indeterminist. Okay. Okay, and that's how it comes at the end of this book. And I'm genuinely puzzled by what he says about his views. And you see the part, talking about words, when I started with him talking about these matters, he said he would not use the word compatibilism because it is anachronistic.

Okay, and he's a very strong anachronist, as it were. And so I could not use, in my defense, the directly compatibilism. So I had to take a more generic kind of determinism than compatibilism, which is relatively modern.

And there was not in the English language until the 18th century, any word with ISM at the end. Okay.

So the terminology of compatibilism is anachronistic, but you would believe that the concept is something that goes back to kind of, how would you say? So you say that it's not completely anachronistic, the concept itself.

Sorry. That's okay. So how It's a 19th century word, a late 19th century word, I think, with Russell and so on, I think. But of course, it's grown in appeal in the 20th and 21st millennia.

Sure. Now, why don't you define compatibilism? I realize we haven't defined it, although folks can get a fuller discussion of this if they're interested. I had two episodes, two hours each with Guillaume Bignon where we talked about compatibilism.

And Michael Preciado, we talked about compatibilism and free will. So folks can definitely check out that interview for some kind of introductory terminology and then going deeper here. But now for folks who are just listening in and perhaps haven't seen those past episodes, Paul, how would you define compatibilism?

Well, it's a form of determinism. Okay. In which, in addition to the mechanics of determinism, it also has a place. It meets the objection to necessitarianism, as it used to be called, determinism, that such a person cannot be responsible for their actions.

So you get a theory of action and you get a theory, a sort of moral side to this, that for a compatibilist, if you're ticking well as a compatibilist, then you are in a state where the actions that you have, which are not the result of compulsion, but the result of co-action or something like that, you are responsible for.

Yes, go ahead. Well, now how have you avoided some of the common objections? I hear a lot of people say, for example, well, compatibilism is just determinism. And if determinism is true, you're not responsible for the evil that you do.

It's God who's determined it, has decreed it. We're kind of just robots. How would you avoid, I guess, the pressure of those sorts of objections?

Well, I don't think I can directly deal with them, but I like to think that we have to take a sort of at a tangent argument by saying we are necessarily creatures and we have been made, we've been created, and we all have DNA and all that.

And if one presses the objection, you come to the rather fatuous thesis of some determinists that they can't ascribe responsibility for anything to determinism. And so I would have to mount an argument like that, a sort of infinite regress of some sort of fatuous examples.

So perhaps I could rephrase the question a little bit. If someone were to say, for example, like when we affirm compatibilism as Calvinists, and we say, for example, that human freedom and responsibility is compatible with determinism, okay?

And someone says, well, I hear Calvinists say that, but how is it compatible? It doesn't seem compatible. How would you kind of help someone along the way in understanding, well, there is no compatibility here.

You can be determined and sufficiently free and held responsible for your actions.

Well, psychological data are important here. You're not being compelled, you're not being blackmailed, but you're coming to an action in the paradigm case through having time to come to a course of action and your desire to enter that course of action.

And so it's a kind of, there's a kind of paradigm sort of beyond the freedom of which is not easy to imagine. Okay. And particularly so because, particularly important because when people offer indeterministic alternatives, then they also have a big problem with, in my way of thinking, a big problem in their ways of thinking because it's very like randomness.

So it's a kind of two-block way.

Sure, sure. So if some determinism is not the case, then it seems that the other option would be a kind of an unwarranted randomness going on where it's not really, our choices aren't rational because they're just kind of produced from kind of a sort of randomness.

Is that what you're getting at? Yes, indeed, indeed. Okay. Yes. All right. All right, well, let's take a quick look at a quick question from one of the listeners here. J Wise asks, how do you balance teaching a compatible view and teaching someone to come to Christ and repent?

What if they just claim I come to Christ or I don't? It's up to God anyways, right? So the idea is, well, if God predestined me to hell, then I can't do anything about it. So it doesn't really matter.

It's not up to me.

How would you speak to something like that? Well, what it shows straight away is that the arguments for determinism go very nicely with predestinarian theology. And there are, as it were, millennia of things which we are given in our makeups that are in a similar state.

And in any metaphysical view of agency, there is nothing that is sort of completely free of problems but problems of a particular kind.

Predestination, Desire, and the Difference Between Sovereignty and Fatalism

Yeah, but you would say this isn't a problem for the reform perspective, right? Perhaps you can tell me if I'm on the right track. So if someone were to ask me, how do I balance this idea of compatibilism and teaching someone to come to Christ and repent?

And the person's like, well, it doesn't matter anyway. Couldn't we say that it does matter in the sense that what the question seems to be assuming is kind of a sort of fatalism, kind of a fatalistic view.

Perhaps you can kind of tease apart the difference between, say, a reformed understanding of sovereignty and how that works with salvation and this idea of fatalism.

What's the difference there when someone tries to conflate the two? Well, to take the theological or the religious side of this, I mean, along with the doctrine of predestination in the Christian revelation, you have the need for desires of a certain kind.

And the question for you, mister, is what are your desires? Don't go back into eternity, but let's stick it, you know? And the New Testament is such that we get all sorts of data on the preparation, if you like, and conversion, and my attitude of penitence, and so forth.

So these are, as it were, everyday states of affairs, whereas predestination, you go into the eternal decrees of God, and it's not a good thing to start with the eternal decrees of God. And there's a good reason for thinking they're, as it were, not available to us other than in speculation.

And whereas these other everyday states of affairs, or conditions, or qualifications, however you want to put it, they're much more manageable. Okay, all right. Sorry. That's okay. Yes. Did you want to follow up?

Just that if you want to start on this matter, then they're accessible to us, whereas speculation about the eternal gods goings on are not. Gotcha.

Calvinistic Soteriology and the Golden Chain of Romans 8

All right, well, let's take a little shift then to, I mean, your focus in your studies is, you know, Reformed theology, Calvinism, philosophy, all these sorts of things. Let's narrow down the discussion with respect to Calvinistic soteriology.

Why don't you summarize for folks, what does it mean when we speak of Calvinistic soteriology? What does that phrase mean? And perhaps you can Oh dear, big words. Yeah, well, okay. I'm a Calvinist.

I'm a Calvinist. Paul is a Calvinist. And that has specific application to issues of how we view salvation, how that works. Why don't you summarize? What is that? What do we believe as Calvinists with respect to how God saves individuals?

And why do you hold to that position yourself?

Well, I hold to that position because it makes best sense of the data of the scriptures. So if you think of Paul's famous golden chain in Romans 8, there you have a kind of series of concepts linked to people who have instances of them.

So that would be a chunk of soteriology. Starting at the other end, if you like, in terms of the effects of sin upon the human mind and will.

Total Depravity, Total Inability, and the Effects of Sin

Okay. Now, when we speak of the effects of sin upon the mind, this often relates to, okay, so you have total depravity, right? That sin has affected all of what man is and all of his parts, his thinking, right?

We can speak of like the noetic effects of sin, the effects of sin upon the mind. How does this relate to what some people call total inability? So what is the difference there between total depravity and total inability?

Well, the word total is really an extension word, not an intention word, okay? So it's total in the sense that the totality of the aspects of our personalities, we were talking a moment ago about different, what scholastic people called faculties.

Oh, I've missed my thread now. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha. You want me to repeat the question again?

Yes, try again if you don't mind. Ha, ha, ha, ha, we'll give it another try. Okay, so what's the difference between total depravity and total inability with respect to say the effects of sin upon our minds and our wills and things like that?

Well, I think that they're related, but I suppose you could make more of inabilities as being causal and a depraved nature as being an effect of one's inabilities. Because they fail, let's say, one of my failures is that I'm dishonest.

And I filter the cash whenever I can and put my hand in somebody else's pocket and so on and so on, all that. The consequence of which is that I have habits and patterns of behavior that I can't get out of.

They become deeply in inroaded into my psyche or part of my psyche. And that would be an instance of a very obvious case of depravity. Sure, sure. So there's the law, you see. There's the law and there's other modes in which an undefraved person, that respects.

The Natural Man, Common Grace, and Moral Inability

Okay. Now, when we speak of total inability and total depravity, that obviously has, it's related to the issue of what the natural man, the unregenerate man is able to do with respect to moral choices and things like that.

So why don't you unpack for us briefly, maybe what is the Calvinistic understanding of the ability of the natural man? Because this is a big issue in a lot of these debates. We'll say something to the effect that the natural man can do no good.

But then you have examples in the Bible where it seems as though you have unregenerate men doing things that are good. And then after that, maybe we can tie it to the issue of the act of choosing Christ.

Can the natural man do that? We'll talk a little bit about that, but perhaps you could address that first point if you can. Yes. What can I say about that? Again, I've lost the thread. I'm sorry. I'm an old man.

That's okay. Yeah, no worries. I was saying, let's see if you could unpack for us the Calvinistic understanding of the ability or lack thereof of the natural man. So for example, the scripture says there's no one who does good.

So we usually speak of the man who's totally depraved. He's unable to do what's pleasing in the sight of God. What is the nature of the ability of the natural man from a Calvinist understanding?

The ability, not the inability, but the ability.

Maybe you could speak to both of those. What is he able to do and what is he not able to do with the natural man?

He can positively because of God's common grace and restraining mercy and all these other categories. Have the opportunity to, and he may be partial in a very striking way to a person's makeup. He can be in certain matters depraved and have an inability, but can have a normal kind of pattern of behavior in other areas.

Okay, all right. We have a I suppose the total depravity would mean that if we take that adjective as a sort of adjective of extension, then there may be less or more areas in which I'm, it's like a disease, a disease as it affects both my limbs or just one of my limbs.

Sure, sure. All right, thank you for that. There's a couple of other questions that folks are sending in. We'll see if we could address them briefly here. Hunter asks Genesis 6, 5, and I'll read the passage for you just to make sure you know what's going on there.

But Genesis 6, 5, the Lord saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth and that every intention of the thoughts of his heart was evil continually. So the question is this, do you think Genesis 6, 5 is explanatory and definitive of the will of man indefinitely or only of the populace pre-flood?

I'm not sure if you understand the question.

Does that make sense to you? Well, I think that Genesis 6 verse, as of course, has a context. Okay. And it's like Sodom has a context. So one has to interpret, one has to interpret the text in terms of the context or the era, perhaps it would be better in the case of post this business in Genesis 6, 5.

Sure, so it seems as though he might be asking, let's say, for example, total depravity and the intense of man's heart is wicked, right? We would say that that's the state of all unregenerate people prior to the flood.

I mean, once Adam sins and has children, the totally depraved state and the state of being totally unable to do that, which is pleasing to God, independent of say his regenerative work, that's the state of all men after the first sin.

Am I correct there? Yes, that's right.

But yes, that is, or at least it was, it's a good example of the definition of, or the characterization of.

So we would, so in answer to this question, would we say therefore that if Genesis 6, 5 speaks of the intentions of the wickedness that was in man was great and every intention of his thoughts was evil continually, would we say that that is just characteristic of those pre-flood sinners or is that characteristic of all unregenerate people?

Well, in some description, yes, Genesis, it is true of us all. And we might even go further than that, perhaps confuse things, but even the regenerates have the remnants of their beginning there earlier, depravity, total depravity.

And you might say that regeneration brings the powers and the opportunities to come with inroads into that totality.

Frankfurt Cases and Libertarianism

We have another question from The Free Thinker. This might be a little more, for those who are listening, might not understand the context, but perhaps Paul will. Maybe he won't, we'll see what happens.

But here's a question from The Free Thinker. What do you say to those who claim that blockage Frankfurt cases do not contradict libertarianism? And if there's any question that seems way too big to address here, we can pass them, that's completely fine.

But if you think you could take a stab at it, you know, go for it.

No, I think we'll leave that if you don't mind, because it's sort of, it's targeted on a rather unusual minority.

No worries, no worries. Now, here's another thing. I heard, I won't mention this individual's name, but I heard someone try to explain the Calvinist understanding of salvation. And they were comparing it to, say, non-Calvinist views.

And I'm sure you've heard this example. They'll say something to the effect that you have the sinner, right? The sinner is at the bottom of a well, okay? Now he can't get out of the well, because he's in the well.

I mean, he's like, help me, somebody get out, you know? And what God must do is throw down the rope, okay? And so when the rope drops down, the sinner is unable to climb the rope himself, because to do so would be to, you know, you're saved by your own ability.

I have to be able to climb the rope. And someone will say, well, that's not the issue. The real issue is Christ has to go down and take you and climb, you know, help you up and climb the rope himself with you on his back, you know?

But they describe the Calvinist view like this. Well, the Calvinist view believes that when you're holding onto the rope, okay, to even let go of the rope is, I hope I'm summarizing this, to let go of the rope is considered a work.

And so you're not even able to let go of the rope. Would you think that's an accurate description of the Calvinist view of how that works?

I mean, it is, and it isn't a work. I mean, it's a work in some senses, but it's just the kind of the language and the way of characterizing it is exaggerated. It's not the only factor. It's a sort of enjoying the grace of God is not just like one thing, but it's a multiplicity of things in the life of a person.

And not only the rope, but the food and the air and so on. These are all, you might say, these are all natural illustrations of what can be a grace of God in the regenerate personality.

Do you even think though, that the idea of God throwing a rope down a well is even a good example as to explain how salvation works? I mean, why shouldn't Calvinists frame the whole issue that way? And I don't think Calvinists do.

I think a lot of non-Calvinists do, but why is that kind of the wrong context in understanding how salvation works?

Well, you can make the thing dramatic if you like, like Charles Wesley's hymn, you know, about my chains fell off. My chains fell off and I went out of the prison and I was free. And that's a very good analogy because you have a capture of, again, we've got inability and then you have suddenly the grace of God comes, but it may not be sudden, but it is in the hymn and delivers, or partially delivers him on that occasion.

Limited Atonement, Perseverance, and Assurance

Now, let me ask you a question.

I'm interested in this, is when you became a believer, did you adopt Calvinism later on or when you became a believer, you were a Calvinist?

No, I think it would be fair to say I didn't get the whole business because I think it's complicated. But I was convinced that Christ did not die for everybody. That was something that was very striking in my teenage years as a teenager.

Yeah, that would be in reference to say something like limited atonement, which I think is interesting because a lot of people will say, out of all of the say, if we were to speak in terms of like the five points, right?

Yes. And we can cast aside kind of the, you know, a lot of people don't like the terminology, you know, total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible. We can argue about the proper phraseology as to what would best represent that.

But be that as it may, most people will say that the hardest thing to accept about the five points of Calvinism is limited atonement. And quite frankly, I don't think that's true. What you just expressed there, when you were convinced that, you know, the atonement wasn't universal in that sense, that came across really clear to me.

It seems clear, notwithstanding even those universal texts in, you know, in scriptures. What I found the most difficult was irresistible grace. Yes. So on your view, what was the most difficult out of, and within the context of kind of the five points, which one for you was the most difficult one to accept when you were first originally working through, you know, those sorts of ideas?

Well, I think that perseverance really, because it's sort of, it's less public somehow. You can go to the New Testament and find plain texts which establish the sort of atonement Christ procured. But perseverance can be, and its identification, it sometimes can be tricky, and perhaps be, well, you then are involved in self-examination and the signs and the fruit of the spirit and so forth.

So it's a highly personal part of Sure. Yeah, absolutely. Whereas you're talking about the objective procurement of what he has said to accompany. Now, how would you understand, and I just got a few more questions.

I think you're doing a great job.

I really appreciate it. Ha ha ha. But let's touch on that whole issue of the perseverance. Now, a lot of people will criticize the Calvinist perspective saying, well, if Calvinism's true, if Calvinism's view of salvation is true, then we really can't know for certain that we're of the predestined.

So where does the believer's comfort and assurance come from when they adopt, say, a Calvinistic understanding of how salvation works?

Yeah, well, you have data again. We're going around in circles a little bit. We're touching the same kind of point. You know that you pass from death into life because you love the brethren. And there are tests of life in one John, I seem to remember, that you can extract from one John and you can have a tick.

You can have a tick. Tick them off. Or not, as the case may be. Well, there are tests, you know. What was it said of Paul? Well, he had a rather extraordinary conversion, but he prayed. He prayed very quickly.

And the idea that you are dependent for the grace of God, and prayer is efficacious to a degree. It's not just, it's just a sort of make-believe that is part of a Christian life. Sure, absolutely. All right, thank you for that.

We have another question. I think it's Asan, Asan Marcello. I do apologize if I mispronounce that name, but he's asking, can Dr. Paul Helm flesh out the distinction between moral versus physical inability?

And why is the one a target of moral responsibility and the other not? Do you understand the distinction there? So you have moral inability versus physical inability. I mean, we're physically able to do all sorts of things, but morally, the natural and regenerate man is unable to do certain things.

So do you think you could flesh out that distinction a little more? Me?

Yes. Yes. Well, there are obvious gross physical inabilities which limits a person's life physically. But there are states where, a person puts up a resistance to what may be the overtures presented to him by a preacher or a friend or a book or whatever.

And that would be a moral inability. Hmm.

Do you think that's the same thing, I guess, physically? I've never heard it in the context of physical inability. I always heard this sort of issue within the context of say, moral ability and natural ability.

So that we have natural abilities to do all sorts of things. I mean, I could raise my right arm, I can raise my left arm.

All I'm saying is that if you have one leg longer than the other, then you will not be able to do certain things. Hmm. Okay. Or if you lose your sense of smell, you're inhibited from doing certain things.

Sure, sure. As a result of this. But there are, they're come by the, I'm trying to think of those verses in John where Christ speaks to the Pharisees and about their inability as if it's because they give honor to each other.

And they're obsessed with that, getting on in that way. And he says, you know, you can't, how can you believe, he says, who take, you might not think that faith and that kind of inability are linked, but in Christ's teaching, they are.

But I've not got the exact wording of the text with me. Sure, sure.

Judicial Hardening and the Limits of Total Depravity

All right. I have one more question that I thought about. It's not necessarily directly related to what we're talking about, but it typically does come up. Is this issue for, this issue of judicial hardening and total depravity.

So I've often hear folks say, well, if man is totally depraved and unable to do that which is pleasing to God, then what's the point of him judicially hardening folks? If he didn't judicially harden them, they would just be off doing their sinful stuff because they're not regenerated.

So how could you speak to that very briefly?

Well, I'm a bit puzzled myself about this, this very harsh understanding of total depravity or that it can break down. I mean, holes can be drilled in it and so on. It's not a wall of iron or of armor that you're forever committed to, until what?

The grace of God can meet such a need if that's what you feel. So, well, you think, I mean, think of people who are converted. They might've been in a terrible condition, morally, spiritually, and the grace of God would cut them.

So, you know, Calvinism emphasizes the work of God in the heart of men and women. And we must present a rounded picture of it while simply, if you're simply interested in total depravity and what you can and cannot.

Well, of course, if it is total depravity and it is depravity, then you will get that kind of a, but thanks be to God, it's not, is it? In reality, it's not like that. From a wretchedness, a person can be saved, even if they're in a powerless condition.

Okay, well, thank you for that.

That was my final question. I might sneak in one at the end with respect to what's your favorite book that you've written and that you would highly recommend. One more. I'll sneak that. How about you address that one now?

And then we have one last question from our audience and then we'll wrap things up.

How does that sound? Oh, I don't mind the book question if that's what you want.

So that was. My question was, what is your favorite book that you've written and which one would you highly recommend to folks? I mean, it could be the one we were, we spoke about at the beginning or maybe some other book that you've written that you really enjoyed writing.